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STATEMENT OF THE CANDIDATE 
 
 
The title “Federal - State financial relations in India with 
special reference to the State of Gujarat”- A Legal study, is itself 
explanatory. Indian Constitution has not come out unscathed in the 
matter of the division of financial powers. An essential and 
fundamental feature of a federal Constitution is to find where the 
purse string lies and how the Constitution uses it. Present scholar’s 
humble effort is not only to discover the string of the purse but to 
have the control over the purse string to strengthen the financial 
status of the States to achieve more financial autonomy in their 
respective spheres, under the spirit of federalism which is the 
hidden character of our Indian Constitution. Present scholar has 
been able to discover new and useful facts in respect to the objects 
and scope of the research study. In this way the Present scholar not 
only contributes towards advancement of knowledge, but also 
includes the remedial measures to strengthen the federal financial 
relationship under the Indian Constitution by giving more financial 
autonomy to the States. 
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Preface 
 
 
Federal - State financial relations in India, constitute an 
important set of determinates in shaping the destiny of Indian 
economy in its diverse aspects and it is natural that they command 
a keen interest. Currently there is a good deal of dissatisfaction 
with the working of the Centre-State financial relations in India 
resulting in comments on the roles of the Central Government and 
the States. The Centre is blamed for betraying the trust reposed in 
it by the fathers of the Constitution. The States believe that the 
Centre has been unmindful of their interests in a welfare and 
developing society and that within the technical framework of the 
Constitution, there has been a policy of making the States 
increasingly dependent upon the Centre. Also the States are often 
blamed for lack of responsibility and indifference towards financial 
discipline and resource mobilization. All this denotes the 
desirability of having sound and stable Centre-State financial 
arrangements and ensuring satisfactory working thereof. 
In the light of the above, the present doctoral thesis, which is 
mainly based on the examination of the impact of judicial 
decisions on Centre-State financial relations in India, history of 
fiscal federalism and materials and data collected from reports of 
the various Finance Commissions, with special reference to State 
of Gujarat. 
 
 
 XIII 
It is a novel and systematic empirical research at legal side, 
aimed at an analytical presentation of periodical federal transfers. 
The review and objective assessment of Finance Commission in 
India (covering award period from April, 1952 to March, 2005) 
highlight the progress of financial federalism in India, and 
evaluates its impact on growth of decentralisation and increasing 
demand of the States for greater financial autonomy. Also a critical 
appraisal of the Finance Commission transfers has been made with 
an eye to rectify regional economic imbalances in furtherance of 
providing social justice. The other transfers to the States through 
Planning Commission and Union Ministers has not included in this 
research thesis. Present scholar being a Law student, the study of 
legal aspects of federal state financial relationship under provisions 
of the Constitution is confined only to judicial reviews and 
transfers through statutory body – Finance Commissions, 
The scholar will feel amply rewarded if her approach is 
found useful and fruitful.  
 
 
Pratima N. Sangani. 
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Chapter – 1 
 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
 
 
India, in the terms of the country’s Constitution, is a Union 
of States. The world federation does not occur anywhere in it. This 
may be due to the fact that the Center in India enjoys political 
power and is both politically and financially far stronger than the 
States. While a federation is an association of two or more States 
the member of the States of a federation have the Union (or 
Central) Government for the whole country and there are States (or 
regional) governments for parts of the country. In a federal set-up, 
there are at least two layers of government. The top most layer is 
the Central or Federal (or Union) Government and below lies it lies 
the layer of State Government. Each authority is virtually 
sovereign in its sphere and, cannot, in general, encroach upon the 
other’s terrain. The actual separation of powers may be spelled out 
in detail in the country’s Constitution or may be outlined 
specifically for some areas, leaving the rest to be built up by 
precedent, tacit understanding or periodical enactments. Thus, a 
federation is not static or a rigid concept. 
 
1. 1    The Concept of Sovereignty. 
 
Sovereignty was a doctrine developed at the close of middle 
ages. The concept of sovereignty as conceived by Bodin, Hobes, 
Austin and Salmond is marked by three important elements: -  
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1. Sovereignty within the State is essential – essentiality; 
2. Sovereignty is indivisible – indivisibility; and  
3. Sovereignty is illimitable – illimitability.  
 There is unanimity amongst jurists as to the point of 
essentiality in the State. However, the element of indivisibility of 
sovereignty has been negatived by the emergence of the concept of 
federal states in which power is divided between the national 
government and the governments of the constituent units. The 
element of illimitability is curtailed by the increasing adoption of 
written Constitutions. The old concept of unlimited sovereignty is 
yielding place to the new concept of limited government. In 
modern age, it is not an easy task to ascertain as to where does the 
sovereignty reside? It was easy to point out in 18th century, which 
conceived uncontrolled law-making power in British Parliament 
and legal unaccountability of the King or those who acted in his 
name. This tendency led to the conclusion that sovereignty rested 
in “some person or body of some persons.” Accordingly, 
Blackstone pointed out, “there is and must be in all (governments) 
a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, in which 
the fura Summi imperior the rights of sovereignty reside.” This 
idea of determinate body is negatived in modern era. For example, 
where does the sovereignty reside in Indian federal policy? 
Whether it resides in Parliament – no, because, Parliament is the 
product of the Constitution, which is supreme. If resides in the 
Constitution – it is doubtful because the Constitution is enacted by 
the people of India. Then, how to ascertain sovereignty in the 
people of India? These are unending questions. In the present age 
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sovereignty is used in its dynamic sense, i.e. adjustable to the 
changing structure of the society.  
   
1. 2    unitary   v/s   Federalism 
 
Unitary natured Indian Constitution bears the spirit of 
federalism. The title of the research study “Federal- State Financial 
Relation in India, with special reference to the State of Gujarat”- A 
Legal study, is itself explanatory. The question of federal financial 
relations arise only where the topmost layer is the Central or 
Federal (or Union) Government. The phenomenon of federal 
financial structure of any country not only reflects the prosperity 
and economic power of concerned country as a whole, but also 
through the light on the concept and nature of the Constitution of 
that particular country. How far the principles of federalism have 
been observed or followed in the fiscal relationship between the 
Union and States under the provisions of the Indian Constitution is 
the subject matter and theme of the present doctoral study. The 
purpose of this study is to examine what role the Courts-High 
Courts and the Supreme Court have played in Centre-State 
relations and in changed context of today, how far can the Court be 
expected to go for retrieval of the situation within present 
Constitution frame work. 
 
1. 3    Claim for Fiscal Autonomy 
  
Through the Constitution in 1950, India adopted a federal 
system of finance with all honesty, sincerity and dedication. The 
experience of the last fifty years has brought into focus some 
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points, which ask for greater fiscal autonomy of States. All the 
principles of federal finance have been in corporate in our system 
of devolution of fiscal resources between Centre and States under 
Vertical and Horizontal distribution of central taxes, but both the 
units have failed to observe fiscal discipline and control leading to 
the present crisis of fiscal imbalance of grave dimension. The 
present scholar’s motive behind the study of the subject matter is 
to find out the degree of fiscal autonomy given to the States, under 
the relative constitutional provisions of fiscal relationship. 
India, in terms of the country’s Constitution, is a Union of 
States. The word federation does not occur anywhere in it. This 
may be due to the fact that the Centre in India enjoys political 
power and is both politically and financially far stronger than the 
States. For instance, while in certain other countries the political 
entity and boundaries of a State cannot be tempered with, in India, 
Parliament can abolish a State, create a new one, change its name, 
and alter its boundaries or area. There are provisions for imposing 
the President’s rule in a State and enacting with respect to matters 
in the State List and enacting a law, which overrides a State law 
pertaining to a matter in the Concurrent List. The Indian federal 
government has exclusive financial powers up to the limit of 
proclamation of financial emergency under Article 360 of the 
Constitution. 
All these provisions imply that the Indian Constitution has a 
strong unitary bias, and for this reason it is often referred to as a 
semi-federal one. However, even then federal financial theory is 
relevant to the Indian case to a significant extent, since, inspite of 
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the sweeping powers enjoyed by the Centre, the Constitution 
assigns functions and financial powers to the two layers of the 
Government in a specific manner and lays down the nature of 
financial relations between them. 
The fact that there are no fixed criteria for delineating the 
federal-state financial relations, and that each country adopts its 
own set of rules and regulations, implies that there can always be a 
lack of unanimity regarding the exact form, which a specific 
federation should adopt. Union-State financial relations in India, in 
the same way, admit of sharp differences of opinion as to the 
specific provisions in the country’s Constitution to this effect. 
Moreover, the very dynamism of even a slow-moving Indian 
economy spells a growing complexity of the system with the 
passage of time and brings to the fore numerous issues and 
problems. A meaningful and enduring financial system should, 
therefore, be able to overcome such hurdles through its in-built 
flexibility and, if need be, constitutional changes.  
The adoption of specific Centre-State relations in India was 
not the result of any haphazard choice. It was the result of a long 
and cool-headed debate in which the experience of some older 
federations was also taken into account to avoid typical problems 
of a federal financial system. Still, actual working of the Indian 
Constitution was bound to run into difficulties since adequate 
safeguards could not be provided against all such eventualities. 
Sometimes it is claimed that the Centre has been following a 
policy, which pushes the States into a situation of financial 
stringency. The transfer of resources from the Centre to the States 
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is regulated in such a way that the States are forced into increasing 
their indebtedness to the Centre resulting in their indifference to 
their inefficiency and wastage in fiscal administration. Moreover, 
the Centre also tries to pre-empt the resource potential of the 
States. An example quoted in this connection is that of imposing an 
excise duty on generation of electricity and coal in the Central 
Budget for 1978-79 which had the repercussions of weakening the 
already poor financial position of the State electricity boards and 
contracting the potential revenue field for the State Governments. 
It is in the very nature of a dynamic economy to exhibit the 
need for adjustment in Centre-State financial relations. The pangs 
of such an adjustment will depend upon the responsiveness of the 
Centre and the State Governments as also their spirit of 
accommodation for each other. In India, however, the Centre-State 
financial arrangements have been subjected to only infrequent 
changes and the stress, and strains of the system have been allowed 
to build up over time. However, since 1977 the agitation for a 
revision of the whole set of these relations has gained a widespread 
hearing and sympathy, so much so, that the Government of India 
was persuaded to appoint the Sarkaria Commission in 1984 with a 
wide spectrum of terms of reference relating to Centre-State 
relations in India. 
In every Constitution institutional devices are provided both 
for checking abuse of power and for moulding the constitutional 
framework in the light of new experiences. Judiciary necessarily 
has an important role to play in this connection both in checking 
the misuse of power and moulding the future constitutional fabric. 
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But in India the framers of the Constitution provided for a system 
of Government in which the major responsibility for making 
necessary constitutional adaptation was entrusted to the care of 
Parliament and in some cases even to the Central executive. Even 
in the area of dispute resolution the jurisdiction of the Courts was 
barred in many types of cases. 
The long experience of the Indian polity first with unitary 
and then tightly federal colonial Government had greater effect on 
the scheme of distribution of financial resources between the 
Union and States, under the Constitution of India. The foremost 
distinguishing feature of fiscal arrangement in India is that there is 
no Concurrent power of taxation. The States and Centre have been 
given exclusive powers to impose taxes in their respective fields. 
State List and Union List under the Schedule Seventh of the Indian 
Constitution. The second feature of fiscal arrangement under our 
Constitution is that proceeds of many taxes put in the Union List 
are either exclusively given to the States or they are shared 
between the Union and the States, under the quinquennial reports 
of Finance Commission, under statutory provision of Article 280 
of the Indian Constitution. The constitutional provisions of Article 
245 and 246 define the relations between Union and States. The 
Article 265 also speaks that no tax shall be levied or collected by 
the authority of law, i.e. it defines competency of the authority to 
levy tax. The Centre has made the further fiscal arrangement for 
statutory grants-in-aid, discretionary grants and loan to the States. 
The canvas of the topic is very vast hence; it has been 
became necessary to select those areas, which are of focal 
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importance in Centre-State relations and where it can be envisaged 
that they can play some. For the purpose of this study it is 
necessary to examine that what role has been played by High Court 
in the cases of validity of Taxation Statutes, till today, and in 
change context of today, how far can the Courts be expected to go 
for retrieval of the situation within the present constitutional frame 
work. 
The whole study has been divided into eight chapters. After 
introducing the subject matter of study in this chapter, in the 
second chapter an attempt has been made to describe the history of 
evolution of fiscal in India. Third chapter is devoted to an 
examination of interpretative rules and doctrine, which are of 
special importance in the interpretation of the federal Constitution. 
Chapter four deals with the Article 265 in regards to provisions of 
Federal Finance and speaks for authority to levy the taxes under 
Indian Constitution. Chapter five deal with the impact of judicial 
decisions on taxing power of Union under the provisions of the 
Constitution under List one of schedule Seventh., while chapter six 
deals with judicial decisions respect to taxing power under State 
List.  Chapter seven examines the various reports of successive 
finance Commissions along with statistic data for Sate of Gujarat. 
Chapter eight concludes the study where a few suggestions have 
also been made. 
Since, the study relates to an evaluation of the impact of 
judicial decisions on Centre-State financial relations in India, it is 
the judicial decisions of the High Courts and the Supreme Court of 
India that constitute the major subject matter of the study. 
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1. 4    Methodology  
 
The present scholar being a research student of law-faculty, 
the legal aspects of the subject matter federal financial relationship 
has been justified under the review of the judicial decisions along 
with respective provisions of the Constitution and also tried to 
examine the recommendations of the relative Finance 
Commissions, for devolution of sharable taxes under the 
Constitution. The research study apparently touches the field of 
economic, the relative required static’s data derived from various 
Finance Commissions, specifically for the State of Gujarat have 
also included to justify the part of the title of research study. 
(a) The present research student’s long experience in field of 
advocacy has been utilized to go deep to the bottom of 
the subject to develop the insight of the subject. The 
eminent authors valuable books, on Constitution of India, 
political science and the research papers and articles of 
leading economist, and the volumes of Supreme Court 
decisions- Millennium 2000, has been thoroughly 
examined and evaluated. An attempt has been made 
towards advancement of the point, where it stands today. 
The scholar has tried to take in to account the entire 
literature on the subject to best of her ability, with help of 
inter-net information also. 
(b) The approach will mostly be descriptive. At times it will     
be critical and evaluative also. The scholar has also 
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visited the Finance Ministry of Gujarat, for the recent 
collection of data and details and has also met the 
Finance Minister Shri Vajubhai Vala, for the proper 
guidance in respect to the subject matter. 
(c) The scholar has conducted survey amongst the well 
informed, through questionnaire. The questions where 
standardize. The questionnaire consisted of fifteen 
questions. The sample consisted of five hundred well-
educated people from all walks of life mainly Lawyers, 
Professors of Law and Economics, Politicians, 
Businessman, Traders and Industrialists. Their responses 
have reflected in last chapter of the study.  
 
1. 5   Hypothesis 
 
It is not sufficient to have proper laws, but it is equally 
important to properly implement them. For realizing the spirit of 
law, efficient administrative, legislative and judiciary 
machinery/organ is essential. The experience of the last more than 
fifty years of working of the Constitution, has brought into focus 
some points, which ask for greater fiscal autonomy of States. All 
the principles of federal finance have been incorporated in our 
system of devolution of fiscal resources between Centre and States 
under Vertical and Horizontal distribution of Central taxes, but 
both the units have failed to observed fiscal discipline and control 
leading to the present crisis of fiscal imbalance of grave 
dimension. Hence, the present situation compelled to revise and 
review the existing present federal fiscal system of India. 
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1. 6    The Rationale 
 
 
 We know that questionnaire matter has, like all other 
methods, limited value and application, it cannot be used in every 
situation and that its conclusions are not always reliable. Because, 
very preoccupied, and aristocrat individuals do not reply, neutrally, 
Due to having some personal prejudices against the present 
constitutional system.  
 So far as the interview schedule and observations are 
concerned, researcher would remain faithful and keen. But after all 
being a human, she may have her own prejudices and conceptions. 
So the result of the analysis may not be cent percent correct to be 
relied upon. 
 
1. 7    Social Utility 
 
The healthy fiscal relationship will promote the welfare of 
the people and the States.  The healthy fiscal relationship can be 
achieved through the system of co-operative federalism.  The 
promotion of co-operative federalism demands the proper blending 
of the criteria of autonomy, fiscal discipline and inter-state equity 
so that a mutual trust and confidence between the Centre and 
States and also amongst State themselves are fostered.  
 
1. 8 Further Scope for Research 
 
The density of the relationship of federal finance cannot be 
evaluated only through the financial provisions of the Constitution. 
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As the subject matter touches the field of Economics and Political 
science, their help is required, and so, they have full scope to do in 
the same matter, from their angle and aspects. Broadly specking 
the federal financial relationship can be looked upon as a human 
body. Looked thus, head of this body is Union Government, heart 
of this body is the State, soul of the body is the Constitution, arms 
of this body is economics and politicians (political science) are like 
legs on which whole of the body moves. It has to be remembering 
here, that present scholar has tried to give justification to the work 
of head, heart and soul of the body; much has been left, untouched. 
Present scholar’s study of federal- State financial relation 
has evaluated on the impact of judicial decisions and Central 
revenue devolution to States on the recommendatory reports of 
various Finance Commissions. The Economics and Political 
science also have the greater roll to figure out the true structure of 
federal financial relationship, which has been left untouched for 
the concerned faculties. 
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Chapter - 2 
 
EVOLUTION OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 
  
The history of federal finance relations in India closely 
follows constitutional developments in the country. The very fact 
that the Constitution of India is the product not of a political 
revolution but of the research and deliberations of a body of 
eminent representatives of the people, who sought to improve upon 
the existing system of administration, makes a respect of the 
constitutional development indispensable for a proper 
understanding of Constitution of the Indian Republic. Basically, all 
the changes brought about in the Indian Constitutional system, 
until Independence assigned a pre-eminent position to the Central 
Government. This basic fact is also reflected in the financial 
powers of the Centre and the Provinces and their inter relationship 
over this period.  
 For the present purpose, it is not needed to go beyond the 
year 1858, when the British Crown assume sovereignty over India 
from the East India Company, and the British Parliament enacted 
the first statute for the governance of India under the direct rule of 
the British Government, The Government of India Act, 1858. This 
act serves as the starting point of the said survey because it was 
dominated by the principle of absolute imperial control without 
any popular participation in the administration of the country, 
while the subsequent history up to the making of Constitution is 
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one of gradual relaxation of imperial control and the evolution for 
responsible Government.  
Except for a brief period in early twenties, when the 
Provincial revenues were enlarged with the devolution of “land 
revenue” in entirely to them and the Province were required to 
make contribution to cover the Central budgetary deficits, it has 
been mainly the Central Government which has transferred 
resources to the Provinces to meet their expanding requirements. 
The evolution of federal financial relationship during the period 
1850 to 1950 is reviewed in the following paragraphs in its 
historical background: - 
2. 1  Financial Devolution [From 1850 to 1919] 
 
Up to the turn of the Century, India had a unitary system of 
Government under which the Viceroy as the representative of the 
British Crown exercised all authority. The Provinces had no 
revenues of their own and depended entirely on the Central 
Government for all their requirements. They had neither the right 
to tax and raise resources nor the power to undertake 
expenditutures on their own. For meeting expenditures on specific 
services, the Provinces were paid fixed grants called “Cash 
assignments” which were reviewed from time to time. 
This however failed to satisfy the revenue requirements of 
the Provinces. It is pertinent here to point out that though this 
process of decentralization commenced with Lord Mayo’s scheme, 
the problem of making change in the financial arrangements had 
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been agitating the minds of the rules ever since the taking over by 
James Wilson as the first Finance member in 1860. 
The Mayo scheme was further extended in 1871, when the 
Government transferred certain additional services to the 
Provinces, and a special donation of 200,000 Pounds was given to 
them so that they “may be able to inaugurate the plan successfully 
and to have as it were start.”1 The practice of a separate budget for 
each for each Province started and the services handed to the 
Provinces ceased to be incorporated in the Imperial Budget. The 
scheme faced criticism at both ends. The supporters of 
Centralization argued that it was too radical, while provincialisms 
averred that it was too conservative. 
In 1877, another step forward in decentralization was taken 
under Lord Lytton. All the remaining heads of expenditure, that 
were provincial in character, such as Land Revenue, Excise, 
Stamps, General Administration, Law and Justice were transferred 
to the Provinces. The main idea behind the transfer of revenues 
was that the revenue that had suffered in the past for want of 
proper vigilance would thrive under the fostering care of the 
Provincial Governments; but this argument did not, however, 
eliminate the practice of making lump sum grants to the Provinces 
to supplement their income and the usual scramble for getting the 
largest possible share in the distribution continued. 
In September 1881, a new resolution was made, in place of 
1877’s temporary nature agreements. In accordance to the fresh 
settlements made with the Provinces which last till the end of the 
century, it was settled that  “a certain proportion of imperial 
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revenue of each Province should be devoted instead of giving fixed 
sums to the Provincial Governments to make good their deficits” 
Thus, the heads of revenue that were essentially of Central 
Character – such as customs, railways, posts and telegraph, foreign 
exchange were wholly reserved as “ Imperial” while those of local 
nature e.g. Police, Education, Law and Justice, etc. were made 
wholly “Provincial” with a view to stimulate their interests in the 
collection than as a step towards making them self-reliant. 
By the end of the Century, evils of quinquennial revisions 
came on surface and the Provincial Governments vehemently 
opposed them. The supreme Government, therefore, in 1904, 
entered into contracts with the Provinces; under these contracts 
although the share of revenues assigned to Provinces was slightly 
lowered, it was fixed as a definite fraction – though different for 
each Province of the aggregate revenue.  The criterion underlying 
the new division of revenues was that the share of each Province 
individually and of all the Provinces collectively should bear 
approximately the same ratio to the provincial expenditure as the 
Imperial share of growing revenues bore to the Imperial 
expenditure. It was also decided that a proportionately larger share 
was to be given backward Provinces. These quasi-permanent 
settlements were concluded with all these Provinces by 1907. 
Thereafter, in 1912, Lord Hardinge made permanent settlements. It 
was hoped that permanency would give the Provinces an incentive 
for economizing their resources. But the First World War that 
broke out in 1914 disturbed the progress of decentralization. Thus 
from 1882 to 1907, there was a certain division of the sources of 
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revenue kept valid for five years at the end of which it was revised 
with a view to removing uncertainty and ensuring continuity, they 
were declared as semi-permanent in 1904, and permanent in 1912. 
This made the Provinces less dependent on the fluctuating grants 
from the Center. 
2. 2    Government of India Act, 1919 to 1935  
 
Prior to 1919, the Provincial Governments, for all practical 
purposes, were agents of the Central Government. The Mont ford 
Report – Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms dated 22nd April 
1918, which formed basis of Government of India Act 1919 was 
strictly speaking, marked the beginning of a new era towards 
financial autonomy. The Government of India Act, 1919, 
demarcated for the first time the field of administration into two 
distinct categories, Central and Provincial. This Act, which aimed 
at giving a certain measures of autonomy to the Provinces, 
dispensed with the “divided heads” of revenue and assigned 
specific heads of revenue wholly either to the Center or the 
Provinces. The Central Government retained customs, income tax, 
commercial stamps, salt and opium, while land revenue, excise and 
judicial stamps were given, in entirely, to the Provinces. Of the 
commercial departments, railways, posts and telegraphs were 
retained by the Center while irrigation was given to the Provinces. 
The Act introduced the system of “Diarchy” in the Provincial 
administration under which, while spending departments like 
education, health, medical and agricultural etc. (called “transferred 
subjects”) were looked after by the ministry responsible to the 
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legislature, the main source of income viz., land revenue and 
subjects like law and order, services etc. (called “reserved 
subjects”) remained under the Executive Council. Politically, this 
system was a failure. As this device of distribution resulted in an 
estimated central deficit of Rs.9.93 lakhs, the Provinces were 
called upon to meet contributions to the Government of India. 
2. 2.1    The Meston Award, 1920 
 
It was decided to assess the contribution of each Province as 
a percentage of the differences between gross Provincial revenue 
and gross Provincial expenditure, i.e. of the gross Provincial 
surplus. Later on, the question of Provincial contributions was 
referred to a “Financial Relation Committee”, headed by Lord 
Meston to advise on “the contributions to be paid by the various 
Provinces to the Central Government for the financial year 1921-
22 and modifications to be made in the Provincial contributions 
thereafter, with a view to their equitable distribution until there 
ceases to be an all-India deficit.”2 One of the main reasons for 
shrinking down of finances of Imperial Government were, that 
Transference of land revenue to Provinces left large deficits at 
Centre, and the additional spending power in the hands of 
Provinces came to them as a wind fall or a by-product of the 
constitutional change; and it was at the cost of Imperial 
Government whose finances had shrunk. The committee, therefore, 
considered it fair to give some relief to the Centre at least 
temporarily. 
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 The Meston Committee, while making the recommendations 
for initial contributions, made an important deviation from the 
principle laid down in the Montford Report. Instead of considering 
the expenditure, they adopted a new principle of “increased 
spending power” of each Province as a consequence of allocation 
of revenues. However, while applying the new principle, they kept 
two provisos in view: - firstly, the each Province must be left with 
a reasonable working surplus, and secondly, the contribution 
should not compel any Province to initiate new taxation. Another 
departure from Joint Report suggested by Meston Committee was 
in respect of division of stamps into judicial and general. The 
Meston Committee recommended that general stamp, too should 
be provincials so as to place the control and collected of both the 
stamps in the hands of the same agency. This would also remove 
the last “taint of a divided head”. 
 The scheme of initial contributions was severely and rightly 
too criticised by all sections as inequitable while Madras, U.P. and 
Punjab were required to contribute on an aggregate three - fourths 
of the total imperial deficit; the two richest Provinces Bombay and 
Bengal were to share only 12 per cent. Again while the Province of 
Bihar and Orissa Was totally exempt, an equally backward and 
poor Province of Assam having less increase in revenue than the 
former, was asked to contribute one-third of its increase in 
revenue. But committee defended it on the ground that the initial 
agreements which was transitional in nature, had necessarily to be 
conditioned by the then prevailing circumstances rather than any 
scientific basis.3  The Committee tried to make the scheme of 
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standard contributions stand on a more equitable and certain basis. 
“To do equity between Provinces,” they observed, “it is necessary 
that total contribution of each Province to the purse of the 
Government of India should be proportionate to its capacity to 
contribute”. According to them “Capacity of a Province to 
contribute is its taxable capacity which is the sum of the income of 
tax payers or the average income of its tax payers multiplied by 
their numbers.”4     
 Regards to the impact of Meston Awards, almost all the 
Provinces were critical of the settlement though for various 
reasons. The inequity of initial as well as standard contributions 
was amply proved by the fact that the system of Provincial 
contributions was discontinued before long. The entire amount of 
contribution was remitted in 1927-28, and the next year the scheme 
itself was abolished. 
 The inadequacy of the existing resources, both of the Centre 
and the Provinces, and a search for new items of taxation, led to 
the first systematic inquiry into the whole field of taxation by the 
Indian Taxation Inquiry Committee-1924-25. 
2.2.2    Taxation Inquiry Committee-1924 
  
The Committee recommended that general stamps and the 
excise duty on foreign liquors manufactured in the country should 
be transferred to the Centre. The Committee expressed themselves 
against giving the Provinces power to levy and administer an 
income tax as well as against the imposition by the Centre of 
surcharges for the benefit of the Provinces 
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2.2.3    Indian Statutory Commission, 1930 
  
The Indian Statutory Commission made the next important 
review of the Indian financial arrangements, in 1930. The 
Commission suggested that in order to meet claim of the industrial 
Provinces, a substantial part of the revenue from income tax should 
be assigned to the Provinces, while Super-tax should remain 
entirely central. The Provincial Governments were also to have the 
option of levying a surcharge on the tax collected on the incomes 
of residents in the Province limited to half the tax transferred to 
them as their share. The Commission also suggested that the 
exemption of agricultural incomes from income tax should be 
abolished by definite stages and whole of the proceeds of the 
taxation of these incomes should be assigned to the Province of 
origin. The Commission further recommended that a Provincial 
Fund be formed out of the proceeds of excises on such distribution 
among the Provinces on a per capita basis. 
 Then the problem of allocation of resources between Centre 
and Unit came up again for consideration by a sub-Committee of 
the Federal Structure Committee of the Second Round Table 
Conference, presided over by Viscount Peel.  
2.2.4    Peel Committee Report 
 
 The Peel Committee, 1931 suggested that all income-tax 
proceeds should be transferred to the Provinces on the coming in to 
being of the Indian Federation, but collection and administration 
should remain the responsibility of the Federal Government. Under 
the scheme drawn up by the Committee, federal tax revenues were 
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to be mostly derived from indirect taxation and any resultant 
federal deficit was to be met from Provincial Contributions which 
were to be extinguished in definite stages over a ten to fifteen years 
period. The Committee suggested the appointment of an expert 
committee to suggest allocation of the proceeds of the income tax 
between the Centre and the Provinces and the share of each 
Province in such proceeds. 
 In pursuance of this recommendation, the Percy Committee 
was appointed in 1932. 
2.2.5     Percy Committee Report, 1932 
 The Committee recommended that Corporation tax (Super-
tax on companies), tax paid by residents in federally administered 
areas and tax paid on salaries of federal officers should be retained 
by the Centre; of the remainder of the net proceeds of a Province 
should receive the amount of personal super-tax on the basis of 
collections from residents, an estimated amount of personal 
income-tax creditable to it, and a share on the basis of population 
of the tax on non residents, and undistributed profits of companies, 
both to be taken as an estimated percentage of the total collections. 
From the point of view of stability of Provincial budgets, 
Committee suggested that the share of income tax due to the 
Provinces should be reviewed every five years in the light of 
personal income tax for the previous quinquennium. For a 
transitional period, Provincial contributions were proposed in 
proportion to the share of income tax. The Committee further 
suggested that the Federal Government should have the power to 
impose a surcharge, for its own purposes, on any tax levied by it 
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for the benefit of the Provinces and that federal grants, if and when 
they become feasible, should be made on a population basis. 
2.2.6    Second Peel Committee  
 
The Second Peel Committee, proposed that the Federal 
Government should be entitled to a share based on the proceeds of 
heads of tax, which were not derived solely from the British India, 
such as Corporation tax, tax on Government of India securities and 
taxes on the incomes of persons not resident in British-India. The 
whole of the remaining proceeds from income tax were to be 
assigned to the Provinces. The Committee made the novel 
suggestion that while such proceeds would accrue to the Provinces, 
until sufficient time had elapsed for the development of new 
sources of revenue, the Federal Government should retain a block 
amount out of the Provincial share of income-tax. The Committee 
proposed subventions from the Centre to the deficit Provinces in 
approved cases and on certain conditions, to enable them to 
balance their budgets on the basis of providing for bare necessities. 
The Committee suggested that the exceptional difficulties of 
Bengal might be met by granting it some share in the revenue from 
jute export duty. 
2.2.7    White Paper on Constitutional Reforms 
  
The White Paper on the proposals for Indian Constitutional 
Reforms, issued by His Majesty Government in December 1931, 
contemplated that a prescribed percentage, not being less than 50 
per cent and not more than 75 per cent, of the net revenue derived 
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from taxes on income, other than agricultural income, except taxes 
on the income of companies should be assigned to the Provinces 
on a prescribed basis. It also proposed that the Federation should 
retain for the first three years a prescribed sum out of the 
Provincial share which would continued to be retained for a further 
period of seven years with a reduction of one-eight of the original 
sum in each successive year. Both the Federation and the 
Provinces were to have power to levy surcharges on income tax for 
their own purposes. 
 The white Paper proposals empowered the Federal 
Legislature by law to assign to the units the whole or part of the 
yield of salt duties, excise duties, other than those specifically 
assigned to the units, and export duties. In respect of certain taxes, 
including terminal taxes and death duties, while the power to levy 
the tax was vested solely in the federation, the proceeds were to be 
distributed to the Provinces; the federation having right to impose a 
surcharge for federation purposes. 
 The Joint-Parliamentary Committee on Indian Constitutional 
Reforms, 1933-34, agreed generally with the proposals in the 
White Paper. They left the Provincial share of Income-tax to be 
prescribed by an Order-in-Council, but could not visualise any 
prospect of the Provinces’ share of income-tax exceeding half of 
the net revenue from the Source. The Committee did not favour the 
proposal to empower the Provinces also to impose surcharges on 
personal income tax. The modified proposals relating to income 
tax and other matters were incorporated in the Government of 
India Act, 1935. 
 25
2.3     Government of India Act, 1935 
 
 Under the structure of financial arrangements embodied in 
the Government of India Act, 1935, the Central Government 
retained a strong financial control. While the Act, introduced 
“Provincial autonomy” it ensured that the Provincial Government, 
should not be allowed to go too far in financial matters. The Act 
accordingly, retained taxes, which were more elastic, under the 
Centre. Agriculture income tax was included in the list of 
Provincial subjects. The Government of India Act, 1935,devided 
the financial resources in to four categories namely:  
(a) exclusively federal; 
(b) exclusively Provincial;  
(c) certain taxes which were to be levied and collected by the 
Federal Government, but their receipts were to be handed 
over to the Provinces; and  
(d) certain taxes which were to be shared between the Provinces 
and the Centre. The Act, provided; 
(a). For the assignment to Provinces and the States which 
acceded in respect of the subject of income-tax of a percentage of 
the net proceeds of taxes on income other than agricultural income, 
except in so far as these proceeds represented proceeds attributable 
to chief Commissioners’ Provinces or to taxes payable in respect of 
federal emoluments; 
    (b). For the distribution among the Provinces and States of 
their share. The Centre was, at the same time, empowered to retain 
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for a period a sum out of the share of income tax assigned to the 
Provinces and federated States. 
 The Act provided that duties on salt, federal duties of excise 
and export duties, while levied and collected by the federation 
would if an Act of the Federal Legislature so provided, be assigned 
wholly or in part to the Provinces and States and be distributed 
among them in accordance with Principles to be formulated by 
such Act. The provision in the Act, in respect of export duty on 
jute laid down that one-half or such higher proportion as might be 
determined by Order-in-Council of the net proceeds of the export 
duty on jute and jute products should be assigned to the Provinces 
or federated States in which jute was grown in proportion to the 
respective amounts of jute grown therein. Provision was made for 
the payment of grants-in-aid of the revenues of such Provinces as 
might be in need of assistance, the amounts of such grants to be 
prescribed, however, by Order. 
 The Act further provided for the levy by Central legislation 
of duties in respect of succession of property other than 
agricultural land, stamp duties, terminal taxes and goods and 
passengers carried by railway or air and taxes on railway fares and 
freights and for the distribution of the net proceeds, other than 
those attributable to the chief Commissioner’s Provinces, to the 
Provinces and federated States, the federal legislature having the 
right to levy a surcharge on these taxes for federal purposes. 
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2.3.1    Niemeyer Enquiry Report 
 
 Sir Otto Niemeyer was appointed in 1936 to make 
recommendations on such matters which under the Government of 
India Act had to be prescribed or determined by Order-in-Council. 
The scope of the enquiry was made comprehensive by a 
supplementary reference to cover a review of the existing liabilities 
of the Provincial Government of the Centre. 
 In respect of income tax, Sir Otto Niemeyer recommended 
that 50 per cent of the net proceeds of income tax should be 
assigned to the Provinces, the scale of distribution being 
determined partly on residence and partly on population. He 
recommended distribution of income-tax among the Provinces 
according to the fixed percentages indicated by him and 
recommended that the Centre should retain for the first five years 
out of the Provincial share a sum equivalent to the amount by 
which the Central share plus the contribution from Railways fell 
short of Rs.13 crores a year and that the amount retained from the 
Provincial share should be surrendered to the Provinces over a 
further period of five years. 
 As part of the assistance for the jute-growing Provinces, Sir 
Otto Niemeyer recommended that the Provinces’ share of the jute 
export duty be raised by twelve and half per cent to sixty two and 
half per cent of the net proceeds of the duty. Sir Niemeyer also 
indicated the annual grants payable to certain Provinces. As part of 
the general scheme, Sir Niemeyer recommended the cancellation 
of the outstanding debts to the Centre of Bengal, Bihar, Assam, 
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North-West Frontier Province and Orissa, contracted prior to 1st 
April 1936, and a reduction in the outstanding debt of the Central 
Provinces. These recommendations were accepted by the 
Government and embodied in the Government of India 
(Distribution of Revenues) Order, 1936. 
2.3.2  Distribution of revenues during   Provincial    autonomy 
 
 Following the outbreak of World War II, and the increasing 
expenditure it entailed on the Centre, steps had to be taken to 
strengthen Central finances. It was decided that for the duration of 
the war, the Centre should be permitted to retain a fixed sum of 
Rs.4.5 crores out of the Provincial share of income tax. The Order-
in-Council was amended accordingly to secure this and the 
modified provision regulated the distribution of the tax from 1940-
41 to 1945-46. In other essentials, the Government of India 
(Distribution of Revenues) Order, 1936, continued to regulate the 
allocation of resources between the Centre and the units’ up to the 
partition of the country in August 1947. 
 The following Table shows the transfer of resources from 
the Centre to Provinces during the decade of ‘Provincial 
autonomy’ covered by the Government of India Act, 1935. 
 
Resources transferred from the Centre to the Provinces 5 
(1937-1947) 
     
Year  Share of       Share in        Subventions                
  Income         Export duty   under the        Total  
  Tax  on Jute Niemeyer       
      Award 
_______      _____  _____  ______ ______  
1937-38 1.25  2.65  3.12                7.02 
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1938-39 1.50  2.51  3.03    7.04 
1939-40 2.79  2.56  3.03    8.38 
1940-41 4.16  1.85  3.03    9.04 
1941-42 7.39  1.95  3.03            12.37 
1942-43     10.90  1.40  2.75            15.05 
1943-44     19.50  1.38  2.75              23.63 
1944-45      26.96  1.49  1.70              29.75 
1945-46      28.75  1.57  1.70              32.02 
1946-47      29.87  2.87  1.70              34.44            
(Rs. Crores.) 
 In addition to the transfers indicated herein, Bengal received 
special grants amounting to Rs. 3 crores in 1943-44, Rs.7 crores in 
1944-45 and Rs.5 crores in 1945-46 to meet expenditure on famine 
relief. During this period, a policy of liberal assistance to Provinces 
for post-war development scheme was initiated and Central 
assistance on this account amounted to Rs.17.17 crores in 1946-47 
including Rs.3.24 crores for Grow Most Food Schemes. This 
amount was paid to the Provinces in addition to the amounts 
indicated in the table. 
 The partition of the country in August 1947 necessitated an 
adjustment in financial arrangements, which affected the scheme 
of distribution of both income tax and jute export duty. In regard to 
income tax, the basic scheme of Sir Otto Niemeyer was retained. 
The Government of India reduced the shares of the divided 
provinces of Bengal and Punjab in proportion to population and the 
released percentages as well as the percentages of Sind and North-
West Frontier Province were pooled for redistribution. The 
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Provincial shares were refixed after distributing the lapsed quota 
among the Indian Union Provinces including West Bengal and 
Punjab, according to population, with a re-adjustment in favour of 
West Bengal and a minor adjustment in favour of Assam. As 
regards the jute export duty, the Provincial share was reduced from 
62.5 per cent to 20 per cent roughly in proportion to the jute-
growing area, which came to India. The basis of the distribution of 
the share among the Provinces was left undisturbed. 
 On account of the partition of the country in August 1947, 
comparable dates regarding Central and State finances are not 
available for 1947-48. Resources transferred from the Centre to the 
States during the years 1948-49 and 1949-50 are given in the 
following table.6 
               
 Year  Share of      share in        Subventions                 
  Income        Export duty   under the       other    Total 
  Tax          on Jute  Niemeyer     grants 
      Award 
_____  ______ _______ ______ _____ _____ 
1948-49  41.79  1.43           0.70        29.12     73.04 
1949-50  45.74  1.94           0.70        30.36     78.74 
        (Rs. Crores)             
 The ‘other’ grants mainly related to post-war development 
schemes, Grow More Food, and rehabilitation. These also included 
special assistance of Rs.2.25 crores in each year to East Punjab and 
West Bengal to meet expenditure on account of dislocation caused 
by the partition of the country. However, the Niemeyer Award 
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continued until 1947, although it did not satisfy any of the 
Governments at the Centre and at the Provinces. 
2. 4    Deshmukh   Award 
 
 Some of the States were not satisfied with the arrangements 
regarding the allocation of income tax and the jute export duty 
made by the Government of India immediately after the partition. 
Towards the end of 1949, Shri C.D.Deshmukh was appointed to 
look into these grievances and to, 
(a) determine the shares to be taken from Bengal, Punjab 
and Assam in respect of parts of these Provinces included in 
Pakistan; and,  
(b) re-allocate among the Part A States these lapsed 
percentages as well as the percentages formerly prescribed for Sind 
and North-West Frontier Province. The Deshmukh Award 
remained effective during 1950-51 and 1951-52. 
 As regards the quantum of lapsed percentages, Shri 
Deshmukh observed: 
           “To my mind the only practical way of determining the 
lapsed percentage shares would be to estimate as nearly as possible 
the percentages that might have been allotted by Niemeyer to the 
parts of the Provinces now included in Pakistan had they been in 
existence as separate Provinces at the time, in relation to the Shares 
be allocated to Provinces of comparable dimensions and fiscal 
status.” 7  He  considered four units to be taken out of the Punjab’s 
share, as fair. From Bengal, share 7.5 units were thus taken out. As 
for Assam, Shri Deshmukh did not deem it worthwhile to make 
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any reduction from its (already) small percentage only by reason of 
the transfer of part of the district of Sylhet to East Pakistan8.  Thus 
the aggregate quota available for redistribution was 14.5 units 
inclusive of two and one units pertaining to Sindh and N.W.F.P. 
respectively now having been ceded to Pakistan. 
While making his recommendations for redistribution of the 
lapsed quota among the Indian Provinces, Shri Deshmukh had 
mainly two things in mind: 
(a) “ We are dealing with residual percentages which are in 
the nature of a windfall; and  
(b) This is an interim arrangement likely to be effective for 
only about two years.” 9  
He also thought that an award that given additional 
weightier to residence would hinder the progress towards a general 
equalisation of the levels of administration. It was, therefore, 
recommended,  “that lapsed portion should be allocated largely on 
the basis of population making only minor adjustments for the 
purpose of rounding off (to the nearest 0.5 per cent in view of the 
magnitude of the amounts involved) and giving a small weightage 
in favour of the weaker Provinces”. 10 
2.4.1 Desmukh Award-Aggregate percentage Share of Province 
 
   Province        Percent         Province    Percent  
1.  Bombay            21. 0     6.  East Punjab           5.5 
2.  Madras             17. 5     7.  Bihar          12.5  
3.  W. Bengal             13. 5                8.  Assam            3.0  
4.  Uttar Pradesh  18. 0                9.  Orissa            3.0  
5.  C.P.& Berar          6. 0                        Total. 100. 0 
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Grants-In-Aid: 
 As started earlier, the Government of India (Distribution of 
Revenue) Order 1948 reduced the proportion of the net proceeds of 
the jute export duty to be assigned to the jute producing Provinces 
from 62.5 per cent to 20 per cent without, however, distributing the 
inter se percentage shares. This reduction was made in view of the 
fact that 70 per cent of the jute producing area had gone over to 
Pakistan. The recipient Provinces resented it and protested, “ the 
Centre unilaterally made itself the sole beneficiary of the new 
situation.” 11 
  Shri Deshmukh recommended the following sums to be paid 
to the four provinces each year subject to the provisions of Article 
273 (2) of the Constitution until the Finance Commission proposes 
any revision. 12 
West Bengal -    105  lakhs  Bihar  -   35     lakhs 
Assam -         40  lakhs  Orissa -    5   lakhs  
 
The Deshmukh Award was in force till the end of March 
1952, after which the recommendations of the First Finance 
Commission were enforced. 
2.5     Krishnamachary Enquiry Committee Report 
   
A development of far-reaching consequence during this 
period was the financial integration of Indian States These States 
had remained outside the fiscal and financial system of the rest of 
the country except for certain agreements entered into with them 
by the Government of India regarding such matters as maritime 
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customs, Central excise, Posts and Telegraphs and Railways. 
Within less than two years after independence, all the Indian States 
had been integrated either into sizeable units or merged in the 
neighboring Provinces or constituted into separate centrally 
administered Chief Commissioner’s Provinces. In October 1948, 
the Indian State Finance Enquiry Committee was set up under the 
chairmanship of Shri T.T. Krishnamachary to consider questions 
relating to the financial integration of the Indian States. The 
recommendations of the Committee were accepted and embodied 
with certain agreed ‘ modifications in agreements entered into by 
the Government of India with the Governments of the States’. 
 As a result of the integration, the Centre took over from 
these States the subjects and services falling in the Union List of 
the Constitution with the related assets and liabilities. The Centre 
agreed to provide to certain States, for a transitional period, the 
difference between the revenue lost to them from Union subjects 
and the expenditure saved to them on Union subjects and services 
as a result of financial integration. The payments made to the 
States under this arrangement, generally called “revenue gap 
grants”, were guaranteed in full for the first five years, and on a 
gradually diminishing scale for a further period of five years. After 
integration all the Part B States were entitled to a share in divisible 
sources of Central revenue on the same footing as the Part A 
States. 
 Three States, viz., Rajasthan, Madhya Bharat and Pepsu, did 
not qualify for ‘revenue gap grants’ since the expenditure saved by 
them by integration was more than the revenue lost to them. These 
 35
States were required to make a limited and progressively 
decreasing contribution to the centre, for a transitional period, to 
cover the payments made by the Government of India on account 
of the Privy Purses of the former Rulers responsibility for which 
had devolved on the Government of India under the Constitution. 
In regard to Income tax, it was agreed that the share of each Part B 
State should be 50 per cent of the net proceeds of the taxes on 
income, other than agricultural income, levied and collected by the 
Government of India in the State in each year. 
2.6    Sarkar Committee Report 
  
At the time of the drafting of the Indian Constitution the 
President of the Constituent Assembly appointed an expert 
Committee under the Chairmanship of Shri N. R. Sarkar to report 
on the financial provisions of the Indian Constitution. The 
Committee was required, under its terms of reference, to make a 
review of the then existing provisions relating to finance and 
borrowing powers in the Government of India Act, 1935, and in 
the light of such a review make recommendations in regard to 
entries in the lists or sections to be embodied in the Constitution. 
The Committee was in particular requested to make 
recommendations in regard to the value of taxes to be included in 
the federal and State lists and the manner of allocation as between 
the Centre and the federating units. The Committee was also 
required to suggest the principles on which the federal grants 
should be made to the units and the machinery for determination of 
the States’ scheme of taxes and grants from the Centre. 
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 The Committee suggested that Centre should retain the 
whole of the net proceeds of (a) duties of customs including export 
duties; (b) taxes on capital value of assets; (c) taxes on Railway 
fares and frights; and (d) Central excise other than on tobacco. The 
net proceeds of income tax, (including corporation tax), Central 
excise on tobacco; and estate and succession duties were to shared 
with the Provincial Governments. Federal Stamp duties and 
terminal taxes on goods, etc., were to be administered centrally but 
wholly for the benefit of the Provinces. The Committee suggested 
that not less than 60 per cent of the net proceeds of income tax 
(including Corporation tax and the tax on federal emoluments) and 
succession and estate duties should be divided between Provinces. 
The net proceeds of the excise on Tobacco to be divided between 
Provinces on the basis of the estimated consumption were not to be 
less than 50 per cent. The Committee suggested that a Finance 
Commission with a High Court Judge or ex-High Court Judge as 
Chairman and four other members be appointed with the following 
functions: 
(a) Allocation between the Provinces of their shares of 
Centrally Administered taxes assigned to them; 
(b) To consider applications for grants-in-aid for Provinces 
and report thereon; and 
(c) To consider and report on other matters referred to it by 
the President.   
      The Commission was to review the position every five years 
or in special Circumstances earlier. 
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Before the considering the impact, impression and adoption 
of the recommendations suggested by Sarkar Committee’s report 
in regard to financial provisions in the existing provision of 
Government of India Act, 1935, the parallel study of Political 
History of India (from 1858 to 1947) is necessary to understand the 
concept of federalism in the Indian Constitution. 
2.7     A   Short   Political   History of   the   Constitution 
  
A short reference to the historical setting in which the 
Constitution came into being may not be altogether out of place, 
before discussing the Federal Financial concept of our Indian 
Constitution.  
 India’s political destiny should be determined by Indian 
themselves had been put forward by Mahatma Gandhi as early as 
1922; but it was rejected by the Joint Parliamentary Committee in 
1933 on the ground that “a specific grant of constituent powers to 
authorities in India is not at the moment a practicable proposition.” 
 The failure of the Statutory Commission and the Round 
Table Conference, which led to the enactment of the Government 
of India Act, 1935, to satisfy Indian aspirations accentuated the 
demand for a Constitution made by the people of India without 
outside interference; but the demand was resisted by the British 
Government till the outbreak of the World War II when the 
pressure of external circumstances forced them to realise the 
urgency of solving the Indian constitutional problem. 
 In 1940, the Coalition Government recognised the principle 
that Indians should themselves frame a new Constitution for 
 38
autonomous India, and in March, 1942, when the Japanese were at 
the doors of India, they sent Sir Stafford Cripps, a member of the 
Cabinet, with a draft declaration of the proposals of the British 
Government which were to be adopted provided the two major 
political parties (Congress and Muslim League) could come to an 
agreement to accept them, viz.: - 
(a) That the future Constitution of India was to be framed by 
 an elected Constituent Assembly of the Indian people; 
(b) That the Constitution should give India Dominion status,  
 equal partnership of the British Commonwealth of 
 Nations; 
(c) That there should be one Indian Union comprising all the 
      Provinces and the Indian States. 
 But the two parties failed to come to an agreement to accept 
the proposals, and the Muslim League urged,  
(a) that India should be divided into two autonomous States 
on communal lines, and that some of the Provinces 
earmarked by Mr. Jinnah, should form an independent 
Muslim States to be known as Pakistan; 
(b) that instead of one Constituent Assembly, there should 
be two Constituent Assemblies, i.e. a separate Constituent 
Assembly for building Pakistan. 
 After the rejection of the Cripps proposals, various attempts 
to reconcile the two parties were made, including the Simla 
Conference held at the instance of the Governor General, Lord 
Wavell. These having failed, the British Cabinet sent three of its 
own members, including Cripps himself, to make another serious 
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attempt with some altered proposals, which were announced 
simultaneously in India and in England on the 16th May 1946. 
 The proposals of the Cabinet Delegation sought to affect a 
compromise between a Union of India and its division. While the 
Cabinet Delegation definitely rejected the claim for a separate 
Constituent Assembly and a separate State for the Muslims, the 
scheme, which they recommended, involved a virtual acceptance 
of the principle of the claim of the Muslim League, by grouping 
the provisions on the lines suggested by the Muslim League, and 
giving the Centre narrow and enumerated powers relating to three 
subjects only. Viz., Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications. 
 The scheme laid down by the Cabinet Mission was, 
however, recommendatory, and it was contemplated by the 
Mission that it would be adopted by agreement the two major 
parties, A curious situation, however, arose after an election for 
forming the Constituent Assembly was held. The Muslim League 
joined this election and its candidates were returned. But a 
difference of opinion had in the meantime arisen between the 
Congress and the League regarding the interpretation of the 
Grouping clauses of the proposals of the Cabinet Mission. 
 The British Government intervened at this stage, and 
explained to the leaders in London that they upheld the contention 
of the League as correct, and on the 6th December, 1946, the 
British Government published the following statements: - 
“Should a Constitution come to be framed by the 
Constituent Assembly in which a large section of the Indian 
population had not been represented, His Majesty’s Government 
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would not contemplate forcing such a Constitution upon any 
unwilling part of the country.” 
 For first time, thus, the British Government acknowledged 
the possibility of two Constituent Assemblies and two States. The 
result was that on the 9th December 1946,when the Constituent 
Assembly first met, the Muslim League members did not attend, 
and it began to function with the non-Muslim members only. 
 The Muslim League next urged for the dissolution of the 
Constituent Assembly of India on the ground that it as not fully 
representative of all section of the people of India. On the other 
hand, the British Government, by their Statement of the 20th 
February 1947, declared: - 
(a) that British rule in India would in any case end by June, 
1948, after which the British would certainly transfer 
authority to Indian hands; 
(b) that if a fully representative Constituent assembly failed to 
work out a Constitution in accordance with the proposals 
made by the Cabinet Delegation, 
“H.M.G. will have to consider to whom the powers of the 
Central Government in British India should be handed over, on the 
due date, whether as a whole to some form of Central Government 
for British India,  or in some areas to the existing Provincial 
Government, or in such other way as seem most reasonable and in 
the best interest of the Indian people.” 
 The result was inevitable and the League did not consider it 
necessary to join this assembly and went on pressing for another 
Constituent Assembly for “Muslim India” 
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 The British Government next sent Lord Mountbatten to 
India as the Governor General, in place of Lord Wavell, in order to 
expedite the preparations for the transfer of power, for which they 
had fixed a rigid time limit. 
 Lord Mountbatten brought the Congress and the League into 
a definite agreement that the two ‘problem’ Provinces of the 
Punjab and Bengal would be partitioned so as to form absolute 
Hindu and Muslim majority blocks within these Provinces. The 
League would then get its Pakistan, - which the Cabinet Mission 
had so ruthlessly denied it – minus Assam, East Punjab and West 
Bengal, while the Congress which was taken as the representative 
of the whole India, excluding the Muslims, would get the rest of 
India where the Muslims were in a minority. 
 The actual decision as to whether the two Provinces of the 
Punjab and Bengal were to be partitioned was, however, left to the 
vote of the member of the Legislative Assemblies of these two 
Provinces, meeting in two parts, according to a plan known as the 
‘Mountbatten Plan’. It was given formal shape by a Statement 
made by the British Government on June 3,1947, which provided, 
inter alia, that,  
 “The Provincial legislative Assemblies of Bengal and the 
Punjab (excluding European members) will, therefore, each be 
asked to meet in two parts, one representing the Muslim majority 
districts and other the rest of the Province…………The members 
of the to parts of each Legislative Assembly sitting separately will 
be empowered to vote whether or not the Province should be 
partitioned. If a simple majority of either part decides in favour of 
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Partition division will take place and arrangement will be made 
accordingly. If partition were decided upon, each part of the 
Legislative Assembly, would decide, on behalf of the areas it 
represented, whether it would join the existing or a new and 
separate Constituent Assembly.” It was also proposed that there 
would be a referendum in the N.W.F. Province and in the Muslim 
majority district of Sylhet as to whether they would join India or 
Pakistan. 
 The statement further declared H.M.G; intention  “to 
introduce legislation during the current session for the transfer of 
power this year on a Dominion Status basis to one or two successor 
authorities according to decisions taken as a result of the 
announcement”. 
 The result of the vote according to the above Plan was a 
foregone conclusion as the representative of the Muslim majority 
areas of the two Provinces (i.e. West Punjab and East Bengal) 
voted for partition and for joining a new Constituent Assembly. 
The referendum in the N.W.F. Province and Sylhet were in favour 
of Pakistan.  
 On the 26th July 1947, the Governor-General announced the 
setting up of a separate Constituent Assembly for a Pakistan. The 
plan of June 3, 1947, having been carried out, nothing stood in the 
way of affecting the transfer of power by enacting a statute of 
British parliament in accordance with the declaration. 
 It must be said to the credit of the British Parliament that it 
lost no time to draft the Indian Independence Bill upon the basis of 
the above plan, and this Bill was passed and placed on the Statute 
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Book, with amazing speed, as the Indian Independence Act, 1947. 
The Bill, which was introduced in Parliament on July 4, was 
enacted with the Royal Assent on July 18, 1947. It was to have 
effect from the 15th August 1947, which was referred to in the Act 
as ‘the appointed day’. 
 The most outstanding characteristic of the Indian 
Independence Act, 1947, was that while other Acts of Parliament 
relating to the governance of India (such as the Government of 
India Acts from 1858 down to 1935) sought to lay down a 
Constitution for the administration of India by the legislative will 
of the British Parliament. This Act of 1947, did not lay down any 
such Constitution. It simply set up two independent Dominions, -
India and Pakistan, by dividing the territory of British India, and 
gave unlimited power to the Constituent Assembly of each 
Dominion to frame and adopt any Constitution and to supersede 
the Indian Independence Act without any further legislation on the 
part of the British parliament. It also directed that the Constituent 
Assembly, which had its first sitting on the 9th December 1946, 
was to be the Constituent Assembly of ‘India’, which Pakistan 
would set up a fresh Constituent Assembly for herself. 
2.8    Framing of the present Constitution 
  
The Constituent Assembly, which was set up in 1946 
according to the Cabinet Mission Plan, was not a sovereign body. 
Its authority was limited both in respect of the basic principles and 
procedure. The Indian Independence Act, 1947, established the 
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sovereign character of the Constituent Assembly, which became 
free of all limitations. 
 The method, which the Constituent Assembly adopted in 
making the Constitution, was first to lay down its objectives. This 
was done in the form of Objective Resolution moved by Pandit 
Nehru. It said: - 
1. This Constituent Assembly declares its firm and solemn 
resolve to proclaim India as an Independence Sovereign 
Republic and to draw up for her future governance a 
Constitution; 
2. Wherein the territories that now comprise British India, the 
territories that now form the Indian States, and such other 
parts of India as are outside British India and the States as 
well as such other territories as are willing to be constituted 
into the Independent Sovereign India, shall be a Union of 
them all and;  
3. Wherein the did territories, with their present boundaries or 
with such others as may be determined by the Constituent 
Assembly and thereafter according to the law of the 
Constitution, shall possess and exercise all powers and retain 
the statutes of autonomous units, together with residuary 
powers and functions of government and administration, 
save and except such powers and functions as are vested in 
or assigned to the Union, or as are inherent or implied in the 
Union or resulting therefrom and; 
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4. Wherein all power and authority of the Sovereign 
Independent India, its constituent parts and organs of 
government are derived from the people and; 
5. Wherein shall be guaranteed and secured to all the people of 
India justice, social, economic and political: equality of 
status, of opportunity, and before the law: freedom of 
thought, expression, belief, faith, worship, vocation, 
association and action, subject to law and public morality 
and; 
6. Wherein adequate safeguard shall be provided for 
minorities, backward and tribal areas and depressed and 
other backward classes; and 
7. Whereby shall be maintained the integrity of the territory of 
the Republic and its sovereign rights on land, sea, and air 
according to justice and the law of civilised nations and; 
8. This ancient land attains its rightful and honored place in the 
world and makes it full and willing contribution to the to the 
promotion of world peace and the welfare of mankind. 
The Constituent Assembly then proceeds to appoint a 
number of Committees to deal with different aspects of the 
Constitutional problems.  The report of the various Committee 
were considered by the Assembly and their recommendations were 
adopted as basis on which the Draft of the Constitution had to be 
prepared. The Drafting Committee was appointed by a resolution 
passed by the Assembly on August 29, 1947. 
 Before the final Draft was put before the Constituent 
Assembly, the partition of the Country played the major role in 
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construction of drafting for federation. Hence, to understand the 
nature of federation proposed by Constituent Assembly the history 
of Constitution making is   required to be divided in two stages:- 
(a) Prior to June 3, 1947; and 
(b) After June 3, 1947, when the decision to partition India into 
two Dominions on Communal basis was announced. 
(a) Prior to June 1947: When the Constituent Assembly first sat, 
there were to major problems in the path of constructing a 
federal polity, namely, the communal sentiments of the 
Muslims and the erstwhile semi-independent Indian States. 
Hence, in order to bring them under the federal scheme, it 
was inevitable that the Union should have only a minimum 
of enumerated powers and that the residue should be left to 
the Units. Hence, in the Objective Resolution which was 
adopted in the Constituent Assembly on January 22, 1947, it 
was announced that the Union should have only those three 
powers of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications, 
which had been conceded to it by Cabinet Mission; and that 
the States of the Federation shall be ‘autonomous units’, 
having all residuary powers left after assigning to the Union 
and three aforesaid subjects, together with those powers 
which followed by implication from the powers assigned to 
the Union. 
(b) After June, 1947: When the decision of partition   India, and  
to form a separate State for the Muslims was announced, and  
a foreign State was to be constituted practically over a part 
of the body of undivided India (and to flank India on both 
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sides by West and East Pakistan), there was a consensus 
amongst the Constitution- makers of India, that the changed 
circumstances called for a reconsideration of the federal 
pattern proposed in the objectives Resolution. Though, in 
view of the history up to the Government of India Act, 1935, 
and the myriads of elements still left with the Dominion of 
India, with their concomitant diversity of interest, it was 
possible to go back to a unitary system, nevertheless, a 
strong Centre was an imperative necessity. Thus, Second 
Report of the Union Powers Committee observed: - 
“Now that Partition is a settled fact, we are unanimously of 
the view that   it would be injurious to the interests of the country 
to provide for a weak central authority, which would be incapable 
of ensuring peace, of co-coordinating vital matters of common 
concern and of speaking effectively for the whole country in the 
internation sphere”. 13  
 In fact, immediately after the decision to partition the 
country had been announced, the Union Constitution Committee 
met on dt.5-6-1947, and decided the Plan of the Cabinet Mission 
was no longer binding in view of the Partition and that, 
accordingly, 
(a) the Constitution of India should be federal with a strong 
Centre; 
(b) there should be three Legislative Lists, and whatever residue 
was left unenumerated, should go to the Union, not the 
State. 
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This overturning of the Objectives Resolution by the 
Constitution Committee was affirmed by the Constituent Assembly 
and the Union Powers Committee implemented that decision. 
 The accession of the Indian States to the Union of India and 
their subsequent execution of revised Agreements, handing over 
the subjects other than the three specified by the Cabinet Mission 
facilitated the implementation of the programmed of drafting the 
constitution so that the Union could be strong Centre, having 
power over all subjects of common concern to the Units of the 
Federation, including residuary powers, Subsequent proceedings of 
the Constituent Assembly were dominated by this need for a strong 
Centre. 
 The above historical background witnessed, why the makers 
Indian Constitution, diverted their path of federal polity from the 
initial opting for the American Model, to the eventually adoption 
of the Canadian Model of a Strong Union and even went beyond 
that model (Canadian) in accentuating the Central bias. 
 In accordance with decisions of the Constituent Assembly 
on the reports made by the various Committees. The Draft 
Constitution, as it emerged from the drafting Committee, contained 
315 articles and 8 schedules. It was considered at great length at 
the second reading stage, and a number of amendments were made 
to the Draft Constitution. The Assembly finalised the Constitution 
on November 26, 1949. It came into force on January 26, 1950. 
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2.8.1 The Preamble of the Indian Constitution, compared with 
other Federations 
 Dr. Ambedkar founding father of the Constitution presented 
the Draft Constitution to the Constituent Assembly. The Draft 
Preamble of the Constitution read as follows: - 
 “We the people of India having solemnly resolved to 
Constitute India into a Sovereign Democratic Republic and to 
secure to all its citizens; Justice, social, economic and political; 
Liberty of thoughts, expression, belief, faith and worship; Equity 
of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all 
Fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity of the 
Nation. In our Constituent Assembly do hereby adopt and give to 
ourselves this Constitution”. 
 Dr. Ambedkar described that the Constitution proposed to be 
federal, even though the word “Union” was inserted in Article 1, 
and there was no mention of the word “federal” in the Preamble or 
in any other provision and though there were a number of 
exceptions from traditional federalism in order to give the Union 
enough strength to meet the disruptive forces external as well as 
internal, - admist which the Union was born and though “in times 
of War it is so designed as to make it work as though it was a 
unitary system.” In the Constituent Assembly, there was a fair 
consensus that in view of the external conditions as well as 
vastness of the country and its heterogeneous elements, a 
completely unitary system was not only undesirable but also 
unworkable. India, therefore, was going to have a federal 
Constitution. In respect to the nature of the Constitution,  
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Dr. Rajendra Prasad, expressed his views that: - 
 “Personally, I do not attach any importance to the label 
which may be attached to it- whether you call it a Federal 
Constitution or a Unitary Constitution or by any other name. It 
makes no difference so long as the Constitution serves our 
purpose”. 14 
 The Preamble is a declaration of the purposes and the under 
the spirit of the Constitution. It is key to open the minds the makers 
of the Act and the mischief, which they intend to redress. The 
Preamble asserted that the new State would be a Republic. It 
simply means that the future Constitution of India will not be 
monarchical. This Republic shall be a democratic one. It means a 
State in which the individual is endowed with all fundamental 
rights essential for the full development of his personality. 
 “We the people”, though these are vibrant words, they 
gained such a power since 1787. These words did not come into 
the Constitution by accidence but it the result of struggle to be free 
from British Commonwealth ruling, to make India free, in all 
respects. Pandit Nehru moved a resolution in the Constituent 
Assembly on Object and Aims clearly started that all power and 
authority of Sovereign Independent India are derived from the 
people. 
 The Preamble is also significant for certain omissions. It 
does not evoke the blessing of Almighty God as the Preambles of 
the Australian and Irish Constitution do.15 The Australian 
Constitution says, “humbly relying on the blessing of God.” The 
Irish Constitution says, “ In the name of the Most Holy Trinity 
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from whom is all authority and to whom as our final end, all 
actions of men’s and States must be referred”.16 Nor does it 
mention the architect of Independence, as the Chinese and Irish 
Constitution do. The Chinese Constitution says, “The National 
Assembly of the Republic of China…………in accordance with 
the teaching bequeathed by Dr. Sun Yat –sen in founding the 
Republic of China”.17 The Irish Constitution says “ humbly 
acknowledging all our obligations to out divine Lord Jesus Christ 
who sustained our fathers centuries of trial. Gratefully 
remembering their heroic and unremitting struggle to regain the 
rightful independence of our nation”.18   Finally, it does not mention 
the secularism of the State, though so much fuss was made about it 
by the members of the Constituent Assembly, because the 
Committee seemed to have felt that the world has anti-religious 
associations, hardly compatible with assurances of freedom of 
religion in the rest of the Constitution. 
 The Preamble also indicates the main purpose for which the 
Constitution was being made. It is to secure the unity of the nation. 
That is, framers of the Constitution felt that the existence of a 
number of small semi-Sovereign States with a variety of 
Constitution is incompatible with the safety and well being of the 
people of subcontinent. 
 The ideals consecrated in the Preamble, are several, 
foremost among them is Justice, social, economic and political. 
The fundamental principle of the modern democratic States is the 
recognition of the value of the individual and that full opportunities 
should be given to each to attain his maximum development in that 
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life. So what the preamble seems to promise is social and 
economic equality insofar as these constitute social and economic 
justice.  
 Another ideal consecrated in the Preamble is the equality of 
status and opportunity. That is to say that every child in this 
country would get equal opportunities to develop those faculties 
which he or she possesses. This provision in the Constitution seeks 
to obliterate the inequalities heaped upon the fair sex and the 
under-privileged by laws, customs, and practices all these years. 
In case of, S.R. Bommai and others etc.etc. v/s Union of 
India and others etc.etc,19 Justice A. M. AHAMDI observed that: - 
In India, Parliament can by law form a new State, alter the 
size of an existing State, etc., and even curtail the power, both 
executive and legislative, by amending the Constitution. That is 
why the Constitution of India is differently described, more 
appropriately as ‘quasi-federal’ because it is a mixture of the 
federal and unitary elements, leaning more towards the latter but 
then what is there in a name, what is important to bear in mind is 
the thrust and implications of the various provisions of the 
Constitution bearing on the controversy in regard to scope and 
ambit of the Presidential power under Art.356 and related 
provisions. At present the 28 States and 7 Union territories are the 
constituent units of the Union of India.  
The Indian Constitution has, in it, not only features of a 
pragmatic federalism which, while distributing legislative powers 
and indicating the spheres of Governmental powers of State and 
Central Governments, is overlaid by strongly ‘unitary’ features, 
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particularly exhibited by lodging in Parliament the residuary 
legislative powers, and in the Central Government the executive 
power of appointing certain constitutional functionaries including 
High Court and Supreme Court Judges and issuing appropriate 
directions to the State government  and even displacing the State  
Legislatures and the Governments in emergency situations,  vide 
Arts.352 to 360 of the Constitution. 
 Notwithstanding the fact that the words ‘Social’ and  
‘Secular’ were added in the Preamble of the Constitution in 1976 
by the 42nd Amendment. The amendments were made for the 
purpose of spelling out expressly the high ideal of socialism, 
secularism and the Integrity of the nation. The concept of 
secularism was very much embedded in our Constitutional 
philosophy. The term ‘secular’ has advisedly not been defined 
presumably because it is very elastic term not capable of a precise 
definition and perhaps best left undefined. By this amendment 
what was implicit was made explicit. 
 Secularism is one of the basic features of the Constitution. 
While freedom of religion is guaranteed to all persons in India, 
from the point of view of the State, the religion, faith or belief of a 
person is immaterial. To the State, all are equal and are entitled to 
be treated equally. In matters of State, religion has no place. No 
political party can simultaneously be a religious party. Politics and 
religion cannot be mixed. Any State Government which pursues 
unsecular policies or unsecular course of action acts contrary to the 
Constitutional mandate and renders itself amenable to action under 
Art.356. 
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 Secularism is thus, more than a passive attitude to religious 
tolerance. It is a positive concept of equal treatment of all 
religious. This attitude is described by some as one of neutrality 
towards religion or as one of benevolent neutrality. This may be a 
concept evolved by western liberal thought or it may be, as some 
say, an abiding faith with the Indian people at all points of time. 
That is not material. What is material is that it is a constitutional 
goal and a basic feature of the Constitution. Any step inconsistent 
with this constitutional policy is, in plain words, unconstitutional.
 Finally, the framers of the Constitution must be 
congratulated for the inclusion of fraternity as one of the objects of 
attainment. Although the fortunes of fraternity, ever since it was 
inscribed on the banner of French Revolution, have had a 
chequered career, the inclusion of this idea in the preamble will 
have a reassuring effect particularly on the minorities. Implied in 
this provision is the idea that the democratic process need not 
necessarily mean ‘rule by majority’, it means a rule based on 
compromise the essence of all life. 
 
2.8.2  some reflections on the Nature of the Indian   
 Constitution  
 
An acute problem today concerns the nature of the 
Constitutional structure of India. The political structure of the 
Indian Constitution is so unusual that it is impossible to describe it 
briefly. Characterisations such as “quasi-federal” and statutory are 
interesting, but not particularly illuminating. The members of the 
Constituent Assembly themselves refused to adhere to any theory 
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or dogma about federalism. India had unique problems, they 
believed, problems that had not, ‘confronted other federations in 
history’. These could not be solved by recourse to the theory 
because federalism was “not a definite concept” and lacked a 
“stable meaning”? Therefore, members of the Constituent 
Assembly, drawing on the experience of the great federations like 
the United State, Canada, Switzerland and Australia, pursued “the 
policy of pick and choose to see (what) would suit (them) best, 
(what) would suit the genius of the nation best……….20 This 
process produced new modifications of established ideas about the 
construction of federal government and their relations with the 
governments of their constituted units. The Constituent Assembly 
in fact, produced a new kind of federalism to meet India’s peculiar 
needs. 
 Theoretically and traditionally, a federation is formed when 
two or more independent neighboring States unite for defined 
purposes of common interest by diver sting themselves of measure 
of sovereignty, which comes to be vested in the federal 
Government. The urge for Union comes from the need for 
collective security against aggression and economic co-ordination 
for protection and expansion of trade and commerce. The 
federation is given only enumerated powers; the sovereignty of the 
States in the Union remains otherwise unimpaired. They continue 
in the main to preserve their original constitutions and exercise 
powers which flow from their respective Constitution.21 
 Alternatively a federation is formed when a sovereign 
authority creates autonomous States and combines them in a Union 
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in one and the same enactment, determining therein their 
respective powers, functions and fiscal authority. Once formed, the 
national and state governments have co-ordinate authority derived 
from the same Constitution and are supreme in their respective 
spheres of authority and jurisdiction. 
 Neither in the mode of formation nor in concept does the 
Indian Union fall into either of these two conventional categories. 
First, the provinces, though largely autonomous, had none of the 
attributes of sovereignty. There was thus no question of their 
forming a compact on their own initiative for common purposes of 
supra-provincial importance. Secondly, the British authority did 
not create the Union before it relinquished power. It were the 
representative of India’s people assembled in a Constituent 
Assembly who decided on the structure of the Union and provided 
for the distribution of authority and functions between the national 
and regional governments. There was, however, continuity in the 
evolution of the Constitution. While dealing with the nature of the 
Indian Constitution one must keep it in mind that the Constitution 
of India is impressed with three major loyalties. They all indicate 
that the structure was intended to be federal or quasi-federal. The 
first loyalty of the Indian Constitution is to the government of 
India Act, 1935 which provides not only most of the flesh and 
blood of the present Constitution, but also a good part of its spirit. 
Indeed, the Constitution even copies textually tot idem verbis22 
some of the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935. That 
Act created a new Federal Legislature and was directed to reform 
the then Provincial Government and to set up a new and novel 
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relationship with what was then called the princely states in India. 
The legacy for federalism, therefore, in the present Indian 
Constitution to drawn primarily from the Government of India Act, 
1935. 
 The second loyalty is to the American Constitution. From 
that Constitution is drawn the inspiration for wide spread judicial 
review of laws and governmental actions, fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution and such federal processes as inter-
state trade and commerce. The American “Due process” clause has 
been formally disclaimed but it survives under the nomenclature of 
“Reasonable Restrictions”. The hand is the hand of Essau but the 
voice is the voice of Jacob.23  This American influence has also 
given federal bias to the Indian Constitution. 
  The third loyalty owned by the Indian Constitution is to the 
British Constitution. The Judicial writs mentioned in the Indian 
Constitution are copies of old English writs, no doubt, modified 
and adjusted to the context of India. The very names of these 
writes in the Indian Constitution carry with them the characteristics 
they had acquired in British Constitutional history. Indian 
Parliament and State Legislatures draw their patterns from the 
British model. 
These three loyalties are not always reconcilable and are 
sometimes divergent and self-contradictory. The colonial traditions 
of suspicion for local autonomy and decentralization, the federal 
American tradition of distrust of a too powerful Centre and the 
unitary tradition of the British Constitution have been dovetailed 
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into Indian Constitution to produce its peculiar federalism in 
Constitutional law.24  
 There are other minor loyalties. The Indian Constitution 
draws upon many other Constitutions in the world, for instance of 
Canada and Australia, the Irish Free State and specially it’s 
Directive Principles and the Weimar Constitution. The defects of 
federalism arising on this score, are the defects of eclecticism in 
constitutional law which appear to ignore the fact that a 
Constitution embellished by the tersellated mosaic set by 
variegated marbles selected exotically is not necessarily strong for 
the traffic and tension it has to bear in the political, social and 
economical evolution of the nation whose Constitution it is.25  
In fact, federal Constitution of India is in the tradition of the 
age-old Indian phenomenon of unity in diversity on which Nehru 
has commented long ago in the following words: 
“ I think, the glory of India has been the way in which it has 
managed to keep two things going at the same time, that is, its 
infinite variety and at the same time its unity in that variety. Both 
have to be kept, because if we have only variety, then that means 
separation and going to pieces. If we seek to impose some kind of 
unity, that makes a living organism rather lifeless”.26  
 It is noticeable that Constitution of India does not use the 
word federation or federalism in any of numerous articles as a 
feature of the Indian Constitution. The omission to use the word 
federation or federalism should, therefore be regarded as 
deliberate. The framers of the Constitution wanted to avoid the 
ticket or the label of federation or federalism for the Indian 
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Constitution obviously, it is not the use the word “Union” or the 
word “Federation” that determines whether a country is a 
federation, nor is the basis or the mode of constituting a federation 
decisive in the matter. Necessarily, the structure of government in 
a country and its functioning should be decisive in concluding 
whether a country is federal. It follows then that a federation can 
be reasonably be answered with reference to only its sovereign 
status, the dual governmental structure and co-ordinate spheres of 
their competence. In defining the ‘federation’ Wheare conclusively 
observe: - 
 “The chief characteristic of the federal system is the division 
of powers between the Federal and State Governments”27 
Federation is then, a device for Constitutions and operating in 
sovereign State national and regional governments with co-
ordinate spheres of competence.28  The study of the nature and 
working of the Indian Constitution brings into bold relief the 
following striking features of Indian Federalism. 
 The distribution of legislative powers has obviously 
weakened the States and strengthened the Union. But most striking 
feature against federalism is the provision in chapter II of Part XI 
of the Indian Constitution regulating the administrative relations 
between the States and Union. This is against all principles of 
federation known in the Constitutional law.11 It is perhaps a 
legacy from the Government of India Act, 1935, where it was 
necessary in that context to encourage Provincial autonomy of that 
time, but which became quite irrelevant in the present context of 
the new Constitution .It can be noticed that there is provision in the 
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Indian Constitution for giving the right to the Union to confer its 
powers on the States, in certain cases and similar rights in the 
States to entrust functions to the Union as in Articles 258 and 
258A of the Constitution. 
 Federalism in the Indian Constitution has not come out 
unscathed in the matter of the division of financial powers. An 
essential and fundamental feature of a federal Constitution is to 
find out where the purse string lies and how the Constitution uses 
it. The taxing power for raising revenue is a mighty power under 
the Constitution. It can make or mar a federation. Scanning the 
distribution of legislative power in the Seventh Schedule of the 
Indian Constitution, the conclusion is irrestible that much larger 
taxing powers both direct and indirect are possessed by the Union. 
This structure of financial relations between the Centre and the 
State Governments – less elastic sources of revenue for the States 
and more elastic sources of revenue for the Centre – places of 
States at a distinct disadvantage. This “strong Centre and weak 
States” arrangement was introduced intentionally in the framers of 
the Constitution in a big to stall the divisive forces operating in the 
economy.  The framers of the Constitution declare, that India by 
self-proclamation is a Union of State. i.e. The units of Union, viz, 
the State have been described by some scholars as co-equal even 
though all residuary powers resides with Union. The Union and the 
States in no way could be said to be co-ordinate although 
constitutionally there are only a few spheres where the States are 
actually subordinate to the Union. The fisc of the States and the 
Union are related to each other through imbalances between 
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capacities for resources and resources required by the task, 
impairing the autonomy of the States to some extent. Resources 
levied and collected by the Union far exceed the resources needed 
by the tasks assigned to it under the Union List, while sources 
levied and collected by all the States put together fall short of the 
resources required by the tasks assigned to them under the State 
List. Principles governing collection of resources at different levels 
and principles assigning execution of tasks could hardly ever 
produce autonomous units with autonomous Union. At the same 
time, looking from the constitutional angle at the spectrum of 
countries it difficult to make any generalization. A small country 
like Switzerland is federal while a large country like France is 
unitary. Pakistan is federal and Bangladesh is unitary, while both 
are almost equal in size. Units within a nation for instance India 
vary in size to an amazing degree. This diversity is product of so 
many factors, which pull in many directions, that it is better to call 
it a product of history. Whatever the legal characterization of the 
Constitution, practically all countries are fiscally federal in one 
sense that their unit fiscs are related to the Union fisc in all cases 
and related to each other in few cases.  
 The Indian federalism has one special feature which is 
significantly its own. The Indian Constitution makes use of 
commissions as a constitutional method of finding facts and 
solving tensions under the Indian Constitution. The commissions 
recognised by the Constitution have interesting and varied 
functions and status, and have a practical bearing on Indian 
federalism in action.  
 62
 The Indian Constitution provides three mechanisms for its 
amendment. Expressing his opinion, before the members of the 
Constituent Assembly, about the amending process of the Indian 
Constitution Dr. B.R. Amedkar said: “One can, therefore safely 
say that the Indian Federation will not suffer from the fault of 
rigidity or Legalism. Its distinguishing feature is that it is a flexible 
federation”29   A simple majority in Parliament and others by a two-
third majority may amend certain provisions of the Constitution; 
amendments to a third category of provision must be notified by 
one half of the States. 
 The role of some extra- constitutional devices in the working 
of the Indian federation may also be mentioned. One such device is 
the Indian Planning Commission. This body has the responsibly for 
framing Five Years Plans for national development. The Plans 
finalise by the Commission are discussed and finally approved by 
the National Development Council which includes the State Chief 
Ministers. The Planning Commission is meant to promote uniform 
national policy and programmes. Another such body is University 
Grants Commission. Certainly these bodies are uniting agents but 
their basic purpose is to secure some uniformity rather than foster 
unity. It should be obvious now that the Indian Polity is the latest 
model of co-operative federation.30 It seems that in the Indian 
context of diversity and regional and local allegiance one or two 
very powerful and organised national political parties are always a 
boon to the working of co-operative federalism in the country.31 
 To Basu, “ the Constitution of India is neither purely federal 
nor purely unitary, but it is a combination of both. It is Union or 
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composite State of a novel type”.32   There seems to be, however, 
definitely no reason to class India as an example of quasi-
federation, because such view fails to realise that the federal 
concept is not a static point. It is also not reasonable to treat the 
Indian Constitution as a class by itself unless it implies recognition 
of the fact that structurally and operationally no two federations in 
the world are alike; each federation is, indeed a class by itself. In 
that sense alone India may be considered a novel or composite 
State, or a federation sui generis . Centralising tendency is a rather 
universal phenomenon inevitable in this age. 
 It is true, as Ambedkar pointed out, that the Indian 
Constitution has not been cast into a tight mould of federalism but 
has been designed to possess the necessary flexibility to function 
as a unitary government in moments of Emergency.33   T.T. 
Krishnamachari observed that in the normal times, the units “enjoy 
substantial and significant powers of legislation and 
administration.”34 The fact is that the Constitution has been 
designed to operate on the principle that”inspite of federalism the 
national interest out to be paramount”35  . The Constitution provided 
“the means and method” whereby “all basic matters which are 
essential to maintain the unity of country may be secured under a 
federal system”.36  The founders were, thus, concerned with 
preserving national unity by providing for a strong Central 
Government. 
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2. 9   IN CONCLUSION 
 
The Indian Constitution has got all the characteristic features 
of federal Constitution, the governmental powers, legislative, 
executive and financial are elaborately distributed between the 
government at Centre and the States. The legislative powers are 
put in three Lists, Union, State and Concurrent. In the financial 
field, the Constitution aims at distribution of revenues resources 
and taxing power in such a manner so as to avoid overlapping. The 
Constitution of India is the supreme law of the country. The Union 
is indestructible, hence the question of allowing the right to secede 
to a State does not arise, and it is a nation. The Union Parliament 
may by law make any arrangement regarding name, States and 
territory of State or a Union territory, including its representation 
in Parliament, within terms of Article 2 to 4 to the Constitution. 
This feature of the Indian federation is said to be militate against 
State autonomy. However, it should be noted that given centrifugal 
forces in India, the principle of co-operative federalism underlying 
our Constitution has in the past seen put into operation only 
because of the existence of only one strong national party. It 
should be obvious that the Indian Polity is the latest model of co-
operative federalism.      
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Chapter- 3 
 
Unitary v/s Federalism 
 
 Our Constitution, as originally adopted, constituted India in 
to a Sovereign Democratic Republic. It is sovereign in the sense 
that it is blessed with internal supremacy as well as external 
independence. It is democratic because the sovereign will of the 
people are expressed through their votes. It has a parliamentary 
form of executive, which is responsible to an elected legislature. It 
is republic since the head of the State is not a hereditary monarch 
but an elected functionary. The Constitution of India is the most 
comprehensive document in the World providing for three main 
pillars of our parliamentary democracy, namely, the Legislature, 
the Executive and the Judiciary. The Constitution like a living 
organism has to fulfill all the emerging needs and future 
eventualities. All the constitutional amendments and enactments of 
ordinary laws are carried out in order to secure justice, social, 
economic and political. The very nature of the duty entrusted to 
Parliament requires formulation of legislative, policy and enacting 
it into a binding rule of conduct. On the other hand, the 
constitutional duty of the court arising from judiciary is to annual 
all those legislative enactments which are either inconsistent with 
the provisions of the Constitution or are beyond the legislative 
competence. This has led some controversy between the legislature 
and the judiciary-involving question of relative supremacy of these 
organs. 
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 The idea of supremacy of Parliament germinated in the 
speech of the Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, on the eve of 
the Constitution Fourth Amendment 2Bill, when he posed a 
question: 
  “Why should eight Judges in the Supreme Court be 
permitted to outlaw the Act passed by elected legislatures of the 
actions of their ministers or of the officers controlled by the 
Ministers? Why should this undemocratic process be permitted in 
the name of judicial review? Why should one have more faith in 
the Court than in the Parliament?”1  
 The Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, the Scope 
of the Article 31A and Article 305 were amended to cover certain 
categories of essential welfare legislation. In the field of 
constitutional amendments, the Supreme Court had four important 
and historic occasions to deal with the matter concerning 
Parliamentary Supremacy 
(1) In “Shankri Prasad v/c Union of India2,” the Supreme Court 
held that Article 368 gives ample power to Parliament to 
amend the Constitution irrespective of Article 13(2). 
(2) In case of Sajjan Singh v/s Union of India3 the Parliament’s 
ample amending power was confirmed, but the seeds of the 
theory of implied limitations, i.e. unamendability of the 
basic feature of the Constitution were sown for the first 
time in dissenting opinion by Justice Madholkar, while 
justice M.Hidayatullah, opined that “the power to make 
amendments ought not ordinarily to be a means of escape 
from absolute constitutional restrictions” 
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(3) In the historic case of Gokalnath v/s State of Punjab,4   by a   
 slender majority of 6:5 blocked the power of Parliament so   
as to take away or abridge any of the fundamental rights. 
The decision was followed by acrimonious debates at the 
national level. It resulted into the enactment of the 
Constitution ‘Twenty Fourth’ Amendment Act, 1971, 
reasserting the supremacy of Parliament in the matter of 
constitutional amendments in respect of all parts including 
Part III of the Constitution. 
(4) In case of Keshvananda Bharti v/s State of Kerala,5 The 
Court gave a temporary relief by over-ruling much 
controversial Golak Nath case, but it put another limitation 
that Parliament is incapable of altering or destroying the 
“Basic Structure” of the Constitution. The decision seems to 
pour the old wine of Judicio-Parliamentary controversy into 
a new bottle. 
 Since the pronouncement of “Keshavananda Bharti” case, 
some national leaders, Parliamentarians and legal luminaries have 
been pleading for the Parliamentary supremacy in general respect 
to ordinary legislation and in particular in exercise of constituent 
power. Mr.H.R.Gokhale, Minister of Law and Social Justice, 
asserted before West Bengal Lawyers’ Conference that  
“Parliament was supreme and this has been recognised. If the 
people of India decided that certain changes should be effected in 
the interest of the people, for their social and economic advance, 
no Court, however high, could stand in the way.”6  Not only this, 
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the Constitution 42nd Amendment Act, 1976, has made effort to 
assert parliamentary supremacy beyond doubt. 
 The rendering ineffective of judgments or orders of 
competent Court and Tribunals by changing their basis by 
legislative enactment is a well-known pattern of all validating 
Acts. Such validating legislation, which removes the causes for 
ineffectiveness or invalidity of actions or proceedings, has not been 
considered as an encroachment on judicial power. 
Again the supremacy of legislature is confirmed by making 
an appropriate amendment in the impugned Statute, to render 
Supreme Court decision ineffective in respect to the said Statute. 
In case of, M/s. Utkal C& J (P) Ltd v/s State of Orissa7, the 
Government of Orissa issued the Notification under 1981 Act, 
regards to some specific contracts. The said Notification was 
challenged in the Supreme Court, where it was held that it should 
not be applicable to certain contracts, which had included and 
mentioned in the notification. Subsequently State Government 
promulgated ordinance purporting to render Supreme Court 
decision ineffective. In challenge of the said Amendment Supreme 
Court held that, “it could not be said that the while purporting to 
amend Act had encroached upon judicial power and set aside the 
binding judgment of Supreme Court”.  
The Constitution of India is an excellent document of 
splendid compromise. The Constitution brings into existence 
different constitutional entities, viz., the Union, the State and 
Union Territories. It creates three major instruments of power, i.e., 
the Legislature, the executive and the Judiciary. It demarcates three 
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spheres minutely and expects them to exercise their respective 
powers without overstepping their limits. Law regulates the Scope 
of the power and the manner of its exercise. “ No authority create 
under the Constitution is Supreme and all authorities function 
under the supreme law of the land.”8 
 The legislature and judiciary are both supreme with their 
respective spheres9 thus, the existence of fearless and independent 
judiciary can be said to be the very basic foundation of the 
constitutional structure in India10. Our Constitution though it does 
not accept the strict doctrine of separation of powers, provides for 
an independent judiciary in the State, it constitutes High Court for 
each State, prescribes the institutional conditions of service of the 
Judges thereof, confers extensive jurisdiction on it to issue writs to 
keep all Tribunals including in appropriate cases the Governments, 
within bounds and gives to it the power of superintendence over all 
Courts and Tribunals in the territory over which it has jurisdiction. 
But the makers of the Constitution also realised that it is the 
subordinate judiciary in India, who are brought most closely into 
contact with the people and it is no less important perhaps indeed 
even more important, that their independence should be placed 
beyond question in the case of the superior Judges. Presumably to 
secure the independence of the judiciary from the executive the 
constitution introduced a group of articles in Chapter VI of Part VI 
under the heading “Subordinate Courts.” 11 
 The utmost need of the age is not the supremacy of any one 
organ over the other but a proper understanding, confidence and 
mutual difference between all the governmental organs. The 
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judiciary does not declare a law unconstitutional enthusiastically or 
willingly. The Supreme Court laid down the principle underlying 
the exercise of the power of judicial review as early as 1952. In 
State of Madras v/s Rao,12  the Supreme Court laid the guidelines 
as follows: - 
 “ If then the Courts in the Country face up to such important 
and non-to-easy task, it is not out of any desire to tilt at legislative 
authority in crusader’s spirit, but in discharge of a duty plainly laid 
upon them by the Constitution.” 
 The legislature should also follow the same path. It is 
submitted, however, that unfortunately the judicial 
pronouncements have not been always hailed in a good spirit. The 
important pronouncements have been nullified by hasty legislation 
or ordinances. The condition of tension and claim of supremacy by 
one organ over the other organs of the government is not 
appreciable.  
The Supreme Court pointed in U.P.Controversy case the 
necessity of the amicable relations among all organs of the 
Government that,  “These two august bodies (the judiciary and the 
legislature) as well as the executive which is another important 
constituent of a democratic State, must function not in a spirit of 
hostility, but rationally harmoniously and in a spirit of 
understanding.”13 
 The past practice of constitutional amendments shows that it 
is easy to make constitutional amendment than of an ordinary law. 
Nobody appreciates Golak Nath verdict but there rest some truth. 
The assumption that legislation is remedy of all evils is ill founded. 
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Lord Denning in “ The Road to Justice”, observed, “Some lawyers 
think that the sovereign remedy for all ills is an Act of Parliament. 
They assume that Parliament knows everything and can do 
everything. But Parliament is made up of men as we are, who have 
not the time or the capacity to guard all the points at which 
freedom threatened.”14 
 Hence, to avoid the extreme anarchy and tyranny, there 
should be discipline in a democracy and sufficient democracy in 
discipline. It may be earnestly summed up in the words of Hon’ble 
Justice Jagan Mohan Reddy that “The edifice of our Constitution is 
built upon and stands on several props, remove any one of them, 
the Constitution collapse.”15   
The above-mentioned amendments were also made 
applicable with retrospective, effects to make important legislative 
functions valid. 
 
3.1 The Retrospective effect to the retrospective operation of  
the Constitution 
  
 The question of validity of the Retrospective operation of 
Constitution was raised in the case of,  Sarwarlal V/s State of 
Hyderabad16, where Section.6 (4) of the Hyderabad (Abolition of 
Jagirs) Regulation (1358 Fasli), promulgated by the Military 
Governor, and Sections 4(1)(c) and 4(2) of the Hyderabad Jagirs 
(Commutation) Regulation (25 of 1359 Fasli), promulgated by the 
Chief Minister were challenged. It was held that they could not be 
challenged on the ground of want of legislative competence or 
colourable exercise of legislative authority, because Parliament had 
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made the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951, included the 
Abolition and Commutation Regulations in the Ninth Schedule, 
and there by virtue of Art.31-B, the two Regulations are exempt 
from challenge on ground that, they are inconsistent with or take 
away or abridge any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III 
of the Constitution and Jagirs taken over prior to the Constitution, 
Retrospective operation of Constitution- Rights extinguished by 
abolition – Regulation not revived. 
 The reason for the bringing out First Amendment, in the 
Constitution Act 1951, was that, during the first fifteen months of 
working of the Constitution, certain difficulties had been brought 
to light by judicial decisions and pronouncements specially in 
regard to fundament rights. In the Constitution citizen’s right under 
Article 19(1)(g), to practice any profession or to carry on any 
occupation, trade or business was subject to “reasonable 
restrictions” which the laws of the State might impose “in the 
interest of the general public”, and although these words were 
comprehensive enough to cover any scheme of nationalisation 
which the State might undertake.  It was considered desirable to 
place the matter beyond doubt by a clarificatery edition to Article 
19(6). Article 31 had also given rise to unanticipated difficulties 
for, notwithstanding the provisions of Clauses (4) and (6) of the 
Article 31, the implementation of important measures of agrarian 
reform passed by the State Legislatures had been held up due to 
dilatory litigation. Hence the main objects of the Act (Amendment 
Act 1951) were, accordingly, to amend Article 19 for the purpose 
indicated above and to insert provisions fully securing the 
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constitutional validity of “Zamindari” abolition laws in general and 
certain specified State Acts in particular. 
3.2      The Legislature and the Executive 
 
 Executive power of State is subject to legislative power 
under Cl.5 (1) of Fifth Schedule. The legislative power in Clause 
(1) of Art.245 equally is “subject to the provisions of the 
Constitution” i.e., Fifth Schedule. Clause (1) of Para 5 of Part B of 
the Fifth Schedule applicable to the scheduled area, adumbrates 
with a non obstinate clause that “Notwithstanding anything in the 
Constitution, in other words, despite of the power, under Art.298, 
the Governor may, by public notification, direct that any particular 
act of Parliament or of the Legislature of a State shall not apply to 
a scheduled area or any part thereof in the State or shall apply to a 
scheduled area or any part thereof in the State, subject to such 
exceptions and modifications as he may specify in the notification 
and any direction given under Clause (1) of Para 5, may be given 
so as to have retrospective effect”.17  The executive power of the 
State is, therefore, subject to the legislative power under Cl.5(1) of 
the Fifth Schedule. 
 It would be therefore, be clear that the executive power of 
State to dispose of its property under Art.298 is subject to the 
provisions in the Fifth Schedule, as an integral scheme of the 
Constitution. The Legislative power of the State under Art.245 is 
also subject to the Fifth Schedule, to regulate the allotment of the 
Government land in scheduled area. 
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  Now the question arises, how to recognise the functions of 
the Government is whether it is Executive, legislative or a judicial?
  The functions, which do not fall strictly within field 
legislative or judicial, fall in the residuary class and must be 
regarded as executive. It cannot however, be assumed that the 
legislative functions are exclusively performed by Legislature, 
executive functions by executive, and judicial functions by 
judiciary alone. The Constitution has not made an absolute or rigid 
division of functions between the three agencies of the State. In the 
complexity of problems which modern Government have to face 
and the plethora of Parliamentary business to which it inevitably 
leads, it becomes necessary that the executive should often 
exercise powers of subordinate legislation. It is indeed possible to 
characterise with precision that an agency of the State is executive, 
legislative or judicial, but it cannot be predicated that a particular 
function exercised by any individual agency is necessarily of the 
character which the agency bears.18 
 Under the Indian Constitution Parliamentary Supremacy’s 
principle is Popularly associated with the British constitutionalism, 
but the States’ self identity and concept of federalism in deserving 
States’ autonomy is kept alive, by way of division of powers 
between two governments, i.e. Union and States. There are 
according to Dicey, three legal features in federal Constitution, 
namely, 
(a) Supremacy of a written Constitution; 
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(b) Distribution of Powers amongst the various organs of the 
federation and of the regional units of the federation, by the 
provisions of that Constitution; and,  
(c) Judicial review or enforcement of that Supreme Constitution 
as law, while to a lawyer, the common test of a federal 
Constitution is distribution of powers between the Union 
and the Regions, which are legally justiciable, so that the 
judiciary may intervene whenever there is a complaint of 
one of the parties to the Union having transgressed the 
constitutional limits of its power. 
Since the federal scheme in the Constitution of India is 
adopted from the Government of India Act 1935, the short details 
regarding distribution of legislative under the said Act, will help us 
to follow the pattern of present Constitution. The three legislative 
Lists – I, II, and III respectively enumerated the powers vested in 
the Federal Legislature, the Provincial Legislature and to both of 
them concurrently [s-100]. If, however, a matter was not covered 
by any of the three Lists, that would be treated as a residuary 
power of the Federal Parliament [s-104]. The Section 107 of Govt. 
of India Act 1935 provided for predominance of federal law in 
case of inconsistency with a Provincial law, in the Concurrent 
Sphere. 
  Borrowing the pattern of treble enumeration from the 
Government of India Act 1935, the Constitution of India makes a 
three fold division of powers – List I (exclusively Union Subjects); 
List II (exclusively State Subjects); List III (Concurrent sphere of 
common interest to both Union and States) [Art.246]. 
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The residuary power belongs to the Union, If, after giving 
liberal interpretation to the relevant Entries in three Lists, a 
particular subject does not appear to be covered by any of them, 
the power to legislate on that subject will belong to the Union 
Parliament. [Art.248] 
The List I or the Union List includes subjects over which the 
Union shall have exclusive power of legislation, including 97 items 
or subjects. These include defence, foreign affairs, banking, 
currency and coinage, Union duties, and taxes and the like. 
List II or the State List comprises 66 items or entries over 
which the State Legislature shall have exclusive power of 
Legislation, such as public order and police, local Government, 
public health and sanitation, agriculture, forest and fisheries, 
education, State taxes and duties, and the like. 
List III gives Concurrent powers to the Union and the State 
Legislatures over 47 items, such as criminal law and procedure, 
civil procedure, marriage, contracts, torts, welfare of labor, social 
insurance, economic and social planning. 
The Lists, in the main, substantially follow the Lists in the 
Government of India Act 1935, and, accordingly, present the same 
feature of elaborateness. The framers of our Constitution attempted 
to exhaust the whole field of legislation, as they could 
comprehend, into numerous items, thus narrowing down the scope 
for filling up the details by the judicial process of amplifying the 
given items. In the case of overlapping of a matter as between the 
three Lists predominance has given to the Union Legislature, as 
under the Government of India Act 1935. Thus, the power of the 
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State Legislature to legislate with respect to matters enumerated in 
the State List has been made subject to the power of Parliament to 
legislate in respect of matters enumerated in the Union and the 
Concurrent Lists. 19 [Art.246 (2)(3)] 
 In case of repugnancy between a law of a State and a law of 
the Union in the Concurrent sphere, the latter will prevail. The 
State legislation may, however, prevail notwithstanding such 
repugnancy, if the State law was reserved for the President and has 
received his assent.20 [Art.254 (2)]  
       In one important respect, the scheme of distribution differs 
from that under the Act of 1935, viz., as to the ‘residual’ powers. 
While under the Act of 1935, the residual powers were vested 
neither in the Federal Legislature nor in the State Legislature but 
were placed at the hands of Governor-General, the Constitution 
vests residuary power, i.e the power to legislate in respect of the 
matter not enumerated in any one of three Lists – in the Union 
Legislature [Art.248, Entry 97, List I], but final determination as to 
whether a particular matter falls under the residuary power or not 
is theft of Courts.21  
 Another innovation is the provision in Art.249. Under this 
Article, Union Parliament is empowered to make temporary laws 
overriding the normally exclusive powers of the State Legislature,- 
relating to matters enumerated in the State List, if by a special 
majority the Council of States declares that this is expedient in the 
national interest.22 
The system of distribution of legislative powers between the 
Union and State Legislature under the Indian Constitution is 
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unique in so far as enumeration of subjects in the Seventh 
Schedule is threefold. Several outstanding features mark this 
system: - 
(a) By enumerating as many as 211 subjects in the three 
Lists, it aims at exhaustion, in order to minimise 
litigation over conflict of jurisdiction as between the 
Union Parliament and a State Legislature. 
(b) Secondly, wherever any conflict could be anticipated, the 
Constitution has given predominance to the Union 
jurisdiction, so as to give the federal system a strong 
central bias. 
(c) Under the Proclamation of Emergency. While a 
Proclamation of “Emergency” made by the President is 
in operation, Parliament shall have similar power to 
legislate with respect to State Subjects.[Arts. 
250,353(b)].A law made by Parliament, which 
Parliament would not but for the issue of such 
Proclamation have been competent to make, shall to the 
extent of incompetence, cease to have effect on the 
expiration of a period of six months after the 
Proclamation has ceased to operate, except as respects 
things done or omitted to be done before the expiration of 
the said period.[Art. 250] 
(d) By agreement between States: - 
 If the Legislatures of two or more States resolve 
that it shall be lawful for Parliament to make laws with 
respect to any matters included in the State List relating 
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to those States, Parliament shall have such power as 
regards such States It shall also be open to any other 
State to adopt such Union legislation in relation to itself 
by a resolution passed in that behalf in the Legislature of 
the State. In short, this extension of the jurisdiction of the 
Union Parliament by consent of the State Legislatures23. 
[Art.252].  
(e) To implement Treaties: -  
 Parliament shall have the power to legislate wither 
aspect to any subject for the purpose of implementing 
treaties or international agreements and   conventions. In 
other words, the normal distribution of powers will not 
stand in the way of Parliament to enact legislation for 
carrying out its international obligations, even though 
such legislation may be necessary in relation to a State 
subject.24 [Art.253]. 
(f) Under a Proclamation of Failure of Constitutional 
Machinery in the State:- 
 When such a Proclamation, is made by the 
President, in such situation, the President    may declare 
that the powers of the Legislature of the State in question 
shall be exercisable by or under the authority of 
Parliament [Art.356 (1)(b)]. 
It must not be supposed, however, that the Indian 
Constitution lays no limits to the federal power or leaves nothing 
to the State Legislatures. By the application of the doctrine of “Pith 
and Substance” and of Liberal interpretation of both the Union and 
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the State Lists, the Supreme Court carved out an area for State 
legislation, even in cases of apparent overlapping 
 
3.3    Relation between the Union and the States 
 
Article 245 of the Indian Constitution, provides that:- 
1. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament 
may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of 
India, and the Legislature of a State may make laws for the 
whole or any part of the State. 
2. No law made by Parliament shall be deemed to be invalid on  
the ground that it would have extra territorial operation. 
Simple reading of Art.245, confirms, that Parliament and 
State Legislature both has power to make laws with respect to their 
territorial limits, but law of Parliament has exclusive power to 
make law with respect to any territory of India, under certain 
circumstances. 
Article 246, of Indian Constitution provides that:- 
(1) Notwithstanding any thing in clauses (2) and (3), Parliament 
has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the 
matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule.( in 
this Constitution referred to as “Union List”). 
(2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament and 
Subject to clause (1), the Legislature of any State also, have 
power to make law with respect to any of the matters 
enumerated in List III, in the Seventh Schedule (in this 
Constitution referred to as the “Concurrent List”). 
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(3) Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature of any State 
has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part 
thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List 
II in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as 
the “State List”). 
(4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any 
matter for any part of the territory of India not included, in a 
State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter 
enumerated in the State List. 
 The simple reading of Art.246 explain that, the Union and 
the State has the power to make laws in respect to the entries given 
under Union List and State List respectively. While Union and 
State has power to make laws respect to heads/ entries enumerated 
in Concurrent List. But in spite of straight and strict division of 
powers, Parliament – Union Government has exclusive power to 
make laws with respect to matters enumerated in State List, under 
certain circumstances. 
 The question of a conflict between Union and State 
jurisdiction primarily arises where the Constitution provides two 
exclusive Lists in India. Since the question is legal question, its 
solution must also be legal, and thus call for legal interpretation of 
the constitutional instrument by the Courts. 
Where there is a conflict between rival lists, it is necessary 
to examine the impugned legislation with general principles of 
interpretation of the concerned legislative entry or entries. 
In determining whether an enactment, provisions, is 
legislation “with respect to” a given power is not the consequences 
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of the enactment on the subject matter or whether it affects it, but 
whether in its pith and substance it is a law upon the subject matter 
in question.25  
It was held in M/s. Ujagar Prints etc. v/s Union India26, that, 
Entries to the legislative lists are not sources of the legislative 
power but merely topics or fields of legislation and must receive a 
liberal construction inspired by a broad and generous spirit and not 
in a narrow pedantic sense. The expression “with respect to” in 
Art.246 brings in the doctrine of “Pith and Substance” in the 
understanding of the exertion of the legislative power and 
whenever the question of legislative-competence is raised the test 
is whether the legislation, looked at as a whole is substantially 
“with respect to” the particular topic of legislation. If the 
legislation has a substantial and not merely a remote connection 
with entry, the matter may well be taken to be legislation on topic. 
Article 246(1) and Article 246(3) words, “Notwithstanding” and 
“subject to” mean that where an entry is in general terms in List II 
and part of that entry is in specific terms in List I, the entry in List 
I takes effect notwithstanding the entry in List II. This is also on 
the principle that the “special” excludes the “general” and the 
general entry in List II is subject to the special entry in List I. 
 Furthermore, the word “notwithstanding” in Cl.(1) also 
means that if it is not possible to reconcile the two entries, the 
entry in List I will prevail. But before that happens attempt should 
be made to decide in which List a particular legislation falls. For 
deciding under which entry a particular legislation falls, the theory 
of “Pith and Substance” has been evolved by the Courts. If in pith 
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and substance a legislation falls within one List or the other, but 
some portion of the subject-matter of that legislation incidentally 
trenches upon and might come to fall under another List, the Act as 
a whole would be valid notwithstanding such incidental 
trenching.27  
 
3.4   General Principles for Interpretation of Legislative Lists. 
 
 The entries in the three Lists are only the legislative heads or 
fields of legislation; they demarcate the area over which the 
appropriate legislature can operate. Widest amplitude should be 
given to the language or the entries. But some of the entries in the 
different Lists or in same list may overlap or may appear to be in 
direct conflict with each other. At that time an endeavor must be 
made to solve the conflict by having recourse to the context and 
scheme of the Act, and a reconciliation should be attempted 
between two apparently conflicting jurisdictions by reading the 
two entries together and by interpreting, and where by necessary 
modifying the language of the one by that of the other. A general 
power should not be so interpreted as to nullify a particular power 
conferred by the same instrument.28 
 Earlier to the above decision the, Supreme Court has 
observed in case of  Calcutta Gas Company (proprietary) Ltd. v/s 
State of West  Bengal29  the matter of construing entries in the Lists 
given in Schedule Seventh of the Constitution was well settled, 
under the rules of interpretation that widest amplitude should be 
given to the language of the entries; But in case where it seems that 
entries in the different Lists appear to be in direct conflict with 
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each other, or seems to be overlapping, then it is the duty of the 
Court to reconcile the entries, and every attempt should be made to 
harmonize the apparently conflicting entries not only of different 
Lists but also of the same List and to reject that construction which 
will rob one of the entries of its entire content to make it nugatory. 
 The above series of Supreme Court Judgment confirms the 
fact that during the interpretation of impugned legislation, the 
‘Words’ in legislative entries must receive wide interpretation and 
narrow construction should be out of place. The widest possible 
amplitude must be given to the words used each general word must 
be held to extend to ancillary or subsidiary matters which can 
fairly be said to be comprehended in it,30 and if during 
interpretation, it is found out that the impugned legislation in its 
pith and substance falls substantially within an entry or entries 
conferring legislative powers, then the impugned legislation is 
valid one. 
3.4.1      Doctrine of Pith and Substance 
     
The Pith and Substance theory has been defined in case of 
Synthetic and Chemicals Ltd. v/s State of U.P. and others31  that the 
Nature and Scope of the concerned Act, required to be interpreted, 
because “ A Constitution is the mechanism under which laws are 
to be made and not merely an Act which declares what the law is 
to be. A Constitution is living and organic thing and must adopt 
itself to the changing situations and pattern in which it has to be 
interpreted. Being the division of powers and jurisdiction in a 
federal Constitution as a scheme, it is desirable to read the 
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Constitution in harmonious way. The power to legislate is given by 
Art.246 and other Articles of the Constitution. The three Lists of 
the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution are legislative heads or 
fields of legislation. These demarcate the area over which the 
appropriate legislatures can operate.” Hence, Constitution being an 
organic document, it should be interpreted in the light of the 
experience. It has to be flexible and dynamic so that it adopt itself 
to the changing conditions and accommodate it self in a pragmatic 
way to the goals of national development and the industrialisation 
of the Country. 
3.4.2      Validity Test for Pith and Substance Theory. 
 
In deciding the Pith and Substance of the Legislature, “the 
true test is not to find out whether the Act has encroached upon or 
invaded any forbidden field but it is the true intent of the Act 
which will determine the validity of the Act”.32  While in case of 
Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills v/s State of U.P.33 , it was held that, in 
Pith  and Substance U.P.Act 23 of 1971, was for acquisition of 
scheduled undertakings. Hence the field of acquisition thereunder 
by State Legislation falls within Entry 24, List II, and it is not 
occupied by Industries Act 1951,(IDR Act) of Central Government 
under entries 7 and 52 of List I, of Schedule Seventh. 
 The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, is 
essentially concerned with the control over the management of the 
industrial undertaking in declared industries. By the acquisition 
under the U.P. Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) Act 1971 and 
vesting of the scheduled undertakings in the Corporation, the 
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scheduled undertakings will nevertheless be under the control of 
the Central Government as exercised by the provisions of IDR Act, 
because the Corporation would be the owner and would be 
amenable to the authority and jurisdiction of the Central 
Government as exercised by the provisions of IDR Act would 
continue to apply to the scheduled undertakings, sugar being a 
declared industry, and scheduled undertakings are industrial 
undertakings within the meaning of the IDR Act. No provision 
from IDR Act was pointed out to show that in implementing or 
enforcing such a provision, the impugned legislation would be an 
impediment. Therefore, there is no conflict between the U.P.Sugar 
Undertakings (Acquisition) Act 1971, and the control exercised by 
the Central Government under the provisions of the IDR Act and 
there is not even a remote encroachment on the field occupied by 
IDR Act. In this decision, the Court has considered the importance 
of the factor of encroachment at the time of deciding the validity of 
impugned legislation under Pith and Substance theory. 
 The doctrine of Pith and Substance postulates for its 
application, that the impugned law is substantially within the 
legislative competence of the particular legislature that made it, but 
only incidentally encroached upon the legislative field of another 
Legislature. The doctrine saves this incidental encroachment if 
only the law is in Pith and Substance within the legislative field of 
the particular Legislature, which made it.34  
 Since the entries are likely to overlap occasionally, it is 
usual to examine the Pith and Substance of legislation with a view 
to determining to which the entry they can be substantially related, 
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a slight connection with another entry in another list 
notwithstanding. If, however, no entry in any of three Lists, then it 
belongs exclusively to parliament under entry 97 of the Union List 
as a topic of legislation, read with Art.248.35 
 While interpreting the impugned legislation the doctrine of 
occupied field, if necessary, has to be apply in conferring the 
validity of impugned Statute. The Doctrine of occupied field is 
mainly applied to the cases of law made with reference to entries in 
Concurrent List. It has been explained with full details in case of, 
State  of Andhra Pradesh v/s Mc Dowell and Co.36  that, once the 
impugned State enactment is within four corners of entry in List II, 
no central law whether made with reference to an entry in list I or 
with reference to an entry in List III can affect the validity of such 
State enactment. The plea of occupied field is totally out of place 
in such a context. If a particular matter is within the exclusive 
competence of State Legislature, i.e., in List II that represents the 
prohibited field for Union. Similarly, if any matter is within the 
exclusive competence of the Union, it becomes a prohibited field 
for the States. The concept of occupied field is really relevant in 
the case of laws made with reference to entries in List III. In other 
words, whenever a place of legislation is said to be beyond the 
legislative competence of a State Legislature, what one must do is 
to find out, by applying the rule of Pith and Substance, whether 
that legislation falls within any of the entries in List II. If it does, 
no further question arises; the attack upon the ground of legislative 
competence then shall fail. It cannot be, said that even in such a 
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case, Article 246(3) can be employed to invalidate the legislation 
on the ground of Legislative incompetence of State Legislature. 
  The question of legislative competency can also be solved 
under the doctrine of colourable legislation. 
3.4.3      Doctrine of Colourable Legislation 
 
 The doctrine of colourable legislation is relevant only in 
connection with the question of legislative competency.37 
Colourable legislation would emerge only when a legislature has 
no power to legislate on an item either because it is not included in 
the list assigned to it under the respective entries in the Seventh 
Schedule of the Constitution or an account of limitations imposed 
either under Part III of the Constitution relating to Fundamental 
Rights or any other power under the Constitution. As the 
Legislature enacts a statute on an assumption of such power, but 
when on examination if it is found that it has traveled beyond its 
power or competence or in transgression of the limitations imposed 
by the Constitution itself, such an enactment is called a colourable 
legislation. 
  It has reference only to the legislative incompetence and not 
to the power as such. If the legislature enacts law in pretext of the 
exercise of its legislative power, though actually it did not possess 
such power, the legislation to that extent becomes void as the 
legislature makes its Act only in pretence of and in purported 
colourable exercise of its power. 38 
 In branch of law dealing with the doctrine of colourable 
exercise of legislative power, the “Colourable” is not “ tainted with 
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bad faith or evil motive,” it is not pejorative or crooked. 
Conceptually ‘colourability’ is bound up with incompetency. A 
thing is colourable which in appearance only and not in reality, 
what it purports to be. Malice or motive is beside the point, and it 
is not permissible to suggest Parliament or any other legislatures 
on the score of malafides.39 
 When a challenge is made to the validity of an Act on the 
ground that it is colourable legislation, what has to be proved to the 
satisfaction of the Court is that, though the Act ostensibly is within 
the legislative competence of the Legislature in question, in 
substance and in reality it covers a field which is outside its 
legislative competence,40 and thus proving the ground of 
colourable legislation, the Impugned Act might be declared as an 
invalid. So, when in process of interpretation of Impugned Act or 
Statutes; if the Court says that a particular legislation is a 
colourable one, it means the Legislature has transgressed its 
legislative powers in a covert or indirect manner, it has adopted a 
device to out step the limits of its powers, in such cases, although 
the legislation purports to have been enacted under a particular 
entry, if it is really outside it, then it would be void. But when 
some provisions of an Act are “Ultra-vires,”the question whether 
the Statute as a whole must be pronounced to be ‘ultra vires,’ 
depends upon the question whether what remains is so inextricably 
bound up with the part declared invalid that what remains cannot 
independently survive, or as it has sometimes been put, whether on 
a fair review of the whole matter it can be assumed that the 
Legislature would have enacted at all that which survives without 
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enacting the part that is ‘ultra-vires.’If the offending provisions of 
the Act are not so inextricably bound up with the part that is valid, 
the whole Act cannot be pronounced to be “Ultra-Vires”.41  
 Before starting an analysis of specific interpretative 
techniques adopted by the Courts in India, it will not be out of 
place to point out the scope for such interpretative techniques in 
the context of the complexity of the pattern of distribution of 
legislative powers in India. In all the federations the division of 
powers between the Centre and the States is formulated both from 
the point of view of territorial operation and from the point of view 
of subject matters. As far as the Central legislature is concerned, it 
has the territorial jurisdiction to legislate over the entire country 
and its laws having even extra territorial operation cannot be 
questioned before municipal Courts. In India the Constitution itself 
says “no law made by Parliament shall be deemed to be invalid on 
the ground that it would have extra- territorial operation.” On the 
other hand, the territorial jurisdiction of federating States is always 
limited and the laws enacted by them can always be subjected to 
challenge on the ground that they affect persons or property 
situated outside the particular State. The position of States in India 
is not different and the Constitution expressly provides that a State 
legislature shall have the power to legislate for the territory of that 
State or any part thereof. And the principle of territorial nexus has 
to be relied upon if a host of State laws are to be saved from 
invalidity. 
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3.4.4      The Rule of Territorial Nexus. 
  
 The legislative competence to enact laws having extra- 
territorial operation is said to be an attribute of sovereignty and 
therefore, legislative bodies which do not possess sovereignty at 
least in the external sphere are denied the competence to make 
laws with extra- territorial operation. Privy Council was faced with 
the problem of colonial legislatures, as the grant of legislative 
powers to them had been expressed by the British Parliament to 
extend to the making of laws “for the peace, order and good 
government” of the respective colonies. And colonial legislative 
powers had always been limited to the making of laws restricted to 
operate within the territory of the colony, unless extra- territorial 
jurisdiction could be said to have been conferred expressly or by 
necessary implication.42 
 The Privy Council and the Federal Court in cases arising 
under the Government of India Act, 1935, applied the rule of 
territorial nexus. The cases decided by the Federal Court and Privy 
Council related to the laws enacted by the Central Parliament. But 
such pronouncements are still helpful in the context of the present 
Constitution while dealing with vires of laws enacted by State 
Legislatures. It is so because there was no general declaration 
under the Government of India Act, 1935, like the one in the 
present Constitution, namely, that a law of the Central legislature 
shall not be invalid by reason of its extra-territorial operation.43  
Since such a concession in favour of the Central Legislature was 
limited to a handful of cases, it was assumed that the Central 
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Legislature under the Government of India Act, 1935 did not 
possess the general power to legislate extra-territorially. The 
Federal Court of India was called upon, for the first time, to apply 
the rule of territorial nexus while determining the constitutional 
validity of Section 4 of the Income-Tax Act, which was impugned 
on the ground of its extra-territorial operation in Governor General 
v. Raleigh Investment Co.44  The facts of the case were that the 
assessed-company was duly registered in England with its 
registered office in London. It held shares in nine sterling 
companies, which were also incorporated in England These nine 
sterling companies carried on business in British India. They 
earned income, profits or gains in British India, declared, and paid 
dividends in England to their shareholders including the assessed-
company. The assessed-company was charged to pay income tax 
under Section 4 of the Indian Income-tax Act. The Federal Court 
rejected the argument that the law suffered from the voice of extra- 
territoriality and that imposition of tax on assessed-company was 
bad because it was neither resident in India nor carried on any 
business in India. Spens C.J., upholding the validity of the 
impugned section ruled that the circumstances that the nine sterling 
companies derived their profits or gains out of business carried on 
by them in British India out of which they paid dividends to the 
assessed-company created sufficient nexus so as to establish the 
tax liability on the assessed-company in respect of income it 
derived from the nine sterling companies. 
 The rule territorial nexus was approved and applied by the 
Privy Council in Wallace Brothers and Co. Ltd. v/s. Commissioner 
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of Income Tax.45  In that case, the assessed –company which was 
incorporated in England and had its registered office there, was a 
partner in a firm which carried on business in British India. This 
connection of the assessed-company was considered sufficient to 
enable the Government of India to tax not only the income or 
profits made by the assessee as a partner in the firm but also its 
income or profits, which accrued for an outside British India. 
Pronouncing the unanimous opinion, Lord Uthwatt, on analogy of 
the operation of taxing statutes in England, said that:- 
“The derivation from British India of the major part of its 
income for a year gives to a company as respect that year a 
territorial connection sufficient to justify the company being 
treated as at home in British India, for all purposes relating to 
taxation on its income for that year from whatever source that 
income may be derived”.46 
 The last case to be decided on the point under the 
Government of India Act, 1935, was that of A.H.Wadia v/s 
Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay.47 It was decided by the 
Federal Court of India at a time when the jurisdiction of the Privy 
Council in relation to India had been abolished and thereby the 
Federal Court had become the highest Court of appeal. The other 
notable change was that by section 6 of the Indian Independence 
Act, 1947, the legislature of the Dominion of India was conferred 
full power to make law including laws having extra-territorial 
operation. And, the case could have been disposed of on the basis 
of above said provision of the Indian Independence Act, 1947. But 
the Federal Court reiterating the power of sovereign legislature to 
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enact laws with extra-territorial operation also discussed the rule of 
territorial nexus. In that case Gwalior Government had advanced 
loans to company, which utilised the loans for business purposes in 
British India. The loan was advanced at Gwalior, the interest was 
payable there and the debentures were also to be deposited there. 
The Indian income-tax authorities had assessed income tax on the 
interest received by Gwalior State (a State outside British India). 
The Federal Court allowed the assessment on the basis of territorial 
nexus and pointed out that before declaring an impugned law 
invalid on the ground of extra-territoriality, the Court had to apply 
the principle of territorial nexus. However, neither the Privy 
Council in Wallace Brothers and Company’s case nor the Federal 
Court in A.H.Wadia’s case made any effort to lay down any test 
for determining the rule of territorial nexus 
 
(a) Application of Territorial Nexus Rule under the present  
Constitution. 
  
The framers of the Indian Constitution intended the cautious 
use of the rule of territorial nexus. On the other hand, the 
preclusion of State Legislature power from imposing taxes on 
inter-State sales itself indicated that despite the implicit denial to 
States of power to enact laws with extra-territorial operation, the 
potentiality of State Legislature powers being used to enact laws 
affecting persons or property outside the State could not be totally 
ruled out. The study hereafter will show that the judiciary has been 
more inclined to save the State laws on the basis of territorial 
nexus rule without at same time encouraging barriers in the free 
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flow of goods from one State to other. The rules have been 
extended to cover different types of laws instead of being confined 
to income-tax legislation to which the triology of pre-Constitution 
cases related.  
 The first attempt towards extension of the scope of territorial 
nexus rule was made in State of Bombay v/s United Motors (India) 
Ltd,48  where the Constitutional validity of Bombay Sales Tax Act, 
1952 was challenged in so far as it imposed a general tax on every 
dealer whose turnover in respect of sales was competed within the 
State. The respondents who were dealers in motorcars in Bombay 
contented that the impugned law affected transactions made in 
other States as well. Repelling the contention Patanjali Sastri C.J., 
made it clear that the constitutional validity of the relevant 
statutory provision turned on the existence of a sufficient territorial 
connection between the taxing State and what it sought to tax. The 
learned Chief Justice also expressed the view that in the case of 
sales it was not necessary that the sale or purchase should have 
taken place within the territorial limits of a State in the sense that 
all the ingredients of a sale like the agreement to sell, the passing 
of title, delivery goods etc. should have taken place in one and the 
same State. 
 The decision in State of Bombay v/s United Motors (India) 
Ltd., explains the scope of the Explanation to Article 286(1) and 
deals with, what might be termed, “Explanation Sales.” That 
decision, however, does not deal with cases where the sale in 
question does not satisfy the requirement of the Explanation 
leading to the fixation of the fictional situs of the sale determining 
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the State by which the tax might be levied. Whether any and, if so, 
which is the State which can levy a tax on a sale, not covered by 
the Explanation, is not dealt with by that decision at all. 
 Under the provisions of law regarding sale or purchase of 
goods a transaction made for sale or purchase of goods is not a 
unilateral transaction but a bilateral one and when it is looked at 
from the point of view of a sale or purchase it is one transaction 
which has two facets. From the point of view of a seller it is a sale 
transaction and from the point of view of a purchaser it is purchase 
transaction. When therefore, the transaction is one on which a tax 
on sale or purchase can be levied it does not necessarily mean that 
only a sales tax can be levied and not a purchase tax. The inside 
dealer may therefore, be taxed on his purchases or if he sells in 
retail to actual consumers in the State he may be taxed on the 
sales.49  
 Thereafter, in Tata Iron and Steel Co. v/s State of Bihar,50  it 
was argued that the rule of territorial nexus was confined to 
income-tax legislation alone and had no application to other kind 
of law, it was pointed out by the Court that it was too late to 
contend that the rule of territorial nexus did not apply to sales tax 
legislation at all. Allowing the validity of Section 2 of the Bihar 
Sales Tax Act, 1949, which authorised the State to impose sales 
tax on the sale of goods produced or manufactured in Bihar, 
irrespective of the fact that under the general law relating to sale of 
goods the property in goods passed outside the State, the Supreme 
Court said that the fact that the goods were manufactured or 
produced in the State was sufficient connection to empower the 
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State Legislature to impose tax on the sales or purchase of such 
goods. The applicability of the rule was reiterated in subsequent 
decisions as well.  
 The issue of the applicability of territorial nexus rule was 
raised in case of State of Bombay v/s R.M.D.C.51 while challenging 
the constitutionality of Bombay Lotteries and Prize Competitions 
Control and Tax Act, 1948 (as amended by Bombay Act No.XXX 
of 1952). The Statute was upheld; insofar as it sought to tax the 
respondent who was the organizer of R.M.D.C. crosswords though 
a weekly newspaper ‘Sporting Star’ printed and published at 
Bangalore, the Supreme Court elaborately discussed the issue of 
the applicability of territorial nexus rule to such cases. The Court 
found that advertisements, on which basis the business was 
conducted, were reaching a considerable number of residents in 
Bombay. The prize competitors filled up the entry forms along 
with the entry fees at collection depots set up in the State of 
Bombay or sent the same by post from Bombay to Bangalore. The 
standing invitations, filling up of forms and the payment of money 
took place inside the State of Bombay. On these facts the Court 
found sufficient nexus between the State of Bombay and the 
activities of the petitioner so as to entitle the State of Bombay to 
tax the petitioner even though he was not a resident of Bombay 
State nor was the head office of his business located in the State. 
 (b)  Doctrine of Territorial Nexus and Principles. 
  
The validity of the Statute has been fully explain by saying 
that when there is territorial connection between the person sought 
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to be charged and the State seeking to tax him the taxing statute 
may be upheld. Sufficiency of the territorial connection involves a 
consideration must be real and not illusory and the liability sought 
to be imposed must be pertinent to that connection. The question 
whether in a given case there is sufficient territorial nexus is 
essentially one of fact. 
  The question of extra territorial operation of State law was 
arose in case of Anant Prasad Laxminivas Ganeriwal v/s State of 
Andhra Pradesh,52  were it was held that, when there is a public 
temple is situate in Hyderabad in the State of Andhra Pradesh and 
there is also some property of the temple there; though the major 
part of the income yielding endowed property is situate outside in 
the State of Madhya Pradesh; The Hyderabad Endowment 
Regulations will apply to the trust because the trust is situate in the 
State of Andhra Pradesh; Though arguing facts were that some of 
the endowed properties are not Andhra Pradesh, would make no 
difference. Further, the fact shown that the trust has been registered 
under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act (30 of 1951); cannot 
exclude the operation of the Regulations in the case of this trust, 
for the trust is undoubtedly situate within the area where the 
Regulations are in force. Hence, in the said case it was decided that 
where the trust is situated in a particular State the law of that State 
will apply to the trust, even though any part of the trust property, 
whether large or small, is situate outside the State where the trust is 
situate 
        The question of extra-territorial operation was also arose in 
case of M/s. Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. v/s I. T. 
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Commisioner,53  where the validity of the Section 9(1)(VII) of the 
Income Tax Act, was challenged on ground that Parliament was 
not competent to enact Section 9(1)(VII) of the Act inasmuch as 
the provision possesses as extra territorial operation without any 
nexus between the person sought to be taxed and the country 
seeking to tax. 
 In brief the facts of the case is as under: - 
 The appellant, M/s. Electronics Corporation of India 
Limited, had entered into a memorandum of understanding with a 
Norwegian company at Paris. This was followed by an agreement 
dtd.2nd. May 1986, executed at Hyderabad. Under that agreement 
the Norwegian company was to provide technical know-how and 
technical services, including facilities for the training of personnel, 
to the appellant in connection with the manufacture of computers. 
The consideration for the technical know-how and technical 
services was represented by Norwegian currency NOK 32 Millions 
equivalent to about Rs.575 lakhs. Eighty five per cent was to be 
paid from credit provided by Norwegian authorities and the 
balance fifteen per cent was to be paid out of free foreign exchange 
made available by the State Bank of India, London branch. It is not 
in dispute that the agreement had received the careful 
consideration of the Reserve Bank of India and of the Central 
Government. 
 The appellant approached the Income Tax Officer for the 
grant of a ‘No Objection Certificate’ as contemplated under 
Section 195(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, to enable him to remit 
the installments due without any obligation of deducting any 
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income tax at source, but the request was denied. On 
23rd.December, 1986, the appellant made an application to the 
Commissioner of Income-tax for a direction to the Income Tax 
Officer, but the Commissioner rejected the application. The 
Commissioner took the view that having regard to Section 
9(1)(VII) and Section 195 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the 
payment constituted income which deemed to accrue or arise in 
India and was liable to deduction of tax at source. 
         The appellant filed a Writ petition against the order of the 
Commissioner, and assailed the constitutional validity of Section 
9(1)(VII) of the Act. It was urged before the High Court that 
Parliament was not competent to enact Section 9(1)(VII) of the Act 
inasmuch as the provision possesses as extra-territorial operation 
without any nexus between the person sought to be taxed and the 
country seeking to tax. It was further contended that even after the 
introduction of Section 9(1)(VII) by the Finance Act of 1976 with 
effect from 1st.June, 1976, the requirement of a business 
connection of a foreign Company was required, and the case was 
governed by Carborandum Co. v/s C .I. T., (1977) 108 I.T.R 335: 
(AIR 1977 SC 1259) It was also urged that after the introduction of 
the Explanation by the Finance Act of 1977 with effect from 
1st.April,1977 Section 9(1)(VII) creates an invidious discrimination 
among companies which had entered into a foreign collaboration 
agreement prior to 1st.April,1976 and those who have done so after 
that date, and that therefore, Article 14 was violated. The High 
Court repelled all the contentions of the appellant and dismissed 
the Writ Petition. A Similar Writ Petition was filed by the 
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appellant against an order of the Commissioner of Income –tax 
declining to direct the grant of a ‘No Objection Certificate’ in 
relation to disbursement made under a license agreement with M/s. 
Control Data Indo-Asia Company, U.S.A. and the Writ Petition 
was dismissed by the High Court for the reasons which had found 
favour with it in the earlier case. 
It was held that under our constitutional scheme that 
Parliament in India might make laws, which operate extra-
territorially. Art.245 (1) of the Constitution prescribes the extent of 
laws made by Parliament. They may be made for the whole or any 
part of the territory of India. Art.245 (2) declares that no law made 
by Parliament shall be deemed to be invalid on the ground that it 
would have extra-territorial operation. Therefore, a Parliamentary 
statute having extra-territorial operation cannot be rule out from 
contemplation. The operation of the law can extend to persons, 
things and acts outside the territory of India. The general principle, 
flowing from the sovereignty of States, is that laws made by one 
State can have no operation in another State. The apparent 
opposition between the two positions is reconciled by the 
statement found in British Columbia Electric Railway Co. Ltd. v/s 
The King, (1946) AC 527: - 
 “A legislature which passes a law having extra-territorial 
operation may find that what it has enacted cannot be directly 
enforced, but the Act is not invalid on that account, and the courts 
of its country must enforce the law with the machinery available to 
them”.54  In other words, while the enforcement of the law cannot 
be contemplated in a foreign State, it can, nonetheless, be enforced 
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by the courts of the enacting State to the degree that is permissible 
with the machinery available to them. Such courts will not regard 
them as invalid on the ground of such extra-territoriality. 
 But the question is whether a nexus with something in India 
is necessary. It seems to us that unless such nexus exists 
Parliament will have no competence to make the law. It will be 
noted that Art.245 (1) empowers Parliament to enact law for the 
whole or any part of the territory of India. The provocation for the 
law must be found within India itself. Such a law may have extra-
territorial operation in order to sub serve the object, and that object 
must be related to something in India. It is inconceivable that a law 
should be made by Parliament in India, which has no relationship 
with anything in India; and so the Parliament legislative 
rights/power to pass law having extra-territorial operation was 
affirmed. 
 Again in the matter of Cauvery water disputes Tribunal,55 
the Supreme Court observed that Karnataka Cauvery Basin 
Irrigation Protection Ordinance,1991, has extra-territorial 
operation and hence beyond legislative competence of State and is 
ultra vires Article 245. It was also observed that the State has 
competence to legislate with respect to all aspects of water 
including water flowing through inter-State rivers, subject to 
certain limitations, viz. the control over the regulation and 
development of the inter-State river waters should not have been 
taken over by the Union (Entry 56 of List I) and secondly, the State 
cannot pass legislation with respect to or affecting any aspect of 
the waters beyond its territory (Entry 14 of List II) relates, among 
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other things, to agriculture. In so far as agriculture depends upon 
water including river water, the State legislature while enacting 
legislation with regard to agriculture may be competent to provide 
for the regulation and development of its water resources including 
water supplies, irrigation and canals, drainage and embankments, 
water storage and water power which are the subjects mentioned in 
Entry 17 of List II. However, such a legislation enacted under 
Entry 14 of List II in so far as it relate to inter-State river water and 
its different uses and the manner of using it, would also be subject 
to the provisions of Entry 56 of List I. So also Entry 18 of List II 
which speaks, among other things, of land improvement which 
may give the State Legislature the powers to enact similar 
legislation as under Entries 14 and 17 of List II would be subject to 
the same restrictions. 
 Again the principle of territorial Nexus was explained in the 
case of, G. G. Kanungo v/s State of Orissa,56  where the main issue 
was whether a State can legislate on the subject of Concurrent List, 
where the Central Act on the same subject is already in existence. 
It was held that when there is already the legislation of Parliament 
made a concurrent subject, it operates in respect of all States in 
India, if not accepted. Since it is open to a State Legislature also to 
legislate on the same subject, it lies within its field of legislation 
falling in any entry in the Concurrent List, and when a particular 
State legislature has made a law or Act on that subject for making 
it applicable to its State, all that becomes necessary to validate 
such law is to obtain the assent of the President by reserving it for 
his consideration. When such assent is obtained, the provisions of 
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the State Law or Act so enacted prevail in State Concerned, 
notwithstanding its repugnancy to an earlier Parliamentary 
enactment made on the subject. But it has to be kept in mind that 
through the Legislative power has been used in accordance with 
Arts.245 and 246, i.e. Territorial and subject wise, if the legislation 
made on any subject; is happens to be covered by other 
constitutional provisions, then the power used by concerned 
legislature under Arts.245 and 246, to that extent would get 
curtailed or cut down qua those topics.57 The Rule of extra-
territorial Nexus has earlier well explained in case   of, Shree 
Anant Prasad Laxminivas Ganeriwal  v/s  State of Andhra 
Pradesh58  by confirming fact that, when there is territorial 
connection between the person and concerned property sought to 
be charged and the State seeking to tax him and property, the 
relevant taxing Statute must be upheld, under ground of territorial 
nexus. 
 Distribution of legislative power, and Lists given in Sch.7, 
has no relevance to Union Territory. Parliament can make law 
respecting all the entries in all the three Lists.59   
 The Constitution confers a power and imposes a duty on the 
legislature to make laws. The essential legislative function is the 
determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a rule 
of conduct. Obviously it cannot abdicate its functions in favour of 
another. But in view of the multifarious activities of a welfare 
State, it cannot presumably work out all the details to suit the 
varying aspects of a complex situation. It must necessarily delegate 
the working out of details to the executive or any other agency. But 
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there is a danger inherent in such a process of delegation. An 
overburdened legislature or one controlled by a powerful executive 
may unduly oversteps the limits of deligation.60  So to avoid such 
situation, The Legislature must lay down the legislative policy and 
principle, and must afford guidance for carrying out the said policy 
before it delegates its subsidiary powers in that behalf.61   
3.4.5        Delegated Legislation – Limitations  
 
The Legislature must normally discharge its primary 
legislative function itself and not through the others. Once it is 
established that it has Sovereign powers within certain sphere, it 
must follow as a corollary that it is free to legislate within that 
sphere in any way which appears to it to be the best way to give 
effect to its intention and policy in making a particular law, and it 
may utilize any outside agency to any extent it finds necessary for 
doing things which it is unable to do itself or finds it convenient to 
do. In other words, it can do everything, which is ancillary to and 
necessary for the full and effective exercise of its power of 
legislation. It cannot abdicate its legislative functions, and 
therefore, while entrusting power to an outside agency, it must be 
see that such agency acts as a subordinate authority and does not 
become a parallel legislature. 
The doctrine of Separation of Powers and the judicial 
interpretation it has received in America, ever since the American 
Constitution was framed, enables the American Courts to check 
undue and excessive delegation, but the Courts of this country are 
not committed to that doctrine and cannot apply in the same way as 
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it has been applied in America. Therefore, there are only two main 
checks in this country on the power of the Legislature to delegate, 
these being its good sense and the principle that it should not cross 
the line beyond which delegation amounts to “abdication and self-
effacement.”62 
  Delegation of essential legislative functions is prohibited. If 
a nature of legislative power is such that legislature cannot 
delegate essential legislative functions the fact that the authority to 
confer power is express and not implicit, makes no difference to 
the application of the principle. In either event, as law-conferring 
power expressly is a law, the rule against excessive delegation 
applies to it as much to cases, where the authority to confer power 
is implicit.63 
 When a Legislature is given plenary power to legislate on 
particular subject, there must also be an implied power to make 
laws incidental to the exercise of such power. It is a fundamental 
principle of constitutional law that everything necessary to the 
exercise of a power is included in the grant of the power. A 
Legislature cannot strip itself of its essential functions and vest the 
same on extraneous authority. The primary duty of law making has 
to be discharged by the Legislature itself by delegation may be 
resorted to as a subsidiary or an ancillary measure.64  
 It is a common legislative practice that the legislature may 
choose to lay down only the general policy and leave to its 
delegate to make detailed provisions for carrying into effect the 
said policy and effectuate the purpose of the Statute by framing 
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Rules/Regulations, which are in nature of subordinate legislation. 
But a piece of subordinate legislation does not carry the same 
degree of immunity, which is enjoyed by a Statute passed by a 
competent Legislature. Subordinate legislation may be questioned 
on the ground that it is unreasonable, the unreasonable not in the 
sense of not being reasonable, but in the sense that it manifestly 
arbitrary.  
The legislature have undoubtedly plenary powers, but these 
powers are controlled by the basic concepts of the written 
Constitution, itself and can be exercised within the legislative 
fields allotted to their jurisdiction by the three Lists under Seventh 
Schedule; but beyond the Lists the legislatures cannot travel. If the 
legislatures steps beyond the legislative fields assigned to them, or 
acting within their respective fields, they trespass on the 
fundamental rights of the citizens in a manner not justified by the 
relevant articles dealing with the said fundamental rights, their 
legislative actions are liable to be struck down by Courts in India. 
Therefore, though our Legislatures have plenary powers, they 
function within the limits prescribed by the material and the 
relevant provisions of the Constitution. 
 The legislative power conferred on the appropriate 
Legislatures to enact law in respect of topics covered by several 
entries in the three Lists can be exercised both prospectively and 
retrospectively. Where the Legislature can make a valid law, it 
may provide not only for prospective operation of the material 
provisions of the said law, but it can also provide for the 
 110
retrospective operation of the said provisions. Legislature is 
competent to cure the infirmity in any statute pointed out by Court 
of law and pass a validating Act with retrospective effect. 
 Article 246 of the Constitution confers exclusive power on 
Parliament to make laws with respect to any of the matters 
enumerated in List I, notwithstanding the concurrent power of 
Parliament and the State Legislature, or the exclusive power of the 
State Legislature in List III and II respectively. Thus, 
Predominance of Parliament is confirmed in our Constitution. 
 
3.5    In Conclusion 
 
 The common place observations about the Federal 
relationship between Union and States in the Indian Constitution 
are that it is curious amalgam of indiscriminate borrowing from 
abroad, that is nothing but the Government of India Act, 1935, 
with some alterations and additions here and there; and that there is 
nothing Indian in or about it. The Indian Constitution, in other 
words, has no philosophy or ideology of its own and seeks to plant 
Western institutions in an alien environment. The pointing out that; 
(a) The Parliamentary institutions duplicate the Webminster 
system, 
(b) The judiciary review has been borrowed from the oldest 
democracy in the World, 
(c) The Centre-State relationship has been patterned upon the 
Canadian Federalism. 
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(d) The Directive Principles of State Policy have been adopted 
from the Irish Constitution, 
(e) The emergency provisions are but unabashed adoptions 
from much maligned Government of India Act, 1935,etc. 
 
It was natural for the framers of the Indian Constitution to 
look around with ‘good will for all, malice towards none’ for 
guidance and inspiration in their endeavor to fashion a Constitution 
for the new independent country, INDIA. 
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Chapter – 4  
 
FEDERAL FINANCE 
 
 The Essence of federalism lies in proper division of powers 
between various levels of Government, of this, however, finances 
are the backbone of   politico-economic strength, and hence an 
essential prerequisite Government. Since the classical exposition 
by Dicey1 of federalism as “a natural Constitution for a body of 
States which desire union and do not desire unity.” It needs hardly 
to explain that a federal system implies a double Government, and 
a division of powers between the two Governments-Federal and 
State. 
 In an ideal federation, therefore, it must be ensured that each 
level gets adequate financial resources so as to enable each of them 
to perform its exclusive functions. In other words, the financial 
powers should be in conformity with the functions assigned to each 
unit. The Constitution provides for two levels of Governments. 
Union Government and State   Government.     During the time of 
 Drafting of the Indian Constitution, the President of the 
Constituent Assembly appointed an expert Committee, under the 
chairmanship of shri N.R.Sarkar, to report on the financial 
provisions of the Indian Constitution. In the light of Sarkar 
Committee’s recommendations the entries in the Lists or Sections 
were embodied in the present Constitution, in place of existing 
provisions of Government of India Act, 1935. 
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 The present financial provisions in the Constitution, by and 
large follows the pattern set by Government of India Act, 1935. 
Many articles in the Constitution are verbalism reproduction of the 
corresponding provisions in the Government of India Act, 
1935.There are however, certain fundamental differences between 
the two i.e. present Constitution and Government of India Act, 
1935, that are the vitals importance, some of them are as follows:- 
(1) Under the Government of India Act, 1935, the residuary 
powers were reserved to the Governor-General to be 
exercised by him in his discretion, while in the present 
Constitution the residuary powers have been specifically 
allotted to Union. This clearly shows the impact of the 
democratic set up and strength to Parliament. 
(2) Again, Article 265 of the Constitution lays down that no tax 
shall be levied or collected except by the authority of law. 
There were no such analogous provisions in the 
Government of India Act, 1935. This provision, too, 
recognises the principles of supremacy of Parliament. 
(3) Further, the Constitution, under Article 266, has created a 
Consolidated Fund each for each of the States wherein flows 
all money received respectively by Union and State 
Governments. No appropriations out of these funds are 
allowed save in accordance with law and for the purpose 
and in the manner prescribed in the Constitution. There 
were no such funding provisions in the Act of 1935. 
 118
(4) The introduction of the institution of Finance Commission is 
also a novel feature of the Constitution, nowhere found in 
the Act of 1935. 
Under the Act of 1935, the determination of the Provincial 
share in devolved taxes of the Centre and the Grants in-aid was left 
to be regulated by the executive orders of the Governor-General. 
The Constitution, however, enjoins upon the President not only to 
take into account the recommendations of the Finance Commission 
in this regard but also to cause such recommendations and action 
taken thereon to be laid before Parliament. All these explain the 
supremacy of Parliament, in the Constitution. 
However, so far as the allocation of taxing power is 
concerned both the Constitution and Government of India Act, 
1935 follow almost a similar pattern. Taxing jurisdictions of the 
two layers of Government have been made entirely separate. 
Chapter I and II of part XII of the Indian Constitution 
contains the main provisions governing the Union-State Financial 
arrangements. This arrangement under the Constitution has two 
main aspects. One relates to distribution of taxation of heads and 
the other to distribution of revenues and sharing of resources, 
between Union and States. Articles 246,248 and 265 reads with 
legislative Lists I and II constitute the core of the first aspect, while 
the main provisions relating to the second aspect are contained in 
chapters I and II of Part XII of the Constitution.  
Let us discuss the first aspect i.e. distribution of taxation 
head in this chapter. 
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4.1  Distribution of Taxation Powers 
 Legislative Lists I and II of the Seventh Schedule to the 
Constitution enumerate the general subjects of legislation 
separately form the heads of taxation. The distinction construed in 
the light of Article 246 and 265 implies that no tax can be levied 
unless it is related to a specific head of taxation in List I or II. The 
Constitution provides in List I and II, separate heads of taxation for 
the Union and States. There is no head of taxation in the 
Concurrent List. This means, the Union and States have no 
concurrent power of taxation. The residuary power of taxation 
vests in the Union. There are thirteen taxation heads in Entries 82 
to Concurrent 92 B in the Union List, and Nineteen taxation items 
in the Entries 45 to 63 of the States List.  
The Constitution of India’s 
SEVENTH SCHEDULE 
(Article 246) 
 
List I – Union List 
 
The Union List contains 13 items enumerated Entries from 
82 to 92 B as taxing heads are as under: - 
Entry No. 82. Taxes on income other than agricultural income 
83. Duties of customs including export duties 
84. Duties of excise on tobacco and other goods 
manufactured or produced in India except – 
(a) alcoholic liquors for human consumption; 
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(b) opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic 
drugs and narcotics, including   medicinal 
and toilet preparations containing alcohol 
or any substance included in sub-
paragraph (b) of this entry. 
85. Corporation tax 
86. Tax on the capital value of the assets, exclusive  
          of   agricultural land, of individuals and  
companies; agricultural land, of individuals and 
companies taxes on the capital of companies. 
  87. Estate duty in respect of property other than  
agricultural land. 
88. Duties in respect of succession to property 
other than agricultural land. 
89. Terminal taxes on goods or passengers, carried 
by railway, sea or air; taxes on railway fares 
and freights.                                                                    
90.  Taxes other than stamp duties on transactions in 
stock exchanges and future markets. 
91.  Rates of stamp duty in respect of bills of 
exchange, cheques, promissory notes, 
debentures, proxies and receipts. 
92.  Taxes on the sale or purchase of newspapers 
and on advertisements published therein.  
   92-A.  Taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other      
than newspapers, where such sale or purchase 
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takes place in the course of inter-State trade or       
commerce. 
    92-B.  Taxes on the consignment of goods (whether 
the consignment is to the person making it or to 
any other person) where such consignment 
takes place in the course of inter-State trade or 
commerce.  
       
SEVENTH SCHEDULE 
(Articale-246) 
          
 List II-State List. 
 
The State List contains 19 items, which have been 
enumerated in Entries from 45 to 63 as taxing heads are as under: 
Entry No. 45. Land revenue, including the assessment and  
collection of revenue, the maintenance of land 
records, survey for alienation of revenues. 
46. Taxes on agricultural income. 
47. Duties in respect of succession to agricultural 
land. 
48. Estate duty in respect of agricultural land. 
49. Taxes on lands and buildings. 
50. Taxes on mineral rights subject to any 
limitations imposed by parliament by law 
relating to mineral development. 
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51. Duties of excise on the following goods 
manufactured or produced in the State and 
countervailing duties at the same or lower rates  
on similar goods manufactured or produced 
elsewhere in India. 
(a) alcoholic liquors for human consumption; 
(b) opium, Indian hemps and other narcotic  
      drugs and narcotics; but not including  
      medicinal   and    toilet     preparations  
      containing alcohol or any substance  
      included in sub-paragraph (b) of this entry 
52. Taxes on the entry of goods into a local area for  
consumption, use or sale therein. 
53. Taxes on the consumption or sale of electricity. 
54. Taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other 
than newspapers, subject to the provisions of 
Entry. 92-A of List I. 
55. Taxes on advertisement other than 
advertisements published in the newspapers 
(and advertisements broadcast by radio or 
television). 
56. Taxes on goods and passengers carried by road 
or on inland waterways. 
57. Taxes on vehicles, whether mechanically 
propelled or not, suitable for use on roads, 
including tramcars subject to the provisions of 
Entry 35 of List III. 
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58. Taxes on animals and boats. 
59. Tolls. 
60. Taxes on professions, trades, callings and 
employments. 
61. Capitation taxes. 
62. Taxes on luxuries, including taxes on 
entertainments, amusements, battings and 
gambling. 
63. Rates of stamp duty in respect of documents 
other than those specified in the provisions of 
List I with regard to rates of stamp duty. 
Allocation of the heads of taxation between the Union and 
the States is based on the broad principle that taxes, which are 
location- specific and relate to subjects of local consumption, have 
been assigned to the States. Those taxes, which are of inter-state 
significance and where the taxpayer can gain or evade tax by 
shifting his habitation where the place of residence is not a correct 
guide to the true incidence of tax, have vested in the Union. This 
clear-cut division of heads of taxation between the Union and the 
States has minimised the scope for conflict and litigation between 
them. 
 In a case where the confliction of jurisdiction arises in a tax 
statute, the Rule of general principles of interpretation of 
legislative entries is also applicable to the said tax statute. The 
general principles of interpretation of legislative entries has well 
discussed in earlier chapter. 
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 While applying the various rules of interpretation, peculiar 
to the interpretation of a federal Constitution, the Courts have 
usefully borrowed from the principles laid down by Canadian and 
Australian Courts and also the Privy Council while interpretating 
the Canadian and Australian Constitutions, have been specifically 
useful. Our Courts have also heavily relied on the pronouncements 
of the federal Court of India and Privy Council in the cases arising 
under the Government of India Act, 1935. It was observed in the 
light of provisions of Government of India Act, 1935, Section –
100, by the honorable Court in the Case of, State of Bombay v/s 
F.N.Balsara2 regarding interpretation of legislative entries, that 
“Principles governing interpretation of Legislative Lists, none of 
the items in each List is to be read in a narrow or restricted sense. 
If there is conflict between an entry in List II and an entry in List I, 
an attempt should be made to see whether the two entries cannot be 
recognised so as to avoid a conflict of jurisdiction.”  An endeavour 
must be made to solve that conflict by having recourse to the 
context and scheme of the Act, and a reconciliation attempted 
between two apparently conflicting jurisdiction by reading two 
entries together and by interpretating, and where necessary, 
modifying the language of the one by that of the other. A general 
power should not be so interpreted as to nullify a particular power 
conferred by the same instrument.3  
It has been discussed earlier; the Constitution makes an 
elaborate distribution of taxing powers between the Union and 
States. Taxing power has been given to the Union Parliament 
under Entries 82 to 92B, of List I and to the State Legislature under 
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Entries 45 to 63 of List II. There is no tax entry in Concurrent List, 
and this may give impression that there cannot be any conflict 
between the powers of the Union Parliament and those of State 
Legislatures. But as noticed earlier in relation to interpretative 
technique, conflicts occur because of overlapping of fields due to 
common incidence of a tax. Thus a tax imposed in one entry may 
appear to relate to an entry in some other List. In such cases, the 
duty of Courts is to ascertain the entry, under which the Pith and 
Substance of the disputed tax falls. In the light of provisions of the 
Articles 245, 246 and 265 along with other concerned provisions 
of the Constitution, the constitutional validity of the impugned tax-
statute can be determined. 
 Article 265, of the Constitution, empowers the Union and 
State Governments to levy tax, under the respective taxing 
legislative entries. It reads:- No tax shall be levied or collected 
except by authority law. The scope of Article 265 is not only to 
raise revenue, but it is also means to reduce inequalities. The 
Parliament is allowed more freedom of choice in matter of taxation 
vis-à-vis other laws.4  Similarly, no Court can give a direction to 
the Government to retrain from enforcing a provision of law. The 
levy of a tax can only be done by authority of law and not by any 
executive order, unless the executive is specifically empowered by 
law to give any exemption, it cannot say that it will not enforce the 
law as against a particular person. The power to impose tax being a 
legislative power, it can be exercised either by legislature directly 
or by its delegate. No Court can issue mandate to legislature or 
subordinate legislative body to enact or not to enact a law which it 
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was competent to enact, such directive principle was confirmed in 
case of, Narinder Chand v/s Union Territory,5  Where it was held 
that no writ or direction can be issued under Article 226 to the 
appropriate authority to delete the entry of “Indian made foreign 
liquor and beer” from Schedule A to E.P. General Sales Tax Act 
(1948) as in force Simla and to include it in Schedule B to the Act. 
 The legislative power conferred on the appropriate 
Legislature to enact law in respect of topics covered by the several 
entries in the three Lists can be exercised both prospectively and 
retrospectively, including tax entries too. The said fact has been 
confirmed in case of, Chandrana and Co v/s State of Mysore,6 the 
facts of the instant case were that, during assessment period 1-10-
1957 to 31-3-1958, the Mysore Legislature was competent to 
impose tax on sale of textiles at a rate in excess of that specified in 
Section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act. As the textiles being not 
declared goods during that above said period, the Mysore 
Legislature has to power levy and impose such tax retrospectively 
for that period even after textiles became declared goods. The State 
Legislature has power to make laws having retrospective effect; 
hence amended Section.5 (5-A) of Mysore Sales Tax Act was not 
invalid. 
 The power to legislate with retrospective effect is within the 
scope of its legislative competence and subject to the other 
constitutional limitations. The power of the legislature to enact law 
is plenary; hence retrospective legislation is within the power of 
the legislature.  
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Where a law is declared invalid for the reason that it has 
been passed by a Legislature without having legislative 
competence, and action is taken under its provisions held in void, 
then said action can be validated by a subsequent law clothed by 
the same Legislature after it has been clothed with necessary 
legislative power. If the Legislature can by retrospective legislation 
cure the invalidity in action taken in pursuance of laws which were 
void for want of legislative competence and can validate such 
actions by appropriate provisions, the same power can be equally 
effectively exercised by the Legislature invalidating actions taken 
under laws which were void.7 
4.2   Fee.  
Under the Constitution, whether any particular levy imposed 
by the competent Legislature is in a form of tax or a fee, has to be 
identify from its character and very nature of the levy. The 
distinction between Tax and Fee is well defined n many cases. 
There is no generic difference a tax and a fee, and both are 
different forms in which the taxing power of a State manifests 
itself. Our Constitution, however, has made a distinction between a 
tax and a fee for legislative purposes and while there are various 
entries in the three lists with regard to various forms of taxation, 
there is an entry at the end of each one of these lists as regards fee 
which could be levied in respect of every one of the matters that 
are included therein. A tax is undoubtedly in the nature of a 
compulsory exaction of money by a public authority for public 
purpose, the payment of which is enforced by law. But the 
essential thing in a tax is that the imposition is made for public 
 128
purpose to meet the general revenue of the State without reference 
to any special benefit to be conferred upon the payers of the tax. 
The taxes collected are all merged in the general revenue of the 
State to be applied for general public purpose. Thus, tax is 
common burden and the only return, which the taxpayer gets, is the 
participation in the common benefits of the State. 
 Fees, on the other hand, are payment primarily in the public 
interest but for some special service rendered or some special work 
done for the benefit of those from whom payment are demanded. 
Thus, in fees there is always an element of quid pro quo, which is 
absent in tax. Two elements are thus essential in order that a 
payment may be regarded as a fee. In the first place it must be 
levied in consideration of certain services, which the individuals 
accepted either willingly or unwillingly. But this by itself is not 
enough to make the imposition a fee, if the payments demanded for 
rendering of such services are not set apart or specifically 
appropriated for that purpose, but are merged in the general 
revenue of the State to be spent for general public purposes.8 
  But in a case, where the imposition of cess-levy is for 
specific services to specified area, or class of persons or trade or 
business in any local area, and as a condition precedent for the said 
services or in return of them, then the cess-levied against the said 
area or the said class of persons or trade or business, the said cess 
is distinguishable from tax and it has to be described as a fee. 
There is, however, an element of compulsion in the imposition of 
both tax and fee. Whether or not a particular cess-levied by a 
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statute amounts to a fee or tax would always be a question of fact 
to be determined in the circumstances of each case.9 
 In case of, Southern Pharmaceutical and Chemical, Trichur 
v/s State of Kerala,10 the nature of a fee was explained by the Court 
that, there should be a broad correlationship between fee collected 
and the cost of services rendered; the element of quid –pro-quo 
strictosensu- i.e. element quid –pro-quo must remain present in the 
imposition of levy. The facts of the case were, the Appellant 
Company was carrying on the business of manufacture of 
medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol in its bonded 
factory. The State Government imposed the levy of charge for cost 
the establishment under Kerala Abkari Act, (1 of 1077), Section 
14(e), calculated in accordance with nature and extent of 
establishment, and collected it from licensee company. The said 
imposition of charge/duty was challenged on ground of its 
constitutional validity. 
 The Court observed that, the imposition of the cost of 
establishment under the Act, could not be said to be an imposition 
of a duty of excise, but it is a price for his franchise to carry on the 
business. If an exaction is to be classed as a duty of excise it must 
of course be a tax; its essential distinguishing feature is that it is a 
tax imposed “upon”, “in respect of”, or “in relation to” goods. The 
exaction in this case is in truth as it purports to be a simply a fee 
payable as a condition of a right to carry on a business11. 
 Further it was stated that, the supervisory staff deployed in a 
bonded manufactory by the Government for its own protection to 
prevent the leakage of revenue, but there was no doubt that 
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simultaneously the licensee was receiving a service in return, and 
hence the cost of establishment levied under Section 14(e) of the 
Act, has broad correlationship between the fee collected and cost 
of the establishment, i.e. service rendered12. 
 The constitutional validity of the charge of Rs.100/-(one 
hundred) per chimney per year from brick-kiln owners to ensure 
compliance with rules in respect of interests of brick-kiln owners 
and general public was confirmed and it was held to be a fee, and 
not a tax, since the existence of an element quid pro quo was 
present in a levy of charge.13 
Now, the question arises that whether the element of quid 
pro quo is the final and concluding test for the determination 
nature of levy to identified it as a fee, the answer is negative, i.e. in 
absence of an element of quid pro quo, the levy can be known as a 
fee, and not a tax.    
    In case of Secunderabad Hyderabad Hotels Association v/s 
Hyderabad Municipal Corporation,14  Hon. Sujata Manohar and 
A.P.Mishra JJ., held that License fee levied on lodging and eating 
houses under Hydrabad Municipal Corporation Act is regulatory-
cum-compensatory. The mere fact that element of quid pro quo 
was absent in the license fee, it could not be treated as a tax. A 
license fee may be either regulatory or compensatory; when a fee 
is charged for rendering specific services a certain element of quid 
pro quo must be there between the service rendered and the fee 
charged so that the license fee is commensurate with the cost of 
rendering the service although exact arithmetical equivalence is not 
expected. However, this is not the only kind of fee, which can be 
 131
charged. License fees can also be regulatory when the activities for 
which a license is given required be regulating or controlling. The 
fee is charged for regulation for such activity would be validly 
classifiable as a fee and not a tax although no service was 
rendered. An element of quid pro quo for the levy of such fees is 
not required although such fees cannot be excessive. Hotels and 
eating houses by reason of the nature of their occupation do 
impose an additional burden on the municipal corporation in 
discharging its duties of lifting of garbage, maintenance of hygiene 
and sanitation services in the city for benefit of all persons living in 
the city. Hence, the license fees charged therefore, were not just for 
service rendered but they also had a large element of a regulatory 
fee levied for the purpose of monitoring the activity of the 
licensees to ensure that they would comply with the terms and 
conditions of the license. Further the fees, though credited in the 
common fund of Municipal Corporation, were earmarked for the 
purposes for which they were collected clearly, therefore, the 
intention is to levy a fee which would be utilised for regulatory and 
compensatory purposes, could not be define as a tax in the guise of 
a fee. 
 In brief it can be said that; A Levy in the nature of a fee does 
not cease to be of that character merely because there is an element 
of compulsion or coerciveness present in it, nor is it a postulate of 
a fee that it must have direct relation to the actual services rendered 
by the authority to each individual who obtains the benefit of the 
service. If with a view to provide a specific service, levy is 
imposed by law and expenses for marinating the service are met 
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out of the amount collected there being a reasonable relation 
between the levy and expenses incurred for rendering the service, 
the levy would be in the nature of a fee and not in the nature of a 
tax. It is true that ordinarily a fee is uniform and no account is 
taken of the varying abilities of different recipients. But absence of 
uniformity is not a criterion on which alone it can be said, it is of 
the nature of tax. A fee being a levy in consideration of rendering 
service of a particular type correlation between the expenditure 
incurred by the Government and the levy must undoubtedly exist, 
but a levy will not be regarded as a tax merely because the absence 
of uniformity in its incidence or because of compulsion in the 
collection thereof, nor because some of the contributories do not 
obtain the same degree of service as others may.15  
4. 3      Tax 
 A tax is a compulsory exaction of money by public authority 
for public purposes enforceable by law, and is not a payment for 
service rendered. 
Article 265 imposes a limitation on the tax power of the 
State in so for as it provides that the State shall not levy or collect a 
tax, except by authority of law. The tax proposed to be levied must 
be within the legislative competence of the Legislature imposing a 
tax and authorizing the collection thereof; and, secondly the tax 
must be subject to the conditions laid down in Article 13 of the 
Constitution. 
Since a taxing statute is a law, it is a law for the purpose of 
Article 13 and so, the validity of the legislation imposing a tax can 
be challenged not only ground of lack or absence of legislative 
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competence, but also on the ground that the impugned legislation 
violates the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the 
Constitution.16  
Generally speaking the primary purpose of the levy of all 
taxes is to raise funds for public good. Which person should be 
taxed, what transaction should be taxed or what goods should be 
taxed, depends upon social, economic and administrative 
considerations. In a democratic set up it is for the Legislature to 
decide what economic or social policy it should pursue or what 
administrative considerations it should bear in mind. Keeping the 
above principles in mind, the Court observed in case of, M/s 
Hiralal Ratanlal v/s Sales Tax Officer, Kanpur & others17 “that, 
classification between processed or pulses and unprocessed or 
unsplit pulses, for the purpose of tax (sales tax) does not violate 
Article 14. The classification is reasonable one and is based on the 
use to which those goods can be put.” Principle of reasonable 
classification is recognized under Constitution. 
A taxing statute is not wholly immune from attack on the 
ground that it infringes the equality clause in Article 14. If the 
legislature has classified persons or properties into different 
categories which are subjected to different rates of taxation with 
reference to income or property such a classification would not be 
open to the attack of inequality on the ground that the total burden 
resulting from such a classification is unequal. Similarly, different 
kinds of property may be subjected to different rates of taxation, 
but so long as there is a rational basis for the classification, Article 
14 will not be in a way of such classification resulting in unequal 
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burdens on different classes of properties. But if the same class of 
property similarly situated is subjected to an incidence of taxation, 
which results in inequality, the law may be struck down as creating 
an inequality amongst holders of the same kind of property.18 
 Similarly, the tax statute relating to the accounts of 
businessmen and professionals whose income exceeds certain limit 
as prescribed under Section 44(AB) of Income-Tax Act, 1961, 
should be audited by Chartered Accountant only, was challenged 
on ground of violation of Articles 14 and 19 of Constitution by 
Income-tax practitioners In justification that “Chartered 
Accountants by reason of their training have special aptitude in the 
matter of audits. It is reasonable that they, who form a class by 
themselves, should be required to audit the accounts of business 
whose income exceeds Rs. 40 lakhs and profession whose income 
exceeds Rs.10 lacks in any given year. There was no material on 
record; so there cannot be assumed that an Income-tax Practitioner 
has the same expertise as Chartered Accountants in the matter of 
Accounts. As such Section 44(AB) excluding them for the purpose 
of auditing accounts cannot be said to be violative of Articles 14 
and 19 of the Constitution.19 
 Same way in another case, restriction was imposed under 
Section 40A(3) of an Income-Tax Act, that the payment of 
business expenditure should be made only by cross cheques or 
cross bank draft for the purpose of deduction at time of assessing 
the income of a legal entity, was subjected to challenge under 
Article 19(1)(f) of Constitution. It was held that there is no 
restriction on the assesses in his trading activities. Section 40A(3) 
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only empowers the Assessing Officer to disallow the deduction 
claimed as expenditure in respect of which payment is not made by 
crossed cheques, or crossed bank draft. The payment by crossed 
cheques, or crossed bank draft is insisted on to enable the assessing 
authority to ascertain whether the payment was genuine or whether 
it was out of the income from disclosed sources. The terms of 
Section 40A(3) are not absolute. Consideration business 
expediency and other relevant factors are not excluded.20  Hence, it 
is left and open to the assesses to satisfied the Assessing Officers, 
justify his claim of education of expenditure, in bonafide manner. 
So here the assesses has the bonafide opportunity to put his claim. 
 The Constitutional validity of levy of Entertainment tax on 
cable television at rate of 40% was challenged, on ground of 
violation of Article 14 and 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, in case of, 
A. Suresh etc.etc. v/s  State of Tamil Nadu & another,21 where it 
was held   that levy of entertainment tax on cable television cannot 
be said to be invalid on ground that similar tax is not levied on 
Doordarshan. It was stated that there couldn’t be any compulsion 
between Doordarshan and the Cable T.V.Operators. Doordarshan 
is a governmental organization, which is supposed to act in 
furtherance of public interest. It is not a business carried on by the 
Government. The revenues collected by it, by permitting 
advertisements are only intended to defray part of the huge 
expenditure the Government incurs on establishing and 
maintaining the broadcasting system throughout the country. 
 Respect to violation of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, 
the Court observed that: - Amendment Act of 1994, levying 
 136
entertainment tax is not invalid on ground that it is violative of 
freedom of speech and expression guaranteed to cable operators by 
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. It may be true that providing 
entertainment is a form of exercise of freedom of speech and 
expression. It is also quite likely, that they also relay the 
programmes broadcast by Doordarshan and other T.V.Networks 
and some of them may be informative in nature or educational in 
character but the fact remains that their activity is a combination of 
two rights i.e. business and speech – sub-clauses (g) and (a) of 
clause (1) of Article 19. So there is no reason why the business part 
of it could not be taxed. The reason is, if tax can be levied upon 
entertainment provided by cinemas, if the taxes can be levied upon 
the Press, then it is understable why such activity (Cable 
Television Network) could not taxed. Where the freedom of speech 
gets intertwined with business, it undergoes a fundamental change 
and so its exercise has to be balanced again social interests. Since 
the appellants (Cable Television Operators) carry on the business, 
it is their duty to share the burden of the State by paying taxes like 
any other business. The entertainment tax is an indirect tax. It is 
meant to be and is passed on to the consumer, i.e. subscriber. 
Everybody is familiar with facts that in the case of indirect taxes, 
levy at more than 100% of the value of goods, are taken in the case 
of customs and central excise duties, and even in the case of direct 
taxes levy, at rate higher than 50% is a regular feature. So the levy 
of entertainment tax at rate of 40% of collection is not excessive. 
 The newspaper industry has not been granted exemption 
from taxation in express terms. On the other hand Entry 92 of List 
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I of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution empowers Parliament to 
make laws levying taxes on sale or purchase of newspaper and on 
advertisement published therein. In India the power to levy tax 
even on persons carrying on the business of publishing newspaper 
has got to be recognized, as it is inherent in the very concept of 
Government. Merely because the Government has the power to 
levy taxes, the freedom of press would not totally lost. The Court is 
always there to hold the balance even and to strike down any 
unconstitutional invasion on that freedom. Newspaper industry 
enjoys two of the fundamental rights namely the freedom of speech 
and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) and the freedom 
to engage in any profession, occupation, trade, industry or business 
guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a). While there can be no tax on the 
right to exercise freedom of expression, tax is leviable on 
profession, occupation, trade, business and industry. Hence, the 
Tax is leviable on newspaper industry. But when such transgresses 
into the field of freedom of expression and stifles that Freedom it 
becomes unconstitutional. As long as it is within reasonable limits 
and does not impede freedom of expression it will not be 
contravening the limitation of Article 19(2). The delicate task of 
determining when it crosses from the area of profession, 
occupation, trade, business or industry into the area of freedom of 
expression and interferes with that freedom is entrusted to the 
Courts.22  
There is a presumption when a statutory authority makes an 
order for imposition of tax, that it has followed the prescribed 
procedure. Nonetheless no tax shall be levied on collected except 
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in accordance with law. If it were not imposed in accordance with 
law, it would infringe the fundament right guaranteed under Article 
19(1)(f) of the Constitution. While a long period of time that lapses 
between the imposition of the tax and the attack on it may permit 
rising of certain presumptions where the evidence is lost by efflux 
of time, but it cannot exonerate the statutory authority if it imposes 
a tax in derogation of the statutory provisions.23 
 When the situation is such that the levy of tax by competent 
authority has declared an invalid and unconstitutional then in that 
circumstances the question of refund of collection thereof made 
earlier arise. It has been observed in such situation, that, a finding 
regarding the invalidity of a levy need not automatically result in a 
direction for a refund. The declaration regarding the invalidity of a 
provision and the determination of the relief that should be granted 
in consequence thereof are two different things and, in the latter 
sphere, the Court has, and must be held to have, a certain amount 
of discretion. It is well settled proposition that it is open to the 
Court to grant, mould or restrict the relief in a manner most 
appropriate to the situation before it in such a way as to advance 
the interest of justice. It will appreciate that it is not always 
possible in all situations to give a logical and complete effect to 
finding. Many situations of this type arise in actual practice. For 
instance, there are cases where a Court comes to the conclusion 
that termination of the services of an employee is invalid, yet it 
refrains from giving him the benefit of “reinstatement” i.e. 
continuity in service, or “back wages”. In such cases, the direction 
of the Court does not result in a person being denied the benefits 
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that should flow to him as a logical consequence of a declaration in 
his favour. It may be said that, in such a case, the Court’s direction 
does not violate any fundamental right as happens in a case like 
this where an “illegal” exaction is sought to be retained by the 
State. But even in the latter type of cases relief has not been 
considered automatic. Thus where a person affected by an illegal 
exaction files an application for refund under the provisions of the 
relevant statute or files a suit to recover the taxes paid under the 
mistake of law, the Court can grant relief only to the extent 
permissible under the relevant rules of limitation. Even if he files 
an application for refund or a suit for the recovery of taxes paid for 
several years, the relief will be limited only to the period in regard 
to which the application or suit is not barred by limitation. Even 
where a petitioner seeks relief against an illegal exaction in a writ 
petition filed under Article 226 the question has often arisen, 
whether a petitioner’s prayer for refund of taxes collected over an 
indefinite period of years should be granted once the levy is found 
to be illegal. To answer the question in the affirmative would result 
in discrimination between persons based on their choice of the 
forum for relief, a classification that prima facie, is too fragile to be 
considered a relevant criterion for the resulting discrimination. 
This is one of the reasons why there has been an understandable 
hesitation on the part of Courts in answering the above question in 
the affirmative.24 
 It is now well settled that it is permissible for a competent 
Legislature to overcome the effect of a decision of a Court setting 
the imposition of a tax, by passing a suitable legislation amending 
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the relevant provisions of the statute concerned with retrospective 
effect, thus taking away the basis on which the decision of the 
Court had been rendered and by enacting an appropriate provision 
validating the levy and collection of tax made before the decision 
in question was rendered.   
 The rendering ineffective of judgments or orders of 
competent Courts and Tribunals by changing their basis by 
legislative enactment is well known pattern of all validating Acts. 
But such validating legislation, which removes the causes for 
ineffectiveness or invalidity of actions or proceedings, was not 
considered as an encroachment on judicial power.25 
 The deficiency in Section 5(4) of the Punjab Act, shown by 
the former decision of the Court was rectified by inserting the 
word “notification” in the same section, and thus making the levy 
and collection of octroi in the area which was included within the 
municipal limits of a municipality in Haryana with retrospective 
effect from date of inclusion under Haryana Amendment and 
Validation Act, 1971.26  
While in a case, the retrospective imposition of market fee 
under amendment Sec.17 (iii)(b) of U.P. Act 7 of 1978, was held 
valid and it was observed therein, ‘if market fee has been realised 
by any market committee in respect of transactions of sale of 
agricultural produce taking place between 12-6-1973 and coming 
into force of U.P. Act 7 of 1978, in accordance with the law as it 
prevailed then, no market fee under the amended law can be 
realised again. But if in respect of any transactions aforesaid 
market fee has not yet been realised then it can be realised in 
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accordance with the amended provision of law’,27 in this 
observation, the principle of   natural justice was applied.  
4. 4     Double Taxation 
 There is nothing in Article 265 from which one can spin out 
the constitutional vice called double taxation. If on the same 
subject matter the legislature chooses to levy tax twice over there 
is no inherent invalidity in the fiscal adventure save where other 
prohibitions exist.28  
The levy of profession tax, under Section 76, of Punjab 
Panchayat Samitis and Zilla Parisad Act was challenged on ground 
of double taxation, in case of, Mr.Kamta Prasad Agarwal v/s 
Executive Officer, Ballabgarh,29 where it was held by full bench 
that, Imposition of profession tax  by Panchayat Samitis  under 
Section 76, is not illegal on the ground that its amounts to double 
taxation. A tax on profession is not necessarily connected with 
income. A tax on income can be imposed if there is income. A tax 
on profession can be imposed if a person carries profession. 
Further stated therein, the Section 76 is not bad on the ground that 
the total taxes imposed on profession etc. by the State and the 
Samitis exceed the maximum limit of Rs.250/- stated in Article 
276 of the Constitution. The words in Article 276 that, the total 
amount payable to the State or any one Municipality, District 
Board, Local Board or other local authority cannot mean that the 
word “or” is used in a conjunctive sense as a substitute for the 
word “and”. The word “or” is used in disconjunctive sense. When 
the provision speaks of any State or any such municipality etc. it 
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indicates that both can tax separately to the limit imposed by 
Article 276. 
 In another case, where Income-Tax Officer did not satisfied 
with explanation of assessee regarding Cash-Credit entries, and 
about genuine or source of amount, in spite of these having already 
been subject matter of declaration, under Section 24, of Finance 
Act,-The Voluntary Disclosure Scheme by creditors, it was held 
that, I.T.O. can include it in income of assessee, no question of 
double taxation can be raised.30 
 The expression “double taxation” is often used in different 
senses, namely in its strict legal sense of direct double taxation and 
in its popular sense of indirect double taxation. Double taxation in 
the strict legal sense means, taxing the same property or subject 
matter twice, for the same purpose, for the same period and in the 
same territory. 
The constitute double taxation, the two or more taxes   must 
have been, 
  (1) levied on the same property or subject matter; 
(2) by the same Government or authority; 
(3) during the same taxing period; and, 
(4) for the same purpose. 
These guidelines have been followed by the Court in the 
Case of, Shri Krishna Das v/s Town Area Committee, Chirgon31 
where it was observed that, the levy of weighing dues to be paid by 
dealers as imposed by Town Area Committee could not be 
challenged on ground of double taxation, as similar tax had already 
imposed by State Legislature under U.P. Sales Tax Act. There was 
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no such taxation has been imposed by the Town Area Committee, 
for the same period on the same goods at the same time and for the 
same purpose. Moreover, where there are more than one legislative 
authorities such as State Legislature, and local Municipal body 
possess the power to levy tax, then there was nothing in the 
Constitution to prevent the same person or property being subject 
to both the State and Municipal taxation or the same Legislature 
exercising its power twice for different purposes. 
 The levy of excise duty on manufactured products are 
understandable, but without changing original the character of that 
products, if any change or alteration has been made on the same 
products then the altered products, is eligible for imposition of 
excise duty or not was the main issue, in Case of, Union of India & 
others v/s J.G. Glass industries Ltd.etc.32 where, respondents were 
carrying on the business of manufacturing ‘glass’ and ‘glassware’. 
That under the Section 2(f) of Central Excise and Salt Act (1 of 
1944) levy of excise duty was taken in respect to glass bottles 
(manufactured), at main gate of the factory. Then the respondent 
made the process of printing names, or logos on the same bottles in 
another premises, which were subjected to levy excise, i.e. the 
competent authority one again imposed the excise duty on the said 
item. The question was raised regarding the constitutional validity 
of said imposition / levy. 
 It was held that, printing on glass bottles did not bring into 
existence a new commercial commodity that was distinct and 
separate in character, use and name from the original commodity. 
The plain bottles are themselves commercial commodities and can 
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be sold and used as such. By the process of printing names or logos 
on the bottles, the basic character of the commodity does not 
change. They continue to be bottles. Therefore, process of printing 
on bottles is not a ‘ manufacturing’ process. The Revenue could 
not be permitted to levy duty twice (double) on the same item, 
when there was no warrant therefore, in the relevant provisions of 
Act. Hence, one again imposition of excise duty on printed bottles 
in premises where printing was carried on amounted to double 
taxation under same tariff item which was not permitted.   
There should be relation between levy of fees and services 
rendered as we have seen earlier in this study, but if the levy so 
called collected used for other than the general purpose of the Act, 
then such levy would be likely to challenge on its constitutional 
validity. It was categorically stated in case of, Sasa Musa Sugar 
Works, etc v/s state of Bihar33, which, collection made by the State 
Government under Section 33M of Bihar Agricultural Produce 
Markets Act (17 of 1980), would not be utilized for general 
purpose. (The collection of levy was in nature of fees), but entire 
collection would be ploughed back for achieving the purpose under 
the Act. It was held that, in view of the matter, it could not be 
reasonably contended that the imposition had lost the character of 
fee and had partaken the character of tax. 
 Under Article 265, the Tax evasion and Tax planning has the 
meaning the colourable device to evade taxes is not the tax 
planning, under the lifting corporate veil is permissible for 
ascertain whether tax is evaded or not. In the appeal Union of India 
v/s M/s. Play world Electronics Pvt. Ltd. & other34, the question of 
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concessional rate of excise duty to the respondent whether it could 
be amount to Tax evasion or not was the issue raised in the appeal. 
Assessee Company was manufacturing wireless receiving sets, tap 
recorders, tape players, were made assessable under Tariff Items 
33A and 37AA of Central Excise Act. The respondent had 
submitted classification list and price lists in respect of the said 
goods, before competent authority for the purpose of assessment of 
excise duty. On verification of said lists, it was found that goods 
were unbranded, while on investigation, it was came to notice of 
the Department that the assessee (respondent) company was 
engaged in the manufactures of wireless receiving sets and tap 
recorders in the brand name of “Bush”, from the very beginning 
and were selling the same exclusively to M/s. Bush India Ltd., or 
its authorized wholesale dealers only and never in open market. As 
these facts were nowhere mentioned by the assessee in its price list 
or its classification lists, and these according to Department, 
amounted to willful suppression of facts with the intention to evade 
payment of central excise duty, because the respondent had 
claimed the concessional rate of excise duty under notification 
No.358/77CE, respect to goods above mentioned.  
From the evidences and facts produced before the Court, it 
was decided that, market value of the goods of the assessee was the 
price charged from M/s. Bush India Ltd, and not the market value 
at which price M/s. Bush India Ltd sold to its wholesalers for the 
purpose of payment of excise duty. So it could not be said that 
there was any misdeclaration of the value with intention to evade 
taxes with critics Court further observed that, it is true that tax 
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planning may be legitimate provided it is within the frame work of 
law, colourable devices cannot be part of tax planning and it is 
wrong to encourage or entertain the belief that it is honorable to 
avoid the payment of tax by dubious methods. It is the obligation 
of every citizen to pay the taxes honestly without resorting to 
subterfuges. It is also true that in order the atmosphere of tax 
compliance, taxes must be reasonably collected and when 
collected, should be utilized in proper expenditure and not wasted. 
That under Article 265, no tax can be imposed by byelaw, 
rule, or regulation unless the statute under which the subordinate 
legislation is made specially authorizes the imposition. Rule-
making authority cannot transgress the basis of the statutory power 
conferred by the statute, as rule-making authority has no plenary 
power. It has to act within limits of the power granted to it.35 
Further that meaning of levy or collection of except by authority of 
law means there should be enactment of valid law for imposition 
of tax or levy, and should be within constitutional limit or 
jurisdiction of an entry or head to respective Lists. If in an 
enactment of any statute of finance, if the legislative authority has 
transgressed the constitutional limit, then aggrieved party can 
claim for refund, which involves the principles of natural justice 
and equity in favour of claimant.(the aggrieved party)                                      
4.5     Exemption   from Taxation (Article 285 & 289 of the  
Constitution) 
The term “Union Taxation” used in Article 289(1) will 
ordinarily mean “all taxes leviable by the Union” and it include 
within its ambit taxes on property levied within Union Territories; 
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therefore, the States can avail of the exemption provided in Article 
289(1) in respect of their properties situated within Union 
Territories. 
 There is no reason to read a limiting principle into the 
definition of the phrase “Union Taxation”. The term can and 
should be given widest amplitude, allowing encompassing all taxes 
that are levied by the authority of Parliamentary laws. As clause 
(4) of Article 246 itself envisage situation where Parliament is to 
make laws in respect of matters in State List, it cannot be said that 
this is a rare or an unusual circumstance. 
 The Constitution does not contain any provision, which 
would indicate that the definition of “Union Taxation” should be 
restrictively interpreted so as to be within the confines of Article 
246(1). The specific situation envisaged in Article 249, 250, 252, 
253 and the emergency provisions in part XVIII of the Constitution 
do not make for the creation of any anomalous situations. These 
Articles, which provide for unusual exercises of Parliamentary 
power involving the matters enumerated in State List, can be 
regarded as exceptions to the general rule. Therefore, unless the 
context requires otherwise – as in the case of Article 249, 250, 252, 
253 and the emergency provisions in part XVIII of the Constitution 
– the broad definition of “Union Taxation” embracing all taxes 
leviable by Parliament ought to be accepted for the purpose of 
interpreting Article 289(1). 
  Unlike other Federation, the Union of India has a sizeable 
territory of its own comprising the Union Territories, which have 
been specified in the First Schedule to the Constitution. Therefore, 
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the limited reciprocal inter governmental immunity bestowed by 
the Constitution in Article 285 and 289 is given fuller meaning by 
virtue of the adoption of the wider meaning of “Union Taxation”, 
this would mean that, just as the properties of the Union are 
exempt from taxes on property leviable by States, the properties of 
the States will also be exempt from taxes on property leviable by 
the Union in areas falling within its territorial jurisdiction36.
 The immunity granted to the States in respect of Union 
Taxation under Article 289(1) does not extend to the duties of 
customs including export duties or duties of excise. The provisions 
of Article 289 of the Constitution therefore, do not preclude the 
Union from imposing, or authorizing the imposition of custom 
duties on the import or export of the property of a State used for 
purposes other than those specified in Clause (2) of that Article. 
 Nor do the provisions of Article 289 of the Constitution of 
India preclude the Union from imposing or authorizing the 
imposition of excise duties on the production or manufacture in 
India, of the property of a State used for purposes other than those 
specified in Clause (2) of that Article. In the light of the above 
stated facts, it was opined. In re. Sea Customs Act (1878)37, that 
“sub-Section (2) of 20 of Sea Customs Act (1878), and sub-Section 
(1-A) of Section 3 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, as 
sought to be amended by the proposed Bill of the Sea Customs and 
Central Excises (Amendment) Act, will not be inconsistent with 
the provisions of Article 289 of the Constitution. 
 Whereas all taxes on income other than agricultural income 
are within the exclusive power of the Union, taxes on agricultural 
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income only are reserved for the States. All Customs duties, 
including export duty, relating as they do to transactions of import 
into or export out of the country are within the powers of the 
Parliament. The States are not concerned with those. They are only 
concerned with taxes on the entry of goods into local areas for 
consumption, use or sale therein, covered by Entry 52 in the State 
List. Except for duties of excise on alcoholic liquors and opium 
and other narcotic drugs, all duties of excise are leviable by 
Parliament. Hence, it can be said that by and large, taxes on 
income, duties of customs and duties of excise are within the 
exclusive power of legislation by Parliament. 
 Reading Article 289 and its complementary Article 285 
together the intention of the Constitution makers was that Article 
285 would exempt all property of the Union fro all taxes on 
property levied by a State or by any authority within the State, 
while Article 289 contemplates that all property of States would be 
exempt from all taxes on property which may be leviable by the 
Union. Both the Articles are concerned with taxes directly either 
on income or on property and not with the taxes which may 
indirectly affect income or property. The contention, therefore, that 
these two Articles should be read in the restricted sense of 
exempting the property or income of a State in one case and the 
property of the Union in the other from taxes directly either on 
property or income as the case may be, is correct. Article 289(1) 
being in the nature of an exception to the exclusive field of 
legislation reserved to Parliament, the exception has to be strictly 
construed and, therefore, limited to taxes on property and on 
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income of a State. In other words, the immunity granted in favour 
of States has to be restricted to taxes levied directly on property 
and income, Therefore, even though import and export duty or 
duties of excise have reference to goods and commodities, they are 
not taxes on property directly and are not within the exemption in 
Article 289(1).38  
 Whether the income derived from trading activity by a State 
is eligible for exemption from the Union taxation, or not, was the 
important issue in a Case of, Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport 
Corporation v/s Income-Tax Officer, Hyderabad39, where it was 
observed that, the income derived from its trading activity by the 
Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, which was 
established under the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950(by a 
notification issued by the Andhra Pradesh) was not to the income 
of the State of Andhra Pradesh within the meaning of Article 
289(1) of the Constitution and hence, it is not exempt from Union 
Taxation. 
 The general proposition flows from clause (1) of Article 
289(1) that ordinarily the income derived by a State both from 
Governmental and non-Governmental or commercial activities 
shall be immune from Income Tax levied by the Union provided 
the income in question can be said to be the income of the State. 
Clause (2) provides an exemption. If clause (1) had stood by itself, 
it may not have been easy to include within its purview income 
derived by a State from commercial activities, but since Clause (2) 
in terms empowers the Parliament to make a law levying a tax on 
commercial activities carried on by on behalf of a State, the 
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conclusion is inescapable that these activities were deemed to have 
been included in clause (1) and that alone can be the justification 
for the words in which clause (2) has been adopted by the 
Constitution. Clause (3) then empowers the Parliament to declare 
by law that any trade or business would be taken out of the 
purview of clause (2) and restored to the area covered by clause (1) 
by declaring that the trade or business is incidental to the ordinary 
functions of Governments. In other words clause (3) is an 
exception to the exception prescribed by clause (2). 
 In justification of the observation, the Court further stated 
that, “from the relevant provisions of the Road Transport 
Corporations Act, 1950, there is no doubt that the bulk of the 
capital is contributed by the State Government and a small 
proportion by the Central Government and in that sense the 
majority of shares are at present owned by the State Government. 
There is also no doubt that the Corporation is a State controlled 
Corporation. But it is clear that all other citizens may be admitted 
to the group of shareholders and from that point of view the Act 
contemplates contribution of the capital for the corporation not 
only by the State Government and Central Government but also 
citizens. Far from making any provision which would make the 
income of the Corporation, the income of the State, all the relevant 
provisions emphatically bring out the separate personality of the 
Corporation and proceeds on the basis that the trading activity run 
by the Corporation and profit and loss there would be made as a 
result of the trading activity would be the profit and loss of the 
‘Corporation’. The Corporation though statutory has a personality 
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of its own and this personality is distinct from that of the State or 
other shareholders. Hence, prima facie the income derived by the 
trading Corporation cannot be claimed by the State which is one of 
the shareholders”. 
 As we have earlier discussed that property or income of 
Union is exempted under Art.285 of Indian Constitution. But in 
case, where the claim of exemption from property tax imposed by 
State legislature was negativated stating that Food Corporation of 
India, being district separate entity from Union Government, the 
property of Food Corporation of India cannot be treated as Union 
property. Hence, Food Corporation of India cannot claim benefit of 
exemption under Art.285 of Constitution40. Again the Honorable 
justice shree D.P.Wadhwa J., favoured the same ruling in Case 
Board of Trustees, Visakhapatnam Port Trust v/s State of Andhra 
Pradesh,4 1  where Board of Trustees  of  Visakhapatnam Port Trust, 
claimed  the benefit of exemption from levy of  property tax 
imposed by Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation, under Art.285 
of  Constitution, stating that the facts that the subjective properties 
were not owned by the Board, and the vested properties in the trust 
was only for the purpose of administrating them and they in fact 
were remained the properties owned by the Union of India, hence, 
it should exempted. The appellant’s contentions were rejected. It 
was held that vesting of properties by Central Government in the 
Board was absolute and not only for the management. Board was 
not department of Central Government, but had distinct identity of 
a company. So the Board was not eligible for exemption from 
taxation under Art.285, on grounds of being property of Union.  
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Once again in Case of Food Corporation of India v/s 
Municipal Committee, Jalalabad & other42, the Justice 
D.P.Wadhwa and M.B. Shah, JJ., held that “the appellant 
Corporation is constituted by Food Corporation Act,1964, the  
Corporation shall be body corporate with name, having perpetual 
succession and a common seal with power, subject to provisions of 
the Act, to acquire, hold and dispose of property….etc. under the 
Act; and the Corporation is company within the  meaning of the 
Income Tax Act,1961, and liable to tax on its income, profits and 
gains. It is thus, apprent that Corporation is a distinct legal entity 
from Union of India, hence cannot claim exemption of House tax 
under Art.285 of Constitution”. It was further stated that even if 
the Corporation was an agency or instrumentality of Central 
Government that did not lead to the inference that the Corporation 
was a Governmental department. The reason was that Act has 
given the Corporation and individuality apart from that of 
Government. 
 The properly of the Union is exempt from all taxes imposed 
by a State or by any authority within a State under clause (1) of 
Article 285 unless the claim can be supported and sustained within 
the four corners of clause (2). The local authority, however, can 
reap advantage of clause (2) only fewer than two conditions 
namely,  
1. that it is “that tax” which is being continued to be levied and 
no other; 
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2. that the local authority in “that State” is claiming to continue 
the levy of tax, i.e. it should continued in force as an existing 
law under Article 372 of the Constitution. 
The object of Article 372 is to maintain the continuity of the 
pre-existing laws after the Constitution can into force till they were 
replaced, altered or amended by a competent authority. The 
Constitution gives a separate treatment to the subject of finance, 
and Article 277 saves the existing taxes etc., levied by States, if the 
conditions mentioned therein are complied with. While Article 372 
saves all pre-Constitution valid laws, Article 277 is confined only 
to taxes, duties, Cesses or fees lawfully levied immediately before 
the Constitution. Therefore, Article 372 cannot be construed in 
such a way to enlarge the scope of the saving of taxes, duties, 
Cesses or fees. To State it differently, Article 372 must be read 
subject to Article 277. 
 The Doctrine of priority or precedence of Crown debts- 
Detur Digniori – has recognized by the Courts, as was applicable 
in British India before 1950. 
 The arrears of tax due to the State can claim priority over 
private debts. The common law doctrine about priority of Crown 
debts, which was recognized by Indian High Courts prior to 1950 
constitutes “Law in force” with the meaning of Article 372(1) and 
continues to be in force. The basic justification for the claim for 
priority of State debts is the rule of necessity and the wisdom of 
conceding to the State the right to claim priority in respect of its 
tax dues. The doctrine may not apply in respect of debts due to the 
State if they are contracted by citizens in relation to commercial 
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activities, which may be undertaken by the State for achieving 
socio-economic good. In other words, where welfare State enters 
into commercial fields which cannot be regarded as an essential 
and integral part of the basic- Government functions of the State 
and seeks to recover debts from its debtors arising out of such 
commercial activities the applicability of the doctrine of priority 
shall be open for consideration.43  
The principle of priority for Government debts is founded on 
the rule of necessity and public policy. The basic justification for 
the claim for priority of state debts rests on the well recognized 
principle that the State is entitled to raise money by taxation, 
because unless adequate revenue is received by the state, it would 
not be able to function as a sovereign Government at all. It is 
essential that as a sovereign its primary governmental functions 
and in order to be able to discharge such functions efficiently, it 
must be in possession of necessary funds and this consideration 
emphasizes the necessity and wisdom of conceding to the State, 
the right to claim priority in respect of its tax dues. 
The Application of Section 372, in above case, helped in 
achieving the priority in respect of tax dues by state Government 
authority over private debts; But in Case of, Union of India v/s        
City Municipal Council, Bellary,44 the view of the Court was 
different, where it was said that; the Railways (local Authorities 
Taxation) Act (1941) creating the liability of Railway to pay 
Municipal Tax could not be said to have been continued in force as 
an existing law under Article 372 of the Constitution.  
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 The Bellary Municipal Council in the city of Bellary which 
was a local authority within the State of Madras could not take the 
advantage of clause (2) as at the time when it was making the 
claim for realization of the tax it was a part of the Mysore State, as 
city of Bellary was merged into Mysore State on 1-10-53. “The 
continuance in force” of such an existing law is “subject to other 
provisions of the Constitution” under the Article 372, of 
Constitution. The Central Legislature passed the Act of 1941 
creating the liability of Railways to taxation by local authorities, 
which was a Federal Legislature of India. The 1941 Act is, 
therefore, repugnant to clause (1) of Article 285. It is neither a law 
made by Parliament nor a law made by the Central Legislature 
after the advent of the Constitution. In either view of the matter it 
is not a law covered by the phrase “save in so for as Parliament 
may by law otherwise provide” occurring in clause (1) of Art.285. 
Thus, the general bar of clause (1) of Article 285 applied and the 
property in question was exempted from all taxes claimed by the 
Bellary Municipal Council.  
 Under Article 285(2)- The Railway buildings constructed 
after 31-3-1937 and 25-1-1950 were liable to pay Municipal taxes 
or not was the question, raised in Case of, Union of India v/s 
Commissioner, Sahibganj Municipality.45 The Court held that, 
Railway properties (buildings) not in existence before 1-4-1937 
and 26-1-1950 (the date of commencement of Constitution) could 
not be made liable to pay the Municipal taxes on the basis of the 
notification was issued in 1911 under Section 135 of Railway Act 
authorizing a local authority to levy taxes. The buildings which 
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vested in the Union after coming into existence of the Constitution 
can be made liable to pay Municipal tax only by a law of 
Parliament providing to that effect. By mere fact that the 
notification issued in 1911 was neither revoked nor its terms varied 
it cannot be said that the notification contributed by virtue of 
Section 4 of Railways (local Authorities Taxation) Act (1941). 
There must be a notification of the Central Government under 
Section 3 of 1941 Act declaring the railway properties to be pay 
the tax in the aid of the funds of any local authority. Hence, in the 
absence of notifications under sub-Section 3 and 4 of Act 25 of 
1941, the said Railway building properties were exempted from 
paying liabilities of Municipal Taxes. 
4.6 Taxation Laws – Validity 
 Article 265 merely enacts that all taxation, i.e. imposition, 
levy and collection shall by Law; the Article beyond excluding 
purely executive action does not by itself lay down any criterion 
for determing the validity of such law to justify any contention that 
criteria laid down excludes others to be found elsewhere in the tax 
has to be imposed by “law” it would appear to follow that it 
Constitution for laws in general. If by reason of Article 265, tax 
could only be imposed by a law, which is valid, by conformity to 
the criteria laid down in the relevant Articles of the Constitution. 
These are that the law should be, 
1. Within the legislative competence of the legislature being 
covered by the legislative entries in Schedule 7 of the 
Constitution; 
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2. The law should not be prohibited by any particular provision 
of the Constitution such as for example, Articles 276(2), 
286, etc.etc., and 
3. The law or the relevant portion thereof should not be invalid 
under Article 13 for repugnancy to those freedoms which are 
guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution which are relevant 
to the subject-matter of law.46 
It is clear from the above observations that the Parliament 
and State Legislature has power to legislate on tax entries of 
respective Lists of Seventh Schedule under Article 265, subject to 
the restrictions of relevant provisions of the Constitution. If any 
taxing Statute fails to comply the above said requirements then, the 
statute would suffer from vice of competency, or constitutional 
validity. In deciding the constitutionality of such Act, the true test 
is not to find out whether the Act has encroached upon or invaded 
any forbidden field but it is the true intent of the Act, which will 
determine the validity of the Act. 
In construing a statutory provision of an Act, the first and 
the foremost rule of construction is the literary construction. All 
that the Court has to see at the very outset is what does that 
provision of an Act say. If the provision is unambiguous and it 
from that provision of the Act the legislative intent is clear, the 
Court need not call into aid the other rules of construction of the 
statute. The other rules of construction of the statute are called into 
aid only when the legislative intention is not clear. The 
constitutional validity of Section 3-D, under U.P. Sales Tax Act 
was challenged in, case Hiralal Ratanlal v/s State of U.P47, on 
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ground of excessive delegation, where it was held on the principle 
that, It is true that Legislature cannot delegate its legislative power 
to any other body. But subject to the qualification, it is permissible 
for the Legislature to delegate the power to select the persons on 
whom the tax is to be levied or the goods or the transactions on 
which the tax is to be levied. In the Act under Section 3, the 
Legislature has sought to impose multipoint tax on all sales and 
purchases, after having done that it has given power to executive to 
select for special treatment dealings in certain class of goods. In 
the very nature of things, it was impossible for the Legislature to 
enumerate goods, dealing in which sales tax or purchase tax should 
be imposed. It was also impossible for the Legislature to select 
goods which should be subjected to a single point sales or purchase 
tax. Before making such selections several aspects such as the 
impact of levy, on the society, economic consequences and the 
administrative convenience require to be considered. These factors 
may change from time to time. Hence, in the very nature of things, 
these details have got to be left to the executive through power of 
delegation. In the battlefield of unconstitutionality, the concerning 
litigants have to produce the socio-economic bio-data of 
challenged legislation. 
The differential in rate of tax between Sugar Mills and 
Khandsari units was justified under the challenge of constitutional 
validity of Section 3 of U.P. Sugarcane (purchase Tax) Act, in 
Case of, Ganga Sugar Corporation Ltd. v/s State of Uttar 
Pradesh,48 by holding that, khandsari units are cottage industries 
unlike sugar factories, and need legislative succor for survival. 
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Their economy justifies State action, classifying them as a part 
from factories. Hence, the differential in rate of tax, as between 
Sugar Mills and Khandsari units is not bad and does not violate 
Article 14 of the Constitution. Unequal cannot be treated equally 
since mechanical uniformity may become unmitigated injustice. 
 There are some instances where constitutional validity of the 
Act has challenged on ground of incompetence to pass the 
legislation; and the levy made thereupon treated as tax, though it 
was in nature fee. It is now well established that, under the 
Constitution a distinction has been made between a tax and a fee 
and in each of the legislative lists, power has been given for levy of 
various forms of taxes. There is an entry in each of the three Lists 
as regards fees, which could be levied in respect of any of the 
matters dealt with in the list. In a case, where the State of 
Rajasthan imposed the levy in nature of fee on public trusts, to 
meet the expenses incurred by State Government in regarding 
services to the public trust through the agency of the Devsthan 
Department. The State collected only Rs.3000/- as registration fees 
against the expenditure incurred for rendering services to the 
Devsthan Department was Rs.2,76,715/-in the year 1964-65. 
Contention raising that imposed levy was gone in consolidated 
fund hence it was a tax, was rejected and held that, as income by 
way of fees was for below the expenditure incurred on the 
Devsthan Department, the levy would be a fee. 
 Sometimes it happens that, imposed levy has no direct 
connection or nexus with services rendered by legal competent 
authority. In such circumstance, whether levy looses his character, 
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or change his character that depends upon the facts, and 
circumstances of each case, such type of situation arose in Case of, 
Manmohon Vig and others v/s State of Haryana,49 where the levy 
was imposed in nature compensatory and regulatory tax respect to 
use of National Highways from concerning users, the levy was 
challenged, on ground that, the State Government Haryana, 
relevant budget shown the facts that no expenditure was incurred 
in connection with the development construction, improvement 
and maintenance of National Highways within the State of 
Haryana. The Court observed that the State Government had 
incurred the expenditure in connection with National Highways not 
by directly constructing or maintaining National Highways but by 
facilitating the transport of goods and passengers along the 
National Highways in various other ways such as, lighting, traffic 
control, amenities for passengers halting places for buses and 
trucks etc. etc. The Courts’ poetic views has expressed by the 
Court in the following way, 
  “And not by eastern windows only. 
    When daylight comes, comes in the light;  
    In front the sun climbs slow, how slowly,  
    But westward, look the land is bright”. 
 The Hon. Court’s above views was somewhat changed in 
case of, Kamaljit Singh and others v/s Municipal Board, Pikhwa,50 
where it was held that the imposition of Toll Tax – by U.P. 
Municipalities Act (2 of 1916) under Section 128(1)(VII)- on 
vehicles and other conveyances, animal and laden coolies etc., was 
ultra-vires and should be struck down, as Municipal Board 
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providing no facilities to the owner of the vehicles like stage 
carriages who were making use of National Highway passing 
through Municipal limit. Hence, Toll tax levied by Municipal 
Board cannot be treated as compensatory tax and so it is liable to 
be struck down as ultra-vires. 
 Whether any imposition of levy is in a nature of a tax, fee, 
cess, duty or toll, etc. etc. all depends on the various interpretation 
rules and doctrines and the real pith and substance of the intended 
taxing statute, which concludes the nature of the impugned levy.  
The levy of one time tax on motorcycle and tricycle under 
Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Act was challenged on its 
constitutional validity. The facts were proportionate amount of tax 
up to 13 years, but the Act had not provided for refund in the 14th 
and 15th years. The collection of tax for period of 15 years at one 
point of time, enabling the owner to use the vehicle for more than 
25 years, without paying any type of taxes, which may occur 
during this levied period. The cost of services rendered by 
Government was twice, than the total amount recovered from all 
types of vehicles. The balance of expenditure was to be met by 
State from the general revenues. Thus the levied imposed State 
Government was regulatory and compensatory tax, The Company 
owned vehicles were taxed at three times the rate payable by 
individual, also did not violate the Article 14 of the Constitution, 
because the company-owned vehicles might travel more and use 
roads more often, hence the differences on rate of taxes on 
company and an individual has reasonable basis to discriminate.  
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 There are certain levies neither tax, nor excise duty but are 
prices or considerations which the Government charges to the 
licensees for parting with its privileges and granting them to the 
licensee. The demand for establishment charges of the supervisory 
staff posted at factory premises, of licensee, was in respect of 
granting of privilege to manufacture and sell intoxicants. The 
nature of the payment which the licensee is required to make to 
State, by the reason of the State parting with privilege in regard to 
manufacture, sale etc. of intoxicants was neither tax nor excise 
duty, but simply a fee. As we have earlier seen that fee should 
bear element of quid pro quo; but every fee must satisfy the test of 
quid pro quo is not to be mandatory, necessity. In short each 
impugned levy has to be justified by the Court, under the relevant 
provisions of the Constitution.  
 As we have seen in the interpretation of Articles 245, 246 
and 265, with respect to taxing statute, that the Indian Courts have 
played the vital role in achieving the goal and soul of Indian 
democracy, which has been represented in our Constitution, by our 
founding fathers of the Nation. But has to be remarked here that, it 
is limited up to the first aspect of financial arrangements under the 
Constitution; i.e. distribution of taxation heads, in the respective 
Lists of Seventh Schedule of Constitution. 
 A cursory glance at the Schedule and the quantitative look at 
the taxes falling under the Union and State jurisdiction may create 
an illusion. While as many as nineteen taxes are allotted to the 
States, only thirteen fall under Union jurisdiction. A closer look, 
however, reveals that qualitatively superior and elastic taxes, like 
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taxes on personal and corporate incomes, duties of excise and 
customs fall under Central jurisdiction, leaving stagnant once to 
the States’ lot. In the State List of taxes there is only one that could 
be exploited by States for its characteristics buoyancy, namely the 
Sales Tax. The result is that State taxes are quite meager in terms 
of quantum as compared with those of Union. The founding fathers 
of our Constitution, too had visualized such situation of log, and 
had therefore, sought to correct it by making certain Central taxes 
sharable between the Union and States, and certain others to be 
wholly assigned to States although levied and collected by the 
Central Government. 
 The fisc of the Union and States are related to each other 
through imbalances between capacities for resources and the 
resources required by the tasks, impairing the autonomy of the 
States to some extent. Resources levied and collected by the Union 
for exceed the resources needed by the tasks assigned to it under 
the Union List, while resources levied and collected by all the 
States put together fall short of the resources required by the tasks 
assigned to them under State List. In an economist language it can 
be said, “correction of horizontal imbalances necessitates creation 
of vertical imbalance”. Principles governing collection of resources 
at different levels and principles assigning execution of tasks could 
hardly ever produce autonomous units with autonomous Union. 
Units within a Nation, in case of India, vary in size to an amazing 
degree. This diversity is product of so many factors, which pull in 
many directions, that it is better to call it a product of history. 
Whatever the legal characterization of the Constitution, practically, 
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all the countries Switzerland, France, Pakistan, Bangladesh and 
India are fiscally federal in one sense that their unit fiscs are 
related to the Union, fisc in all cases and related to each other in 
few cases. Their fiscs are often directed to disburse resources for 
mutually exclusive domains. In modern times, the Union fisc is by 
and large found to develop resources or pass on resources to its 
respective unit fiscs under the empirical assumption that 
concentration of resources collected at the Union level is far in 
excess of resources required at that level.  
In India, the mismatches are sought to be removed through 
vertical and horizontal devolution from the Union to the unit States 
through different channels/mechanism of: - 
1. Finance Commission,  
2. Planning Commission, and 
3. Union Ministries. 
While the Finance Commission usually makes 
recommendations regarding devolution of taxes and duties 
collected by the Union under provisions made in Article 246(1) 
about the subject matter for exclusive legislation by the Parliament 
and listed in Union List of the Seventh Schedule and grants-in-aid 
of the revenue of the States in need of assistance under Article 275, 
the Planning Commission makes recommendations for grants for 
the States under Article 282, it provides for Government 
(Union/State) assistance for any public purpose. The Union 
Ministers also use the same article for assistance to the States for 
various schemes, known as the centrally funded schemes. With a 
view to avoiding duplication of work and overlapping   
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recommendations, it may be noted the sphere of the Finance 
Commission was restricted in 1961 to non-Plan revenue needs of 
the States. 
 Under the present arrangement, first a particular portion of 
revenue resources (net proceeds) levied and collected by the Union 
under a particular head/article is earmarked for passing on to the 
States and then this portion appointed to different States according 
to some formula combining different criteria in a liner fashion 
through assignment of weights. This could be possible only when 
the Union would have disproportionate power to collect resources 
in comparison to its unit States. The issue got a bit complicated 
right in the beginning as the Plans also require some current 
expenditure, which ought to be met from the viewpoint of sound 
financing from the current revenue. After deducting non-plan 
revenue expenditure, inclusive of defence expenditure of capital 
nature from the total revenue receipts (comprising of tax and non-
tax receipts), the balance is passed on to the Plan for meeting the 
development needs. The earlier Finance Commissions conceded 
this position, left a part of the revenue with Planning Commission 
to deal with it, and did no exercise as regards the plan expenditure 
of revenue nature. Since this has now turned Negative, the 
Eleventh Finance Commission has been advised to consider the 
requirement of the States for meeting the Plan and non-plan 
expenditure both. This is entirely valid for a constitutional body 
dealing with inter-governmental fiscal matters. 
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4.7  Constitutional   Provisions Regarding Devolution 
According to the Constitution, the Union Government is 
empower to make legislation  in matters related to the entries in 
the List I of the Seventh Schedule, which contains inter alia 
provisions for taxation. Till the other day, the taxes and duties 
were classified in five categories: - 
(a) Taxes and duties which are to be levied, collected and 
wholly appropriated by the Union; customs duties including 
export duties (entry no.83), corporation tax (entry no, 85), 
taxes on the capital value of assets (exclusive of agricultural 
land) of individuals and companies and taxes on the capital 
of companies (entry no.86). The proceeds were to form part 
of the Consolidated Fund of India. 
(b) Taxes and duties which are to be levied and collected by the 
Union but necessarily to be distributed between the Union 
and States (Art.270); taxes on non-agricultural income 
(entry no.82). Only a part of the proceeds was to form part 
of the Consolidated Fund of India. 
(c) Taxes and duties, which are to be levied and collected by 
the Union and may be distributed between the Union and 
States (Art.272); duties of excise with exception of alcoholic 
liquors and narcotics but including medicinal and toilet 
preparations containing alcohol (entry no.84). Such 
proceeds from part of the Consolidated Fund of India but a 
part of such proceeds could be paid out of Consolidated 
Fund of India if the Parliament so decides. 
 168
(d) Taxes which are to be levied and collected by the Union but 
are assigned to the States, where they are leviable (Art.269); 
estate duty and duty of succession in respect of property 
other than agricultural land (entries nos.87 & 88), terminal 
taxes on goods and passengers carried by railway, sea or air 
as well as taxes on railway fares and freights (entry no.89), 
taxes (including stamp duties) on transactions on stock 
exchange and future markets (entry no.90), taxes on sale and 
purchase of newspapers and on advertisements published 
therein (entry no.92), taxes on inter-state sale and purchase 
of goods other than newspapers (entry no.92A), taxes on the 
consignment of goods in inter-state trade or commerce 
(entry no.92B). The proceeds are not to form a part of the 
Consolidated Fund of India. 
(e) Duties, which are to be levied and collected by the Union 
but are to be appropriated by the States (Art, 268); Stamp 
duties in respect of bills of exchange, cheques, promissory 
notes, bills of lading, letters of credit, policies of insurance, 
transfer of shares, debentures, proxies and receipts (entry 
no.91), duties of excise on medicinal and toilet preparations 
containing alcohol (part of entry no.84). 
Though Article 269 lists the items taxes on which have to be 
wholly assigned to States and Article 270, the items taxes on which 
are to be necessarily shared between the Union and States, Art.271, 
permits the Union to appropriate surcharges levied on those taxes. 
Article 272 lists the items taxes on which the Union could share 
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with States. There were items listed in the Union List, taxes on 
which were not to be shared with the States at all.  
Our Constitution had made some of the taxes compulsory 
divisible (taxes on income other than agricultural) and left some 
(Union excise duties) at the discretion of the Union. Under the 
Presidential reference both were entrusted with the Commissions 
for their consideration for devolution between the Union and the 
States and the share of the States among the States. All 
Commissions, including the Tenth, used different proportions for 
division of income tax and Union excise duty. But for the fact that 
one is a direct tax and mandatory and the other is an indirect tax 
and discretionary, there is little reason to discriminate between the 
two taxes as regards choosing the proportions of division of 
proceeds between the Union and the States. 
These provisions were clumsy and unnecessary. They were 
quite baffling and mind-boggling. There was little merit to make so 
meticulous distinction between items under Article 270 (income 
tax) and Article 272 (excise duty) that one has to be necessarily 
distributed and the other may be distributed. The only distinction 
that one is direct tax and the other may be distributed. The only 
distinction that one is direct tax and other is indirect tax, did not 
warrant such a distinction. Further, there was little reason to make 
distinction between income tax and excise duty on the one hand 
and corporation tax and custom duties on the other, that the 
proceeds of one could be distributed and that of the other could 
not. The charge that the Union does not want to share the elastic 
and buoyant resources could be leveled with ease. The Union 
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could be charged, and it indeed was charged, that it concentrates 
on those resources, while it has not to share with States. It was also 
alleged that the Union had incentive in granting exemptions and 
deductions in taxes the proceeds of which were to go the States in 
a large measure.  
4.8     Inter Governmental Fiscal Transfers  
A sound system of intergovernmental fiscal transfers serves 
a two fold purpose, One, to address the vertical fiscal imbalance, 
i.e. the inadequacy of revenues of sub-national governments to 
meet their expenditure liabilities, arising from asymmetrical 
assignment of functional responsibilities and financial powers 
among different government levels; and two, to alleviate horizontal 
fiscal imbalances to the disparities in the revenue capacity of the 
constituent units of the federation52. 
 There are four ways in which Centre-State financial 
relations take place in India 
1. Tax devolution and deficit-filling grants under Art.275 (1) of 
the Constitution as per the Finance Commission award, 
2. Normal plan assistance under the Gadgil formula, as also 
additional central assistance for externally aided projects; 
3. Non plan loans any grants of which the main elements are 
Center’s contribution to the States calamity relief fund and 
loans out of the net small saving mobilised from the States;  
4. Finally assistance for centrally sponsored schemes. 
 In a federation the allocation of functions and finances is 
done on the basis of efficiency and suitability while the question of 
adequacy is met by a system of transfer. The latter issue gets 
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complicated as it varies according to the nature of federation itself. 
In a federation, the federating units are equal only in juristic sense, 
while wide economic; disparities are found to exist among them. 
The fiscal adjustment aims at reducing these inequalities53. Fiscal 
imbalance refers to the mismatch between own revenue raising 
capacity and expenditure needs at different governmental units. 
Usually there are two types of fiscal imbalances, as we have stated 
above,  
(1) Vertical fiscal imbalances  
(2) Horizontal fiscal imbalances.  
Vertical fiscal imbalances are usually given primary 
importance, as it serves to focus mismatch in assignment of taxing 
powers and expenditure responsibilities. The Central Government 
has a comparative advantage in raising revenues and sub-Central 
Governments in spending. In India, there is a fairly high degree of 
vertical imbalances. A high degree of centralisation of revenue is a 
necessary condition for high vertical imbalances. The major reason 
for these vertical imbalances is the constitutional assignment of 
higher expenditure responsibilities to the States couple with the 
relative advantage that the federal Government has in collecting 
taxes. Again, the Central Government in India control monetary 
policy deficit financing, which has also given rise in vertical fiscal 
imbalance. Effective central influence on the expenditure pattern 
of the States has also contributed to the degree of vertical fiscal 
imbalance in India. Still the Indian States have failed to raise 
sufficient revenues to finance their burgeoning expenditure. 
Agricultural taxation has not yet been used, administrative 
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convenience has often prevailed over economic considerations, and 
this has resulted in narrow tax bases and lower income elasticity of 
tax revenue. All this clearly reflects the erosion of State autonomy 
and fiscal independence in India.  
 In India, horizontal fiscal imbalance also exists. This has 
arisen mainly from interstate disparities in revenue capacity and 
effort as well as in expenditure needs. In India, most of the States 
are homogeneous only a few (seven north eastern States, Sikkim, 
Jammu & Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh) are hill States form a 
distinct category, generally grouped together as special category 
States. 
 Most of the relatively homogeneous States exhibit wide 
disparities in the level of economic and social development. 
Naturally their fiscal situation also shows wide divergence. Special 
category States are characterised by small industrial sectors and 
largely unorganised economics and the unit cost of providing 
various public goods and merit goods is relatively high in these 
States. As a result, their revenue capacity is low compared to their 
high per capita public expenditure. All these are leading to fairly 
high degree of fiscal imbalance. Apart from revenue effort and 
expenditure needs, inter-State tax exportation has also its impact 
on the horizontal imbalance. 
 Inter-governmental transfers have been employed as a potent 
instrument to resolve fiscal imbalances, both vertical and 
horizontal. The founding father of the Constitution sought to 
ensure that the finance of the Centre and the States are kept on an 
even keel. Therefore, the Constitution provided for the sharing of 
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individual income tax and Union excise duties, and for giving 
grants-in-aid to the States in need of assistance. Though these 
channels vertical and horizontal imbalances were sought to be 
offset. There are three channels of central transfers to States; the 
Finance Commission, plan transfers and assistance for central 
sector and centrally sponsored schemes. 
 In India, transfers are never designed purely on economic 
considerations. Barring the economic rationale for federal 
transfers, in practice, such transfers are mapped out both overtly 
and covertly on political plan in India. Thus, transfers serve not 
only economic objectives but also political objectives. 
 A notable feature of India’s fiscal arrangements is the 
existence of bio-model institutional structure, the Finance 
Commission and Planning Commission. Finance Commission – a 
semi-judicial, statutory body appointed by the President of India, 
under Art.280 of the Indian Constitution, quinquentially to make 
statutory transfers – makes recommendations about devolution of 
central taxes to the States, and grants-in-aid to States in need of 
central assistance. There are also arrangements for plan transfers 
by way of both loans and grants through the Planning Commission 
and discretionary transfers. This means that Finance Commission 
is concerned with non-plan revenue gap of the States. Thus, 
Finance Commission adopts a “gap-filling” approach that prevents 
it form making a holistic assessment of Central-State relationship 
by looking at both Plan and non-Plan resources. As Finance 
Commission acts as “fiscal dentists filling in budgetary cavities”, it 
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has to device rational basis for the division of total assistance in to 
devolution and grants. 
 The founding fathers of the Indian Constitution were 
convinced that the States would require more and more resources 
as the responsibilities they would be called upon to shoulder were 
bound to increase and therefore, there should be a statutory 
arrangement for the transfer of funds from the Centre to the States 
for public purposes. They rightly felt that an independent body 
appointed periodically to adjudicate in this matter better did this, 
and this is how the institution of Finance Commission came into 
being. 
 The appointment of Finance Commission and its devolution 
are made in terms of the current Indian Constitution. Hence, it will 
be worthwhile to have a glance on the concerned Articles (from 
268 to 281) of the Constitution, however, in nutshell. Articles 
marked with an asterisk (*) relate to Finance Commission. 
 Though Article 269 Lists the items taxes on which have to 
be wholly assigned to States, and Article 270, the items taxes on 
which are to be necessarily shared between the Union and States, 
Article 271, permits the Union to appropriate surcharges levied on 
those taxes. Article 272 lists the items taxes on which the Union 
could shares with States. There were items listed in the Union List, 
taxes on which were not to be shared with the States at all.  
 The fiscs of the States and the Union are related to each 
other through imbalance between capacities for resources, and 
resources required by the tasks, impairing the autonomy of the 
States to some extent on the top of horizontal mismatches, which 
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exist between the States, there exists what has earned the 
nomenclature of vertical mismatch. Resources levied and collected 
by the Union for exceed the resources needed by the tasks assigned 
to it (Union) under the Union List while resources levied and 
collected by all States put together fall short of the resources 
required by the tasks assigned to them under the State List. It is 
rarely if at all pointed out that correction of horizontal imbalances 
necessitates creation of vertical imbalance. Principles governing 
collection of resources at different levels and the principles 
assigning execution of tasks could hardly ever produce 
autonomous units with autonomous Union. 
 Tax Reforms Committee (Chairman Raja J. Chelliah) had 
expressed the view that percent constitutional provision regarding 
tax sharing needed to be re-examined. The Committee observed, 
“The task of fiscal adjustment at the Centre has been rendered 
more difficult because of the compulsions arising from the formula 
of tax sharing with the States.” What is more, the States have been 
demanding that Corporate Profit tax should also be brought within 
the divisible pool. According to the Committee, the prevailing tax 
devolution to the States constituted around 24 per cent of gross 
central government tax revenues. With the consent and co-
operation of the states the relevant constitutional provisions could 
be amended to the effect that 25 per cent of aggregate tax revenues 
of the centre be shared with the States. There would then be 
certainty for the states and the union regarding what revenues 
would accrue to their respective budgets. The centre would not 
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have to distort its pattern of taxation by being virtually compelled 
to raise non-sharable taxes. 
 The Tenth Finance Commission set out an alternative 
scheme of devolution. According to the Commission, the main 
benefits resulting from this new arrangement would be: -  
(a) With a given share being allotted to the states in the 
aggregate revenues from central taxes, states will be able to 
share the aggregate buoyancy of central taxes; 
(b) The central government can pursue tax reforms without the 
need to consider whether a tax is sharable with the states or 
not; 
(c) The impact of fluctuations in central tax revenues would be 
felt alike by the central and state governments; 
(d) Should the taxes mentioned in articles 268 and 269 form 
part of this arrangement, there would be greater like hood of 
their being tapped. 
Under this scheme, proceeds of all central taxes, except 
surcharges, would constitute a common sharable pool from which 
a share was to be devolved to the states. The Tenth Finance 
Commission recommended 29 per cent of the proceeds to be 
devolved to the states under this scheme. This percentage share 
included devolution on account of additional excise duties levied 
in lieu of sales tax as well as grants in lieu of tax on railway 
passenger fares. 
             The proposed recommendation was but to be lauded. The 
Finance Ministry of the Government of India brought out in 
January 1997a discussion paper on the ‘Alternative Scheme of 
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Devolution of Share in Centre Taxes to States’ spelling out its pros 
and cons though it finds the scheme reasonable and feasible. It is 
reported that a consensus had reached in the Third meeting of the 
Inter-State Council on 17th July 1997. With some modifications, it 
is reported, the Government of India introduced a Constitution 
(Eighty Fifth Amendment) Bill, 1998 in the 12th Lok Sabha but it 
was referred to the Standing Committee on Finance, which gave its 
report in February 1999. But the Lok Sabha got dissolved and the 
bill lapsed. Finally, a modified version of the Bill was introduced 
as the Constitution (Eighty Ninth Amendment) Bill, 2000 on 
March 9 and was passed by the Parliament as the Constitution 
(Eighty Amendment) Act, 2000, which received the assent of the 
President of India on June 9, 2000. 
 This amendment, which is more revolutionary than was 
originally recommended, substituted a new article for Article 270, 
substantially amended Article 269 and omitted Article 272. Article 
269 includes taxes on sale and purchase of goods across States and 
taxes on consignment of goods crossing State boundaries. Article 
270 reads as: - 
 “(1)  All taxes and duties referred to the Union List, except 
the duties and taxes referred to in article 268 and 269, 
respectively, surcharge on taxes and duties to in 
article 271 and any cess levied for specific purposes 
under any law made by Parliament shall be levied and 
collected by the Government of India and shall be 
distributed between the Union and the States in the 
manner provided in clause (2). 
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 (2) Such percentage, as may be prescribed, of the net 
proceeds of any such tax or duty in any financial year 
shall not form   part of     the Consolidated Fund of 
India and shall be assigned to the   State in (3). 
 (3)  In this article,’ prescribed’ means, 
1. Until a Finance Commission has been constituted, 
prescribed by the President by order, and 
2. After a Finance Commission is constituted, 
prescribed by the President by order after 
considering the recommendations of the Finance 
Commission.” 
 It may be noted that instead of income tax under old 
Article 270 and excise duties under old Article 272 (which now 
stands omitted), all taxes, all duties, all surcharges and all cesses, 
which were earlier wholly or partly appropriated by the Union 
have been included form part of the Consolidated Fund of India, 
Article 272 allowed the whole of collection to be part of the 
Consolidated Fund of India and whatever had to be paid to the 
States, had to be paid out of the Consolidated Fund of India. 
Devolution of excise duties to the States, under Article 272, had 
thus character of grant. Now this has been done away with. 
However, any specific tax proceeds would be sharable with only 
those States where the tax/duty is levied in the year in question. 
 It may be further noted that, 
  (a) as against the recommendation of Tenth Finance 
Commission for excluding surcharges on taxes and duties 
from the pool, the amendment has included them, 
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 (b) cesses were not specifically referred to in the Tenth  
  Finance Commission recommendation but they have  
  been included, 
 (c) as against the recommendation of the Tenth Finance 
Commission for pooling the gross proceeds, only net 
proceeds have been pooled (in order to maintain 
consistency with Articles 270, 279, and 280), 
 (d) as against the recommendation of the Tenth Finance 
Commission for fixing the share for 15 years, the issue 
was left open and the share could vary even year to year. 
 (e) many small encumbrances relating to Union territories 
and Union emoluments have been done away with in the 
new version, and 
 (f)  the share of net proceeds of these taxes, which is 
devolved to the States, is not form part of the 
consolidated Fund of India. 
4. 9 Roll of Finance Commission in Devolution 
(a) Vertical Devolution  
 
The Finance Commission was earlier enjoined to 
recommend the distribution between the Union and the States of 
the net proceeds of taxes, which, were to be, (old Art.270) might 
be, divided (old Art.272) between them and the allocation, between 
the States of the respective shares of the proceeds, so earmarked 
for the all States. After Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 
2000, all taxes and duties referred to in the Union list (barring 
those enumerated in Article 268 which are levied by the Union but 
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collected and appropriated by the respective States and those in 
Article 269, which are levied and collected by the Union but are 
finally passed on to the States), including all surcharges on taxes 
and duties referred to in Article 271 and any cess for specific 
purpose, shall henceforth be distributed between the Union and the 
States. 
(b) Horizontal Devolution 
 As pointed out earlier, federalism is not just a unifying 
mechanism but also a leveling mechanism. Different units are 
likely to develop at different pace and not likely to provide the 
same level of basic social services to the citizens domiciled in 
different units because of paucity of resources. There are various 
reasons for disproportionate collection of resources with the 
Union. This has happened almost in all countries. The Unions are 
distributing resources to units everywhere. The USA where the 
Union and unit States both can tax the citizens on the same bases 
depends on specific purpose grants. In Australia the 
Commonwealth Grants Commission allocates special purpose 
grants to claimant States while general grants are settled at political 
level through negotiation and bargain. In India, the Constitution 
has clearly demarcated taxes and duties between the Union and the 
States and has provided for a Finance Commission, which will 
determine the devolution of tax proceeds among the States and 
grants-in-aid of revenues of the States in need of assistance.  
 Thus our Finance Commission is supposed to first determine 
vertical devolution of each of the shareable taxes and then to 
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horizontally distribute the States’ share in each tax proceeds to 
different States.  
 Two basic principles for determining the inter se shares of 
States are those of equity and efficiency. The principle of 
horizontal equity is guided by the consideration that as a result of 
revenue sharing, the resource deficiencies across State arising out 
of systemic and identifiable factors are evened out. The principle 
of makes up for resource equity deficiencies. As such, it also tends 
to create a vested interest in continuing with the resource 
deficiencies. To neutralize this adverse incentive it needs to be 
complemented by suitable criteria for rewarding ‘efficiency’, i.e., 
efforts to improve the resource bases and deliver services at 
minimum cost. 
(c) Role of Finance Commission in Grant-In-Aid of Revenues 
 Under Article 280 (3B), the Finance Commission is further 
enjoined to recommend the principles, which should govern the 
grants-in –aid of the revenues of the States out of the Consolidated 
Fund of India. In fact, Article 275 stipulates that grants-in –aid of 
revenues of such States as are in need of such assistance could be 
charged on the Consolidated Fund of India. This aid could in 
nature be capital and recurring. However, this has by and large 
been restricted to non-Plan revenue though the Constitution does 
not forbid the Commission to consider total revenue expenditure 
and total revenue receipts. It means in practical terms that for 
deciding the amount of grants in aid of the revenues of the States 
the Finance Commissions considered the gap between non-Plan 
revenue expenditure and all revenue receipts (tax and non-tax) 
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after devolution from the Union. It has to be noted that tax 
devolution cannot be denied even if there is no gap between the 
revenue expenditure of a State and its revenue receipts. Grants-in-
aid would be nature accrue to a State only when there is a positive 
gap between the revenue expenditure (non-Plan) and post-
devolution revenue receipts. 
4.10      Roll of Planning Commission in Plan Grants 
 The Planning Commission was not conceived in the 
Constitution. It came into being by an executive order on March 
15, 1950 hardly after 50 days of promulgation of the Constitution, 
however, for its activity of development. Article 282 came handy 
where it came to making grants to the States for plan purposes. 
Article 282, Expenditure defrayable by the Union (or a State) out 
of its Revenue, provides that the Union (or a State) may make any 
grants for any public purpose, notwithstanding that the purpose is 
not one with respect to which Parliament (or the Legislature of the 
State, as the case may be,) may make laws. Grants under Article 
282 are discretionary in nature and are different from those under 
Article 275, which are mandatory. The invocation of Article 282 
for this purpose was earlier objected as it was intended to meet 
unforeseen emergencies like natural calamities or partition 
holocaust. It was indeed used to help the States to settle the 
persons displaced as a result of partition. 
 While the Finance Commission is supposed to take care of 
non-Plan revenue gap of the States, the Planning Commission has 
assumed to take care of Plan revenue gap as well as Plan capital 
gap. It is pointed out that non-Plan capital needs, which are 
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basically repayment dues of the States, are not taken care of. 
Article 293 (2), which permit the Government of India to make 
loans out of the Consolidated Fund of India, is invoked for 
disbursement of loans by the Planning Commission for State Plans.  
4. 11   Roll of Union Ministries in Making Grants 
In addition, various Union Ministries formulate many 
schemes, known as Centrally Sponsored Schemes, which are 
approved by the Planning Commission. These schemes are wholly 
or substantially funded by the Union Ministries but are executed by 
the State agencies under the technical guidance of the parent 
Ministry. The sponsoring Ministry/Department issues the 
guidelines the contents, coverage, expenditure pattern, and staffing 
of such schemes. The assistance given for these schemes is 
specific, has very large grant element and is over and above the 
assistance given by the Planning Commission as block grants. The 
States are unhappy on two counts. One, they are inadequately 
consulted in the formulation stage even though most of the 
schemes fall under the items included in the State List of the 
Seventh Schedule. Two, sponsoring of these schemes in the 
manner it is done is intrusion into subjects reserved for States. 
Sponsoring of schemes is not intrusion as Article 282 suggests 
defray by the Union for any public purpose. Let the schemes be 
formulated by the States, let the Union take cognizance the 
schemes, and sponsor them. 
 The assistance for these centrally sponsored schemes is 
substantially of the nature of grants. This grant element is 
equivalent to 5 per cent of the total revenue receipts of the Union. 
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4.12  In Conclusion 
 
The Article 265 and devolution of taxes from Union, to 
States represents the federal fiscal structure of India. In federal 
form of governments inter- governmental fiscal relation, who 
refers to the division of financial powers to raise revenue and to 
spend it by the central and lower level of governments is a 
complex issue. One of the vital issues is the mismatch between 
revenue sources and expenditure function vertically across 
different layers of governments. In the last few years, there have 
been simmering and open conflict between Indian Union and the 
States in the matter of devolution of fiscal and financial resources 
due to the political and ideological differences among the ruling 
parties in the States. In a federation, the federating units are equal 
in justice sense, while wide economic disparities are found to exist 
among them. The fiscal adjustment aims at reducing these 
inequalities. In recent years, the need of comprehensive re-
examination of Indian fiscal federalism has emerged, and existing 
perceptible degree of inequality among the federating units have 
compelled the policy makers to give a new look to fiscal 
federalism in the changing scenario. The constructive efforts 
should be made to promote co-operation between units and 
between the units and Union, to make the units and Union co-equal 
and co-ordinate. The sphere of co-operation should increase and 
the sphere of interference and intrusion should diminish in the 
interest in developing a genuine federal polity. 
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Chapter– 5 
 
Judicial Decisions on Union Taxation Power 
 
Division of powers between the two layers of Government 
necessarily involves disputes about the scope of the respective 
authorities of the two governments. This dispute must be resolved 
by an agency, which, as far as possible, must be independent of 
both the governments. And since the nature of disputes must 
generally be such as to require legal acumen for their proper 
resolution, the job is generally entrusted to the Judiciary. 
The power of judicial review has three important 
implications – nullification, credibility and creativity. Since power 
of judicial review results into nullification or annihilation of 
legislative and executive actions of not only the Central 
Government but also the State Governments, it has attracted two-
fold challenges from both the Governments. The challenge to 
judicial review coming from the former is based on the principle of 
separation of powers and the challenge coming from the latter is 
based on the nature of federal structure, which allows two co-
ordinates, and independent sets of governments to function in 
relation to the same people in the same territory. 
The Judiciary will always be safer than other two branches 
of the Government because it is the least dangerous branch and it is 
due to the fact that it has neither the purse, which the legislature 
has, nor the sword of community which executive has; it has 
merely judgment. 
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The second implication of judicial review, i.e. its credibility. 
This aspect of the problem is taken care of by two-fold process. 
First, in every democratic country the constitutional system 
ensures the independence of Judiciary. Secondly, the appointments 
of judges has been made by a democratically elected government 
which is accountable to the people is perhaps considered to be 
itself a good enough guarantee against nepotism and abuse of 
power.  
The last implication of judicial review is judicial creativity. 
To what extent the Courts should be allowed to play creative role 
in federal systems is a perennial problem. In right sense, in a 
federal set up the impact of judicial decision is not only that it 
preserves the sanctity of the Constitution by enforcing the 
constitutional limitations; a close examination of the role of Courts 
as constitutional interpreter shows that they place the vital role of 
maintaining the proper equilibrium between the claims of national 
powers and States’ right. 
In the light of the above discussion it is now possible to 
examine the scope of judiciary’s role in India as an umpire in the 
Centre-State relations. The discussion below will show that the 
cases do not bring the Union and the State Government directly in 
picture against each other. As usual, it is the private party, which 
has challenged the imposition and Centre-State relations figure 
only indirectly.  
 Now we will discuss the taxing entries of Union Lists. The 
first taxing entry of Union List: - 
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5.1   List – I Entry 82 
 “Taxes on income other than agricultural-income.”-
 The word “income” is of widest grammatical meaning. The 
relevant item 82 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the 
Constitution to enact the legislation for imposition of taxes on 
income other than agricultural income. The expression ‘income’ in 
the legislative entry has always been understood in a wide and 
comprehensive connotation to embrace within it every kind of 
receipts or gain either of a capital nature or of a revenue nature. 
The word ‘income’ is of elastic import. In interpreting expression 
in the legislative lists a very wide meaning should be given to the 
entries. In understanding the scope and amplitude of the expression 
‘income’ in Entry 82, List I, any meaning, which fails to accord 
with the plentitude of the concept of ‘income’ in all its width and 
comprehensiveness, should be avoided. The concept and scope of 
term’ income’ has been fully examined and explained in number of 
cases, by applying various rules of interpretation, to reconcile the 
two conflicting provisions, in rival legislative Lists. The extension 
of the scope of Union Legislative power by the use of rule of 
incidental power relates mainly to the area of tax entries. Thus in 
case of, Sardar Baldev Singh v/s Commissioner of Income Tax1, 
the Supreme Court ruled that the Central Legislature was not 
competent only to pass a law imposing a tax on person on his own 
income but also a law preventing him from evading the tax payable 
on his income. In the instant case the assessee was one of the three 
shareholders of a company. The company at a meeting passed 
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accounts for a particular year but declared no dividends although 
accounts disclosed the large profits. The income-tax authority 
assessed income tax on the income of assessee including his share 
of undistributed assessable income of the company. Speaking for 
the Court Sarkar J. said that Entry 54 of the Federal List of the 
Government of Indian Act dealing with the taxes on income had to 
be read so widely as to include all subsidiary and ancillary matters 
including authorization of an enactment, which prevented the tax 
being evaded. The learned Judge made clear that “ if it were not be 
so read, then the admitted power to a tax a person his own income 
might often be made in fructuous by ingenious contrivances”. 
The above rule was reaffirmed in case of, Balaji v/s Income 
tax Officer2, speaking for the Court, Subba Rao, J., upheld the 
constitutionality of certain provisions of the Income-Tax Act, 
which enabled the income tax officer in computing the total 
income of a person to include the share of the income of his wife 
and minor sons arising out of a partnership business. The Court 
upheld the validity of law by recognizing it as an exercise of 
ancillary power with a view to prevent tax evasion by constituting 
fictitious partnership along one’s wife and minor children.                            
Again in, Panjab D. Industries v/s Income Tax 
Commissioner3, constitutionality of certain Provisions of the 
Income Tax Act allowing the extension of the concept of 
“dividend” to include any distribution by a company on the 
reduction of its capital to the extent to which the company possess 
accumulated profits whether such accumulated profits had been 
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capitalized or not, was sustained. Accepting the impugned 
provisions as a measure to prevent evasion of tax, the Court said: - 
 “A company may on the pretext of reducing its capital, 
utilizes its accumulated profits to pay back to the shareholders the 
whole or part of the paid up amounts on the shares. A shareholder 
though in form gets back the whole or part of the capital 
contributed by him, in effect he gets a share of accumulated 
profits, which, if a straight-forward course was followed, he should 
have received as dividend. This is a division of profits under guise 
of division of capital. If this were permitted, there would be 
evasion of super-tax, the extent of evasion depending upon the 
prevalence of the evil. The legislature presumably in the interest of 
the exchequer, enlarged the definition of “dividend” to catch the 
said payments within the net of taxation. By doing so, it is really 
taxing the profits in the hands of shareholders, though they are 
receiving the said profits under the cloak of capital.” In another   
case of, Hari Krishna Bhargav v/s Union of India4, dealing with 
question whether power to collect annuity deposit as introduced by 
the Finance Act, 1964, in Income-Tax Act, 1961 was within the 
competence of Parliament, Hidaytullah, J., made clear in his 
concurring judgment that, “It is open to Parliament to give relief 
from a part of the Income-tax, the assessees have to pay on 
condition that a particular amount is put into an annuity deposit. 
The deposit is not obligatory. Any person can elect to pay the full 
tax and not take the advantage of the scheme. The Pith and 
Substance of the impugned provisions, therefore, rightly belong to 
the topic of taxes on income. The annuity deposit is in lieu of some 
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tax and the machinery sections also take the aid of machinery of 
the Income Tax Act. As the enforcement of the provisions is by the 
agency of the Income Tax Department and they are intimately 
connected with Income-tax, hence the provisions are very 
appropriately included in the income tax”. The wider concept of 
word “income” was recognized in case of, Madurai District Central 
Co-Operative Bank, v/s Income-Tax Officer, Madurai,5 the 
question of constitutional validity of the charging provision 
introduced in Finance Act, by Parliament was raised. Where 
Justice Y.V. Chandrachud J., justified competency of Parliament 
by holding that, it is true, that the Income –tax Act is permanent 
Act, while the Finance Acts are passed every year and their 
primary purpose is to prescribe the rates at which the income-tax 
will be charged under the Income-Tax Act. But that does not mean 
that a new and distinct charge cannot be introduced under the 
Income-Tax Act; a Finance Act can make what is not ‘income’ 
under the Income-Tax Act. The Finance Act can withdraw an 
exemption granted by the Income-Tax Act or the efficacy of that 
exemption may be reduced by the imposition of a new charge. 
Subject to the constitutional limitations, additional tax-revenue 
may be collected either by enhancing the rate or by the levy of 
fresh charge. The Parliament through medium of a Finance Act 
may as much do the one as the other. Thus Parliament was held 
competent to introduce charging section in a Finance Act. 
 Apart from the above fact, the Parliament has power to 
include any kind of receipts or gain either of a capital nature or of 
revenue in ambit of word “Income”. Hence the word “Income” is 
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of elastic import. The expression  “Income” in Entry 82, List I, 
cannot be subjected by implication, to any restriction by the way in 
which that firm might have been deployed in a fiscal statute. A 
particular statute enacted under the Entry, might, as a matter of 
fiscal policy, seek to tax some species of income alone. The 
destinations would, therefore, be limited by the consideration of 
fiscal policy of a particular statute. So the challenge to the validity 
of a statute, under Hotel Receipts Tax Act, to impose the tax on, 
gross receipts of certain category of hotels, was rejected, by saying 
Venkatachalion J.,6 that, the “taxable – receipts” as defined in the 
statute could not be held to fall outside such ‘wider connotation’ of 
‘income’, in wider constitutional meaning and sense the of the 
term as understand in Entry 82, List I. 
 The word ‘income’ is of widest amplitude and it must be 
given its natural and grammatical meaning. Since the definition of 
income in Section 2(24) of Income Tax Act, is an inclusive one, its 
ambit should be the same that of word ‘income’ occurring in Entry 
82, List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Again the 
widest amplitude of word “Income” was rerecognised in case of 
held in case of, Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v/s G. R. 
Karthikeyan7, by holding that prize money received by the 
participant is an ‘income’. By explaining the nature, concept and 
ambit of word ‘Income’, Justice P. Jeevan Reddy and 
N.Venkatachali, JJ. Spoken that, Even if a receipt does not fall 
within sub-cl. (IX) or that matter, any of the sub-clauses in S.2 
(24), it may yet constitute income. To say otherwise would mean 
reading the several clauses in S.2 (24) as exhaustive of the 
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meaning of ‘income’ when the statute expressly says that it is 
inclusive. It would be a wrong approach to try to place a given 
receipt under one or the other sub-clauses in S.2 (24) and if it does 
not fall under any of the sub-clauses, to say that it does not 
constitute income. Even if a receipt does not fall within the ambit 
of any of the sub-clauses in S.2 (24), it may still be income if it 
partakes of the nature of the income. The idea behind providing 
inclusive definition in S.2 (24) is not to limit it’s meaning but 
widen its net. Even the casual income is ‘income’ is evident from 
Section 10(3). In view of the Court, merely because winnings from 
gambling, betting activities are included within the ambit of 
income, it cannot be said that the moneys received fro non-
gambling and non-betting activities are not so included. If the 
monies which are not earned- in the true sense of word constitute 
income why do monies earned by skill and toil not constitute 
income? The motor rally in the instant case was a contest, if not a 
race. The participant entered the contest to win it and to win the 
first prize. What he got was a ‘return’ for his skill and endurance. 
Hence the prize money received by respondent was considered as 
the income of him.  
 In the case of taxation, it is settled law that hardship or 
equity has no role to play in determining the eligibility of tax, and 
it is for the legislature to determine the same. So, when the 
Parliament amended the Sec.171 (9) which de-recognize the 
concept of partial partition of H.U.F, the challenged was made on 
ground of absence of legislative competence and hardship by 
respondent was rejected in case of, Union of India v/s M. V. 
  196
Valliappan and others,8 Justice Shah, rightly observed   that, the 
Parliament has the authority to delete or amend any provisions of 
the Income Tax Act, and so it cannot be said that it is beyond 
legislative competence. As per the object and reasons of the 
Amending Act, it was introduced because, multiple Hindu 
Undivided Families were created by effecting partial partitions as 
regards persons constituting the joint family or as regards the 
properties belonging to the joint family or both, which resulted in 
tax reduction or evasion and with a view to curbing this creation of 
multiple Hindu Undivided Families by making partial partitions of 
the HUF. Hence, it would be difficult to hold that addition of sub-
section (9) to Section 171 was beyond the legislative competence. 
 It is for the Legislature to recognize or not to recognize 
partial partition of HUF property for the purpose of levy and 
collection of tax, it is also for the Legislature to decide whether 
only non-bonafide partial partition undertaken for reducing tax 
liability should not be recognized or not to recognize all partial 
partitions of HUF properties. Further, consideration of hardship is 
totally irrelevant for deciding the question of legislative 
competence. In the case of taxation, it is settled law that hardship 
or equity has no role to play in determining eligibility to tax, and it 
is for the legislature to determine the same. Hence, the question 
whether the HUF is required to recover tax from the person to 
whom the properties have been allotted, where HUF had find any 
hardship in recovering the relevant tax, is not to be required to be 
considered by taxing authority as for the purpose of income-tax the 
properties belong to the HUF. If the HUF finds any hardship the 
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competent authority advised, to have the partition of the entire 
estate, not to have partial partition. Moreover, under the provisions 
of S.171 (9) of Income Tax Act, the two distinct classes were 
created – one of families having partial portion, which has taken 
place prior to the cut off date 31-12-1978 and other of partial 
portion taking place after the cut-off date. Benefit, which had been 
conferred upon those assessees who had partially partitioned their 
property prior to the cut-off date, was not withdrawn, but the 
others who partitioned their property after the cut-off date would 
not get the same benefit. Whether such type of classification of 
transactions, amounts to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution 
or not, was another question raised in the instant case. Court 
defined the meaning of Differentiation that “Differentiation is not 
discriminatory if there is a rational nexus on the basis of which 
differentiation has been made with object sought to be achieved by 
particular provision”. Hence, in the instant case, there was an 
intelligible basis for differentiation and classification is having 
rational nexus of achieving the object of preventing the creation of 
further multiple Hindu Undivided Families for reduction of tax 
abilities. It is settled law that the choice of a date as a basis for 
classisification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no 
particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to 
be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances, while fixing, a 
point is necessary and there is no mathematical or logical way of 
fixing it, precisely, the decision of the Legislature or its delegate 
must be accepted unless it very wide off the reasonable mark. 
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 From all above decisions of Supreme Court it is clear   that 
right of levy of tax on income on a person or a group of persons, 
firm, and an institution and on association, exclusively, conferred 
to Parliament, under Entry 82 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of 
Constitution. In support and in achieving the real object of Income 
Tax the, Parliament has right to, amend or delete the existing 
provisions of Income-Tax Act. To raise the revenue of Nation, 
Parliament can very the Income Tax Act, as per need of nation, and 
in the interest of public good, and public policy. Word ‘Income’ is 
so elastic, that any gain or receipt in any form can be titled as part 
of income. Being word ‘income’ inclusive, there cannot the strict 
and rigid definition to Income. Though the Income tax is the main 
revenue source of Parliament, the part of the net proceeds of 
income tax is the attributable to the State under the 
recommendation of quinquennial reports of the respective Finance 
Commission under the mandatory provision of Chapter I of the 
part XII of the Constitution.      
 There are some other rulings, which confirms the 
Parliament’s exclusive power respect to ‘income tax,’ where the 
income accrued prior to Indian independence was held liable to 
assess under Income-Tax Act. In Case of Rungata Engineering and 
Construction Co Ltd v/s Income-Tax Officer9, the issue involved 
was whether Parliament was competent to enact certain provisions 
under income tax amendment Act, 1954 so as to make it into 
income, which had escape from the assessment in respect to the 
period prior to Indian independent. Bachawat J., who spoke for the 
Court, said that the tax in question would still be a tax on income 
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within the meaning of Entry 82, which related to “taxes on income 
other than agricultural income”. The learned Judge further said “if 
assuming that it was not a law with respect to income tax, since 
topic was not a law with respect to income tax, since the topic was 
not with respect to any matter enumerated in the Concurrent List or 
State List, the Parliament had the legislative competence to pass 
the impugned law under residuary powers given under Entry 97 of 
List I.” 
Similarly in, Laxaman v/s Additional Income tax Officer10, 
while in dealing with the validity of certain provisions of Income-
Tax Act, 1922 (as amended by the Finance Act, 1955) insofar as 
they imposed tax on loan received by a member of a controlled 
company as dividend, to prevent evasion of tax. In justification of 
the said imposition, Rameshchandra Ayer, J., said that the power 
of Parliament to impose tax on income under Entry 82 of List I 
also included a power to legislate with a view to check tax evasion. 
He further pointed out that even if it were held the impugned Act 
imposed a tax on loan and not on income, and was out the ambit of 
Entry 82 of List I, the impugned law could be sustained under the 
residuary power under Entry 97 of List I read with Article 248 of 
the Constitution. But against the frequent application of Entry 97 
of List, the judiciary in the Case of, Hari Krishna Bhargava v/s 
Union of India11, where Hidayatullah J. was provoked to make the 
following observation.  
 “The very frequent reliance on Entry No.97 makes me say 
these few words. That entry, no doubt, confers residuary powers of 
legislation or taxation but is not an entry to avoid a discussion as to 
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the nature of a law or of a tax with a view to determine the precise 
entry under which it can come. Before recourse can be had to 
Entry No.97 it must be found as a fact that there is no entry in any 
of three Lists under which the impugned legislation can come. If 
the impugned legislation is found to come under any entry in List 
II, the residuary entry will not apply. Similarly, if the impugned 
legislation falls within any entry in one of the other two lists 
recourse to the residuary entry will hardly be necessary. The entry 
is not a first step in discussion of such problems but the last resort. 
One cannot avoid the issue by taking its aid unless such a course is 
open. It is always necessary to examine the Pith and Substance of 
any law impugned on the ground of want of legislative competence 
with a view to ascertaining the precise entry in which it can come. 
The entries in the three Lists were intended to be exhaustive and it 
would be very remote chance that some entry would not suit the 
legislation which is impugned.” 
 Very few cases have come before the Courts wherein the 
rule of broad construction had bee resorted to uphold the 
constitutionality of Union measures. The reason might the 
existence of the alternative source of residuary powers with the 
Centre. However, the Courts have favoured the broad and liberal 
interpretation of legislative heads of the Union as well. Thus in, 
Navinchandra Mafatlal v/s Commissioner of Income-Tax, 
Bombay12, while dealing with the constitutionality of certain 
provisions of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, insofar as they 
allowed the levy of income-tax on capital gain, the Supreme Court 
preferred the broad construction of the word ‘income’ used in 
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Entry 54 of the Federal List of the Government of India Act, 1935, 
which read “taxes on income other than agricultural income”. 
Rejecting the contention that a distinction should be drawn 
between ‘capital gains’ and ‘income’ used in Entry 54 of Federal 
List of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 
1935. Speaking for the unanimous Constitution bench Das J. said: - 
“The cardinal rule of interpretation, however, is that words 
should be read in their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning 
subject to this rider that in construing words in a constitutional 
enactment conferring legislative power the most liberal 
construction should be put upon the words so that the same may 
have effect in their widest amplitude”. 
In a number of subsequent cases the term ‘income’ was 
given broad construction with a spirit similar to that adopted in 
Navinchandra Mafatlal case. In, Navnitlal C. Javery v/s K.K. Sen, 
Applet. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax13, while dealing 
with the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Indian 
Income Tax Act, 1922, insofar as they sought to impose tax on 
accumulated profits of a private limited company which was not 
distributes as dividend but was advanced as loan to the share-
holders, the Court said the word ‘income’ in Entry 82 of the Union 
List must receive wide interpretation. And, doing so it declared the 
balance of accumulated profits as income of the company. The 
decision of the Supreme Court Bhagwan Dass Jain v/s Union of 
India14, dealing with the constitutionality of certain provisions of 
the Indian Income Tax Act, 1961, insofar as they allowed the 
imposition of income-tax on petitioner assessee on the basis of 
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annual value of the house in possession of the assessee owner for 
the purposes of his own residence heralds the scope of still a wider 
interpretation of ‘income’ used in Entry 82 of the Union List. 
Rejecting the argument that there could be no income at all in 
respect of residential house, the Court gave widest possible 
meaning to the word ‘income’. Said, Venkataramiah J., “even in its 
ordinary economic sense, the expression ‘income’ includes not 
merely what is received or what comes in by exploiting the use of 
a property but also what one saves by using it”. The learned Judge 
further said that what “can be converted into income can be 
reasonably regards as giving rise to income.” The above judiciary 
approached towards Entry 2 of List I is a reflection of a trained, to 
strengthen the revenue source of the Central Government, in aim 
of stronger Centre. In a federal democratic polity the fundamental 
rights of the citizens, guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) should not 
be narrow down by giving undesired wider scope to the definition 
of word “Income” id the belief of present scholar. So, it is the duty 
of the Court to construe the respective Entry in true spirit of the 
democratic value intended by our foundning fathers of the nation. 
5. 2     List I  - Entry 83 
“Duties of Customs including export duties.” 
 All customs duties, including export duties, relating as they 
do to transactions of import into or export out of the country are 
within the powers of Parliament. The States are not concerned with 
those. The States are only concerned with taxes on the entry of 
goods in local areas for consumption, use or sale therein, covered 
by Entry 52 in the State List. Except for duties of excise on 
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alcoholic liquors and opium and other narcotic drugs, all duties of 
excise are leviable by Parliament. Hence it can be said that by and 
large taxes on income, duties of customs and duties of excises are 
within the exclusive power of legislation. Whereas old taxes on 
income other than agricultural income are within the exclusive 
power of while taxes of agricultural income is only reserve for the 
States.   
Article 285 says about the exemption of property of the 
Union from the State taxation as under: - 
1. The property of the Union shall save in so far as Parliament 
may by law otherwise provide, be exempt from all taxes 
imposed by a State or by any authority within a State. 
2. Nothing in Clause (1) shall, until Parliament by law 
otherwise provides, prevent any authority within a State 
from levying any tax on any property of the Union to which 
such property was immediately before the commencement 
of this Constitution liable or treated as liable, so long as that 
tax continues to be levied in that State.  
Same way the Article 289 speaks for exemption of property 
and income of a State from Union taxation as under:- 
1. The property and income of a State shall be exempt from 
Union taxation. 
2. Nothing in Clause (1) shall prevent the Union from 
imposing or authorizing the imposition of, any tax to such 
extent, if any, as Parliament may by law provide in respect 
of a trade or business of any kind carried on by, or on behalf 
of, the Government of a State, or any operations connected 
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therewith, or any property used or occupied for the purposes 
of such trade or business or any income accruing or arising 
in connection therewith.  
3. Nothing in Clause (2) shall apply to any trade or business or 
to any class of trade or business, which Parliament may by 
law declare to be incidental to the ordinary functions of 
Government. 
Reading Article 289 and its complementary Article 285 
together in the intention of the Constitution makers was that 
Article 285 would exempt all property of the Union from all taxes 
on property levied by a State, while Article 289 contemplates that 
all property of States would be exempt from all taxes on property 
which may be leviable by the Union. Both the Articles are 
concerned with taxes directly either on income or on property and 
not with the taxes which may indirectly affect income or property. 
Therefore, these two Articles should be read in the restricted sense 
of exempting the property or income of a State in one case and the 
property of the Union in the other from taxes directly either on 
property or on income as the case may is rather proper and correct. 
 The provisions of Article 289(1) being in the nature of 
exception to the exclusive field of legislation reserved to 
Parliament, the exception has to be strictly construed and, 
therefore, limited to taxes on property and income of a State. In 
other words, the immunity granted in favour of State has to be 
restricted to taxes levied directly on property and income. 
Therefore, even though import and export duty or duties of excise 
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have reference to goods and commodities, they are not taxes on 
property directly and are not with the exemption in Article 289(1). 
 As per the views expressed in  re: Sea Customs Act (1878)15, 
by the Sinha, C.J., Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo, Shah and Ayyangar 
JJ., that the immunity granted to the States in respect of Union 
taxation under Article 289(1) does not extend to duties of customs 
including export duties  or duties of excise. The provisions of 
Article 289 of the Constitution therefore, do not preclude the 
Union from imposing or authorizing the imposition of customs 
duties on the import or export of the property of a State used for 
purposes other than those specified in clause (2) of that Article. 
Nor do the provisions of Article 289 of the Constitution of India 
preclude the Union from imposing or authorizing the imposition of 
excise duties on the production or manufacture in India, of the 
property of a State used in purposes other than those specified in 
clause (2) of that Article. In this view sub-Section (2) of Section 20 
of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, and sub-Section (1-A) of Section 3 
of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, as sought to be amended 
by the proposed Bill of the Sea Customs and Central Excises 
(Amendment) Act, will not be inconsistent with the provisions of 
Article 289 of the Constitution. 
 The levy of duty on export and import being exclusive in 
favour of Parliament and under the extra help and strength of 
residuary power given under Entry 97 of List I, Parliament enjoy 
the said power with full glory. 
 The expression and meaning of phrase “customs frontiers of 
India” in relevant to the Entry 83 of List I was well explained in 
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Case of, State of Madras, Davar & Co.etc16, where the turnover of 
the Imported goods sold at Indian harbor by transferring the 
documents of the title of the said goods (property) was made liable 
to pay sales tax under the Madras General Sales Tax Act. In 
justification to the imposition of the levying authority stated that, 
as transfer of documents of title to the respective buyers had 
affected the sale after the ships had crossed the territorial waters, 
and hence they were liable to tax under the said Madras Act. The 
respondents contended that the turnover in question represented 
sales in the course of import, and as such, not liable to tax under 
the Madras Act. 
 Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes 
negatived by the Assistant Commercial Tax Officer, and the 
contentions of the respondents also. But, on further appeal by the 
assessees, the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal accepted the 
contentions of respondents and held that the disputed turnovers 
were not liable to tax under the Madras Act. The revision was 
made by the State against the order of the Sales Tax Appellate 
Tribunal was dismissed by the High Court, and this appeal came 
before Supreme Court. 
 The Supreme Court’s set aside the judgment High Court, 
and expressed his view that the judgment of Madras High Court 
cannot be sustained and the expression ‘customs frontiers’ in 
Section 5 of the Central Act cannot be construed to mean ‘customs 
barriers’. Article 286(1) places a ban on the State imposing or 
authorizing the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of goods 
where such sale or purchase takes place outside the State or in the 
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course of import of goods into or export of goods out of the 
territory of India. Clause (2) of Article 286 gives power to the 
Parliament, by law, to formulate principles for determining when a 
sale or purchase of goods takes place in any of the ways mentioned 
in Clause (1). Accordingly Parliament has enacted the Central Act. 
Section 5 of that Act lays down the conditions under which a sale 
or purchase of goods can be said to take place in the course of 
import or export. Sub-sections (1) and (2) deal with sale or 
purchase of goods in the course of export and sale or purchase of 
goods in the course of import, respectively. As the case was 
concerned with a sale in the course of import, the relevant 
provision is sub-section (2) of Section 5, which is as follows:- 
 “5 (2) A sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take 
place in the course of the import of the goods into the territory of 
India only if the sale or purchase either occasions such import or is 
effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods before the 
goods have crossed the customs frontiers of India”. 
 The expression ‘customs frontiers of India’ in Section 5 of 
the Central Act must be construed in accordance with the 
notification issued by the Central Government under Section 3-A 
of the Act, on August 6, 1955 read with the Proclamation of the 
President of India dated March 22, 1956. So applying the 
definition of ‘customs frontiers’ it is clear that, in the instant case, 
the sales were effected by transfer of documents of title long after 
the goods has crossed the customs frontier of India. It have been 
already stated that the ships carrying the goods in question were all 
in the respective harbors within the State of Madras when the sales 
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were effected by the assessees by transfer of documents of title to 
the buyers. If so, it follows that the claim made by the assessees 
that the sales in question were sales in the course of import, has 
been rightly rejected by the assessing authority. 
 The power to levy duty of export and import is strictly 
conferred only to the Central Government. The State Government 
is not empowered to make rules or regulation with respect to said 
levies. But in this case the State’s right of levy sales tax on the 
above stated the Supreme Court recognized transactions positively. 
 The duties on customs (import) including the export duties 
are buoyant revenue resources for the Union of India, but 
unfortunately these revenues are not sharable among the States 
under the provision of the Constitution. 
5. 3 List- I Entry 84 
“Duties of excise on tobacco and other goods manufactured 
or produced in India except – 
(a) alcoholic liquors for human consumption; 
(b) opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs and narcotics, 
but including medicinal and toilet preparations containing 
alcohol or any substance included in sub-paragraph (b) of 
this entry.” 
 Excise duty is primarily a duty on the production or 
manufacturer of goods produced or manufactured within country. 
Before Independence, the scope and nature of excise duty was 
recognised by federal Court of India, that Central Legislature had 
power to impose excise duty on excisable articles at the stage of 
manufacture or production and Provincial Legislature had 
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exclusive power to impose a tax on sales thereafter. So, the power 
of the States to levy sales tax may appear to conflict with the 
power of the Union to impose excise duty. Though State 
legislatures have been given power to impose sales tax under Entry 
54 of the State List and Parliament has been given power to impose 
excise duty under Entry 84 of the Union List, the incidence of both 
ultimately falls on the consumer. This may on times, enable the 
people to confuse one tax with the other and may also give rise to 
litigation. Under the Government of India Act, 1935, also the 
power to impose excise duty was with the Dominion Government 
and the power to levy sales tax was with Province. Therefore, 
similar problems arose under that Act as well. But the Federal 
Court of India and the Privy Council did pretty well in demarcating 
the nature and scope of the two taxes and the Supreme Court and 
High Courts have followed the principles laid down by them. In 
Re. C.P. Motor Spirit Act17, Mr. Justice Sulaimn, in his judgment 
at page 22 of the report observed “ the power to tax on sale of 
goods is quite distinct from any right to impose taxes on use or 
consumption. It cannot exercise at earlier stage of production, or at 
the later stage of use or consumption, but only at the stage of sale. 
The essence of tax (excise duty) on goods manufactured or 
produced is that right to levy it accrues by virtue of their main 
manufactured. On the other hand, the duty on sale of goods cannot 
be levied merely because goods have been manufacture or 
produced”. In the similar vein were the observations of Lord 
Simonds in case of, Governor General in Council v/s Province of 
Madras18, where he said: - 
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 “The two taxes (sales and excise duty), the one levied upon 
a manufacturer in respect of his goods, the other upon a vendor in 
respect of his sales, in one sense overlap that they are related to 
goods- Articles. But in law, there is overlapping. The taxes are 
separate and distinct imposts. If in fact they overlap, that may be 
because the taxing authority, imposing a duty of excise, finds it 
convenient to impose that duty at the moment when the excisable 
articles leaves the factory or workshop for the first time upon the 
occasion of its sale, but that method of collecting the tax is an 
accident of administration; it is not the essence of the duty of 
excise which is attracted by the manufacture itself”. While in case 
of, Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v/s The State of Assam19, one of the 
grounds of challenge against the constitutionality of Assam 
Taxation (on Goods Carried by Roads and Inland Waterways) Act, 
1954 was that the tax under the Act was in the nature of duty of 
excise. The above contention was made on the ground that the tax, 
though imposed on the transport of the tea by road or inland 
waterways, was to be realised from the producer. Gajendragadkar, 
J. who delivered the majority decision and Shah, J., who delivered 
concurring judgment did not touch the issue and confined 
themselves to the main question in that case i.e. violation of Article 
301. However, Sinha, J. dealt with the issue in his dissenting 
judgment. He found no substance in the above argument. He 
pointed out: “………so long as jute or tea is not sought to be 
transported from one place to another, within the State or outside 
the State, no tax is sought to be levied by the Act. It is only when 
those goods are put on a motor truck or a boat or a steamer or other 
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modes of transport contemplated by the Act that the occasion for 
the payment of tax arises.” The learned Chief Justice arrived at the 
conclusion that the Legislature had chosen the dealer or the 
producer merely as the convenient agency for collection of the tax, 
but the occasion for the imposition of tax remained the 
transportation of the goods and not their production. 
 As we have seen the excise duty has a definite connotation 
i.e. it is a duty on the production and manufacture of goods. Once 
the relation of imposition of duty with the production or 
manufacture of goods is established, Parliament has been held to 
be competent to levy and collect such duties at any convenient 
State. Thus, it can be collected not only from the consignor of 
goods but also from the consignee and the manufacturer may have 
pay the duty even though he may itself consume part of the goods 
produced or manufactured. The flexibility in the mode of 
imposition of excise duty makes it, on times, indistinguishable 
from some taxes imposed by the State on the same items. One such 
tax is tax on luxury, which a State Legislature may impose under 
Entry 62 of the State List. Tobacco is undoubtedly an item of 
luxury and it can be subjected to luxury tax. On the other hand, 
under Entry 84 of the Union List Parliament of India can impose 
excise duty on the production of tobacco. This overlapping became 
the principal source of dispute in the cases discussed below. 
 In the State of Travancore-Cochin before it became Part B 
State under the present Constitution, there existed laws, which 
provided for controlling the cultivation, production, manufacture, 
storage and sale of tobacco. There were rules, which provided that 
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no one could engage himself in the above activities except under a 
license and payments were to be made for getting the license. 
Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 was enforced in British India 
and this Act and rules made thereunder served the same purpose. 
They prohibited wholesale purchase, sale, or storage of any 
excisable goods including tobacco except under a license issued by 
the Central Government and on terms and conditions of the license 
so granted. On the commencement of the Constitution the Finance 
Act, 1950 extended the operation of Central Excise and Salt Act, 
1944 to the whole of the territory of India except the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir and further provided that any corresponding 
law prevalent in any part of the territory of India shall stand 
repealed. Thereafter the Travancore-Cochin Government modified 
the earlier rules. The modified rules related themselves only with 
storage and sale of tobacco and not with cultivation, production, 
manufacture, storage and sale of tobacco and not with cultivation, 
production or manufacture. Earlier licenses were given to the 
highest bidder in an auction sale. The modified rules provided for 
payment of graded license fee. In, A.B.Abdul Kadir v/s State of 
Kerala20, the point for decision before the Supreme Court was 
whether the modified rules of Travancore-Cochin State were void 
ab initio inasmuch as the law under which they were promulgated 
had become repealed. The decision of the Court depend on the 
determination of the issue whether both the Central law contained 
in Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 and the rules made there 
under and Travancore-Cochin law and the rules made there under 
dealt with the same subject, i.e. imposition of excise duty on 
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tobacco. The Supreme Court held that the Central law definitely 
imposed excise duty even though method of its collection was such 
that the impost was not directly imposing on the producer. 
Referring to earlier cases the Court pointed out that a duty of 
excise could be imposed at any stage so long it retained its 
character of an impost on production or manufacture. With regard 
to the State law the Supreme Court said that there was nothing to 
distinguish the same from the Central law. Earlier in the High 
Court it had been held that the State law provided for the 
imposition of a duty on luxury. But this view did not find favour 
with majority of Judges of the Supreme Court. However, Justice 
Shah in his concurring Judgment held that whereas under the 
Central law provisions for obtaining licenses for storage of tobacco 
was a provision ancillary to the recovery of excise duty, under the 
State law “the levy of license fee was imposed in pursuance of a 
scheme for maintaining control on the sale of tobacco without 
expressly levying any excise duty.” But despite this, Justice Shah 
found the relevant rules of Travancore-Cochin Rules requiring 
licenses to be taken for storage of tobacco to be law corresponding 
to the provisions of Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. 
 Subsequent to the above decision the State of Kerala enacted 
Kerala Luxury Tax on Tobacco (validation) Act, 1964. This Act 
provided that the rules issued in providing for obtaining the license 
and payment of license fee on storage and sale of tobacco shall be 
deemed to have been issued under the present Act. It also validated 
them with retrospective effect and thereby made the liability for 
payment of license fee retrospective. When the validity of this Act 
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was challenged in A.B.Abdul Kadir v. State of Kerala the Court 
held that the earlier decision did not operate as res judicata. It was 
pointed out that the earlier case had merely decided that 
Travancore Tobacco Regulation and Cochin Tobacco Act were 
corresponding laws to Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 and 
therefore, had been repealed after the extension of the Central 
Excise and Salt Act, 1944 to Travancore – Cochin. In the view of 
the Court the infirmity lay not with the modified rules issued in 
1950, which provided for licensing for storage and sale of tobacco, 
but with the Cochin and Travancore Acts (Cochin Tobacco Act, 
1084 and Travancore Tobacco Regulation, 1087) under which the 
modified rules were purported to have been issued. The rules 
validated by the new law were held to provide for levy in the 
nature of a tax on luxury, which was within the competence of the 
State Legislature under Entry 62 of the State List. Thus it would 
appear that one who wants to engage himself in the activity of 
storage and sale of luxury article like tobacco may be required 
simultaneously to pay for such activity both to the Central 
Government and to the State Government. His payment to the 
Central Government would be treated as excise duty though levied 
not at the State of production but at the stage of storage and sale 
and his payment to State Government would be treated as a 
payment of tax on luxury. If both the laws provide for the 
collection of duties in the form of license fee such a dealer will 
have to take two distinct licenses under two distinct laws. To a 
layman the two taxes may look to be hardly distinguishable. 
Therefore, if the Courts hold them to be distinct referable to 
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distinct objectives and therefore valid within the respective 
competences of Parliament and State Legislature, one can hardly 
doubt the extent of indulgence which the Courts have shown in 
upholding the validity of Central and States taxation measures. 
 The permissibility of, Finance Act (1951) Section 7(2) – 
imposition of Excise duty with retrospective effect, is beyond the 
legislative competence was alleged in case of, Chhotabhai 
Jethabhai Patel & Co. v/s Union of India21, where Ayyangar, 
Imam, Das Gupta and Raghubir Dayal JJ, observed that: - 
 Section 7(2) of the Finance Act (1951), not withstanding 
that it imposed excise duty on tobacco retrospectively was not 
beyond the legislative competence of the Parliament, under Entry 
84, List I of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. 
 Under the Indian Constitution the scheme of division of the 
taxing powers between Union and States is not based on any 
criterion dependent on the incidence of the tax. 
 In construing the expression duty of excise as it occurs in 
Entry 84 of List I in Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, the 
Court is not concerned so much with whether the tax is direct or 
indirect as upon the transaction or activity on which it is imposed. 
A duty of excise is a tax-levy on home-produced goods of a 
specified class or description, the duty being calculated according 
to the quantity or value of the goods and which is levied because of 
the mere fact of the goods have been produced or manufactured 
and unrelated to and not dependant or any commercial transaction 
in them. The duty levied under Section 7(2) of the Finance Act 
(1951), satisfies this test, hence imposition of excise duty with 
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retrospective effect is not beyond legislative competence of 
Parliament. 
 But levy of duty upon consumption of electric energy cannot 
be regarded as duty of excise falling within the Entry 84 of List I in 
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The Central Provinces and 
Berar Electricity Duty Act, 1949, was enacted under Item 48-B of 
List II in Seventh Schedule of Government of India Act, 1935. 
Entry 53 of List II of the Constitution is to the same effect. Under 
the M.P. Act and under various Provincial and State Acts 
consumption of electricity may mean consumption by person other 
than producers, however those Acts deal only with a certain aspect 
of the topic “electricity” and not all of them. Therefore, in those 
Acts the word “consumption” may have a limited meaning. But the 
word  “consumption” has wider meaning. It means also “use up” “ 
“spend” etc. The mere fact that a series of laws were concerned 
only with a certain kind of use of electricity, that is consumption 
other than the producer cannot justify the conclusion that the 
British Parliament in using the word “consumption” in Item 48-B 
and the Constituent Assembly in Entry 53 of List II wanted to limit 
the meaning of “consumption” in the same way. The language 
used in the legislative entries in the Constitution must be 
interpreted in a broad way so as to give the widest amplitude of 
power to the Legislature to legislate and not in a narrow pedantic 
sense22.  
 As under the Entry 84 of List I in Seventh Schedule to the 
Constitution, the duties (excise) can be levied on goods 
manufactured or produced in India; but whether it could be 
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leviable from users or consumers of that commodity was the main 
point raised in case of, M/s. Jullundur Rubber Goods 
Manufacturer’s Association v/s Union of India23, J.C.Shah, 
V.Ramaswami and A.N.Grover observed that: - 
 The primary and fundamental meaning of Excise duty in 
English is still that of a tax on articles produced or manufactured in 
the taxing country and intended foe none-consumption. It could be 
obviously be imposed at the stage which was found to be most 
convenient and lucrative as that was a matter of the machinery of 
collection and did not affect the essential nature of a tax; only 
relates to the machinery of collection for administrative 
convenience, whether in a particular case the tax ceases to be in 
essence an excise duty, and the rational connection between the 
duty and the person on whom it is imposed ceased to exist, is to be 
decided on fair construction of the provisions of a particular Act. 
So it was decided on fair construction of the impugned Act that 
sub-Section (2) of Section 12, of Rubber Act (1947) that the excise 
duty could be collected from members of Appellant Association 
who use the rubber in the manufacture of chappls. 
 The levy of excise duty on production /manufacture of 
industrial alcohol and States’ power of levy vend fee on the same 
item was challenged for want of its legislative competency of the 
States. In deciding the right of the States to levy vend fee or duties 
in respect of Industrial alcohol under different legislation in 
different States in case of, Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. etc. v/s 
State of U.P. and others24, Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji (for 
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himself, E.S.Venkataramiah, C.J., Rangnath Mishra, B.C.Ray, 
K.N.Singh and S.Natrajan, JJ.), observed that: - 
 The difference between Industrial alcohol and alcoholic 
liquor for human consumption, that ethyl alcohol (which has 95%) 
is an industrial alcohol and is not fit for human consumption, is 
non-potable and highly toxic in nature, while in range of spirits 
potable alcohol is from country spirit to Whisky and Ethyl Alcohol 
contents varies between 19 to about 43 per cent. These standards 
are according to ISI specifications. 
The relevant provisions of the U.P.Act, A.P. Act, Tamil 
Nadu Act, and Bombay Prohibition Act are unconstitutional in so 
far as these purported to levy tax or charges imposts upon 
industrial alcohol used and useable for industrial purposes. Having 
regard to the principles of interpretation and Constitutional 
Provisions, in the light of the language used and having considered 
the impost and the composition of industrial alcohol and the 
legislative practice of this country, the imposts in question cannot 
be justified as State imposts. Provisions of the State Act are not 
merely regulatory. Those are much more than that. These seek to 
levy imposition in their Pith and Substance not as incidental, to 
Entry 51 of List II, or as merely disincentives but as attempts it 
raise revenue for State purposes. There is no taxing provision 
permitting these in the Lists in the field of Industrial alcohol for 
State to legislate. Further more, in view of the occupation of the 
field by the IDR Act, it was not possible to levy this impost. After 
1956 amendment to the IDR Act bringing alcohol industries (under 
fermentation industries) as item 26 of the First Schedule to IDR 
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Act the control of this industry has vested exclusively in the Union. 
Thereafter, licence to manufacture both potable and non-potable 
alcohol is vested in the Central Government. Distilleries are 
manufacturing alcohol under the Central Licence under IDR Act, 
no privilege for manufacture even if one existed, has been 
transferred to distilleries by the State. The State cannot itself 
manufacture industrial alcohol without permission of the Central 
Government. The States then, cannot claim to pass a right, which 
these do not possess. Nor can the State claim exclusive right to 
produce and manufacture industrial alcohol, which are 
manufactured under grant of licence from Central Government.  
Industrial alcohol cannot upon coming into existence under such 
grant to amenable to States’ claim of exclusive possession of 
privilege. The State can neither rely on Entry 8 of List II nor Entry 
33 of List III for such a claim. The State cannot claim that under 
Entry 33 of List III, it can regulate industrial alcohol as a product 
of the scheduled industry, because the Union, under Section 18 –G 
of the IDR Act, has evinced clear intention to occupy the whole 
field. 
 In respect of industrial alcohol the States are not authorised 
to impose the impost they have purported to do. This will not 
affect any impost so far as potable alcohol as commonly 
understood is concerned. It will also not affect any imposition of 
levy on industrial alcohol free, where there are circumstances to 
establish that there was quid pro quo for the fee sought to be 
imposed. This will not affect any regulating measure as such. 
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 So it is clear that State Legislature had no authority to levy 
duty or tax on alcohol, which is not for human consumption as the 
Centre could only levy that. The ambit of the word was enlarged 
by reversing the Judgment of 1980 Tax LR 1766(Gujarat) in case 
of, Ujagar Prints, etc. etc. v/s Union of India25, by holding that 
assessable value should not comprise only processing charges, 
respect to  manufacture of Grey Fabric, but under Central 
Excises and Salt Act (1944), Section 2(f), Sch.I, respect to Tariff 
Items, 19 and 22 (as amended in 1980) the word ‘Manufacture’ has 
enlarged under Amendment, to equate ‘processing’ with 
‘manufacture’. 
 The nature of the excise duty is not be confused with, or 
tested with reference to the measure by which the tax is assessed. 
The standard adopted as the measure of assessment may throw 
light on the nature of the levy but it is not determination of it. Any 
statutory standard, which maintains a nexus with essential 
character of the levy, can be regarded as valid basis for assessing 
measure of the tax. 
 In case of processing houses, they become liable to pay 
excise duty not because they are the owners of the goods but 
because they cause ‘manufacture’ of the goods. Thus in view of 
R.4 and Central Excise (valuation) Rules, 1975, framed under 
Section 37 of the Act, it cannot be said that the assessable value of 
the processed fabric should comprise only the processing charges. 
So, the ruling that the assessable value of the processed fabric 
should comprise only the processing charge in 1980 Tax LR 
1766(Gujarat) was Reversed. Per Sabyyasachi Mukharji, J.: - 
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 “The assessable value of the processed fabric would include 
the value of the grey cloth in hands of the processor plus the value 
of the job-work done, plus manufacturing profits and 
manufacturing expenses whatever would be included in the price at 
the factory gate. The correct assessable value must be the value of 
the fabric at factory gate that is to say, the value of which the 
manufactured goods leave the factory and enter the main steam. 
Computation of the assessable value is one question and as to who 
should be liable for the same is another. Duties of excise are 
imposed on production or manufacture of goods and are levied 
upon the manufacturer or the producer in accordance with relevant 
rules. This is quite independent of the ownership of goods. 
Therefore, the value for assessment under Section 4 of the Act will 
not be the processing charge alone but the intrinsic value of the 
processed fabrics which is the price at which the fabrics are sold 
for the first time in the wholesale market”.  
 The above ruling impacts the impression of that Union 
Government has wide power to enlarge the scope of any relevant 
Entry, subject to other provisions of the Constitution, for instance 
Entry 97 of List- “The Residuary Power,” as it was held in the 
instant case that the said respective amendment if not covered by 
Entry 84, it could be supported by Entry 97 of List I.  
 Short look to Entry 82, 83 and 84 confirms the fact that 
Union has more elastic resources of income compare to States’ tax 
resources. The Income Tax, Export & Import Duties and Excise 
Duty are the main sources to income of Union. The Entry 85, List I 
is a Corporation Tax. The Income-Tax derived from Company 
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under Entry 85, has special feature that, it solely vest to Union. 
Under Tax-sharing scheme the Devolution of the Corporate-tax is 
not allowed.  
5. 4    List I Entry 85 – Corporation Tax 
 Corporation Tax, as which is in substance a tax on income 
by the companies. A Company incorporated under Indian 
Companies Act 1956, is a separate legal Entry from its 
constituents-The Shareholders. 
 The Union Government has exclusive power to levy, impose 
the tax on a company’s income, -gain and profits, in its personal 
capacity, being a legal entity. In the assessment of Company’s real 
income in respect to any finance year, the competent taxing 
authority has wide power to lift the corporate veil to decide the true 
and real nature of income to make the person or personality 
responsible (company) for the payment of tax, as the case may be. 
Thus, In Sardar Baldev Singh v/s Commissioner of Income Tax,26 
Where the assessee was one of the three shareholders of a 
company, the income tax authority assessed income-tax on the 
income of assessee including his share of undistributed assessable 
income of the company, because to evade the tax-liability, the 
assessee had, at the meeting of company, passed the accounts for a 
particular year, but declared no dividends, although the accounts 
disclosed the large profits. So lifting the corporate veil the assessee 
was made liable to pay income tax on above said undistributed 
assessable income of the company. 
 In the field of taxation of corporation tax, the only battle for 
fighting for liability to pay tax is to discover the true title of 
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income, to whom it vests; for confirming the taxing statutes’ 
liability. In case of Navinchandra Mafatlal v/s Commissioner of 
Income tax, Bombay27, while dealing with the constitutionality of 
certain provisions of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, insofar as 
they sought to impose tax on accumulated profits of a private 
limited company which was not distributed as dividend but was 
advanced as loan to the shareholders, the Court said that, the word 
‘income’ in Entry 82 of the Union List must received wide 
interpretation. And, in doing so, it declared the balance of 
accumulated profits as income of the company. 
 As we know, Parliament has the power under Entry 85 of 
the Union List to impose corporation tax. In case of, Central 
Potteries Ltd., Nagpur v/s State of Madhya Pradesh28,it was 
contended that, C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act,1947 imposed a tax 
which was in the nature of a corporation tax. The basis for this 
contention was that the tax imposed on all the dealers including the 
companies on the basis of their sale turnover, which exceeded the 
taxable minimum. There was no difficulty for the Court to reject 
this contention. It was pointed out that while sales tax was imposed 
on the transaction of sale made by dealers including corporations, 
corporation tax was made on the income derived by the 
corporation and that it was perfectly possible for a corporation to 
enter into many sale transactions without deriving any income 
from the same. 
 The corporation tax exclusively belongs to Union 
Government; and Union Government exclusive source of ample 
revenues. 
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5. 5    List I  Entry 86 
 “Taxes on the capital value of the assets, exclusive of 
agricultural land, of individuals and companies; taxes on the 
capital of companies”. 
 As already stated earlier, the State Legislature has the power 
to levy tax on land and building. This power has the potentiality of 
coming into conflict with the Parliament’s power to impose tax on 
the capital value of assets under Entry 86 of the Union List. The 
overlapping arises because while calculating the assets of an 
individual land and buildings owned by him can also be taken into 
consideration. Similarly, while the State Legislature levies a tax on 
lands and buildings it may take into consideration the capital value 
of land and building for determining the amount of tax to be 
imposed. However, the Courts have discovered a clear demarcating 
line between the scopes of the two Entries. It has been held that 
while a tax imposed under Entry 49 of List II is a property tax and 
is imposed on lands and buildings, a tax imposed under Entry 86 of 
List I is a personal tax imposed on an individual on the basis of the 
capital value of his assets including any land and building owned 
by him. This basic distinction is further explained by pointing out 
that a tax under Entry 49 of List II is tax on units and lands and 
buildings are treated as separate units. In other words, it is not a 
composite tax, which may be imposed on the total value of all 
lands and buildings. Again, if an unit on which the tax is imposed 
is owned or occupied by two or more than two persons, the tax 
liability on unit is not at all affected by that and the tax is least 
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concerned with the division of interest in the unit. Thus, the Courts 
have allowed imposition of tax on lands and buildings without 
reference to the use to which the same are put. If there happens to 
be a factory on certain premises, it has been treated as a separate 
unit and has been allowed to be taxed separately. Of course any 
conceivable relevant criterion may be employed for determining 
the quantum of tax liability. The Legislature may determine the tax 
amount by reference to the payment made for extracting minerals 
from the land, it may take into account the land revenue paid for 
that land, or it may take into account the annual rent of the 
building. The distinction has been aptly summarised in the 
following observations of the Supreme Court in, Sudhir Chand 
Nawn v/s Wealth-tax officer29, 
 “The tax which is imposed by Entry 86, List I of the Seventh 
Schedule is not directly a tax on lands and buildings. It is a tax 
imposed on the capital value of the assets of individuals and 
companies, on the valuation date. The tax is not imposed on the 
components of the assets of the assessee; it is imposed on the total 
assets which the assessee owns, and in determining the net wealth 
not only the encumbrances specifically charged against any item of 
asset, but the general liability of the assessee to pay his debts and 
to discharge his lawful obligations have to be taken into account. 
Again Entry 49, List II of the Seventh Schedule contemplates the 
levy of tax on lands and buildings or both as units. It is normally 
not concerned with the division of interest or ownership in the 
units of land or buildings, which are brought to tax .Tax on lands 
and buildings, is directly imposed on lands and buildings, and 
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bears, a definite relation to it. Tax on the capital value of assets 
bears no definable relation to lands and buildings, which may form 
a component of the total assets of the assessee. By legislation in 
exercise of power under Entry 86, List I, tax is contemplated to 
levied on the value of the assets. For the purpose of levying tax 
under Entry 49, List II, the State Legislature may adopt for 
determining the incidence of tax the annual or the capital value of 
the lands and buildings. But, the adoption of the annual or capital 
value of lands and buildings for determining tax liability will not, 
in our judgment, make the fields of legislation under the two 
entries overlapping.” 
 From the above, it is clear that a tax does not ceases to be 
tax under Entry 86 of the List I merely on the ground that the 
taxing authority has thought fit to include the capital value of lands 
and buildings in the total asset of an individual. Similarly, a tax 
does not cease to be tax under Entry 49 of List II merely because 
the quantum of tax has been determined on the basis of capital 
value of lands and buildings. Thus, in Prithvi Cotton Mills v/s 
Broach Borough Municipality,30 it was held that the imposition of 
house tax on the basis of capital value of lands and buildings was a 
tax within the scope of Entry 49 of List II. 
However, while the above reading of the scope of Entry 49 
of List II and Entry 86 of List I has been helpful in demarcating 
their respective areas of operation, it has also circumscribed 
completely the scope of Entry 49 of List II. Thus, the Court has 
held that since a tax under Entry 49 of List II can only be a tax in 
the nature of a property tax, the State Legislature has no power to 
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levy tax on transactions concerning land and buildings. Since, 
there is no specific entry in the Union List either, as will be seen 
later, the Court has been forced to hold that such taxes can be 
imposed only by Union Parliament in exercise of its residuary 
power. 
The other important item, which has attracted the broad 
interpretation in favour of the Union, is Entry 86 of the Union List. 
The said entry relates to “taxes on the capital value of the assets 
exclusive of agricultural land of individuals and companies; taxes 
on the capital of companies.” The Supreme Court was asked in, 
Benarasi Dass v/s Wealth Tax Officer31, to decide whether the term 
‘individuals’ used in Entry 86 of the Union List has included the 
Hindu- Joint family. Giving the widest interpretation to the 
expression ‘individuals’ could not take in its sweep groups of 
individuals like Hindu Undivided Families. 
 In case of, Union of India v/s H.S. Dhilon32, the question for 
decision before the Supreme Court was whether Sec.24 of the 
Finance Act, 1969, which amended the provisions of the Wealth 
Tax Act, 1957, so as to include the agricultural land for computing 
the net wealth, was within the legislative competence of 
Parliament. The Supreme Court by overruling 4:1 decision of the 
Punjab High Court ruled that it was competent for the Parliament 
to include capital value of agricultural land for computing the net 
wealth, of someone while imposing tax on net wealth of an 
individual. This decision is of far reaching importance and has 
attracted much more academic discussion. The Supreme Court 
decided the case by 4 to 3 and three separate judgments were 
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delivered. The Judges dealt with three distinct and yet interested 
issues: - 
1. Scope of the Entry 49 of the State List. 
2. Scope of the Entry 86 of the Union List 
3. Approach to be adopted while taking recourse to the 
residuary power of the Parliament.  
With regard to the scope of Entry 49 of the State List the 
Judges held that it related to a tax on property and did not 
comprehend personal tax like the tax on the net wealth of an 
individual Shelat J, of course said that, neither parliament nor a 
State Legislature could impose wealth tax on all assets of an 
individual including agricultural land by him would not mean that 
the capital value of agricultural land could be done under Entry 49 
of the State List. But it is doubtful if his observations cannot be 
interpreted to mean that such a tax would be in the nature of a 
personal tax like wealth tax. 
With regard to Entry 86 of Union List, Shelat J., said that it 
authorized the Parliament to levy tax on the total net assets of an 
individual exclusive of his agriculture land. 
Shelat J., put emphasis on the language of Entry 97 of the 
Union List 97 of the Union List, and said that, before one could 
resort to residuary power, one had to examine not only List II and 
III, but also entries 1 to 96 of List I. 
It was held that, Wealth Tax Act, at least after amendment 
could be said to have passed wholly with reference to Entry 97 of 
List I. 
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However, the majority decision in Dhilon’s case cannot be 
taken as an authority for enlarging the scope of central power in 
relation to States. In a federal system the powers of the both the 
sets of Government are defined and demarcated. Under our 
Constitution the Central Government has been given certain 
special powers in relation to the States. It is submitted that, 
additional powers in favour of all Central Government cannot be 
informed by resort to residuary power of Parliament. All powers of 
the Central Government in relation to the States must be either 
expressly given under the Constitution or should be possible to 
necessarily imply the same by taking into account the expressly 
given power in context of the nature and signature of the 
Constitution.  
The question of validity of Kerala Buildings Tax Act (7 of 
1975) was challenged in case, D.G. Gouse and Co.(Agents) Pvt. 
Ltd. v/s State  of  Kerala33, where, the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
the fact  in the said case that :-  
“It may well be that one’s building may imperceptibly be the 
subject-matter of tax, say the wealth-tax, as a component of his 
assets, under Entry 86 (List I), and it may also be subjected to tax, 
say a direct tax under Entry 49 (List II), but as the two taxes are 
separate and distinct imposts, they cannot be said to overlap each 
other, and would be within the competence of the Legislatures 
concerned.” 
  While considering the competency of concerned 
Legislature, it should be remember in mind that if the impugned 
legislation in Pith and Substance relates to subject which are within 
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the competence of the State Legislature, the fact that there is an 
incidental encroachment on matters, which are the subject-matter 
of entries in List I, would not affect the Legislative competence of 
State Legislature to pass the impugned legislation. 
 In the case of, Momogram   Mills v/s State of Gujarat34 It 
was held that, the validity of validating law is to be judged by three 
tests: -  
1. Firstly, whether the Legislature possesses competence over 
the subject-matter, 
2. Secondly, whether by validation the Legislature has 
removed the defect which Courts had found in the previous 
Law, and/or whether the impugned Act’s operation extends 
beyond the boundaries of the concerned State, 
3. Thirdly, whether it is consistent with the provisions of Part 
III of the Constitution. 
In determining the constitutional of Statute the Court is not 
concerned with motives of the Legislature, and whatever 
justification some people may feel in their criticisms of the 
political wisdom of a particular legislative or executive action, the 
Supreme Court cannot be called upon to embark on an enquiry into 
public policy or investigate into questions of political wisdom or 
even to pronounce upon motives of the Legislature in enacting a 
law which it is otherwise competent to make. Further, in case of, 
Sarup sinh v/s State of Punjab35, it was observed that: -  
 “A Court of law can pronounce upon the validity of any law 
and declare the same to be null and void if it is beyond Legislative 
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competence of Legislature or if it infringed the rights enshrined in 
Part III of the Constitution”. 
5. 6   List  I   Entry 87 
 Estate duty in respect of property other than agricultural 
land. The judgment of the said entry joint with other entries has 
been given hereafter. This duty has been abolished since long ago. 
5.7    List I   Entry 88  
 Duties in respect to property other than agricultural land. 
The Constitutional validity of the Act imposing a tax on urban land 
under Entry 49 of List II was challenged on ground that it trenched 
upon the field of legislation of Entry 86, 87 & 88 of List I, 
Schedule VII of the Constitution, in case of, Assistant 
Commissioner of Urban Land Tax, Madras v/s Buckingham and 
Carnatic Co Ltd.etc36., it was held by M.Hidayatullah,C.J., 
J.C.Shah, V.Ramaswamy, G.K.Mitter and A.N.Grover, JJ. that: - 
 Entry 86 and 87 of List I do not preclude the State 
Legislature from taxing capital value of lands and buildings under 
Entry 49 of List II. There is no conflict between Entry 86 of List I 
and Entry 49 of List II. The basis of taxation under the two entries 
is quite distinct. As regards Entry 86 of List I the basis of the 
taxation is the capital value of the asset. It is not a tax directly on 
the capital value of assets of individuals and companies on the 
valuation date. The tax is not imposed on the components of the 
assets of the assessee. The tax under Entry 86 proceeds on the 
principle of aggregation and is imposed on the totality of the value 
of all the assets. It is imposed on the total assets which the assessee 
owns and in determining the net wealth not only the encumbrances 
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specifically charged against any item of assets, but the general 
liability of the assessee to pay his debts and to discharged his 
lawful obligation have to be taken into account. In certain 
exceptional case, where a person owes no debts and is under no 
enforceable obligation to discharge any liability out of his assets, it 
may be possible to break up the tax, which is leviable on the total 
assets into components and attribute a component to lands and 
buildings owned by an assessee. In such a case, the component out 
of the total tax attributable to lands and buildings may in the matter 
of computation bear similarity to a tax on lands and buildings 
levied on the capital or annual value under Entry 49,List II. But in 
a normal case a tax on capital value of assets bears no definable 
relation to lands and buildings, which may or may not form a 
component of the total assets of the assessee. But Entry 49 of    
List II contemplates a levy of tax on lands and buildings or both as 
units. It is not concerned with the division of interest or ownership 
in the units of lands or buildings, which are brought to tax. Tax on 
lands and buildings is directly imposed on lands and buildings, and 
bear a definite relation to the tax on the capital value of assets bear 
no definable relation to lands and buildings which may form a 
components of the total assets of the assessee. By legislation in 
exercise of power under Entry 86, List I tax is contemplated to be 
levied on the value of the assets. For the purpose of levying tax 
under Entry 49, List II the State Legislature may adopt for 
determining the incidence of tax the annual or the capital value of 
the lands and buildings. But the adoption of the annual or capital 
value of lands and buildings for determining tax liability do not 
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make the fields of legislation under the two entries overlapping. 
The two taxes are entirely different in their basic concept and fall 
on different subject matter. 
Merely because a statute imposes tax on land alone it cannot 
be said that the statute does not fall under Entry 49. The legislative 
history of Entry 49 does not show that Entry 49 relating to tax on 
lands and buildings cannot be separated. Before the Government of 
India Act, 1935 lands and buildings were taxed separately and all 
that was done under the Government of India Act, 1935 and the 
Constitution was to combine the two entries relating to lands and 
buildings into a single entry. Entry 49 “Taxes on lands and 
buildings” should be construed as taxes on land and taxes on 
buildings and there is no reason for restricting the amplitude of the 
language used in the entry. Consequently, it cannot be said that as 
Madras Urban Land Tax Act (12 of 1966) imposes tax on lands 
alone it falls under Entry 45 and not Entry 49 of List II. 
Hence, in Pith and Substance the Madras Urban Land Tax 
Act is entirely within the ambit of Entry of 49 of List II and within 
the ambit of Entry 49 of List II and within the competence of the 
State Legislature and does not in any way trench upon the field of 
legislation of Entry 86, 87, and 88 of List I. 
5. 8    List  I Entry 89 
“Terminal taxes on goods or passengers, carried by railway, 
sea or air; taxes on railway fares and freight”.  
The question of constitutional validity of the tax imposed by 
State Government of Haryana on passengers and goods carried on 
national highways, was raised in case of, International Tourist 
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Corporation, etc. etc. v/s  State of Haryana37, in the instant case, 
the appellants were transport operators playing stage carriage and 
contract carriage between Delhi and Jammu and other places in the 
State of Jammu and other places in the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir. Their carriage had followed the National Highways No.1 
and 1-A. They operated directly between Delhi and other terminus 
in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, that is to say, they did not pick 
up or set down passengers and goods enroot. In the course of their 
journey it was necessary for them to travel through the State of 
Haryana, as part of National Highway No.1 passes through tat 
State. 
The State of Haryana levied a tax on C, which in short 
“passengers and goods tax”, under Section 3(1) of Haryana on 
Passengers and Goods Taxation Act, 1952. The Act empowers the 
levy of a tax, to be paid to the State Government at such rates not 
exceeding 60% of the value of the fare or freight as the case may 
be, on all  passengers and goods carried by motor vehicles other 
than a private carrier. In the case of stage carriages and contract 
carriages the State Government was authorised to accept sum in 
lien of the tax chargeable on passengers and goods respectively, in 
the manner prescribed. 
 It was held that the levy under S.3 is intra vires. In 
justification of the levy the honorable R.S. Sarkaria and 
O.Chinnappa Reddy, JJ., observed that :-  
 The Entry 56 of List II refers to taxes on passengers and 
goods carried by road or on inland waterways. It does not except 
National Highways and National waterways, so declared by law 
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made pursuant to Entry 23 and Entry 24 of List I. The omission of 
reference to National Highways in Entry 30 and Entry 89 of List I, 
indicates that the subject of “passengers and goods” carried on 
National Highways also fall directly and squarely within and are 
included in  Entry 56 of List II. The Haryana Passengers and 
Goods Taxation Act is a law made pursuant to the power given to 
State Legislature by Entry 56 of List II. The power exercisable 
under Entry 56 of List II is the power to impose taxes, which are in 
the nature of regulatory and compensatory measures. But to say 
that the nature of tax is of compensatory and regulatory measures 
is not to say that the measure of tax should be proportionate to the 
expenditure incurred on the regulation provided and the services 
rendered. If the tax were to be proportionate to the expenditure on 
regulation and services it would not be a tax but a fee. c incurs 
considerable expenditure for the maintenance of roads and 
providing facilities for transport of goods and passengers within 
the State of Haryana. 
 The maintenance of Highways other than the National 
Highways is exclusively the responsibility of State Government. 
But the State Government is not altogether devoid of responsibility 
in the matter of development and maintenance of a national 
highway, though the primary responsibility is that of the Union 
Government. Since the development and maintenance of that part 
of the highway, which is within a municipal area is equally 
important for the smooth flow of passengers and goods along the 
national highway, it has to be said that in developing and 
maintaining the highway which is within a municipal area, the 
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State Government is surely facilitating the flow of passengers and 
goods along the national highway. Apart from this other facilities 
provided by the State Government along all highways including 
national highways, such as lighting, traffic control, amenities for 
passengers, halting places for buses and trucks are available for use 
by everyone including those traveling along the national highways. 
If cannot, therefore be said that the State Government confers no 
benefits and renders no service in connection with traffic moving 
along national highways and is, therefore, not entitled to levy 
compensatory and regulatory tax on passengers and goods carried 
on national highways. There is sufficient nexus between the tax 
and passengers and goods carried on national highways to justify 
the imposition. While in Case of M/s. Sainik Motors, Jodhpur & 
others v/s State of Rajasthan38, the levy imposed by State 
government on passengers and goods was challenged on ground 
that the amount of imposed levy or tax was measured by the 
concerned fares and freight under Sec.3 of Rajasthan Passengers 
and Goods Taxation Act, 1959. It was held that: -  
In terms, the speak of the charge of the tax in respect of all 
passengers carried and goods transported by motor vehicles, and 
though the measure of the tax is furnished by the amount of fare 
and freight charged, it does not cease to be a tax on passengers and 
goods. The explanation to Sec.3 (1) lays down that even if 
passengers are carried or goods transported without the charge of 
fare or freight, the tax has to be paid as if fare or freight has been 
charged”. This clearly shows that the incidence of the tax is upon 
passengers and goods, though the amount of tax is measured by the 
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fares and freights. Though the tax is laid on passengers and goods, 
the amount varies in the case of passengers according to the 
distance traveled, and in the case of goods because the freight must 
be differ on account of weight, bulk and nature of the goods 
transported.  The tax levied by Sec.3 is in Pith and Substance a tax 
on passengers and goods and not on income of the petitioners or on 
fares and freights. The charging Section does not go beyond Entry 
56 of List II, Sch.VII of the Constitution and is not 
unconstitutional on that ground. Here in this case, the levy of tax 
on passengers and goods was for the purposes of State and falls on 
passengers and goods carried by motor vehicles within the State. 
No doubt, it falls upon passengers and goods proceeding to or from 
an extra State point but it is limited only to fare and freight 
proportionate to the route within the State. For this purpose there 
was an elaborate scheme in R.8A to avoid a charge of tax on that 
portion of the route, which lies outside the State. There is thus, no 
tax on fares and freights attributable to routes outside the State 
except in one instance which is contemplated by the proviso to 
sub-Sec.(3) of Sec.3. Thus, the levy of tax cannot be said to offend  
Articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution. 
 
5.9    List I  Entry 90 
  
“Taxes other than stamp duties on transactions in stock 
exchange and further markets.”  
This entry is exclusively for the Union taxation power. 
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5. 10   List I   Entry 91 
 “Rates of stamp duty in respect of bills of exchange, 
cheques, promissory notes, bills of landing, letters of credit, 
policies of insurance, transfer of shares, debentures, proxies and 
receipts.” 
 Under Entry 44 of Concurrent List both Parliament of India 
and State Legislatures have the power to pass a law in respect of 
stamp duties other than duties or fees collected by means of 
judicial stamps. However, Entry 44 clearly states that a law passed 
with reference to that entry couldn’t prescribe the rates of stamp 
duty. With respect to that Parliament and State Legislatures have 
been given separate power under the Union List and State List 
respectively. Entry 91 of the Union List empowers the Parliament 
to levy rates of stamp duty in respect of bills of exchange, cheques, 
promissory notes, bills of landing, letters of credit, policies of 
insurance, transfer of shares, debentures, proxies and receipts. 
With respect to other documents the power is given to the State 
Legislatures under Entry 63 of State List. The constitutional 
provisions seem to be reasonably clear and a conflict should not 
have normally arisen. However, the question cropped up before 
different High Courts whether State Legislatures were competent 
to impose a stamp duty on the certificate of enrolment of an 
advocate. It was contended that this amounted to encroaching upon 
the power of the Parliament under entry 78 of the Union List to 
pass a law in respect of persons entitled to practice before the High 
Courts. It was further contended that such a stamp duty, if allowed 
to be imposed would conflict with Bar Council of India Act which 
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provides for the payment of fee to the Bar Council. The different 
High Courts and ultimately the Supreme Court held that it was 
perfectly within the power of the State Legislature to impose a 
stamp duty on the certificate of enrolment of an advocate under 
Entry 63 of the State List read with Entry 44 of the Concurrent 
List. Parliament’s power under Entry 78 of Union List was held to 
be limited to determine the eligibility of a person to practice before 
the High Courts. It was further held that fee charged under the Bar 
Council of India Act was merely incidental to the giving of an 
application to the Bar Council for enrolment purposes.  
5. 11    List I  Entry 92 
 “Taxes on the sale or purchase of newspapers and on 
advertisements published therein.” 
 The above taxation heads have no confliction with any 
taxing entry of State List II of Sch.VII of the Constitution hence, 
levy of taxes under the above entries exclusively vest to Union 
Government. 
The newspaper industry has not been granted exemption 
from taxation in express terms. On the other hand Entry 92 of List 
I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution empowers Parliament 
to make laws levying taxes on sale or purchase of newspapers and 
on advertisements published therein. In India the power to levy tax 
even on persons carrying on the business of publishing newspapers 
has got to be recognised, as it is inherent in the very concept of 
government. Merely because the Government has the power to 
levy taxes the freedom of press would not be totally lost. The 
Court is always there to hold the balance even and to strike down 
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any unconstitutional invasion on that freedom. Newspaper industry 
enjoys two of the fundamental rights namely the freedom of speech 
and expression guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(a) and the freedom to 
engage in any profession, occupation, trade, industry or business 
guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(g). While there can be no tax on the 
right to exercise freedom of expression tax is leviable on 
profession, occupation, trade, business and industry. Hence tax is 
leviable on newspaper industry. But when such tax transgresses 
into the field of freedom expression and stifles that freedom it 
becomes unconstitutional. As long as it is within reasonable limits 
and does not impede freedom of expression it will not be 
contravening the limitation of Art.19 (2). The delicate task of 
determining when it crosses from the area of profession, 
occupation, trade, business or industry into the area of freedom of 
expression and interferes with that freedom is entrusted to the 
Courts. Such observations where made in case of, Indian Express 
Newspapers, (Bom.) Pvt. Ltd. v/s Union of  India39. 
5. 12    List I – Entry 92-A 
 “Taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than 
newspapers, where such sale or purchase takes place in the course 
of inter-State trade or commerce.” 
 Entry 54 of List II and Entry 92-A of List I empower the 
State Legislature and the Parliament respectively to levy sales tax 
on sale or purchase of goods with the difference that if is an intra-
State sale it is the State Legislature which is competent to levy the 
tax whereas in the case of inter-State sale, it is the Parliament alone 
that can levy tax. By giving full effect to Entry 54, in List II is in 
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no way affected or curtailed, so far as the meaning of the 
expression “goods” is concerned, these two entries cannot be 
called competing entries.  
 Whether the transfer of an Import Licence called 
R.E.P.Licence/ Exim Scrips by the holder thereof to another person 
constitutes a sale of goods within the meaning of and purposes of 
Sales Tax enactments of relevant States or not was the main 
question arose in case of, Vikas Sales Corporation v/s 
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes40, the facts of the case were, 
Several registered exporters who obtained R.E.P.Licence/ Exim 
Scrips sold them to others for profit. In fact these Licences/ Exim 
Scrips were being traded freely in the market and on stock 
exchanges. The sales tax authorities of certain States proceeded to 
subject such sales to sales tax under their respective enactments. 
The main content raised for objection was that these Licences/ 
Exim Scrips do not constitute “goods”, within the meaning of the 
relevant sales tax enactments and therefore, not exigible to tax. 
 It was held by A.M.Ahmadi, C.J. and B.P.Jeevan Reddy & 
Suhas C. Sen, JJ., that, the transfer of an Import licence called 
R.E.P.Licence/ Exim Scrip by the holder thereof to another person 
constitutes a sale of goods within the meaning of and for the 
purposes of the Sales Tax enactments of Tamil Nadu, Karnataka 
and Kerala. It is exigible to sales tax. The R.E.P. Licences and 
Exim Scrips have their own value. They are bought and sold as 
such. The original licencee or the purchaser is not bound to import 
the goods permissible thereunder. He can simply sell it to another 
and that another to yet another person. In other words these 
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Licences/ Exim Scrips have an inherent value of their own and are 
traded as such. They are treated and dealt as goods. R.E.P.Licence/ 
Exim Scrip is neither a chose-in-action nor an actionable claim. It 
is also not in the nature of a title deed. It has a value of its own. It 
is by itself a property and it is for this reason that it is freely bought 
and sold in the market. For all purposes and intents, it is goods. 
Unrelated to the goods, which can be imported on its basis, it 
commands a value and is traded as such. This is because; it enables 
its holder to import goods, which he cannot do otherwise. The 
contents of R.E.P. Licence/ Exim Scrip are far more substantial 
and real than that of a lottery ticket. If lottery tickets are goods, 
there is no reason why these Licences/ Exim Scrips are not goods. 
Hence the R.E.P. Licence/ Exim Scrips were treated as goods, and 
were made liable to relevant State’s Sales Tax Act. 
 By virtue of Entry 92-A of List I, Parliament has power to 
legislate in regard to taxes on sales or purchase of goods other than 
newspapers where such sale or purchase takes place in the course 
of inter-State trade or commerce. Article 269 provides for levy and 
collection of such taxes. Because of these restrictions, State 
Legislatures are not competent to enact law imposing tax on the 
transactions of sales which takes place in the course o inter-State 
trade or commerce; nor State Legislatures are competent to enact 
law imposing tax on the transactions of transfer of right to use any 
goods which takes place in the course of inter-State trade or 
commerce. Further, by virtue of cl.(1) of Art.286, the State 
Legislature is precluded to make law imposing tax on the 
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transactions of transfer of right to use any goods where such 
deemed sales takes place, 
(a) outside the State; and 
(b) in the course of import of goods into the territory of India, 
yet, there are other limitations on the taxing powers   of the 
State by virtue of cl.(1) of Art.286. When such law is 
enacted by Parliament, the State Legislature would be 
required to exercise its legislative power, under Entry 54 of 
List II, in conformity with such law. Thus, the above stated, 
are the limitations on the powers of State Legislatures on 
levy of sales tax on deemed sales envisaged under Art.366 
(29A) (d).  
Again, the constitutional validity of State, sales tax was 
challenged in case of, 20th Century Finance Corporation Ltd. & 
another etc.etc. v/s State of Maharashtra41 where the State  
(Maharashtra) imposed the levy of sales tax on transfer of right to 
use goods merely on the basis that the goods put to use were 
located within its State irrespective of the facts that: -  
(a) the contract of transfer of right to use goods has been 
executed    outside the State; 
(b) sales has taken place in the course of an inter-State into the 
territory of India; and 
(c) sales are in the course of export or import into the territory 
of India. 
   The major objection taken by the appellants was that the 
State Legislature couldn’t frame its law as to convert an outside 
sale or a sale in the course of import or export or a sale in the 
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course of an inter-State trade or commerce into a sale inside the 
State. 
 Facts of the case were: - The appellant company was 
carrying on the business of leasing diverse equipments under 
master lease agreement to the lessee, i.e. the party who desired to 
take equipment for use on hire. The Master Lease Agreement 
provides that the appellant company at the instance of lessees 
would place orders for individual equipment and that the 
equipment to be leased would be dispatched by manufacturer or 
supplier concerned to the locations specified in the lease. After the 
equipments have been delivered and put to use, the lessee has to 
executes supplementary lease schedules acknowledging due 
receipts of leased equipments, and such supplementary lease deeds 
formed the integral part of the Master Lease Agreement. 
 Such transaction, of transfer of right to use goods has been 
subjected to tax by more than one States, V.N. Khare, J., held that: 
 The States in exercise of power under Entry 54 of List II 
read with Art.366 (29A)(d) are not competent to levy sales tax on 
the transfer of right to use goods, which is a deemed sale, if such 
sale takes place outside the State or is a sale in the course of inter-
State trade or commerce or is a sale in the course of import or 
export. 
 The transactions contemplated under sub-cla.(9) to (1) of 
clause (29A) of Art.366 are not actual States within the meaning of 
‘sale’ but are deemed sales by legal fiction created therein. The 
situs of sale can only be fixed either by appropriate legislature by 
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Judge made law, and there is no settled principle for determining 
the situs of sale. 
5. 13    List I   Entry 92- B 
 “Taxes on the consignment of goods (whether the 
consignment is to the person making it or to any other person), 
where such consignment takes place in the course of inter-State 
trade or commerce.” 
Tax on Purchase: - A transaction of sale or purchase is not a 
unilateral transaction but a bilateral one and when it is looked at 
from the point of view of a sale or purchase it is one transaction 
which has two facts. From the point of view of a seller it is a sale 
transaction and point of view of a purchase it is purchase 
transaction. When therefore, the transaction is one on which a tax 
on sale or purchase can be levied it does not necessarily mean that 
only a sales tax can be levied and not a purchase tax. The inside 
dealer may therefore, be taxed on his purchase or if he sells in 
retail to actual consumers in the State he may be taxed on the 
sales42.  
 Under the Constitution (46th Amendment) Act, 1982, a new 
Entry 96B was inserted in the Union List to enable the levy of tax 
on the consignment of goods takes place in the course of inter-
State trade or commerce, and Article 269 was amended so that the 
tax levied on the consignment of goods in the course of inter-State 
trade or commerce shall be assigned to the States. This article was 
also amended to enable Parliament to formulate by law principle 
for determining when a consignment of goods takes place in the 
course of inter-State trade or commerce. 
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 Clause (3) of Article 286 was amended to enable Parliament 
to specify, by law, restrictions and conditions in regard to the 
system of levy, rates and other incidence of tax on the transfer of 
goods involved in the execution of works contract, on the delivery 
of goods on hire-purchase or any system of payment by 
installments, etc. Article 366 was also suitably amended to insert a 
definition of “tax on sale and purchase of goods” to include 
transfer for consideration of controlled commodities, transfer of 
property in goods involved in the execution of works contract, 
delivery of goods on hire-purchase or any system of payment by 
installments etc. 
 The State of affairs that the Parliament has sought to remedy 
by the 46th Amendment of the Constitution was that prior to 
promulgation of each State attempted to subject the same 
transaction to tax on the nexus doctrine under its sales tax law. 
Consequently, on the basis of one or the other element of the 
territorial nexus, the same transaction had to suffer tax in different 
States with the inevitable hardship to trade and consumers in the 
same or different States. The framers of the Constitution being 
fully aware of the problems sought to check the same by a 
somewhat complex constitutional scheme and by imposing 
restrictions on State’s power with regard to levy tax on the sale or 
purchase of goods under Art.286. 
 But high judicial authorities had found the interpretation of 
the original Article 286 a difficult task and had expressed divergent 
views as to the scope and effect in particular of the explanation in 
clause (1) and of clause (2). The majority of the view of the 
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Supreme Court in the, State of Bombay v/s The United Motors 
(India) Ltd.43, was that sub-clause (a) and the explanation in clause 
(1) prohibited the taxation of sale involving inter-State elements by 
all States except the State in which the goods were delivered for 
the purpose of consumption therein, and furthermore, that clause 
(2) did not affect the power of the State to tax the inter-State sale 
even though Parliament had not made a law removing the ban 
imposed by that clause. This resulted in dealers resident in one 
State being subjected to the sales tax jurisdiction and procedure of 
several other States with which they had dealings in the normal 
course of their business. Two-and-a-half years later, the second 
part of this decision was reversed by the Supreme Court in the, 
Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v/s The State of   Bihar,44 but here too 
the Court was not unanimous. 
 Further, in pursuance of clause (3) of the Article, Parliament 
passed an Act in 1952 declaring a number of goods to be essential 
to the life of the community. Since this declaration could not affect 
pre-existing State laws imposing sales tax on these goods the result 
was a wide disparity from State to State, not only in the range of 
exempted goods, but also in the rates applicable to them. 
 The Taxation Enquiry Commission, after examine the 
problem with great care and thoroughness, made certain 
recommendations which were generally accepted by all the State 
Governments. So, the Parliament by 6th Amendment to the 
Constitution, enacted the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, with the 
object to formulate principles for determining when a sale or 
purchase of goods takes place in the course of inter-State trade or 
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commerce or outside a State or in the course of import into or 
export from India, to provide for the levy, collection and 
distribution of taxes on sales of goods in the course of inter-State 
trade or commerce and to declare certain goods to be of special 
importance and specify the restrictions and conditions to which 
State laws imposing taxes on sale or purchase of such goods shall 
be subject. 
 The constitutional validity of Section 9 (1)(b) of Haryana 
General Sales Tax Act (20 of 1973) respect to purchase tax was 
challenged in case of, M/s. Goodyear India Ltd. v/s State of 
Haryana45. 
 The facts were: - M/s. Goodyear India Ltd. was engaged in 
manufacture and sale of automobile tyres and tubes at, factory 
Ballabhagrah, district Faridabad, State of Haryana. The said 
company had its depot at different places in the State of Haryana as 
well as in other States. For the manufacturing activity, the 
company was purchasing necessary raw materials from Haryana 
and from other States as and when required. The company has the 
sales within the State, outside the States i.e. inter-State trade and 
commerce and export, outside the country. With respect to finance 
years 73, 74 and 75, the appellant company paid sales tax and 
Central sales tax in accordance with law. But, the assessing 
authority, Faridabad, imposed upon the appellant company the 
purchase tax under Section 9 of the Act, for relevant financial 
years 73, 74 and 75, on the dispatches made by the said company, 
on the manufactured goods to its various depots outside the State 
(Haryana). 
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 These impugned levy of purchase tax, led to the filing of 
writ petitions in the Punjab and Haryana High Courts, and 
thereafter at the final determination of validity of impugned levy at 
Supreme Court, where Sabyasachi Mukharji & S. Ranganathan, 
JJ., observed that, It is well to remember that in construing the 
expressions of the Constitution to  judge whether the provisions 
like S. 9 (1) (b) of the Haryana General Sales Tax are within the 
competence of the State Legislature, one must bear in mind that the 
Constitution is to be construed not in a narrow or pedantic sense. 
Constitution is not be construed as mere law but as the machinery 
by which laws are to be made a Constitutional Court, one must 
bear in mind, will not strengthen, but only derogate from its 
position if it seeks to do anything but declare the law; but it may 
rightly reflect that a Constitution is a living and organic thing, 
which of all instruments has the greatest claim to be construed 
broadly and liberally. In the interpretation of fiscal laws, the true 
test must always be the language used, nothing should be 
presumed or implied. The taxable event under S. 9 (1) (b) can be 
confirmed if two conditions have cumulatively satisfied by the 
event of dispatch of goods outside the State- namely, 
1. Purchase of goods in the State; and 
2. Using them for the manufacture of any other goods in the 
State. 
 But, if the goods do not answer both descriptions 
cumulatively, even though these are dispatched outside the State, 
the purchase of those goods would not be put to tax under Section 
9 (1) (b). The focal point in the expression “goods, the sale or 
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purchase of which is liable to tax under the Act” is the character 
and class of goods in relation to exigibility. 
 A taxable event is that which is closely related to imposition. 
In the instant section, there is such close relationship only with the 
dispatch. Therefore, the goods purchased are used in manufacture 
of new independent commodity and thereafter the said 
manufactured goods are dispatched outside the State of Haryana. 
In this series of transactions the original transaction is completely 
eclipsed or cease to exist when the levy is imposed at the third 
stage of dispatch of manufactured goods. In the instant case the 
levy has no direct connection with the transaction of purchase of 
row materials, it has only a remote connection of lineage. It may be 
indirectly and very remotely connected with the transaction of the 
purchase of raw materials wherein the present levy would lose its 
character of purchase tax on the said transaction. 
 The Section. 9 (1) (b) of the Haryana Act though purports to 
impose tax only on price at which row materials are purchased but 
actually becomes effective with reference to a totally different 
class of goods, i.e. manufactured goods on their dispatch to a place 
of business situated outside the State, the tax is a tax on 
consignment of goods, and hence, the provision imposing such tax 
is beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature as the 
power to levy consignment tax vests in the Parliament in view of 
clause (9) in Article 269 (1) of the Constitution and Entry 96-B in 
Schedule Seventh, List I inserted by the 46th amendment of the 
Constitution. 
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5. 14    List I   Entry 96 
 “Fees in respect of any of the matters in this List, but not 
including fees taken in any Court.” 
 The Constitution recognises a clear distinction between a tax 
and a fee. The several entries in the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, 
which enumerate the legislative powers and distribute them 
between Parliament and the State Legislature point to this 
distinction. The scheme underlying the Lists may shortly be 
summarised thus. Each of the Union and the State Lists, which are, 
List I and II start by enumerating first the entries conferring 
general legislative powers as distinct from taxation powers. In 
other words, the taxation entries, that are entries conferring taxing 
power, are separately enumerated after entries conferring general 
legislative power. Thus Items 1 to 18 of List I deal with the 
exclusive general legislative powers of Parliament while 82 to 92 
enumerate the taxes which Parliament to legislate in respect of fees 
in respect of any of matters in this list, but not including fees taken 
in any Court. 
 This would clearly demonstrate that while fees may be 
levied in respect of or as incidental to legislation on the topics set 
out in the other entries in the list, the power to levy a tax is not to 
be taken as conferred by entries conferring general legislative 
power. Thus though a fee may be levied as incidental to legislation 
be it general as in respect of entries 1 to 81 or the entries 
conferring taxing powers – Entries 82 to 92, or in respect of the 
miscellaneous matters enumerated by such an entry like 94, no 
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taxes may be imposed by virtue of the general legislative power 
under entries 1 to 81. The same pattern of classification and 
conferment of general legislative as distinguished from taxing 
power is adopted in the State List. List II, Entries 1 to 44 of this list 
deal with general legislative power while items 45 to 63 with 
specific taxes, which might be imposed exclusively by the State 
Legislature. The last entry in this list is in the same terms as Entry 
96 of List I and reads: ‘fees taken in respect of any of the matters 
in this List but not including fees taken in any Court.’ So far as the 
Concurrent List is concerned, it contains no entry conferring the 
taxation power but by its last entry, Entry 47, it enables the 
legislature to impose ‘fees in respect of the matters in that List but 
not including fees taken in any Court and this is in terms identical 
with Entries 96 of List I and 66 of List II.’ 
 When entry 96 of List I or 66 of List II speak of any of the 
matters in this list, they necessarily include also the entries relating 
to taxation. In other words, a fee may be levied even under an 
enactment relating to the imposition of a tax46.  
 In the absence of express provision under the Development 
fees imposed by the delegated authority- the Gujarat Town 
Planning and Urban Development Act (1976), Section 119 was 
challenged on ground that it is unauthorized and illegal, in case of, 
Ahmedabad   Urban Development Authority v/s sharadkumar 
Jayantikumar Pasawalla & others, where M.M. Punchhi, S. Mohan 
and G.N. Ray, JJ., observed that :- 
 In a fiscal matter it will not be proper to hold that even in the 
absence of express provision, a delegated authority can impose tax 
  253
or fee, such power of imposition of tax and/or fee by delegated 
authority must be very specify and there is no scope of implied 
authority for imposition of such tax or fee. Delegated authority 
must act strictly within the parameters of the authority delegated to 
it under the Act and it will not be proper to bring the theory of 
implied intent or the concept of incidental and ancillary power in 
the matter of exercise of fiscal power. Since there is no express 
provision in the Town Planning Act, 1976 for imposition of fee 
and the State Government has not delegated any such power to the 
Development Authority to impose fees for development, the 
regulations framed for such imposition of fees and the demands 
made therefore are wholly unauthorised and illegal. 
5. 15    List I  Entry 97 
 “Any other matter not enumerated in List II or List III 
including any tax not mentioned in either of those Lists.” 
Residuary Power: - the expression ‘residuary powers’ refers to 
those powers, which are not allocated either to the federal 
Legislature or to the Units. It carries the idea of non-descript i.e. 
powers which were not in contemplation of the framers of the 
Constitution. Any scheme of the distribution of powers has to 
leave room for unforeseen eventualities. The Constitution of a 
country has to endure for ages and its framers cannot contemplate 
all the future eventualities. Therefore, it becomes necessary to 
provide in advance as to which of the two sets of Government will 
have the power to deal with those matters, which are not covered, 
by any of the specifically enumerated powers. 
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 If we look at the different federal constitutions from which 
the framers of our Constitution freely borrowed, we find that no 
common pattern emerges from them with regard to the allocation 
of the residuary powers. Thus, while in the United States of 
America and in Commonwealth of Australia residuary powers 
remain with the States, in Canada they have been allocated to the 
Dominion Government. Under the Government of India Act, 1935 
residuary power was allocated neither to the Centre nor to the 
Provinces: it was given to the Governor-General who, in the 
exercise of his description, was to allocated the same to the Centre 
or to the Provinces, as the circumstances might require from time 
to time. This extraordinary provision was enacted because a 
compromise could not be reached amongst the different parties and 
interest groups on the question of allocation of this power to the 
Centre or to the Provinces. 
 At the time of the framing of the present Constitution, in the 
original objectives resolution moved by Pt. Jawahar Lal Nehru in 
the Constituent Assembly, residuary power was contemplated to be 
given to the States. The resolution of Pt. Nehru read: “ ….the   said 
territories…shall possess and retain the status of autonomous units, 
together with residuary powers and exercise all powers and 
functions of Government and administration, save and except such 
powers and functions as are vested in or assigned to the Union or 
as are inherent or implied in the Union.” This was done with a 
view to accommodate the Muslim League. But after partition of 
the country into India and Pakistan, the plea for a strong Centre got 
momentum and residuary power was thought as one of the means 
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to strengthen the Central power. Therefore, residuary power was 
allocated to the Centre. This is provided in Article 248 and Entry 
97 of the Union List which are given below:    
1. “Article 248(1). Parliament has exclusive power to make 
any law with respect to any matter and enumerated in the 
Concurrent List or State List. 
2. Such power shall include the power of making any law 
imposing a tax not mentioned in either of those lists”. 
Entry 97 of List I. “Any other matter not enumerated in List 
II or List III including any tax not mentioned in either of 
those lists”. 
 The fact that the Indian Constitution provides for the 
distribution of legislative powers in three elaborately drawn long 
lists, has given rise to certain comments on the nature of residuary 
power in India. First, one may question the utility of a long Union 
List and may suggest that it would have been enough to demarcate 
the State and Concurrent fields of legislation and to leave the rest 
to the Centre. In the Constituent Assembly Dr. Ambedkar met such 
a criticism by pointing out that in the British North America Act, 
1867 as well the federal Legislature powers are specifically 
enumerated even though residuary power is also given to the 
Centre. In addition, he mentioned that the existence of Union List 
containing specifically enumerated powers of the Centre would 
help the States to know the extent of the legislative power of the 
Centre. What Dr. Ambedkar failed to point out was that in the 
absence of the Union List, the powers of the Centre would have 
been much less than what they are today. Today, the legislative 
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items in the State and Concurrent Lists are interpreted in the 
context of the specific items mentioned in the Union List and by 
applying the rule of harmonious construction the Courts delimit 
their scope. And in the context of the text of the Indian 
Constitution, specific enumeration of items in the Union List 
carries more than a normal importance. As pointed out earlier, the 
Union List not only contains the items on which the Parliament has 
the power of legislate, it also specifically delimits the ambit and 
scope of many legislative items mentioned in two other lists and in 
some cases authorises the Parliament of India to appropriate to its 
own jurisdiction part of the legislative power allocated to the 
States. In addition, while allocating legislative power to the Centre, 
in certain cases it delimits that power by expressly extending 
certain aspects of that power. In the discussion hereafter we shall 
see that a controversy has arisen whether any importance should be 
given to such exclusionary clause or not.  
 The second comment relates to the utility of residuary power 
in a Constitution where legislative powers have been so 
exhaustively enumerated. The elaborateness of enumeration of 
items led some of the Constituent Assembly members to think that 
chances of the use of residuary powers would be very few and such 
a power was only a matter of academic significance. An other 
member, writing after one decade of the enforcement of the 
Constitution, said “in the Indian Constitution, where all the 
subjects are listed, the scope for residuary powers is limited and it 
is not a significant indication of inferiority that the States have no 
residuary powers while the Centre has all residuary powers”. The 
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proceedings of the Constituent Assembly further indicate that the 
provision of the residuary power was meant to relate to those 
subjects which were not identifiable at the time of the framing of 
the Constitution and that every effort would be made to 
accommodate a subject of legislation within the items specifically 
enumerated and recourse would be made to residuary powers as a 
last resort. 
 The controversy about the residuary power at the time of the 
enactment of the Government of India Act, 1935 and shift in the 
decision of the Constituent Assembly of India about the allocation 
of residuary power after the partition of the country would indicate 
that the grant of residuary power to the Centre or the States reflects 
the intention of the Constitution- makers about the nature of 
federal set up the Constitution proposes to establish. This is 
recognised by writers. Thus, Prof. K.C. Wheare observes that the 
question “where residue of the power is to rest is an important 
question in framing a federal government. It may affect the whole 
balance of power in a federation”. Similarly, K. Santhanam says : 
“There was a big battle in the old days between politicians about 
this issue of residuary powers. It was considered to be a test as to 
whether there should be strong Centre or a weak Centre. It was 
imagined that any Centre which had residuary powers would be 
strong and a Centre which had no residuary powers would be 
weak.” 
 But the importance of residuary power should not be 
exaggerated either. Working of federal constitutions shown that “ it 
does not make much difference whether the Federation or the 
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States have the residuary legislative power”. Thus in the United 
States of America and in Commonwealth of Australia, the Courts 
have been able to give expansive meaning to enumerated powers 
of Centre and given restrictive interpretation to the residuary 
power of the States. On the other hand, in the case of Canada the 
Privy Council has given expansive meaning to the Provincial 
power to legislate for “property and civil rights” and has preferred 
to give narrow interpretation of the power of Dominion Parliament, 
which has residuary powers as well. That is the reason why S.A. de 
Smith points out that “…experience in Canada and Australia 
suggest that the method of allocating the undistributed residuum of 
legislative power may not be very significant except as a general 
guide to the intention of the framers of the Constitution”. 
 (a)    Judicial Interpretation of residuary power in India 
 After having discussed the meaning and scope of residuary 
power in general, their pattern of allocation in different federations 
including India, and their importance in determining the nature of 
federal set up a country has, now it would be appropriate to 
examine the trend of decisions of the India Courts with regard to 
the nature and scope of residuary power under our Constitution. 
The discussion hereafter will show that contrary to the general 
prediction that residuary power was to occupy an insignificant 
place in the scheme of the Indian Constitution, the Courts have 
often found it necessary to take recourse to residuary power to 
sustain Parliamentary legislation. We have seen that the Courts 
were expected to take recourse to residuary power as a last resort. 
That the Courts have lived up to that expectation can be debatable. 
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The principle is that all the items in all the lists, including the 
Union List, have to be given broad construction so as to avoid 
resort to residuary power. But when legislation is sustained as an 
exercise of residuary power and not less than one of the items 
enumerated in the Union List or even Concurrent List the debate is 
largely academic because State interests are not adversely affected. 
However, when giving restrictive interpretation to State powers 
enlarges the scope of residuary power the decision assumes 
importance and becomes indicative of the judicial attitude on 
Central-State relations. It has already been pointed out that judicial 
attitude plays a major role in the area and the examples of United 
States, Australia and Canada have been given. What we can add 
here is that, in general, the State List items are to be harmonised 
with the Union and Concurrent List items and, if necessary, their 
scope may be delimited. But in relation to residuary powers, items 
of each list including those of State List are to be given 
precedence. 
 The constitutional validity of the “Expenditure Tax Act” 
was challenged on ground of vice of legislative incompetence of 
the Parliament, in case of, Federation of Hotels & Restaurants v/s  
Union of India48, where it was held that: - 
 It cannot be said that the Expenditure Tax Act is outside the 
legislative competence of the Parliament or that the Act in its true 
nature and character is not one imposing an “Expenditure Tax”, as 
known to Law, accepted notions of Public Finance, and to 
legislative practice but is, in pith and substance, either tax on 
luxuries falling within Entry 62 of List II of the Seventh Schedule; 
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or a tax on the consideration paid for the purchase of goods 
constituting an impost of the nature envisaged in Entry 54 of List 
II. The question of legislative practice as to what a particular 
legislative entry could be held to embrace is inapposite while 
dealing with a tax, which is sui generis or none, descript imposed 
in exercise of the residuary powers so long as such tax is not 
specifically enumerated in Lists II and III. Secondly, there is no 
conclusive material indicating that the appropriate legislature had 
limited the notion of expenditure within any confines. The 
Expenditure Tax Act is essentially a tax on  expenditure and not 
on luxuries or sale of goods falling within the State power. The 
distinct aspects namely ‘the expenditure’ aspect of the transaction 
falling within the Union power must be distinguished and the 
legislative competence to impose a tax thereon sustained. 
 Residuary power cannot be so expansively interpreted as to 
whittle down the legislative powers of the States, was held in 
Satpal & Co. v/s Lt. Governor of Delhi,49  where Chinnappa Reddy 
J. observed that :- 
 “Before exclusive competency can be claimed for 
Parliament by resort to the residuary power, the legislative 
incompetence of the State legislature must be clearly established. 
Entry 97 itself is specific that a matter can be brought under that 
entry if it is not enumerated in List II or List III, and in the case of 
a tax, if it is not mentioned in either of those Lists. In a federal 
Constitution like ours where there is a division of legislative 
subject, but the residuary power cannot be so expansively 
interpreted as to whittle down the power of the State Legislature. 
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That might affect and jeopardize the very principle. The federal 
nature of the Constitution demand that an interpretation, which 
would allowed the exercise of legislative power by Parliament 
pursuant to the residuary powers vested in it to trench upon State 
legislation which would there by destroy or belittle State autonomy 
must be rejected”.    
 In short, the Entry 97 of List I, Schedule Seventh of the 
Constitution is such a magic weapon “Brahmastra”for the 
Parliament, which helps in getting rid off any abstraction created 
by rival entry, which comes in his path progress, towards the 
achieving his goal of supremacy in power of legislation. 
5.16    In Conclusion 
 A careful study of the entries of Union List reveals the fact 
that the scheme of allocation of functions and revenue resources 
(taxing heads of List I) has put the Centre in strong financial 
position than States. 
The Entries- 82.    Taxes on Income other than agricultural income. 
83. Duties of Customs including export duties. 
84. Excise duty, subject to other provisions of the 
         Constitution. 
  85.      Corporation Tax. 
92.      Taxes on the sale or Purchase of newspapers 
            and on advertisements published therein. 
  92-A.  Taxes on the sale or Purchase of goods other
    than newspapers, where such sale or Purchase   
                                takes place in the course of inter-State trade or  
                                commerce. 
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  92-B  Taxes on the consignment of goods (whether 
the consignment is to the person making it or 
any other person), where such consignment 
takes place in the course of inter-State trade or 
commerce. 
97. Residuary power. 
 Above taxing heads are the (money-mines) Mint resources 
for the Parliament, compare to revenue sources of the State List II, 
under Schedule Seventh of the Constitution. Whither fiscal 
management of Indian economy requires new sources of revenue 
through innovative approach. Now the time has arrived ti find the 
new solution under which both the Centre and State Governments 
will have to put their houses, by way of exchange and adjustment 
of present entries and thereby creating new additional sources of 
revenue, to ensure equitable distribution of function and power 
between Union and the States. It is also true that except 
Corporation Tax (Tax on companies), the some of the above stated 
tax revenues are shareable with the States, on recommendations of 
the respective Finance Commission. Looking to the changing 
social economy and political situation in India, the present scholar 
believe that, to mobilise maximum financial resources, and to 
maintain a reasonable measure of monetary stability, the share of 
Corporation tax should be brought into the divisible pool of Union 
revenues.  
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Chapter- 6 
 
 
Judicial Decisions on State Taxation Power 
 
 The long experience of the Indian polity first with unitary 
and then with tightly federal colonial government had great effect 
on the scheme of distribution of financial resource between the 
Union and the States under the republican Constitution of India. 
Thus, State List contains 19 items, which have enumerated in 
Entries 45 to 63. The study of this chapter will show that, there are 
several more chances of overlapping between taxing jurisdiction of 
the Union and Courts have been called upon to resolve them.  
6. 1   List II  Entry 45 
 “Land revenue, including the assessment and collection of 
revenue, the maintenance of land records, survey for revenue 
purposes and records of rights and alienation of revenues.”  
In construing an Entry in a List conferring legislative 
powers, the widest possible construction, according to their 
ordinary meaning, must be put upon the words used therein. The 
cardinal rule of interpretation, however is that words should be 
given their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning subject to 
the rider that in construing words in a constitutional enactment, 
conferring legislative power under Article 246, the most liberal 
construction should be put upon the words in the Entries in the 
respective Lists in Seventh Schedule so that the same day have 
effect in their widest amplitude. 
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 The Entry 45 deals with “land revenue”, including the 
assessment and collection of revenue, the maintenance of land 
records, survey for revenue purposes and records of rights and 
alienation of revenue lie under the broad head “land revenue”. 
Whether the word “land” includes the right to the flowing water, 
for the purpose of imposition of relevant tax, which has to be 
imposed by State Legislature, was the main issue in the case of, 
M/s R. S. Rekchand Mohota Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. v/s 
State of Maharashtra1, the facts of the case were, the appellant had 
installed a mill in the year 1898 and had been drawing water for 
industrial purpose from the river “Wana” by installing water 
pumps at its bank. The Maharashtra Government imposed the cess 
on at varied degree; on use of flowing water from the river “Wana” 
under resolution passed dated.5th June 1972. The appellant made 
liable to pay the amount of Cess Rs.18348-30 p.s. for the period 
from 1967-68 to 1973-74, on the use of water for industrial 
purpose. The appellant challenged the demand of cess, dated 
December 19,year 1974, inter-alia contending that he had easement 
right to draw flowing water from the river Wana, uninterruptedly 
and continuously since he had been so drawing through water for 
over 70 years, that it had perfected as his prospective right to draw 
water from the flowing river and the Government is, therefore, 
devoid of any power to levy cess on the use of water. 
 In justifying the levy of cess imposed by State authority on 
flowing water K.Ramaswamy, S. Saghir Ahmed and G.B. 
Pattanaik, JJ. held that, the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 
Sec.20, includes flowing water as investing title thereof in the State 
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as integral part of the land. The definition ‘land’ includes the right 
to the water flowing there from 96 in the definition in the Transfer 
of Property Act. Therefore, when the Cess has been imposed by 
virtue of power vested under Section 70 of the Code by the State 
Government by way of legislation, the power of the State was 
traceable to the legislative Entry under Entry 45 of List II of 
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Therefore, the demand of 
water cess was within the legislative competence and the 
Legislature was competent to enact law in exercise of the power 
under Article 246. The Government had power under Section 70 
read with Sec.20 for levy of water cess on the use of water by the 
Resolution, which came to be passed by the State Government 
determining the rate at which water cess was cessable on the use of 
water for industrial purpose. It would accordingly be exigible for 
levy of tax. It was further stated though the appellant had been 
using the water for over 70 years but that could not be construed to 
mean that it had established a right to draw water by artificial 
contrivance from flowing river to use in his factory for industrial 
purpose, so it is taxable as incidence on cess on water as land cess 
and, therefore, appellant was made liable to pay water cess at rates 
prescribed by the Government.  
In another case of, Province of Madras v/s Lady of Dolours 
Convent, Trichinopoly2, the word ‘land’ was interpreted to include 
land cess and in Kandukari Bala Suryaprasada Rao v/s Secretary to 
State for India3, the privy council had also interpreted “charge” on 
water in the nature of land cess. The same rule was followed by the 
Madras High Court in, K.S. Ardanareeswarar Gounder v/s 
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Tahsildar Bhavan4, with regard to the incidence of cess on the use 
of water in urban area, the Andhra Pradesh and Allahabad High 
Court has also held that rates of cess on water under the municipal 
limit are the cess of land revenue in the urban area. Thus it was 
held that the legislative Entry 45 of List II of the Seventh Schedule 
of the Constitution brings within the ambit of the power of the 
legislature under Article 246 to levy cess on use of the water even 
from flowing river.  
In the above decision, the ambit of “land revenue” was 
increased to include “the use of the water from flowing river,” to 
raise the respective revenues. 
6. 2     List II  Entry 46 
Taxes on “Agricultural Income.” 
 Entry 46 of List II in the Seventh Schedule makes it clear 
that the State Legislature has exclusive jurisdiction to legislate in 
respect of taxes on agricultural income. The term “agricultural 
income” used in that Entry has to be construed in accordance with 
definition of the said term in Article 366(1) of the Constitution and 
that sub-articles states that agricultural income means “agricultural 
income as defined for the purpose of the enactments relating to 
Indian income-Tax.” The definition does not say that “agricultural 
income” means agricultural income as defined in the 1922 Act.” It 
does not even say that it means “agricultural income as defined for 
the purposes of the enactment relating to Indian Income-tax.” The 
use of plural ‘enactments’ is very relevant. It means that 
agricultural income for the purposes of the Constitution means 
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agricultural income as it is defined at the relevant time in the 
enactment that then relates to income tax. 
 Therefore, the agricultural income about which a State 
Legislature may enact under Entry 46, List II would be such 
income as is defined in the Indian Income-tax Act. The income 
derived from sale of tea grown and manufactured by the seller is an 
income, which is derived partially from manufacturing processes. 
The rule 23 and 24, of the Indian Income-tax Rules 1922, made 
under Section 59 of the Indian Income-tax Act provides for the 
determination of income for the purposes of income tax when the 
entire income is partially agricultural income and partially income 
chargeable to income-tax under the head “business”, Rule 23 deals 
with the case of tea grown and manufactured by the seller. 
In case of, Tata Tea Ltd.  v/s State of West Bengal5, it was 
said by the Court that, when S.59 of the Income-tax Act provides 
for the rule made under that Act to prescribe the proportions of 
income from business and income from agricultural in the entire 
income derived in part from agricultural and in part from business, 
the proportion so prescribed must be taken to be prescribed by the 
Act. These rules were in existence in 1950 when the Constitution 
incorporated the definition of “agricultural income” from the 
Income-tax Act by reference. The definition of the term was bound 
up with the rules. 
 The result of Rule 24 is that the income derived from the 
sale of tea grown and manufactured by the seller is to be computed 
in the first instance as if it was income derived from business, 
consequently in accordance with the provisions of S.10 of the 
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Income-tax Act. Of the Income so computed, 40 per cent is under 
Rule 24, to be treated, as income liable to income tax and 
remaining 60 per cent only will be deemed to be agricultural 
income with the meaning of the expression in the Income-tax Act. 
It follows therefore, that the power of the State Legislature to make 
a law in respect of taxes on agricultural income arising from tea 
plantation will be limited to legislating with respect to the 
agricultural income so determined. The State Legislature is free in 
the exercise of its plenary legislative power to allow further 
deductions from such computed agricultural income as it considers 
fit, but it cannot add to the amount of the agricultural income so 
computed by providing certain items of expenditure deducted in 
the computation of the income from a business under the 
provisions of the income tax Act, cannot be deducted and cannot 
be considered to be part of the taxable agricultural income. But in 
case of, Karimtharuvi Tea Estate Ltd, Kottayam v/s State of 
Kerala6, the income derived from rubber plantation was assessed 
on a different footing. While in case of, Travancore Rubber & Tea 
Co. Ltd. v/s State of Kerala7, the Court held that, State Legislature 
was free to legislate in respect of total income derived from such 
plantation in any manner it thought fit, under Entry 46 of List II of 
Seventh Schedule. The term ‘agriculture’ could not be confined 
merely to the production of grain and food for men and cattle, but 
must extend to all products of the land that had some utility either 
for consumption or trade or commerce.  
 The Supreme Court demarcated the areas of the operation of 
Union and State taxation with respect to income derived from 
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forestry by maintaining a distinction between products which grew 
wild on the land or were of spontaneous growth and did not 
involve any human skill or labor on the land and those products 
with respect to which human skill or labor was needed. In the 
former case products were held not to be agricultural products 
whereas in the latter case they were held to be agricultural 
products. The income derived from the latter was declared exempt 
from income tax as it formed part of ‘agricultural income.’ In the 
words of Bhagawati, J., in case of, Commissioner of Income-tax, 
West Bengal v/s Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy8, that, “the result 
of this determination would be that the assessee would not be 
liable to assessment under the Indian Income-tax Act, but he would 
have to pay the agricultural income tax which would be levied 
upon him under the respective Agricultural Income tax Acts”. The 
income derived from trees planted and grown on vacant part of 
forestland could legitimately be treated as agricultural income. 
 Whether the profits arising from sale of agricultural land, 
does amounts to capital gain within the meaning of Income Tax 
Act, 1961? Was the Question raised in case of, Singhavi Rakesh 
Kumar v/s Union of India9. It was observed by Bharucha J., that 
the Income Tax Act, 1922 Section 2(1)(A) and 2(14)(iii), defines, 
‘agricultural income’ as any rent or revenue derived from land 
which is used for agricultural purposes………and  ‘Capital asset’ 
to mean ‘property of any kind held by an assessee’ but not any 
land which the income derived as  ‘agricultural income’. It is in 
this background that the impugned amendments in the 1961 Act 
may be seen. The words “agricultural land in India” were   
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substituted by the Finance Act 1970 with the effect from 1st April 
1970. The position as a result, is that income arising from transfer 
of agricultural land that falls within the terms of Items (a) and (b) 
of sub-clause (iii) of clause 14 of Section 2 falls outside the ambit 
of revenue derived from land and therefore, the outside the ambit 
of ‘agricultural income’. Such income therefore, is liable to capital 
gains tax chargeable under Section 45 of the 1961 Act. Parliament 
has the power to define what agricultural income is in the 1961 
Act, the amendment of sub-Section (2) and (14) of Section 2 
thereof in the manner afore stated are, therefore, good in law. The 
effect was that the assessee was made liable to pay capital gains 
tax on sales of his land within Municipal area. 
 The Parliament has the power to define what agricultural 
income is, seems to me somewhat typical encroachment into the 
topic/head of ‘agricultural income’, under Entry 46, List II. Thus 
the State’s power to impose levy on agricultural land is curtailed. 
6. 3   List – II Entry 47 
 “Duties in respect of succession to agricultural land.” 
 Basically, the entry being a local in origin it bears no 
conflictions with the other entries of any list. 
6. 4     List – II   Entry 48 
 “Estate duty in respect of agricultural land.” 
The comparative study and scope of above entries, with 
Entries 86, 87 and 88 of Union List I, has already been discussed 
fully in case of, Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax, 
Madras, v/s Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd.etc10, so it has not 
repeated here. 
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6. 5    List –II Entry 49 
 “Taxes on lands and buildings” 
 Entry 49 of List II has been interpreted to mean the levy of 
tax directly on land as a unit. The land has been regarded as 
meaning the land on surface and also below the surface. Therefore, 
in order a tax can be levied under Entry 49 of List II of Schedule 
Seventh, it is essential that “land” as a unit must exist on which the 
tax is imposed. 
 Legality of Cess imposed by State Government on Royalty 
of mineral rights was challenged in case of, The India Cement Ltd. 
etc.etc. v/s State of Tamil Nadu, etc11 where, E.S.Venkataramiah, 
C.J., held by saying that: - 
 Royalty on mineral rights is a tax, and as such a cess on 
royalty being a tax on royalty is beyond the competence of the 
State Legislature because Section 9 of the Central Act covers the 
field and the State Legislature is denuded of its competence under 
Entry 23 of List II of Schedule Seventh of the Constitution. In any 
events, cess on royalty cannot be sustained under Entry 49 of List 
II as being a tax on land. Royalty on mineral rights is not a tax on 
land but a payment for the user of land. None of the three lists of 
the Schedule Seventh of the Constitution permits or authorizes a 
State to impose tax on royalty. 
 Moreover, royalty, which is indirectly connected with land, 
cannot be said to be a tax directly on land as a unit. No tax can be 
levied or is leviable under the impugned Act if no mining activities 
are carried on. Hence, it is manifest that it is not related to land as a 
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unit, which is the only method of valuation of land under Entry 49 
of List II, but it is relatable to minerals extracted. Royalty is 
payable on proportion of the minerals extracted. The act does not 
use dead rent as a basis on which land is to be valued. Hence, there 
cannot be any doubt that the impugned legislation in its pith and 
substance is a tax on royalty and not a tax on land. The same 
principle was reemphasized in case of, M/s. Orissa Cement Ltd. & 
others v/s State of Orissa & others12, where, S.Ranganathan, 
N.M.Kasliwal  & S.C. Agrawal, JJ. Expressed their views that: - 
 The Royalty for carrying on mining operations on tax 
thereon could not be equated to land revenue. Thus, the imposition 
of cess under the Orissa Act could not be brought under Entry 45, 
List II, Schedule VII of the Constitution. Tax on royalties could 
not be a tax on minerals. The imposition of cess could not, 
therefore, be justified by having recourse to Entry 50 of List II. 
The change in the scheme of taxation under S.7 in 1976; the 
importance and magnitude of the revenue by way of royalties 
received by the State; the charge of cess as a percentage and indeed 
as multiples of the amount along with royalties and as part thereof 
are circumstances which go to show that the legislation in this 
regard is with respect to royalty rather than with respect to land. 
The cess imposed under the Act cannot be treated as ‘tax on land’ 
within meaning of Entry 49 of List II. Moreover, The Mines and 
Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act (1957)(MMRD Act) 
is a law of Parliament. Sub-section (3) of Section (9) of the Central 
Act is a clear bar on the State Legislature taxing royalty so as, in 
effect, to amend the Second Schedule to the Central Act and if the 
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cess under the Orissa Act is taken as a tax falling under Entry 50 it 
would be ultra-vires in view of the provisions of Central Act. 
 With more clarification, it can be said that, considering the 
provisions of S.10 of the Orissa Act, the levy under that Act cannot 
be treated as fee falling under Entry 66 of List II. The levy cannot 
be co-related to any services rendered or to be rendered by the 
State to the class of persons from whom the levy is collected. 
Whatever royalty is a tax or not, but the cess on royalty is only a 
tax and cannot be property described as a fee. 
 The mere declaration of a law of Parliament that it is 
expedient for an industry or the regulation and development of 
mines and minerals to be under the control of the Union under 
Entry 52 or 54 does not denude the State Legislatures of their 
legislative powers with respect to the fields covered by the several 
entries in List II or List III. Particularly, in the case of a declaration 
under Entry 54, this legislative power is erred only to the extent 
control is assumed by the Union pursuant to such declaration as 
spelt out by the legislative enactment which makes the declaration. 
The measure of erosion turns upon the field of the enactment 
framed in pursuance of the declaration. 
 The tax levied under Bihar Forest Restoration and 
Improvement of Degraded Forest Land Taxation Act (1992) was 
challenged on ground of legislative incompetence of State 
Government in case of, State of Bihar & others v/s Indian 
Aluminum Company & others13, where it was observed by J. S. 
Verma, C.J., B.N. Kirpal and S.P. Kurdukar, JJ., that :- 
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 The tax under Bihar Act was one on the excavation and use 
of forestland not on the forestland as such. Taxing of the 
undertaking of a non-forest activity in a forest land could not be 
regarded as being covered by Entry 49 of the State List because 
what was sought to be taxed was not land but tax on was on 
absence of land or forest by reason of the activity of excavation 
and/or mining or use of forest land for a non-forest purpose. The 
State Government therefore lacked in legislative competence. The 
imposed levy schedule further shown that the assessment of tax 
was on excavation / use of forest land for non-forest purpose, the 
rate of tax to be levied, in the case of mining or excavation varies 
with the extent of the land voided. In the instant case the land had 
been rehabilitated no tax was to be levied. The tax was levied, in 
effect, on the activity of the removal or excavation of land. In other 
words, the tax was squarely on the activity of mining, the levy was 
on the activity of removal of earth and not on the land itself and 
was therefore, outside the ambit of Entry 49 List II. The tax was 
not on the surface of the land but was on the extent to which 
destruction has taken place. It was with reference to the extent of 
empty space or the void, which had been created as a result of 
mining activity, that the tax was levied. Tax, in effect, was levied 
on the absence of land and not on land itself. At the most this 
might be regarded as a tax in respect of land but it was certainly 
not a tax on land. The existing land or trees were not taxed, the tax 
was leviable only when a non-forest activity took place and the 
land was not rehabilitated. Therefore, in Pith and Substance it was 
a tax on activity on land and not on land itself. 
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 The Forest Conservation Act, 1980, of Central Government, 
contains complete provisions for reclamation and rehabilitation of 
such land; planting and replanting trees etc.etc; and therefore, the 
impugned Act of Bihar directly impinge on the analogous 
provisions of Forest Conservation Act, 1980. 
 One of the facets of tax being levied on land is that the 
primary responsibility of payment of tax is on the owner of the 
land, which in the instant case, the levy is not on the general 
ownership of the land but is on the person who uses it and who 
may or may not be the owner. The primary liability is on the use 
by occupier and if the occupier and the owner were two different 
persons the liability would be that of the occupier alone and not of 
the owner. 
 The requisites of a tax under Entry 49, List II may be 
summarized thus, : 
1. It must be a tax on units that is lands and buildings 
separately as units 
2. The tax cannot be a tax on totality, i.e. it is not a composite 
tax on the value of all lands and buildings. 
3. The tax is not concerned with the division of interest in the 
building or land. In other words it is not concerned whether 
one person owns or occupies it or two or more persons own 
or occupy it. 
 In short the tax under Entry 49, List II is not a personal tax 
but a tax on property. Thus, “Taxes   on   lands and   buildings” 
includes levy of taxes on building constructed by respondent was 
held valid in case of, Government of Andhra Pradesh v/s 
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Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd14., the house tax levied under 
Andhra Pradesh Gram Panchayat Act, on respondent’s factory was 
challenged on its constitutional validity. It was observed by 
H.R.Khanna, M.H.Beg and Y.V. Chandrachud, JJ.; that :-  
 The House tax levied by Gram Panchayat under Andhra 
Pradesh Gram Panchayat Act, 1964, as amended by Amending Act 
of 1974 to include factory with the definition of “house” for 
purpose of taxation. Therein Rule 6 of the Rules relating to house 
tax under Act providing the machinery and furniture were to be 
excluded from consideration for the purpose of assessment of 
house-tax. Here the tax was only on the “buildings” and did not 
transgress the scope of Entry 49, hence it was valid and 
constitutional. 
 The levy of cess, under S.27 of the Bombay Buildings 
Repairs and Reconstruction Board Act (47 of 1969) imposed on 
residential buildings who were in sound and good conditions and 
were not require able to any structural repairs for the respective 
period of cess, where it was held that, the levy of cess was valid 
and constitutional, and it did not violate the fundamental rights 
guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. 
 The word “lands” in the Entry 49 of List II is wide enough 
to include all lands, whether agricultural or not. As the agricultural 
lands are included in Entry 49 of List II, the validity of the U.P. 
Large Land Holdings Tax Act was held valid, though the measure 
of the tax on land holding had to be determined by its annual value, 
as it was ascertained in the manner prescribed by Section 5 of the 
said Act. In justification of observation it was said that, the object 
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of the tax was land holding and the extent of the tax leviable was 
determined in the light of annual value of the land, thus there could 
be no doubt that, the Act was within the legislative competence of 
U. P. Legislature15.The scope of land and buildings thus has been 
widen to include all lands and every constructed buildings, 
premises, factory etc.etc. 
6. 6     List – II Entry 50 
“Taxes on mineral rights subject to any limitations imposed 
by Parliament by law relating to mineral development.” 
Earlier the relative judgments regarding the entry 50, has 
already been discussed, in case of Orissa Cement Ltd, and India 
Cement Ltd. v/s respective States, where it has already been 
declared by Supreme Court that: - 
1. Levy of cess on land in connection with mineral rights is 
invalid and ultra-vires State Legislature so not referable to 
Entry 49 or 50 of List; and 
2. On mineral rights is a tax on royalty and not tax on land, so 
it is beyond competence of State Legislature. 
But in case of challenge to constitutional validity of levy of 
royalty imposed by Union Government on mineral rights; the two 
conflicting views between two different Division Benches of the 
Gujarat High Court have taken were came into the notice in case 
of, Saurashtra Cement & Chemical Industries & another v/s Union 
of India16. 
 In the impugned judgment (Civil Appeal No.7000 of 1994), 
the Gujarat High Court has held that royalty is a tax on minerals 
and the Union Government has the power to impose such a tax. On 
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the other hand on earlier judgment, the same High Court in the 
case of Tata Chemicals v/s State of Gujarat sounded a contra note 
and against which the Union Government preferred appeals, under 
Nos.8166 & 8167 of 1994, against the findings that the State 
Legislature is clearly entitled to impose a tax on mineral rights. 
 The interpretation of the entries (Entry 54 of List I and 
Entries 23 and 50 of List II) being the focal point for consideration, 
the same set out herein below for proper appreciation:- 
List I (Seventh Schedule)   
Entry 54    
“Regulation of mines and mineral development to extent to 
which such Regulation and Development under the control 
of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be 
expedient in the public interest”. 
List II (Seventh Schedule)   
Entry 23 
“Regulation of mines and mineral development subject to 
the provisions of List I with respect to Regulation and 
Development under the control of the Union”. 
List   II (Seventh Schedule)   
Entry 50.  
“Taxes on mineral rights subject to any limitations imposed 
by Parliament by law relating to mineral development”. 
While interpreting these entries however Supreme Court in, 
India Cements’ recorded as bellow: 
 “Court of law are enjoined together the meaning of the 
Constitution from the language used and although one should 
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interpret the words of the Constitution on the same principles of 
interpretation as one applies to an ordinary law but these very 
principles of interpretation compel one to take into account the 
nature and scope of the Act which requires interpretation. 
Constitution is the mechanism under which the laws are to be 
made and not merely an Act. The royalty admittedly is fixed under 
the Mines and Minerals Development Act, 1957 that happens to be 
a Central legislation. Legislation of 1957 is to provide for the 
regulation of Mines and Development of Minerals under the 
control of the Union. On a plain reading of the language of the 
statutes (S.2, Act of 1957) and upon a declaration as to expediency 
of Union control under S.2, the Central Government alone has the 
power to legislate in regard to regulation of Mines and Minerals 
Development. On reference to S.9, which provides for Royalties in 
respect of mining lease the field being occupied, question of 
empowerment of the State Government to collect royalty does not 
arise. It is in this perspective that Article 245 and 246 of the 
Constitution ought to be noticed, doctrine of pith and substance of 
the legislation stands accepted, and it requires no dilation that as 
long as the legislation is within the permissible limit in its 
substance, no objection can be entertained as regards the legislative 
competency. The field concerned, stands firmly covered by reason 
of the incorporation of the Mines and Minerals Development Act, 
1957 by the Parliament. 
 Distribution of revenue as mandated under the Constitution 
cannot possibly be interpreted to whittle down Entry 54 of List I. 
Entry 54 of List I cannot but be read as the authorization as 
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conferred on to the Central Government pertaining to regulation of 
Mines and Minerals Development and as declared by Parliament 
by law in public interest. It is in pursuance of this authorization 
that the M.M.R.D. Act of 1957 came into the Statute Book and on 
the wake of the Legislation of 1957, Entry 50 of List II cannot but 
be read subject to the provisions of the Act of 1957 and when so 
read, there is an inescapable conclusion that the field in issue under 
Entry 50 already stands covered by Parliamentary legislation of 
1957. 
 Hence, it was held that, it is within the legislative 
competence of Parliament to make the law levying tax on minerals 
and neither Entry 23 of List II nor Entry 50 of list II would be 
attracted. The Entry 54 of List I to enact such law, which denudes 
the right of the State Legislature to levy tax on mineral, rights 
under Entry 50 of List II. The Union Legislature did have the 
competence under entry 54 of List I to enact MMRD Act, 1957 
and Ss.9 and 9(3) thereof providing for levy of royalty on minerals 
is constitutionally valid. 
 So, one can easily say from the above series of judgment 
that Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) 
Development Act, 1957, have curtailed the States rights of 
Regulation of Mines and Minerals Development given under Entry 
23 & 50 of List II of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. 
6. 7   List –II Entry 51 
 “Duties of excise on the following goods manufactured or 
produced in the State and countervailing duties at the same or 
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lower rates on similar goods manufactured or produced elsewhere 
in India”. 
(a) Alcoholic liquors for human consumption; 
(b) Opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs and narcotics;   
But not including medicinal and toilet preparations 
containing alcohol or any substance included in sub-
paragraph (b) of this entry. 
 The framers of the Constitution when they used the 
expression ‘alcoholic liquor for human consumption’ they meant at 
that time and still the expression means that liquor which as it is 
consumable in the sense capable of being taken by human being as 
such as beverage of drinks. The expression “consumption” must 
also be understood in the sense of direct physical intake by human 
being in this context. 
 The Indian Constitution recognize the sovereign power, 
gives the States sufficient authority to enact any law subject to the 
limitations of the Constitution, to discharge its functions. Hence, 
the Indian Constitution as a sovereign State has power to legislate 
on all branches except to the limitation as to the division of powers 
between the Centre and the States and also subject to the 
fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. The Indian 
State, between the Centre and the States, has sovereign power. The 
sovereign power is plenary and inherent in every sovereign State to 
do all things, which promote the health, peace, morals, education 
and good order of the people. Sovereignty is however, subject to 
constitutional limitations. Right to tax or levy imposts must be in 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. 
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 The States have the power to regulate the use of alcohol and 
that power must include power to make provisions to prevent 
and/or check industrial alcohol often being used as intoxicating or 
drinkable alcohol. 
 By common standards ethyl alcohol (which has 95%) is an 
industrial alcohol and not fit for human consumption. Industrial 
alcohol, which is ethyl alcohol (95%) by itself is not only non-
potable but is highly toxic. The range of spirits of potable alcohol 
is from country spirit to whisky and the ethyl alcohol content 
varies between 19 to about 43 per cent. These standards are 
according to the ISI specifications. In other words, ethyl alcohol 
(95%) is not alcoholic liquor for human consumption but can be 
used as raw material- in-put after processing and substantial 
dilution in the production of Whisky, Gin, Country liquor etc. 
 In the light of the above stated facts, the relevant provisions 
of the U.P. Act, Andhra Pradesh Act, Tamil Nadu Act, Bombay 
Prohibition Act, purported to levy a tax or charges imposts, upon 
industrial alcohol, namely ethyl alcohol used and usable for 
industrial purposes, which were challenged in case of, Synthetics 
& Chemicals Ltd. etc. v/s State of U.P. and others17, where It was 
observed by E.S.Venkataramiha, C.J., that, having regard to the 
principles of interpretation and constitutional provisions, in the 
light of the language used and having considered the impost and 
the composition of industrial alcohol, and the legislative practice of 
this country, the impost in question cannot be justified as State 
imposts. Provisions of State Acts are not merely regulatory. These 
are much more than that. These seek to levy imposition in their 
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pith and substance not as incidental or as merely distinctive but as 
attempts to raise revenue for States purposes. There is no taking 
provision permitting these in the lists in the field of industrial 
alcohol for the State to legislate. Further more, in view of the 
occupation of the field by the IDR Act, it was not possible to levy 
this imposts. After 1956 amendment to the IDR Act bringing 
alcohol industries (under fermentation industries) as item 26 of the 
First Schedule to IDR Act, the control of this industry has vested 
exclusively in the Union. Thereafter the licence to manufacture 
both potable and non-potable alcohol is vested in the Central 
Government. The State cannot itself manufacture industrial alcohol 
without the permission of the Central Government. The States 
cannot claim to pass a right, which these do not possess. Nor can 
the States claim exclusive right to produce and manufacture 
industrial alcohol, which are manufactured under the grant of 
licence from the Central Government. Industrial alcohol cannot 
upon coming into existence under such grant be amenable to 
States’ claim of exclusive possession of privilege. The State can 
neither rely on Entry 8 of List II nor Entry 33 of List III as a basis 
for such claim. The State cannot claim that under Entry 33 of List 
III, it can regulate industrial alcohol as a product of the Scheduled 
industry, because the Union, under S.18-G of the IDR Act has 
evinced clear intention to occupy the whole field. 
 In respect of industrial alcohol the States are not authorized 
to impose the imposts they have purported to do. But this will not 
affect any imposts so far as potable alcohol as commonly 
understood is concerned. It is clear that the State Legislature had 
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no authority to levy duty or tax on alcohol, which is not for human 
consumption as the Centre, and Not State Government could only 
levy that. Relevant provisions of State Acts declared illegal 
prospectively. 
 The normal meaning of industrial alcohol is, to be, the 
incapable of being consumed by human beings; it is irrelevant and 
immaterial that, it can be transformed and made for human 
consumption. The word “consumption” of industrial alcohol in its 
strict meaning, direct physical intake by human being and not for 
utilization in manufacturing process. 
 The Nature and Character of excise duty and countervailing 
duty were defined in case of, M/s McDowell and Co. Ltd. v/s 
Commercial Tax Officer,18 that, Excise duty is primarily a duty on 
the production or manufacture of goods produced within the 
country. It is an indirect duty which the manufacturer or producer 
passes on to the ultimate consumer, that is ultimate incidence will 
always be on the consumer. 
 Counter veiling duties are mean to equalize the burden on 
alcoholic liquors imported from outside the State and the burden 
placed by excise duties on alcoholic liquors manufactured or 
produced in the State. If no alcoholic liquors similar to those 
imported into the State are manufactured or produced, the right to 
impose counter-balancing duties of excise levied on the goods 
manufactured in the State will not arise. The meaning of Narcotic 
drug or narcotic was explained in, Indian Chemical and 
Pharmaceutical Works, Hyderabad v/s State of Andhra Pradesh19, 
that the, Dictionary meaning of the word ‘narcotic’ is a substance 
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which relieves pain, produces sleep and large doses brings on 
stupor, coma, and even death, as opium, hemlock, alcohol etc. 
Obviously, therefore, choral hydrate, which is admitted to be 
hypnotic and sedative, would be a narcotic or a narcotic drug 
within the meaning of Entry 51 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. 
According to Entry 84 of List I and Entry 51 of List II the State 
Government does not possess the power to legislate on medicinal 
and toilet preparation containing alcohol or any substance included 
in sub-paragraph (b), i.e. opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic 
drugs and narcotics, this right has been vested in Central 
Government. But in this instant case, the Rules dealing with 
licence and excise duty on narcotics under Andhra Pradesh 
Intoxicating Drugs Act (as amended by Hyderabad Act of 1333-F) 
were declared effective. 
Whether the State Government is competent to grant the 
periodic licence for retail vend of foreign liquor on basis of 
“auction system” or “fixed fee system” was the question, raised in 
case of, State of Uttar Pradesh & others v/s Sheopat Rai & others20, 
where it was held by B.P. Jeevan Reddy and Venkatachala JJ. 
That, the term ‘licence fee’ or the term ‘fixed fee’ in the context of 
the U.P. Excise Act, the ordinance with its preamble and the 
Excise (Amendment) Rules, connotes the idea of payment of a sum 
by a person to the granter of a licence as consideration for 
conferring upon such person by the grant of shop licence, the 
exclusive privilege or right to carry on certain activities in respect 
of country liquor, or foreign liquor or intoxicating drug, within any 
local area of U.P. State, the carrying of which activities would 
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have been otherwise the exclusive privilege or right of the grantor 
(Government). The term ‘licence fee’ or ‘fixed fee’ used in the 
context of the U.P. Excise Act, the ordinance read with preamble 
and the Excise (Amendment) Rules is the amount of consideration 
receivable by State Government for parting with its exclusive 
privilege or right in dealing with liquor or drugs including the 
exclusive privilege of vending foreign liquor in favour of a private 
party under a licence (contract). 
 So the above said ‘licence fee’ or ‘fixed fee’ cannot partake 
the character of either ‘regulatory fee’ or compensatory fee’ so as 
to regard it as ‘fee’. Thus neither the ‘licence fee’ nor ‘fixed fee’ 
realizable from a private party for granting the privilege or right to 
sell or vend foreign liquor to such party can fall within the ambit of 
the subject ‘fee’ in the entry to List II of the Seventh Schedule to 
the Constitution. Then, the ‘licence fee’ or the ‘fixed fee’, cannot 
be regarded as ‘tax’ since the characteristics of tax, namely, its 
levy being compulsive in nature, is absent in both of them. The 
levy of ‘duty’ and ‘cess’ stand on the same footing as ‘tax’, the 
‘licence fee’ or ‘fixed fee’ cannot be regarded either as ‘duty’ or 
‘cess’. 
 The terms of the ‘licence fee’ or ‘fixed fee’ used in context 
of the U.P. Excise law, fall outside the Entries 51, 62, 66 in List II 
of the Seventh Schedule to our Constitution, which enable the 
making of legislation for imposition of tax, duty or cess. However, 
the State is competent to levy such fee under Entry 8 of List II. 
Hence the power exercisable by Excise Commissioner in the 
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matter of the mode of levy and collection of ‘licence fee’ or ‘fixed 
fee’ under Excise (Amendment) Rules was held intra vires. 
6. 8    List II Entry – 52  
“Taxes on the entry of goods into a local area for 
consumption, use or sale therein”. 
 Entry tax is a tax levied at the point of entry of goods into a 
local area for the purpose of consumption, use or sale therein. The 
Entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the government of 
India Act 1935 as well as Entry 52 of List II in Constitution speaks 
of “local area” and not “local authorities”. The tax, by whatever 
name called is levied upon the entry of goods into a local area for 
consumption, use or sale therein, Entry 52 empowers the State 
Legislature to levy this tax. The local authorities themselves cannot 
levy this tax. The power is that of the State Legislature and none of 
else. So long as the tax is levied upon the entry of goods into local 
are for the purpose of consumption, use or sale therein, the 
requirement of Entry 52 is satisfied. The character of the tax so 
levied is that of entry tax- by whatever name it is called. As 
regards utilisation of revenue raised at the most it can be said that 
the tax is meant for and must be utilised for the purpose of the 
local areas. It cannot further be stipulated that this utilisation 
should be through or by the concerned local authorities. The local 
authorities, derives its power to tax from the State Legislature and 
it obviously cannot have any authority more extensive than the 
authority of State Legislature. Since, the State Legislature in view 
of Entry 52 of List II of the Seventh Schedule is competent to levy 
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a tax only on the entry of goods for “consumption, use or sale” into 
local area. 
The expression “imported into Municipal Limits” and 
meaning of “for purposes of consumption, use or sale therein” 
were well explained in case of Indian Oil Corporation v/s 
Municipal Corporation, Jullundhar & others21, where, the 
Expression “imported into city” used in S.113 of the Punjab 
Municipal Corporation Act (42 of 1976) was construed to mean 
“imported into the city for any purpose and without any limitation” 
by Municipal Corporation was challenged. It was observed by 
J.S.Verma & Dr. A.S. Anand that: - 
 The municipality cannot under a legislation enacted in 
exercise of the powers conferred by Entry 52 of List II, have the 
power to levy tax in respect of goods brought into the local area for 
purpose, other than consumption, use or sale. S.113of the Act has, 
therefore, reasonably to read subject to the same limitations as are 
contained in Entry 52 of List II of Sch.VII. The expression 
“imported into city” used in S.113 of the Act, as meaning 
“imported into the city for any purpose and without any limitation” 
would amount to attributing to the legislature an intention to give a 
go-by to the restrictions contained in Entry 52 of List II. That is not 
permissible S.113, therefore, has to be interpreted as meaning 
“imported into the municipal limits for purpose of consumption, 
use or sale” only. So State cannot levy octroi on mere entry of 
goods within municipal limits. Whether the Town Area 
Committee,(Chirgaon, in State of Uttar Pradesh) was eligible to 
impose the levy on entry of goods under Entry 52 of List II was the 
  
 
292
question raised, in case of, Shri Krishna Das v/s Town Area 
Committee, Chirgaon22(U.P),  It was observed by K.N. Saikia and 
P.B. Sawant, JJ., that in view of S.14(1)(g) of Town Areas Act, the 
TAC became empowered to levy all those taxes which the State 
Government could levy under sub-Section (1) of S.128 of the 
Municipality Act; and TAC could impose any tax which the State 
Legislature could impose under the Constitution. Entry 52 of List 
II empowered the State Government to impose tax on entry of 
goods in to local area, for consumption, use or sale therein, and 
Entry 54 of List II empowered the State Government to impose a 
tax on sale or purchase of goods and hence the T.A.C could impose 
tax on entry of goods as well as sale or purchase of goods in view 
of the entries 52 and 54 of List II. Bye-law No.1 imposing 
weighing dues to be paid by dealers was upon the entry of the 
mentioned articles in to Town Area for sale and it was clearly 
covered by Entry 52 of List II of Sch.VII and hence it could not be 
said that the T.A.C. did not possess the requisite power to levy this 
tax. 
 In case of Indian Oil Corporation23 that, State cannot levy 
octroi or entry tax on mere entry of such goods within municipal 
limits. But if in such cases, if the supervision charges has been 
collected from transporters for carrying goods through corporation 
limits under supervision of staff of corporation without paying 
octroi then it would not be amount tax, under entry 52 of List II, 
but is merely a fee charged for the privilege or services rendered to 
the payers and provided it satisfies the quid pro quo principle. 
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 The nature and scope of levy under Entry 52 of List II was 
explained in, The Municipal Corporation of the City of Baroda v/s 
Himatlal   Babubhai24.  In this case the validity of standing order 
No.3, of Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act (59 of 
1949) under Ss 466(1)(A) (f) with read with S.147 gave the option 
to transporter to pay supervision fees if he so choose, and had to 
carry goods through Corporation limits without made any payment 
of octroi, under supervision staff o Corporation. The said standing 
Order was approved by standing committee and was confirmed by 
State Government Gujarat. 
 The Gujarat High Court, who declared the above said 
standing order unconstitutional and invalid on it 28th April 1971 
was reversed by Supreme Court, in the instant case (appeal), 
stating that, the Standing Order was valid and enforceable. G.L. 
Oza and K.N.Saikia, JJ. justify the levy of supervision charges by 
explaining that, 
 “Standing Order does not impose a compulsory levy but it 
only gives an option to the transporter to take advantage of the 
provision by paying fees and if they so choose they may follow 
this Standing Order and save themselves from hardship of paying 
the octroi and then claiming the refund. Moreover, the applicability 
of quid pro quo principle was also satisfied by the Corporation by 
explaining the amount expected to be collected and spent in the 
process of supervision.” 
 While, in another case, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation 
Ltd, v/s Okha Gram Panchayat and others25, the Dealer (appellant 
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd) was made entitle to get 
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refund of octroi duty, for the goods exported from panchayat limit 
after two months of their import at gram Okha. In explanation of 
Rule 32 of Gujarat Gram and Nagar Panchayats taxes and fees 
Rules (1964), B.P.Jeevan Reddy and S.P.Bharucha, JJ., said that :- 
 Where goods are exported from panchayat limits even after 
two months, it is entitled to refund of the octroi duty. Rule 32 did 
not create any irrebuttable presumption that goods not exported 
within two months shall be deemed to have been consumed, used 
or sold within panchayat limits. The object behind prescribing the 
period of two months in clause (ii) was merely to emphasize that 
after the expiry of two months the burden cast upon the person 
becomes heavier, viz., the burden to establish that goods which 
have been imported into the octroi limits and whereon the octroi 
has been paid have been exported without being used, consumed or 
sold within the said limits. 
 The Bihar Tax on Entry of Goods into local Area for 
consumption, use or sale therein Act (16 of 1993), S.3 was 
declared void and unconstitutional by Patna High Court on 
grounds that, as the State Government failed to establish the nature 
of impugned tax and to produce evidences to show that the 
impugned tax is either compensatory or regulatory in natural; the 
levy must, therefore, be held to be impending the freedom of trade, 
commerce or intercourse guaranteed by Article 301 of the 
Constitution; and it violates Article 304(b) of Constitution, by 
empowering State Government to exempt from levy of tax any 
class of dealers, persons or importers, subject to such conditions 
and restrictions might be imposed in that behalf. But the above said 
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decision of Patna High Court was reversed, in Supreme Court. So 
in the same case, State of Bihar, etc v/s Bihar Chamber of 
Commerce, etc26.B.P. Jeevan Reddy and Suhas C. Sen, JJ., held 
that :- 
 It is not and it cannot be stipulated that for the purpose of 
establishing the levy of three per cent by virtue of the impugned 
Act on tobacco could not be said to be impeding the trade, 
commerce or intercourse in tobacco products, directly and 
immediately or to any appreciable degree. In this connection, it is 
not irrelevant to take into consideration the harmful nature of the 
tobacco products. The extra ordinary high level of excise duties on 
tobacco is meant precisely to discourage its consumption. 
Therefore, it cannot be said that the addition of three per cent is 
either unreasonable restriction on the freedom of trade and 
commerce or that it is not required in public interest. Thus it could 
be said that the requirements of Article 304 (b) have been satisfied 
and the challenge upon the validity of the impugned Act on the 
ground violation of Article 301 would not be tenable. 
 As we have seen earlier that mere physical entry of goods 
into the octroi limits would not attract levy of octroi unless goods 
are brought in for use, consumption, or sale. The said fact was 
reaffirmed in case of, Mafatlal Industries Ltd v/s Nadiad Nagar 
Palika & Others27. 
The facts of the case were, the appellant, Mafatlal Industries, 
a textile manufacturing, brought cloth pieces of 100 meters length 
within the octroi limits of Nadiad town. To meet the requirement 
of relevant excise rules and also demands in the market, the cloth 
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pieces were cut into smaller pieces of different size and thereafter 
sent outside the octroi limits of the said town. Whether such cut 
pieces of the cloth, amounts to transfer in new commercial 
commodity or for the purpose of levy of octroi duty or not was the 
basic question for determination at Gujarat High Court, gave the 
ruling that, clothes pieces of 100 meters length brought in octroi 
limits and cut into smaller pieces of different length and then 
exported amount to formation of new commodity, hence entitle for 
respective octroi duty. 
The aggrieved party came before Supreme Court, to decide 
the matter finally, the S.P.Bharucha, S.N.Phukan and Mrs. Ruma 
Pal, JJ. held that: - 
Where, the clothe pieces of 100 meters length were brought 
within the octroi limits and those cloth pieces were cut into smaller 
pieces of different sizes and then exported, no different 
commercial commodity was produced and it cannot be said that 
there was use or consumption of the cloth within the octroi limits. 
Consequently, no octroi was leviable on the cloth pieces of 100 
meters length. In such a case, it would not be said that when the 
cloth pieces of 100 meters length were cut to smaller pieces. Some 
utility was added as cutting was done to meet the requirement of 
exercise rules and conditions of cloth, no different commercial 
commodity was produced. 
So, it is clear from all above decisions of Supreme Court, 
that the eligibility of octroi duty on entry of goods into a local area 
only and only applicable, when entered goods utilized for either 
consumption, use or sale therein. 
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Schedule VII, List II, Entry 52 – octroi and List I, entry 89- 
terminal taxes were different taxes though they resembled in one 
respect, that they were leviable in respect of goods brought into a 
local area. While terminal taxes were leviable on goods “imported 
or exported” fro the municipal limits denoting there by that they 
were connected with traffic of goods, octroi were leviable in 
respect of goods brought in to a Municipal area for consumption, 
use or sale. 
When the Government of India Act, 1935, was enacted 
terminal taxes were separated from octroi and included in the 
Central List. The proceeds of the terminal taxes, however, were to 
be distributed among the Provinces, the word itself was avoided 
because, terminal taxes are also octroi in the sense, and instead a 
description of the tax was mentioned in Entry 49, which read 
“cesses on the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use 
or sale.” This scheme has been repeated in the consumption with 
the difference that in entry relating to octroi the word “taxes” 
replaces the word “cess”. 
The Bombay Municipal Borough Act which was enacted in 
1925 mentioned only “consumption and use” with respect to levy 
of cess/octroi duty regarding the entry goods into local area. Word 
“sale” was not there, means it was absent in the respective entry. 
The appellant Burmah Shell oil Company raised the objection that 
as the word ‘sale’ is absent, so the oil brought in to local area for 
purpose of sale therein should be exempt from the octroi duty 
imposed by the concerning authority. 
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The Supreme Court rejected the contents of appellant and 
observed in case, Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Co. of 
India Ltd. Belguam v/s Borough Municipality, Belguam28, that, 
though the Bombay Municipal Borough Act, which was enacted in 
1925 mentioned only “consumption and use” ever since its 
enactment, no dispute seems to have been raised by any person that 
goods brought in for sale were exempt from octroi. All persons 
who brought the goods apparently paid this tax without objection, 
even though the word “sale” was not there. Of course, the conduct 
of the taxpayer is not determinative of the meaning of the words 
“consumption and use”. But it shows how the term was always 
understood. 
6. 9   List II    Entry 53 
“Taxes on the consumption or sale of electricity” 
 The Electricity Board of a State is a statutory body, 
constituted under Electricity Supply Act, 1948, in respect of its 
principal activities of generation, distribution, sale and supply of 
electric energy. Whether electric energy is “goods” for purposes of 
Sales Tax was determined in case of, The Commissioner of Sales 
Tax Madhya Pradesh, Indore v/s Madhya Pradesh Electricity 
Board, Jabalpur,29 where, J.C.Shah, V.Ramaswami and 
A.N.Grover, JJ., observed that :- 
 The definition in terms is very wide according to the 
relevant provisions of the Act to which “goods” means all kinds of 
movable property. Then certain items are specifically excluded or 
included and electric energy or electricity is not one of them. The 
term “movable property” when considered with reference to 
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“goods” as defined for the purposes of sales tax cannot be taken in 
a narrow sense and merely because electric energy is not tangible 
or cannot be moved or touched like, for instance, a piece of wood 
or a book it cannot cease to be movable property when it has all the 
attributes of such property. It can be transmitted, transferred, 
delivered, stored, possessed etc. in the same way as any other 
movable property. Therefore, electric energy was intended to be 
covered by the definition of “Goods” in the two Acts. Hence the 
electric energy is goods for the purposes of Sales Tax, and the 
statutory body like Electricity Board is dealer in respect of its 
principal activity of sale and supply of electricity. 
 Except the explanation of definition of “goods” the other 
import issue evolved in this instant case was ‘works contract’ 
between Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board and Nepa Mills. 
Whether the ‘works contract’ executed between above said parties 
was liable to pay sales tax on terms of said contract or not, was 
also decided by Supreme Court, under observations that: - 
 There is a distinction between a contract of sale of goods 
and a contract for work and labor. The distinction is often a fine 
one. A contract of sale is a contract whose main object is the 
transfer of the property in, and the delivery of possession of a 
chattel as a chattel to the buyer. Where the main object of work 
undertaken by the payee of the price is not the transfer of a chattel 
qua chattel, the contract is one for work and labor. In business 
transactions the works contracts are frequently not recorded in 
writing meeting out all the covenants and conditions thereof, 
terms, and incidents of the contracts have to be gathered from 
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evidences, and attendant circumstances. In the instant case, there 
was not a written documents should facts that there existed the 
work contracts between Electricity Board and Nepa Mills. The 
Court said that, the question of determination of any contract 
depends in each case is one about the true agreement between 
parties and the terms of agreement must be deduced from a review 
of all attendant circumstances. 
 So, the arrangement between the assessee Electricity Board 
and Nepa Mills with respect to supply of steam to the Mills with 
respect to supply of steam to the mills on actual costs basis with no 
profit motive in return for free supply of water was in the nature of 
‘works contract’, and not sale, and as such the Assessee Board 
(Ele.Board) was not liable pay sales tax on its turnover on that 
account. 
 The levy of duty upon the consumption of electrical energy 
cannot be regarded as duty of excise falling under Entry 84 of List 
I in Sch.VII of the Constitution. The Central Provinces and Berar 
Electricity Duty Act, 1949, was enacted under Item 48-B of List II 
in Sch.VII of Government of India Act, 1935, and Entry 53 of List 
II of the Constitution is to the same effect. Under the various 
Provincial and State Acts, consumption of electricity the word 
“consumption” may have a limited meaning. i.e. consumption of 
electricity by persons other than the producer. The word 
“consumption” also includes “useup” and “spend” of electricity. 
So, the language used in the legislative entries in the Constitution 
must be interpreted in a broad way so as to give the widest 
amplitude of power to the legislature to legislate30. 
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6. 10    List II   Entry 54 
 “Taxes on sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers, 
subject to the provisions of Entry 92-A of List I.” 
Entry 54 in List II of Sch.VII of the Constitution confers on 
the States authority to enact a law with respect to tax on sales of 
goods. But if the transaction sought to be taxed is not a sale, a law 
that seeks to tax it, treating it as a sale will be ultra-vires. 
The power of State legislature to enact law to levy tax on the 
transfer of right to use any goods under Entry 54 in List II of the 
Sch.VII has two limitations – 
1. One arising out of the Entry itself; which is subject to Entry 
92A of List I, and; 
2. The other flowing from the restrictions embodied in Art.286. 
By virtue of Entry 92A of List I, Parliament has power to 
legislate in regard to taxes on sales or purchase of goods other than 
newspapers, where such sale or purchase takes place in the course 
of inter-State trade or commerce. Article 269 provides for levy and 
collection of such taxes. Because of these restrictions, States 
legislatures are not competent to enact law-imposing tax on the 
transactions of transfer of right to use any goods, which takes place 
in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. Further, by virtue of 
cl. (1) of Art.286, the State Legislature is precluded to make law-
imposing tax on the transactions of transfer of right to use any 
goods where such deemed sales take place (a) outside the State and 
(b) in the course of import of goods into the territory of India. Yet, 
there are other limitations on the taxing power of the State 
Legislature by virtue of cl. (3) of Art.286. Although Parliament has 
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enacted law under cl. (3) (a) of Art.286 but no law so far has been 
enacted by Parliament, under cl. (3) (b) of Art.286. When such law 
is enacted by Parliament, the State Legislature would be required 
to exercise its legislative power in conformity with such law. Thus, 
the above stated are the limitations on the power of States 
Legislatures on levy of sales tax on deemed sales envisaged under 
Art.366 (29A)(d). 
 So, there are restrictions imposed by Parliaments with 
respect to sales and deemed sales upon the legislative power of 
States given under Entry 54 List II. 
 The 46th Amendment of the Constitution made it possible for 
the State to levy Sales Tax on the price of the goods and materials 
used in works contracts as if there was a sale of such goods and 
materials. By the 46th Amendment (1982) a new clause namely, 
clause (29A) was introduced in Art.366 of the Constitution. The 
constitutional Amendment in Art.366 (29A) read with the relevant 
taxation entries has enabled the State to exert its taxing power in an 
important area of social and economic life of the community. The 
object of the new definition introduced in clause (29A) of Art.366 
of the Constitution is, therefore, to enlarge the scope of tax on sale 
or purchase of goods whenever it occurs in the Constitution so that 
it may include within its scope the transfer, delivery or supply of 
goods that may take place under any of the transactions referred to 
in sub-clauses (a) to (f) thereof whenever such transfer, delivery or 
supply becomes subject to levy of sales tax. Article 286 is also 
amended. 
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 On the passing of the 46th Amendment the State 
Governments after making necessary amendments in their laws 
commenced to levy sales tax on the turnover of the works contracts 
entered into by the building contractors for constructing houses, 
factories, bridges etc. The landmark decision was given in the case 
respect to the levy of sales tax on turnover relating to work 
contracts in case of, Builders Association of India & others etc.etc. 
v/s  Union of India & others etc31, R.S.Pathak C.J., 
E.S.Venkataramiah, Rangnath Misra, M.N.Venkatachaliah  and  
N.D.Ozha, JJ. Observed that: - 
 The sales tax laws passed by the Legislatures of the States 
levying tax on the transfer of property of goods (whether as goods 
or in some other form) involved in the execution of a works 
contract are subject to restrictions and conditions mentioned in 
each clause or sub-clause of Art. 286 of the Constitution. The 
Hon’ble Court that after 46th Amendment it would not be possible 
to accede to the plea of the States that what is transferred in a 
works contract is the right in the immovable property also 
observed it. On passing of the 46th Amendment it could not be said 
that the Constitution had conferred on the States a larger freedom 
than what they had before in regard to their power to levy sales tax 
under Entry 54 of the State List. The 46th Amendment does no 
more than making it possible for the States to levy sales tax on the 
price of goods and materials used in works contract as if there was 
a sale of such goods and materials. 
 The Hon’ble Court also observed that in exerting this power 
particularly in relation to transfer of property in goods involved in 
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the execution of “works contract” in building activity, in so far as 
it affects the housing projects of the under privileged and weaker 
sections of the society, the State might perhaps, be pushing its 
taxation power to the peripheries of the social limits of that power 
and perhaps, even of the constitutional limits of that power in 
dealing with unequal. In such a class of cases “Building Activity” 
really relates to a basic subsistential necessity. It would be wise 
and appropriate for the State to consider whether the requisite and 
appropriate classification should not be made on such building 
activity attendant with such social purposes for appropriate 
separate treatment.  
  Prior to the 46th Amendment, a distinction was being made 
between “work contract” which was entire and indivisible and a 
works contract composed of two distinct and separate contracts, 
namely one, for transfer of material and other, for payment of 
remuneration for services and for work done. 
 As a result of the 46th Amendment, the contract which was 
single and indivisible has been altered by a legal fiction into a 
contract which is divisible into one for sale of goods and other for 
supply of labor and services and as a result of such contract which 
was single and indivisible has been brought at par with contract 
containing two separate agreements. Since the provisions of Ss 3,4 
and 5 of Central Sales tax were applicable to such contracts 
containing two separate agreements, there is no reason why the 
said provisions should not apply to a contract which, though single 
and indivisible, by legal fiction introduced by the 46th Amendment, 
has been altered into a contract which is divisible into one for sale 
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of goods and other for labor and services. Even in a single and 
indivisible works contract there is a deemed sale of goods, which 
are involved in execution of a works contract. Such deemed sale 
has incidents of a sale of goods involved in execution of a works 
contract where the contract is divisible into one for sale of goods 
and other for supply of labor and services32.  
 This division of contract under the amended law can be 
made, if the works contracts involved a dominant intention to 
transfer the property in goods and not in he contracts where the 
transfer in the property takes place as an incident of contract of 
service. The Amendment has not empowered the State to indulge 
in microscopic division of contracts involving the value of 
materials used incidentally in such contracts. What is pertinent to 
ascertain in this connection is what was the dominant intention of 
the contract. 
 Every contract, be it a service contract or otherwise, may 
involve the use of some material or the other in execution of the 
said contract. State is not empowered by amended law to impose 
sales tax on such incidental materials used in such contracts. 
 Thus, it is clear that unless there is sale and purchase of 
goods, either in fact or deemed and which sale is primarily 
intended and not incidental to the contract, the State cannot impose 
sales tax on a works contract simpliciter in the guise of the 
expanded definition found in Article 366(2-A) read with 
concerning section of State Act. 
In case of M/s Rainbow Colour Lab. v/s State of Madhya 
Pradesh33, It was held that, the provisions of sub-cl.(f) of cl.(29-A) 
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of Art.366 permits the States to impose a tax on the supply of food 
and drink. The supply can be by way of a service or as part of a 
service or it can be other manner whatsoever. The supply or 
service can be for cash or deferred payment or other valuable 
consideration. While in another case, the Tamil Nadu State 
Government imposed tax on sale of food and drink, under S.3D of 
Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act (1 of 1959) instead w.e.f.April, 
1997. In accordance to imposition of said levy in one case, the 
Restaurateur charged the bill given in respect of food served to 
customer, as consisting of charges for service like uniformed, 
waiters, dance floor, cutlery etc. in addition to meal (food) served. 
Whether the charging bill for served meal can be split up in to 
parts, and was the question arose in case of, M/s K. 
Damodaraswamy Naidu & Bros. v/s State of Tamil Nadu34, where 
It was held that: - 
 The words of sub-cl. (f) of Art.366 (29A) have found place 
in the Sales Tax Acts of most States and they have been used in 
Tamil Nadu Act. The tax, therefore, is on supply of food or drink 
and it is not of relevance that the supply is by way of a service or 
as part of service. Therefore, the price that the customer pays for 
the supply of food, in a restaurant cannot be split up between what 
was charged for service provided in addition to food and what was 
charged for the food. The supply of food by the restaurant owner to 
the customer though it may be a part of the service that he renders 
by providing good furniture, furnishing and fixtures, linen, 
crockery and cutlery, music, a dance floor and a floor show is what 
is the subject of the levy. The patron of a fancy restaurant who 
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orders a plate of cheese sandwiches whose price is shown to 
Rs.50/-on the bill of fare knows very well that innate cost of the 
bread, butter, mustard and cheese in plate is very much less, but he 
orders it all the same. He pays Rs.50/- for its supply and it is on 
Rs.50/- the restaurant owner must be taxed. Therefore, the tax on 
food served in restaurant can be levied on the sum total of the price 
charged, to the customer. While in case of Vikas sales Corporation 
& another etc.etc. v/s Commissioner of Commercial Taxes & 
another etc.etc35., It was held that, the transfer of an import licence 
called R.E.P(Replacement licence). Licence/Exim Scrip by the 
holder thereof to another person constitutes a sale of goods within 
the meaning of and for the purpose of the sales tax enactments of 
Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Kerala. It is exigible to sales tax. The 
R.E.P. Licence and Exim Scrip have their own value. They are 
bought and sold as such. The original licencee or the purchaser is 
not bound to import goods permissible there under. He can simply 
sell it to another and that another to yet another person. 
 The Gujarat Sales Tax Act (1 of 1970) S.15B-C as amended 
by Act 6 of 1990- ‘Purchase tax’ was challenged on ground of its 
constitutional validity, in case of, Hotel Balaji & others, etc.etc v/s         
State of Andhra Pradesh & others36, along with the purchase taxes 
of State of Andhra Pradesh, Haryana State, U.P. Sales Tax Act etc.  
Respect to levy of purchase tax under S.15B of Gujarat 
Sales Tax Act, it was observed by S.Rangnathan, V.Ramaswami 
and B.P.Jeevan Reddy that: - 
Additional purchase tax levied under section 15B is neither 
in the nature of excise duty nor a tax on use. It is an additional tax 
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on the purchase of raw material used in manufacture of other 
goods. A certain concession is given to manufacturers (recognized 
dealers) in purchase of certain types of raw material (Sec.15A); an 
addition purchase tax is levied under Section 15B; and in certain 
situations, this tax is refunded or set off, as the case may be under 
Rule –42E. All these provisions are intended to encourage industry 
and to derive revenue at the same time. Heading of Sec.15B is 
“purchase tax on raw or processing materials or consumable stores 
used in manufacture of goods in certain cases. The second read as 
a whole, is applicable only to those goods, which are used in the 
manufacture of goods. The levy is upon the purchase price of raw 
material and not upon the value of the manufactured products. So, 
the Entry 54 of List II must receive a liberal Constitution, being a 
legislative entry. The Legislature cannot be confined to only one 
form of levy. So long as the levy retain the basic character of a tax 
on sale, the Legislature can levy it in such mode or in such manner 
as it thinks appropriate. The well-established principle in such 
matters is “that reasonable construction should be followed and 
liberal construction may be avoided if that defeat the manifest 
object and purpose of the Act”. The Legislature must be presumed 
to know its limitations and acted within those limits. Transgression 
must be clearly established, and is not to be lightly assumed. 
The transfer of right to use goods under lease agreement, 
amounts to deemed sale and if such sale takes place out of the 
State or is a sale takes placed outside the State or is a sale in the 
course of inter-State trade or commerce or is a sale in the course of 
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import or export then State is not eligible or entitle to exercise its 
power given under Entry 54 of List II read with Art.366 (29A)(d). 
The appropriate legislature by creating legal fiction can fix 
situs of sale. In absence of any such legal fiction of situs of sale in 
case of other transaction of transfer of right to use any goods 
would be the place where the written agreement transferring the 
right to use is executed, so in the case of, 20th Century Finance 
Corporation Ltd.   v/s  State of Maharashtra37, where the main 
issue of the levy by State was in respect to the deemed sales was 
settled under the observation  that :- 
 The location or delivery of goods with in the State cannot be 
made a basis for levy of tax on sales of goods under general law, 
merely because the goods are located or delivery of which has 
been effected or use within the State would not be the situs of 
deemed sale or levy of tax if the transfer of right to use has taken 
place in another State. Therefore, the contention on behalf of the 
respondents States that there would be no completed transfer of 
right to use goods is also entered in to the said State in which the 
goods are located or delivered for use. The State cannot levy a tax 
on the basis that one of the events in the chain of events has taken 
place within the State. The delivery of goods may be one of the 
elements of transfer or right to use, but it would not be the 
condition precedent for a contract of transfer of right to use goods. 
Where a party has entered into a formal contract and goods 
available for delivery irrespective of the place where they are 
located the situs of such sale would be where the property in goods 
passes, namely, where the contract is entered into. 
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 So, in a case, where the goods are available for the transfer 
or right to use, the taxable event on the transfer or right to use any 
goods is on the transfer which results in the right to use and the 
situs of sale would be the place where the contract is executed and 
not where the goods are located for use, and in a case, where the 
goods are not in existence or where there is an oral or implied 
transfer of right to use goods, such transactions made be effected 
by delivery of goods. In such a case the taxable event would be on 
the delivery of goods. 
 On a plain construction of sub-cl (d) of cl.(29A), the taxable 
event is the transfer of right to use goods regardless of when or 
whether the goods are delivery for use. What is required is that the 
goods should be in existence so that they may be used. And further 
contract in respect thereof also required to be executed, given that, 
the locus of the deemed sale is the place where the right to use the 
goods is transferred. Where the goods are when the right to use 
them is transferred is of no relevance to the locus of the deemed 
sale. Also of no relevance to the deemed sale is where the goods 
are delivered for use pursuant to the transfer of right to use them, 
though it may be that in the case of an oral or implied transfer of 
the right to use goods, it is effected by the delivery of the goods. 
Art.366 (29A)(d) further shows that the levy of tax is not on the 
use of the goods but on the transfer of the right to use goods 
accurse only on account of the transfer of the right. In other words, 
right to use arises only on the transfer of such a right and unless 
there is transfer of right, the right to use does not arise. Therefore, 
it is the transfer, which is since qua non-for the right to use any 
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goods. If the goods are available the transfer of the right to use 
takes place when the contract in respect thereof is executed. As 
soon as the contract is executed, the right is vested in lessee. Thus, 
situs of taxable event of such a tax would be the transfer, which 
legally transfers the right to use goods. In other words, if the goods 
are available irrespective of the fact where the goods are located 
and a written contract is entered into between two parties, the 
taxable event on such a deemed sale would be the execution of the 
contract for the transfer of the right to use goods it may be effected 
by the delivery of goods. 
 The delivery of goods cannot constitute a basis for levy of 
tax on the transfer of the right to use any goods. Therefore, where 
the goods are in existence, the taxable event on the transfer of the 
right to use goods occurs when a contract is executed between 
lesser and the lessee and situs of sale of such a deemed sale would 
be the place where the contract in respect thereof is executed. 
Thus, where goods to transferred are available and a written 
contract is executed between the parties, it is at that point to use 
goods would occur and situs of sale of such a transaction would be 
the place where the contract is executed. 
6. 11   List II    Entry 55 
“Taxes on advertisements other than advertisements 
published in the newspapers and advertisements broadcast by radio 
or television.” Being a clear-cut entry no scope for tax confliction. 
6. 12    List II  Entry 56 
Under Entry 56 of List II, the State Government is 
competent to levy taxes on goods and passengers who are carried 
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by roads or on inland waterways. But, usually, it would be 
inexpedient, if not impossible to recover the tax directly from the 
passengers and so, it would be expedient and convenient to provide 
for the recovery of the said tax from the owners of the vehicles 
themselves. Hence it is competent to the Legislature to devise 
machinery for the recovery of the said tax by requiring the bus 
operators or bus owners to pay the said tax38. 
 It is not correct to say that the power to levy tax on 
passengers and goods under Entry 56 was to be confined to 
passengers and goods carried within the State. There is no 
jurisdiction for reading entry 56 of List II in conjunction with entry 
26. The taxing power of the State Legislature in regard to 
passengers and goods carried by road or inland waterways is to be 
found in Entry 56 and there is no warrant for holding that such 
taxing power is controlled by another entry in List II, which is 
unrelated to taxing power. It was held in case of, M/s International 
Tourist Corporation v/s State of Hariana39, that when the goods 
were merely transported through the State in the course of inter-
State trade and commerce, the taxable event is the carrying of 
goods and passengers on roads within the State thereby making use 
of the facilities provided by the State. Since the development and 
maintenance of that part of High way, which is within the 
Municipal area, is equally important for the smooth flow of 
passengers and goods along the national highway. The State 
Government along all highways including national highways, such 
as lighting, traffic control, amenities for passengers, halting places 
for buses and trucks are available for use by every one including 
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those traveling along the national highways. So it cannot be said 
that State Government confers no benefits and renders no service 
in connection with traffic moving along national highways. So on 
above stated fact it can be said that there is sufficient nexus 
between the tax and passengers and goods carried on national 
highways to justify the said imposition under Section 3 of the 
Haryana Passengers and Goods Taxation Act (16 of 1952). 
 In another case, Khyerbari Tea Co. Ltd. v/s State of 
Assam40, it was held that, where the Pith and Substance of the 
Assam Act (10 of 1961) which was for the levy of tax on tea which 
has been carried in the State of Assam, the right to levy such a tax 
could not be said to have been taken away merely by the fact that, 
A Tea Act had been passed by the Central Legislature which was 
referable to the relevant entry in List I of Schedule 7. The power to 
levy a tax, which has been conferred on the State Legislature by 
entry 56 cannot, therefore, be said to b controlled by the Tea Act in 
question. There is, therefore, no substance in the argument that the 
State Legislature has no power to levy a tax on tea which is carried 
over a part of the area of the State of Assam, because one of the 
objects taxed under the Assam Act has been covered by the Central 
Tea Act of 1953. 
The power to subject the goods either octroi or to terminal 
tax squarely falls within entry numbers 52 and 56 of List II to the 
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The distinction between 
terminal tax and octroi is as follows: - 
Terminal and octroi are similar kinds of levies, which are 
closely interlinked with, 
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1. Destination of goods 
2. The user in the local area on arrival of the goods. 
 (a) Where the goods merely pass through a local area without 
being consumed therein the mere fact that the transport 
carrying goods halt within local area for transshipment or 
allied purposes would not justify the levy of either terminal 
tax or octroi duty. This is because the halting of the goods is 
only for incidental purposes to effectuate the journey of the 
goods to the final destination by unloading, sorting and 
reloading them at a particular place 
 (b)There is very thin margin of differences between a terminal 
tax and octroi. In the case of the former (terminal tax) the 
goods reach their final destination and their entry into area 
of destination immediately attracts payment of terminal tax 
irrespective of their user. In case of octroi, however the tax 
is levied on goods for their use and consumption. 
 (c) But at the same time, the goods while halting at local area 
should leave for their destination within a reasonable time 
which may depend on circumstances of each case and if the 
goods are kept within area for such a long and indefinite 
period that the purpose of reaching the final destination 
lying in a different area is frustrated or defeated, they may 
be exigible to terminal tax. 
 (d) Where the goods enter into a local area, which is also the 
destination of the goods either temporarily or otherwise, the 
terminal tax would be leviable. 
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The Levy of terminal tax by Corporation of Delhi was 
challenged on the ground of lack of its constitutional validity in 
case of, Man Mohan Tuli etc. etc. v/s Municipal Corporation of 
Delhi, & others41. The fact of the case were that, Man Mohan Tuli, 
the appellant was the owner of a piece of land situated on the 
Grand Trunck Road near the sixth milestone, as one goes from 
Delhi to Ghaziabad on his land for use as godawns and had rented 
them out to various transport companies engaged in bringing goods 
from other States and storing them before their transshipment to 
Delhi and other States beyond Delhi. The trucks carrying the goods 
for various destinations pass along the G.T. Road and move into 
Tuli’s land, where the goods were unloaded into the godawns, 
sorted out and reloaded in to the respective trucks meant for 
various destinations. Thereafter, the trucks move out of the land 
and passing through Union territory of Delhi after crossing the 
borderline, proceeded to their destination. 
The Municipal Corporation of Delhi, by its Orders dated 
May 23rd, 1975 and July 7th, 1975 (impugned orders) directed that a 
Terminal Tax post be set up at the entrance to Tuli’s land in order 
to collect terminal tax on goods carried into that land. 
The Delhi Court held that even though the goods were 
stored in godawn of Tuli, sorted out and reloaded but as they while 
passing through the territory of Delhi undoubtedly entered the said 
territory, so the Corporation of Delhi was legally entitled to levy 
terminal tax at the point of entry into the Union territory of Delhi. 
Aggrieved party, appellant preferred appeal in the Supreme Court, 
contending that the goods were not meant either to be used or 
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consumed in Delhi neither the Delhi was the final destination of 
the goods. Moreover, as the goods were to be sent to destination 
beyond Delhi, the transport carrying the goods had perforce to pass 
through the territory of Delhi; the goods were not carried into the 
territory of Delhi but were merely carried through the territory of 
Delhi to other destinations, which were beyond Delhi.  
Considering the contents of appellant the Court held that, the 
Terminal Tax could be leviable only if it is proved that the goods 
remained at the godawn for on indefinite and unexplained period, 
which could not be said to be reasonable. The word “immediately” 
occurring I respective Rule 26 of the Terminal Tax Rules framed 
under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act (66 of 1957) has to be 
liberally construed so as to imply a reasonable period and if the 
export is delayed the rules may apply if a reasonable explanation 
has been given. Rule 27 does not warrant that “immediate export” 
must mean within a very short time irrespective of any other 
consideration. Terminal Tax can leviable only if it is proved that 
the goods remained at the godawn for an indefinite without any 
reasonable ground to do so.  
Only on the following conditions the above said goods could 
be exigible to terminal tax: - 
1. If the said goods were meant for Delhi and; 
2. If after having reached and having been unloaded at Delhi 
they were supposed to rebooked and reloaded for some other 
place, which would be a fresh and different transaction. But 
in this instant case merely the said goods after having been 
unloaded in the godawn situated in Delhi, are sorted and 
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reloaded in different trucks and there after pass through the 
territory of Delhi, were declared not exigible to the terminal 
tax. (Delhi High Court decision AIR 1979 Delhi 144 was 
reversed.) 
The levy of tax on passengers and goods under entry 56 of 
List II is for the purpose of State and falls on passengers or goods 
carried by motor vehicles within the State. No doubt, it falls upon 
passengers and goods proceeding to or from an extra-State point 
but it is limited only to the fare and freight proportionate to the 
route within the State.  
6. 13   List II Entry 57 
 “Taxes on vehicles, whether mechanically propelled or not, 
suitable for use on roads, including tramcars subject to the 
provision of entry 35 of List III.” 
After the Constitution came into force, the power to levy 
taxes on goods and passengers carried by road or on inland 
waterways and the power to levy taxes on vehicles, whether 
mechanically propelled or not suitable for use on roads including 
tramcars, subject to the provisions of Entry 35 of List III of the 
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution are assigned to the States 
respectively by Entries 56 and 57 of List II of the Seventh 
Schedule to the Constitution. The power to levy tax on Entry 57 of 
List II, on vehicles, is meant for to obtain the contribution towards 
the cost of maintenance of roads etc. from the owners of the 
vehicles. When they (owners) are taxed so, they are paying a price 
for something which makes their movement safer, easier, and more 
convenient. The payment of such tax is nothing but the price for 
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facilities provided by State in the form of roads, bridges, check 
posts, the departmental organizations intended for regulation of 
transport, law and order etc. Whether such imposition of levy 
under Entry 57 of List II the enhancement of tax on stage carriages 
under Punjab Motor Vehicle Taxation Act violate the freedom of 
trade given through Article 19(1) (g), Articles 301 and 304 (b) or 
not was main issue for determination in case of, The Malwa Bus 
Service (Pvt.) Ltd. etc.v/s State of Punjab42, where it was held by 
A.P. Sen and E.S.Venkataramiah, JJ. That: - 
 The mandate of the provisions in Part XIII of the 
Constitution is not that trade, commerce and intercourse should be 
“absolutely free” i.e. subject to no and no taxes at all. In modern 
communities the exercise of any trade and the conduct of any 
business must involve many kinds of fiscal liabilities. Merely 
because certain taxes are levied on them, it cannot be said that 
trade or commerce has become unfreeze. Without the repair, 
unkeep, maintenance and provision for depreciation of roads, 
transportation would itself become impossible. Motor vehicles, 
which stand in direct relation to such roads, should contribute 
towards the cost incurred for the aforesaid purposes. There is 
nothing in consistent with the conception of freedom of trade and 
commerce if, in truth, what is collected by way of tax is a 
pecuniary charge, which is compensatory in character. What is 
essential is that the burden should not disproportionately exceed 
the cost of the facilities provided by the State. 
 The Courts do have the ultimate power to decide whether 
what is recovered by way of tax is in truth and substance either a 
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contribution towards the construction and maintenance of the 
roads, bridges and other facilities that are necessary for providing a 
smooth transport service or an exaction far in excess of what is 
needed for providing such facilities. Courts, however, cannot insist 
upon an exact correlation between the tax recovered and the cost 
so incurred because such exact correlation is in the very nature of 
things impossible to attain. There may be in some cases a little 
excess recovery by way of such taxes. That by itself should not 
result in the nullification of the law imposing the tax if the extent 
of such excess is marginal having regard to the total cost involved 
in the instant case the enhancement of tax on stage carriage held 
valid. 
 Entry 57 of State List is subject to Entry 35 of Concurrent 
List. It is therefore, open to the Parliament to lay down the 
principles on which taxes may levy on mechanically propelled 
vehicles. But the Parliament while enacting Section 63 (7) of 
Motor Vehicles Act refrained from indicating any such principles, 
either expressly or by necessary implication. The State’s power to 
tax and to exempt was left uninhibited. It may be that a State 
legislation, plenary or subordinate, which exempts “non-home-
State tourist vehicles” fro tax would be advancing the object of 
Section 63(7) of the Act and accelerating inter-State trade, 
commerce and intercourse. But merely by Parliament legislating 
Section 63(7), the State Legislatures are not obliged to fall in line 
and to so arrange their tax laws as to advance the object of Section 
63(7) be it ever so desirable. 
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 For the purpose of advancing the object of Section 63(7) of 
Motor Vehicles Act (4 of 1939) the State of Karnataka, declared 
the exemption of State tax (under Entry 57 of List II), respect to 
the vehicles which were registered in other States, but holding All 
India Permit under Section 63(7) of Section 63(7) of Motor 
Vehicles Act (Central Act), if they had paid the tax in their home-
States. But thereafter, by a notification dtd.31/3/1981 (Karnataka) 
the aforesaid exemption was withdrawn. The legality and 
constitutionality of said withdrawn exemption was challenged 
under Article 14 and Article 301 of the Constitution, in case of, 
D.P. Sharma etc. etc. v/s Union of India & others43, where it was 
held by Justice D.A.Desai and O.Chinnappa Reddy, JJ., that :- 
The State is obliged neither to grant an exemption nor to 
perpetuate an exemption once granted. There is no question of 
impairing the freedom to refuse or to withdraw an exemption under 
Art. 301. Further even if it could be said that the withdrawal by the 
Karnataka Government of the exemption granted to “outsiders” has 
resulted in the Karnataka operators having to pay tax in every State 
in the country it did not affect them directly. The withdrawal of 
exemption cannot also be said to be violative of Art. 14 on ground 
that all-India tourist vehicles do not use the roads of the State as 
much as the contract carriages operating in the State and therefore, 
the State was wrong in treating them alike, or that vehicles holding 
inter-State permits under inter-State agreements were still exempt 
from tax. 
The Motor Vehicles Taxation Acts of the States are 
regulatory and compensatory legislations, so outside the range of 
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Article 301.The levy of one time tax on motor cycle and tricycle 
under the Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Act (1958), was held 
regulatory as well as compensatory and not discriminatory in case 
of, State of Maharashtra & others v/s Madhukar Balkrisna Badiya 
& others44, where in justification of the said tax, Justice Sabyasachi 
Mukharji and L.M.Sharma, JJ. observed that: -   
The Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Act after its amendment in 
1987 and 1988 comes within the constitutional requirement of 
making the one time tax a regulatory and compensatory tax. The 
Act has provided for refund of proportionate amount of tax up to 
13 years, but the fact that the Act has not provided for refund in the 
14th and 15th years does not make the law outside the competence 
of the State Legislature. The collection of tax for period of 15 
years at one point of time is a convenient method enabling the 
owner to use the vehicles for more than 25 years. According to the 
State government the cost of service is twice the total amount 
recovered from all types of vehicles. The balance expenditure is 
met by the state from general revenues. There is in the provisions 
as amended, a discernible and an identifiable object behind the 
levy and a nexus between the subject and the object of levy. So, 
the vehicles taxes under entry 57 of list II are regulatory and/or 
compensatory in nature. 
6. 14   List II Entry 58 
“Taxes on animal and boats”. 
 The State Government is competent to enact the Barge Tax 
Act, levying tax on barge by virtue of the power conferred by 
Entry 58 in list II of the VII schedule to the Constitution of India, 
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which permits levy of taxes on animals and boats. A “barge” is a 
large lat-bottomed boat used for transporting heavy burdens on 
canals and rivers but is not generally a ocean going vessel. It may 
or may not be fitted with an engine depending on its calibration. It 
is essentially a freight-boat chiefly meant for canal and river-
navigation. It can be define as a water craft mechanically propelled 
and used for capable of being used as a means of transport of 
minerals. 
 Whether a barge could be equated with a boat was the 
question raised in case of, Panduranga Timblo Industries v/s Union 
of India45, in the determination of constitutional validity of the tax 
levied imposed on barges under the Goa, Daman and Diu Barge 
Act, 1973, It was observed by Justice A.M. Ahmedi. 
 From the definition of ‘ship’ and ‘vessel’ in Ss.3 (55) and 
3(63) of the General Clauses Act, it cannot be inferred that a 
mechanically propelled vessel is not a boat for the simple reason 
that the definition of vessel is wide enough to include a ship, which 
is mechanically propelled. Both the definition of vessel is wide 
enough to include boats of every description, both mechanically 
propelled and those propelled exclusively by oars. Merely because 
the Act and Rules cover barges ranging from less than 100 tones to 
350 tones and above, it cannot be said that such large sized vessels, 
which are mechanically propelled, cannot be called boats. The 
definition of a ‘barge’ in the dictionaries clearly shows that barges 
are flat bottomed boats meant for carrying goods on inland waters 
and are usually fitted with engines. Barges are bound to be heavy 
vessels, which can take the load. For the reason they do not cease 
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to be flat-bottomed boats and in ordinary parlance they cannot be 
described as ships. It cannot, therefore, be said that Entry 58 in List 
II must be confined to boats, which exclusively propelled by oars. 
 Neither the language of entry 58 in List II nor the context in 
which the word ‘boats’ is used therein calls for confining its scope 
to boats exclusively propelled by oars. The language of Entries 24, 
25 and 27 in List I and Entries 31 and 32 in List III does not also 
justify a narrow meaning to be given to the words ‘boats’ in Entry 
58 of List II. These entries have nothing to do with the subject of 
levy of tax on boats. These entries from List I and III operate in 
their own fields and do not trench upon the subject covered by 
Entry 58 in List II. Boats of all description can be taxed by the 
State Legislature by reason of the power conferred by Entry 58 in 
List II of the VII Schedule. Section 2(1) of the said Act also 
defines it as a watercraft mechanically propelled and used or 
capable of being used as a means of transport of minerals. Thus, 
the legislature has carved out only Mechanically propelled barges 
for tax purposes. It would therefore, seem that the State Legislature 
was competent to tax is under Entry 58 of List II. 
6. 15     List  II Entry 59 
“Tolls” 
 Usually, the consideration for a toll is some amenity; 
service, benefit or advantage, which the person entitled to the 
‘toll’, undertakes to provide for the public in general to the persons 
who are liable to pay the ‘toll’ tax. 
 The legality of toll tax imposed by Hardwar Municipality, 
under Section 128 of U.P. Municipalities Act (2 of 1916) was 
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challenged, in case of, Municipal Board of Hardwar v/s                         
Raghubir Singh etc.46 The facts were, the Hardwar Municipal 
Board, in exercise of its power under Sec.128 of U.P. 
Municipalities Act 1916, increased the toll from two annas to four 
annas, per passenger and rickshaws were added to the list of 
vehicles, i.e. motor vehicles and tongas. The exemption in respect 
of persons traveling from Rickshaw was also removed. The Toll 
was collected at the barrier from vehicles entering the municipal 
limits or departing from it at rate of four annas per passenger 
traveled by motor, tonga or rickshaws. The High Court upheld the 
validity of toll on vehicles entering the municipal limits but held 
that toll could not be levied on vehicles leaving Hardwar 
Municipality, on further appeal to Supreme Court. Justice 
P.B.GajendragadkarC.J, N.Wanchoo, M.Hidaytullah, Ramaswami, 
P.Satyanarayan Raju, JJ. held that :- 
 The decision of the High Court was correct in the 
circumstances of the case, and no toll could be levied under the 
Act on vehicles leaving the municipality limits. Toll as such can 
only be collected under the Municipalities Act from vehicles 
entering the municipal limits. Local authorities like the Board do 
not act as legislatures when they impose a tax but as agent of the 
State Legislatures. Their powers and the extent of these powers 
must be found in the statute, which creates them, and endow them 
with such powers. The power of the Legislature derivable from 
Entry 59 of List II of Sch.VII of Constitution is not a tax on 
passengers but on vehicles only, and the power to levy tolls 
continued to be restricted to vehicles entering the municipality. 
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 Again, the validity of toll tax was raised in case of Kamaljit 
Singh and Others v/s Municipal Board Pikhwa and others.47In the 
instant case the validity of the imposition of toll tax by the 
Municipal Board, Pikhwa on vehicles and other conveyances, 
animals and laden coolies entering the municipal limits under 
Sec.128 (1)(VII) of the U.P. Municipalities Act 1916 was 
challenged. The High Court of Allahbad had upheld the levy of the 
toll tax relying upon the decision of Automobile Transport 
(Rajasthan) Ltd v/s State of Rajasthan48, as being compensatory in 
nature. On further appeal the Supreme Court held that: - 
 The appellant being the owner of the vehicle-stage carriages 
was making the use of National Highway No.24. The township of 
Pikhwa is off the National Highway and is quite at some distance, 
was connected by a road and a part of the National Highway has 
been included within the municipal limits. Merely because stage 
carriage operators like appellant ply their stage carriages on permit 
issued on the inter-State route like Delhi-Garhmkteswar which 
falls on the National Highway and stop their buses for the facility 
of passengers going to and coming from Pikhwa. That the 
Municipal Board has set up two electric poles at the toll barriers 
for facility of collection of the toll tax, does not justify the 
imposition of the toll tax, does not justify the imposition of a toll 
tax. The National Highway is being maintained by the Government 
and the approach road built up by the Public Works Department, 
the only a nallah constructed by Municipal Board for flow of the 
sewage water from the town of Pikhwa, did not entitle the Board to 
levy a toll tax on stage carriage operators like appellant as a 
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compensatory tax. Even assuming that the Municipal Board had 
occurred the expenditure on maintenance of connecting road and 
nallah, but they are the facilities which has been provided for the 
residents of the town for which it recovers various taxes. 
Therefore, the levy of the toll tax by Municipal Board was struck 
down as ultra-vires. 
6.16    List –II  Entry 60 
“Taxes on professions, trade, callings and employments.” 
 The taxes specified in Item 60 of the List II are taxes on the 
carrying on of a profession, trade, etc. The Union power to impose 
taxes on professions, trade, callings and employments under Entry 
60 of the State List may seems to overlap, if the income derived 
from the professions, trade, callings and employments is made the 
basis of both the taxes. Such an overlapping is explicitly 
contemplated in Articles 279(1) and 376(3). The former provides 
that “notwithstanding anything in Article 246, no law of the 
legislature of a State relating to taxes for the benefit of the State or 
of a municipality, district board, local board or other authority 
therein in respect of professions, trade, callings or employments 
shall be invalid on the ground that it relates to a tax as income”, 
and the latter lays that State legislative power does not affect 
Parliament’s power “to make laws with respect to taxes on income 
accruing from or arising out of professions, trade, callings and 
employments”. However, a ceiling of Rs.250/- per annum is fixed 
in respect of any tax imposed by a State Legislature on professions, 
trade, calling or employment. There is an exception in case of pre-
Constitution State Laws imposing such taxes. In other words under 
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such laws even if tax in excess of Rs.250/- is imposed, the same 
will be constitutionally valid. But this arrangement is to continue 
only so long as Parliament does not provide otherwise. 
Therefore, the validity of State taxation laws imposing tax 
on profession or calling has been determined generally on the basis 
specified above. In other words, taxation laws, which obeyed the 
ceiling of Rs.250/- laid down in Article 276, were upheld and those 
imposing tax beyond that limit were declared to be invalid. 
However, ceiling of Rs. 250/- seems to be too rigorous. Courts 
have discovered means to sustain State laws on the point. Firstly, it 
has been held that Article 276 does not speak against double or 
multiple taxation. In case of, Kamta Prasad Agrawal v/s     
Executive Officer49, the Supreme Court pointed out that, up to the 
permissible limit of Rs.250/-, per annum given in Article 276, a tax 
can be imposed by each one of the authorities mentioned in the 
Article, viz. the State, municipality, district board, local board and 
other local authorities. In the immediate case the validity of a claim 
by a Panchayat Samiti under the Punjab Panchayat Samiti and Jilla 
Parisad Act, 1961 for payment of Rs.200/-from the appellant-
assessee on account of profession tax for the year 1963-64 was 
challenged on the ground that it was in violation of Article 276, as 
a similar tax on a graded scale subject to a maximum limit of 
Rs.250/- per annum had been and was being collected by the State 
of Haryana under Punjab Profession, Trade, Callings and 
Employment Taxation Act, 1956, Ray, C.J., speaking for the 
Court, repelled the connection that taxation fro different bodies 
mentioned in Article 276 were to be treated conjunctively up to a 
  
 
328
limit of Rs.250/- per annum. Putting emphasis on the word ‘or’ 
used in Article 276, the learned Chief Justice pointed out that it 
was used in a disjunctive sense. Such a construction was also 
supported by proviso to Article 276(2), which also spoke of State 
or municipality and thereby indicated that each of the entities could 
tax up to the limit imposed by the Article. 
 Secondly, where a tax could be referred to some other entry 
under the State List, the Courts have preferred to Judge the validity 
of that taxation measure with reference to that tax entry and not 
with reference to Entry 60 read with Article 276. Thus, in State of 
Bombay v/s R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala50, the validity of Section 
12A of the Bombay Lotteries and Prize Competition Control and 
Tax (Amendment) Act, 1952 was challenged, inter-alia, for being 
violative of Article 276. The Court refused to treat it as a tax on 
business and treated it as a tax on gambling under Entry 62 of List 
II. Chief Justice S.R. Das said that as the law related to betting and 
gambling taxing provision should also be held to relate to betting 
and gambling. Moreover, a Legislature was presumed to legislate 
within the limits of its powers. Therefore, when a law could be 
interpreted to relate to two alternative tax entries, the Court must 
hold it to relate to that entry which would make the same valid 
instead of holding it to relate to an Entry, which would make it 
invalid. Similarly in, Y.V. Srinivasmurthy   v/s State of Mysore51, 
Section 3 of Mysore Cinematographic Shows Act, 1951 was held 
to impose a tax on entertainment under Entry 62 of the State List 
and not business under Entry 60 of the State List and in case of 
Ismail and Company v/s State of Kerala52, a tax on advertisement 
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levied under Section 126 of Kerala Municipality Act was held to 
be a tax under Entry 55 of List II and not under Entry 60 of the 
same List. 
 Thirdly, State taxation measures have been saved from the 
restrictive aspects of Article 276 by treating them as regulatory 
measures. The full bench decision of   Kerala   High   Court in, P. 
Ramchandran v/s State of Kerala53, is a pointer in this direction. 
The High Court upheld the validity of certain provisions of Cochin 
Abkari Act, which restricted and controlled the sale of liquor by 
required the same, could be done only by obtaining a licence for 
the purpose. Krishnamurthy Iyer, J. speaking for the Court laid 
emphasis on the primary object of the Act and followed the 
Supreme Court decision in, Nagar Mahapalika, Varanasi v/s      
Durgadas54, wherein the Supreme Court had observed: “if primary 
purpose of such an enactment is the regulation of some particular 
occupation, calling or activity, it is in the exercise of police power, 
even if it incidentally, produces revenue”. Applying this principle 
Cochin Act was held to be a regulatory measure under Entry 8 of 
the State List and not a taxing law under Entry 60 of List II. 
 The tax on the receipt of pension or on the income from 
investment etc. cannot justify a tax under this entry. With respect 
to Entry 60, the Madras City Municipal Act, impose a tax on 
profession, trade etc. under Section 111(1) of the Act in case of, 
Raja Gopalachari v/s Corporation of Madras55, it was held that the 
tax on receipt of pension is referred to in the last part of Section 
111(1) of the Madras City Municipal Act is in truth and substance 
a tax on income. At the time the tax is levied the pensioner is in no 
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employment but is only in receipt of income through it might be 
for past services, in an employment. 
(a) Taxes on Income and “Circumstances and Property Tax”  
 The local bodies in the State of U.P. at least have been 
imposing under the authority conferred on them by the State 
Legislature a tax, known as ‘Circumstances and Property Tax’. 
There is no specific entry in any of the lists by this name. 
Therefore, in the full bench decision of the Allahabad High Court 
in, R.R. Engineering Co. v/s Jilla Parisad, Bareilly56, two of the 
Judges comprising the bench (Pathak and Beg, JJ.) took the view 
that such a tax could be imposed only by Parliament in exercise of 
its residuary powers and that such a tax imposed by local bodies in 
a State could be saved only by resort to Article 277. However, on 
appeal, the Supreme Court rejected this view partly and expressed 
its view in further appeal that the levy of circumstances and 
property tax is valid and is covered by Items 49, 60 of List II. It is 
not a tax on income. It is not necessary to take resort of Article 277 
to uphold its validity. Moreover, Article 277 will not save the 
impugned tax since the Town Area Committee levied it in 
pursuance of the power conferred by clause (f) of Section 14 of the 
Town Areas Act, which was introduced by a post-Constitution 
amendment. The circumstance and property tax levied under 
Section 119 of the Act is a tax on status of an individual and not 
tax on income. It has covered by Items 49, 60 and 58 of Schedule 
Seventh List II of Constitution. 
 Further, it is unnecessary and in fact erroneous to take resort 
to Article 277 of the Constitution for the purpose of saving the tax 
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on circumstances and property. The mere name of a tax does not 
bear on legislative competence and the absence of express 
enumeration of a tax by a particular name will not justify the 
tracing of legislative authority to the residuary entry. What is true 
in other jurisdictions is true in this branch of law also, namely, that 
one must have regard to the substance of the matter and not to the 
form or label. 
 Concurrence with the view taken in earlier decision of the 
same High Court and the decision of the Supreme Court in, Pandit 
Ram Narain v/s State of U.P57, among the High Court decisions 
referred to by Supreme Court was the special bench decision in, 
Notified Area Committee v/s Sri Ram Singhasan Prasad Kalwar58. 
The Supreme Court expressed its complete agreement with 
the view taken in this case and in other cases that ‘circumstances 
and property tax’ was a composite tax, which was referable to 
Entries 49, 58 and 60 of the State List. 
 After having held that the tax measure came within the 
legislative competence of State Legislature, the Supreme Court had 
to decide two other issues: 
1. Whether ‘circumstances and property tax’ encroached upon 
the power of Parliament to impose income-tax under Entry 
82 of the Union List; 
2. Whether ‘circumstances and property tax’ was free from the 
limitation imposed by Article 276 of the Constitution.  
With regard to the first question the Court quoted 
approvingly the observations of Malik, C.J. in, District Board of 
Farrukhabad v/s Prag Dutt59, to the effect that while income-tax 
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could be imposed only on income, ‘circumstances and property 
tax’ was imposed on the total turnover of the assessee from his 
trade or calling or the fact of his having an interest in the property. 
Like the profession or property tax income derived from profession 
or property could be the measure of the tax but it was not the 
object of the tax. With regard to the second question the Court took 
the position that the limitations imposed by Article 276 did not 
apply as such because the tax was referable not exclusively to 
Entry 60, but was rather composite tax referable to Entries 49, 58 
and 60 of the State List. In other words, it was a tax on the 
financial circumstances or statute of a person, which was the result 
of many factors including his land and building and also the 
income derived from his profession, trade, calling or employment. 
Therefore, in the immediate case, the Court upheld the imposition 
of a tax to the rule of Rs.2000/- on the appellant. Nevertheless the 
Court cautioned the local bodies that the impost should not be so 
excessive as to make it look like a tax on income. Delivering the 
judgment of the Court Chandrachud, C.J., observed:- 
“The fact that one of the components of the impugned tax 
namely, the component of ‘circumstances’ is referable to other 
entries in addition to Entry 60, should not be construed as 
conferring an unlimited charter on the local authority to impose 
disproportionately excessive levies on the assesses who are subject 
to their jurisdiction. An excessive levy on circumstances will tend 
to blur the distinction between a tax on income and a tax on 
circumstances. Income will then cease to be a more measure or 
yardstick of the tax and will become the very subject matter of the 
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tax. Restraint in this behalf will be a prudent prescription for the 
local authorities to follow”. 
6. 17    List  II    Entry 61 
 “Capitation taxes”. 
The scope and nature of the entry being a local in origin no 
dispute has been considerably noted. 
6. 18    List II Entry 62 
 “Taxes on luxuries, including taxes on entertainments, 
amusements, betting and gambling.” 
 Under Entries 34 and 62 respectively of the State List the 
State Legislature has the exclusive power to make law on betting 
and gambling and to impose tax on betting and gambling. The 
Income tax Act, as amends by the Finance Act, 1972 has widened 
definition of the income for the purpose of income-tax so as to 
include any prize won from lottery, cross word puzzle, races 
including horse races, card games and other games or from 
gambling or betting of any formal nature. In two High Court 
decisions the question was raised whether this widened definition 
of income encroached upon the State taxing power under Entry 62 
of the State List. The Allahabad High Court in, Bholunath Kesari 
v/s Director of State Lotteries60, and the Andhra Pradesh High 
Court in, Amara Kondiah v/s Income-tax Officer61, answered the 
question in the negative. In the latter case Justice Gangadhar Rao 
pointed out:- 
“While Parliament has got the power to tax the income, the 
State Legislature has got the power to impose tax on betting and 
gambling. Tax on betting and gambling is different from tax on 
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income from betting and gambling. If a person wants to enter the 
racecourse enclosure, he should purchase a ticket. If he wants to 
bet on a horse, he should purchase a ticket. The State Legislature 
can impose a tax on those tickets, because that will be a tax on 
betting. But, if that person were to win a jackpot, then what will be 
income from betting and only the Parliament, could levy tax on 
that income”. The constitutional validity of the Punjab Forward 
Contracts Tax Act (7 of 1951) was asked for determination respect 
to Entry 62 of List II in case of, Bullion and Grain Exchange Ltd. 
v/s State of Punjab62, it was held that, If the Act provide for tax on 
betting and gambling then only, it can come within item 62. 
Though in form an agreement for sale purports to contemplate 
delivery of the goods and the payment of the price, what is 
contemplated is merely a receipt and payment of the difference 
between the contract price and price on a later day, that makes a 
contract a wagering contract. The words ‘forward contract’ is 
defined in the Act do not set out all elements which are necessary 
to render a contract a wagering contract and so the impugned 
legislation to tax forward contracts acts as defined does not come 
within Entry 62 and is beyond the legislative competence of the 
State Legislature. 
 The concept of a tax on luxuries in Entry 62, List II cannot 
be limited merely to tax things tangible and corporeal in their 
aspect as “Luxuries”. But, the concept of ‘luxuries’ in the 
legislative entry takes within it everything that could be fairly and 
reasonably said to comprehend in it. The actual measure of the 
levy is a matter of legislative policy and convenience. So long as 
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the legislation has reasonable nexus with the concept of “luxuries” 
in the broad and general sense in which the expressions in 
legislative tests are comprehended, the legislative competence 
extends to all matters ‘with respect to’ that field of topic of 
legislation. 
In case of, Express Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v/s State of Gujarat & 
another63, the constitutional validity of the levy of tax on the 
services for lodging provided at the Hotel was challenged on 
grounds of competence of State Legislature and violation of 
fundamental rights guaranteed under Constitution. In justification 
to levy, Justice R. S. Pathak, C.J., Sabyaschi Mukherji, S.Natrajan, 
M.N.Vennkatachalian and S. Rangnathan, JJ, held that: - 
The Entry 62 encompasses all the manifestations or 
emanations, the notion of “luxuries” can fairly and reasonably be 
said to comprehend. The element of extravagance or indulgence 
that differentiates ‘luxury’ from ‘necessity’ cannot be confined to 
goods and articles. There can be elements of extravagance or 
indulgence in the quality of services and activities, it is true that 
while frugal or simple food and medicine may be classified as 
necessities; articles such as jewellery, perfume, intoxicating liquor, 
tobacco etc. could be called articles of luxury. But the legislative 
entry cannot be exhausted by these cases, illustrative of the 
concept. The entries in legislative list should not be read in narrow 
or pedantic sense but must be given their fullest meaning and the 
widest amplitude and be held to extend to all ancillary and 
subsidiary matters, which can fairly and reasonably be said to be 
comprehend in them. 
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The plea taken by appellant was that the means of providing 
luxury, by itself did not provide the nexus between the taxing 
power and subject of tax, and there might be an actual and merely 
a notional or potential consumption or utilization of the luxury. 
The plea was rejected and said that, the taxable event need not 
necessarily be the actual utilization or the actual consumption, as 
the case may be of the luxury. A luxury which can reasonable be 
said to be amenable to a potential conception does provide the 
nexus. Once the legislative competence and the nexus between the 
taxing-powers, and the subject of taxation is established, the other 
incidents are matters of fiscal policy behind the taxing law. The 
measure of the tax is not the same thing as, must be kept 
distinguished from the subject of tax. 
The plea that fundamental rights under Art.19 (1)(g) are 
violated by a levy on mere provision for luxury, without its actual 
utilization would not be tenable as is the mere excessiveness of a 
tax or the that it affect the earning cannot, parse, be held to violate 
of Art.19 (1)(g). Under the deeming provisions of Gujarat Tax on 
Luxuries (Hotels & lodging Houses) were applied to cases where 
accommodation was provided free or at commercial rates to the 
employee of the hotel, though usual lodging charges were not 
collected from employee of hotel for lodging accommodation, but 
owner of hotel would have to pay the luxuries tax on the usual 
charges if had so collected. This is a provision against evasion and 
cannot be said to violative of Art.19 (1)(g). 
The Section 2(g) of Gujarat Tax on Luxuries (Hotels & 
lodging Houses) Act (1977), “charges for lodging” to include 
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charges for air conditioning, telephone, television, radio, music, 
extra beds “and the like”. It was alleged that the expression “and 
the like” was vague and confers an arbitrary power to bring to tax 
an undefined entity. 
It was stated by the Court that, there are inbuilt checks on 
the power of State Government under explanation to S.2 (a) for 
deciding the “lodging charges”. The expression “and the like” 
would require being construed enjusdem generis. The genus or the 
class of items, envisaged by the preceding words not having been 
exhaustive of the genus or the class, the legislature, therefore, has 
supplied the words “and the like” so as to bring any other item of 
the same class or genus. This, by itself, is a clear guide for the 
exercise of the power. Another relevant consideration is the 
identity and status of the repository of the power. The power is 
given a high authority like the State Government. In these 
circumstances, it cannot be said that the power is uncanalised 
power and is an arbitrary or unreasonable one. There are statutory 
guides governing its exercise and the guidelines are well settled 
principle of interpretation. Therefore, the levy of tax on the 
services for lodging provided at the Hotels, is not beyond the scope 
of Entry 62. The levy of tax on the services for lodging provided at 
the Hotels based on mere criterion of price above certain level is 
not ultra-vires the State power under Entry 62 of List II. 
The Legislature has chosen to identify the luxury by the 
statutory standards prescribed by it. According to Legislature 
assumption, price does not become evidence of the special quality 
on basis of which ‘luxuries’ could be distinguished and that some 
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special quality is attributable to goods and services through the 
means of price. Quality and price, in the legislative assessment, 
can be assumed to have logical interrelationship. This cannot be 
held to suffer from vice of irrationality. Hence the levy of tax on 
“luxuries” under Entry 62 of List II by State of Gujarat under 
Gujarat Tax on Luxuries (Hotels & lodging Houses) Act (1977) 
was held valid and constitutional.  
Whether the altering mode of levy of Entertainment Tax, 
have the capacity to change the nature of tax was the question 
raised in case of, Venkateshwara Theatre v/s State of Andhra 
Pradesh & others64.  
 The facts of the case were that, under the amended 
provisions of Ss.4 & 5 of A. P. Entertainments Tax Act 24 of 1984, 
the system for levy of tax on the basis of number of persons 
actually admitted to each was dispensed with and the tax to be 
levied on the basis of the percentage of the gross collection 
capacity per show and different percentages were described 
depending on the type of the theatre and the nature of the local area 
where it was situated. Under Section 5, an option was given to pay 
a tax on the basis of the prescribed percentage fixed for fixed 
number of shows in a week irrespective of the number of shows 
actually held. 
  The mode of levy or measure of the tax prescribed under 
S.4(1), as substituted by Act 24 of 1984, is a more convenient 
mode of levy of the tax in as much as it dispenses with the need to 
verify or enquire into the number of persons admitted to each show 
and to verify the correctness or otherwise of the returns submitted 
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by the proprietor containing the number of  persons admitted to 
each show and amount of tax collected The entertainment tax that 
would be collected over and above the average occupancy rate 
would constitute the profit of the proprietor. In the circumstances, 
it cannot be said that the adoption of system of consolidated levy in 
Section 4(1) as amended by Act 24 of 1984 alters the nature of tax 
and it has ceased to be a tax on entertainments. 
 Since the elaborate study of tax and fee has been discussed 
in Chapter IV Federal Finance it need not required repeating here. 
 The Luxury Tax on Tobacco was held valid, as the item 
Tobacco was considered as an article of luxury in case of, 
A.B.Abdul Kadir v/s State of Kerala65.In justification of definition 
of word “luxury” it was observed by the Court that, the word 
“Luxury” has not been used in the sense of something pertaining to 
the exclusive preserve of the rich. The fact that the use of an article 
(tobacco) is popular among the poor sections of the population 
would not detract from its description or nature of being an article 
of luxury. The connotation of the word “luxury” is something, 
which conduces enjoyment over and above the necessaries of life. 
It denotes something, which is supering fluous and not 
indispensable and to which we take with a view to enjoy, amuse or 
entertain ourselves. An expenditure on something which is in 
excess of what is required for economic and personal well being 
would be expenditure on luxury although the expenditure may be 
of a nature which is incurred by a large number of people, 
including those not economically well off. The use of tobacco has 
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found to have delirious effect upon health and a tax on tobacco has 
been recognized as a tax in the nature of a luxury tax. 
 The Expenditure Tax Act (1957) (as amended by Finance 
Act, 1959) Section 4 (11) was introduced for computation of 
expenditure of an assessee. In the case, where assessee is 
individual, the expenditure incurred by his wife is liable to be 
included for computing the expenditure of the assessee even 
though she has her own properties, assets and income there from. 
The reason behind is that the wife is ‘dependent’ of the assessee as 
defined in Section 2(g)(i). After the amendment word ‘dependent’ 
in Section 2(g)(i) in relation to an assessee as individual means his 
or her spouse and minor child irrespective of such spouse or minor 
child being dependent on or independent of the assessee for 
support and maintenance. The words “who is wholly or mainly 
dependent on the assessee for support and maintenance” in Section 
2(g)(i) do not refer to the spouse or minor child, but new category 
of persons who came to be included in the definition of 
“dependent”. 
 The Expenditure Tax does not fall within Entry 62 in List II. 
Since, it is not specifically provided for any of the Entries in List II 
or III, residuary Entry 97 in List II covers it. 
6.19  List II Entry- 63 
 “Rates of stamp duty in respect of documents other than 
those specified in the provisions of List I with regard to rates of 
Stamp duty.” 
 Under Entry 44 of Concurrent List both Parliament of India 
and State Legislature have the power to pass a law in respect of 
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stamp duties other than duties or fees collected by means of 
judicial stamps. However, Entry 44 clearly states that the rates of 
stamp duty, could not be prescribed by, a law passed with 
reference to that entry. With respect to that Parliament and State 
Legislatures have been given separate powers under the Union List 
and State List respectively. Entry 91 of the Union List empowers 
the Parliament to levy rates of stamp duty in respect to bills of 
exchange, cheques, promissory notes, bills of lading, letters of 
credit, policies of insurance, transfer of shares, debentures, proxies 
and receipts. With respect to other documents the power is given to 
the State Legislatures under 63 of State List. The constitutional 
provisions seem to be reasonably clear and a conflict should not 
have normally arisen. However, the question cropped up before 
different High Courts whether State Legislatures were competent 
to impose a stamp duty on the certificate of enrolment of an 
advocate. In a case of Bar Council of U.P. v/s State of U. P66, it 
was contended that this amounted to encroaching upon the power 
of the Parliament under Entry 78 of the Union List to pass a law in 
respect of persons entitled to practice before the High Courts. It 
was further contended that, such a stamp duty, if allowed to 
impose, would conflict with Bar Council of India Act, which 
provides for the payment of fee to the Bar Council. The different 
High Courts and ultimately the Supreme Court held that it was 
perfectly within the power of the State Legislature to impose a 
stamp duty on the certificate of enrolment of an advocate under 
Entry 63 of the State List read with Entry 44 of the Concurrent 
List. Parliament’s power under Entry 78 of Union List was held to 
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be limited to determine the eligibility of a person to practice before 
the High Courts. It was further held that fee charged under the Bar 
Council of India Act was merely incidental to the giving of an 
application to the Bar Council for enrolment purposes. 
 List II Entry – 64 is not the taxing entry but entry for 
offences against law with respect to any of the matters in this List. 
While, List II Entry – 65 is meant for  Jurisdiction and powers of 
all Courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the 
matters in this List.  
6. 20     List II  Entry 66 
“Fees in respect of any of the matters in this List, but not 
including fees taken in any Court.” 
 A fee is generally defined to be a charge for a special service 
rendered to individuals by some Government agency. The amount 
of levy is supposed to be based on the expenses incurred by the 
Government in rendering service, though in many cases the costs 
are arbitrarily assessed. Ordinarily, the fees are uniform and no 
account is taken of the varying abilities of different recipients to 
pay. These are undoubtedly some of the general characteristics, but 
as there may be various kinds of fees, it is not possible to formulate 
a definition that would be applicable to all cases. 
In respect to the nature of a fee the observations of the Court 
in case of, Commissioner of H.R.E. Madras v/s Lakshmindra 
Tirtha Swamiar67, were that there is no general difference between 
a tax and a fee, and both are different forms in which the taxing 
power of a State manifests itself. Tax is a common burden and the 
only return, which the taxpayer gets, is the participation in the 
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common benefits of the State. Fees, on the other hand, are 
payments primarily in the public interest, but for some special 
service rendered or some special work done for benefit of those 
from whom payments are demanded. Thus, in fees there is always 
an element of quid pro quo, which is absent in tax. 
A fee in order to be legal fee must satisfy the following two 
conditions. 
1. There must be an element of quid pro quo that is to say, the 
authority levying the fee must render some service for fee 
levied however remote the service may be; 
2. That the fees realized must be spend for the purposes of the 
imposition and should not form the part of the general 
revenues of the State. 
  The registration fee leviable under notification does not 
satisfy the second requirement as to a valid fee namely, that the fee 
realized must be correlated with expenditure incurred on 
registration so as to be spent on maintenance of registration 
organization, consequently, the impost under notification was held 
illegal68. 
It was held in case of State of U. P. v/s Sheopat Rai & 
others69, which the periodic licence for retail vend of foreign liquor 
was granted on basis of ‘fixed fee’ or licence fee. The ‘fixed fee’ 
and  ‘licence fee’ connote and mean consideration received by 
Government for parting with its exclusive privilege to deal in 
intoxicants. It was held the no fee, no neither tax nor excise duty or 
cess but the said levy was sustainable under Entry 8 of List II of 
the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.  
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  6. 21    In Conclusion 
 
The analytical study of taxing entries of both Lists, Union 
and State Lists, show the facts that Centre has relatively more 
resources of income as compared to the functions to be performed 
by it and the States, on the other hand, face the problem of 
inadequacy of resources as against the various social and economic 
functions – expanding and expensive in nature to be performed by 
them (States). The Entry 97 of Union List I, is the magic power 
supply entry for the Union, for the purpose of raising revenue, 
from any tax not mentioned in either of those Lists. 
 The taxing entries of both Union and State Lists are such 
that, they meant to raise the revenue in accordance with their 
respective responsibilities. Viz. The Government of a State is 
concerned with the internal welfare of the people of the State, 
while Centre deals with foreign affairs, currency and 
communication, but one thing has be borne in mind that there is no 
clear cut distinction between functions of the Union and State 
Government. There should be co-ordination must at national level. 
This power of co-ordination must rest either with Central 
Government or with some specially constituted body. 
 From the above decisions, it seems bonafidely that, the 
judicial system does not seems to be natural free hence, the judicial 
interpretations of the taxing entries of State List have not reached 
the desired mark of expectation under the spirit and values of 
democracy. In a democratic federal polity the role of judiciary is 
more vital and significant than any other organs. The primary and 
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basic duty of the judiciary is to guide and guard the Constitution 
under the principal of democracy.  
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CHAPTER – 7 
 
Finance Commissions and their Functions 
 
Since civilization, the socio-political system has been 
revolving around resources accumulation and its allocation. The 
devolution, distribution and determination of financial flows 
between the suzerain power and its subordinates have been 
controversial issues through ages. The transfer of resources from 
Centre to the State is a silent feature of the post-independence 
financial system. In the last few years, there have been simmering 
and open conflicts between the Indian Union and States in the 
matter of devolution of fiscal and financial resources due to the 
political and ideological differences among the ruling parties in the 
States. This has been aggravated by the successive multi-party 
coalition Government at the Centre in recent times. The excessive 
dependence on the Centre’s devolutionary directive and the 
aggressive demands of the State Governments open new thrust 
areas and perspectives in federal financial relation. 
Apart from selected countries like U.S.A., Canada, 
Australia, Brazil and Nigeria, the India is the only country having 
federal financial system. In view of keeping intact the unity of the 
nation and maintaining disparity between the regions, the founder 
fathers of Constitution have strongly focused on the strong Centre 
concept. So, the framers of the Indian Constitution realised that to 
narrow down the Centre-State disparities a permanent or 
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immutable formula would hardly meet the situation for all time to 
come, as change in socio-economic conditions of the people would 
demand constant adjustment on the bastes of transfer of funds from 
the Centre to the States. They, therefore, after providing for the 
taxes, which the Centre shall or may share, with the States and for 
fiscal need grants from the Centre to the States, desisted from 
laying down any rigid formula to determine the specific amounts 
payable to the States by the Centre under each head. They 
embodied in the Constitution, a flexible system of revenue 
allocation, a system adjustable in the light of experience, 
contemporary economic situation, financial position of the Centre 
and the States and reviewable periodically and which would work 
without causing any inter-governmental friction. To ensure that the 
transfer of funds from the Centre to the States should be made in 
such a manner as not to impair State autonomy, it was provided 
that the quantum of such devolution of funds and the principles of 
their distribution among the States should not be left entirely to the 
discretion of the Central authorities but should be determined on 
the recommendations of an independent and impartial agency, 
which would assess the changing needs of the States and take into 
account the imbalance between the rich States and the poor ones, 
in making its recommendations. Unless provisions to this end were 
made, the framers of the Constitution realised that a mere 
distribution of sources of revenue between the Centre and the 
States might stereotype the existing economic disparities between 
the States as such. All these objectives were achieved by making 
provision in the Constitution itself for a periodic appointment of a 
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Finance Commission, a non-political body and by leaving to in the 
task of making inter-governmental financial adjustments from time 
to time. It goes a long way in increasing the flexibility in the 
division of revenues between the Centre and the States and also the 
distribution of divisible share among the States. In this approach, 
the founding fathers were guided by the experiences of Canada and 
Australia where the formula, laid down under the respective 
Constitution for Central grants to the Units was soon found 
inadequate and new methods had to be evolved from time to time 
to meet the changing needs. 
7.1    Composition of Finance Commission 
 Article 280(1) requires the President to constitute by order a 
Finance Commission within specified time frame, comprising a 
Chairman and four Members. Clause (2) of the same Article leaves 
it to Parliament to determine by law the requisite qualifications of 
the members and the manner of their selection. Parliament enacted 
the Finance Commission (Miscellaneous provisions) Act, 1951. 
Finance Commission (Miscellaneous provisions) Act, 1951 
provides that the Chairman should be a person having experience 
in public affairs and the four members are to be selected from 
among persons, qualified to be appointed as the Judges of a High 
Court; or having special knowledge of the finances and accounts of 
the Government; or having wide experience in financial matters 
and in administration; or having special knowledge of economics. 
A person is disqualified to be a member of the Commission if he is 
of unsound mind, or is an undischarged insolvent, or has been 
convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude, or has financial 
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or other interests prejudicially affecting his functions as a member 
of the Commission. The Commission being an ad hoc body, the 
President in the order of appointment determines the tenure of its 
members. Usually they are appointed for a period of one year. The 
members render such whole time or part time service as the 
President may specify in each case and the Government of India 
determines their emoluments. The procedure to be followed is 
determined by the Commission itself, which in the performance of 
its functions enjoys all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code 
of Civil Procedure 1908, in respect of summoning and enforcing 
the attendance of witnesses, requiring the production of documents 
and requisitioning any public record from any Court or Office. The 
Commission also has power to requite any person to furnish 
information on any matter, which the Commission considers useful 
or relevant to any matter under its consideration and in such a case 
protection of Section 54(2) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 or 
any other law, is not available to him. The Commission is deemed 
to be a Civil Court for the purposes of Sections 480 and 482 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. 
 The function of the Finance Commission is recommendatory 
and advisory in nature. The recommendations that the Commission 
makes ultimately find their destination under Article 281 is being 
‘laid’ before each House of Parliament. The duty of the 
Commission ends with the making of recommendations, the 
acceptance of which rests with the President or with Parliament, 
which has to enact laws in reference to them in the matters 
prescribed by Articles 270, 272 and 275. However, a convention 
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has been established under which the President or Parliament as 
the case may be, accepts, in these matters, the recommendations so 
made by the Commission. In the words of B.N. Rao, the 
Constitutional Advisor to the Constituent Assembly, “as a matter 
of strict law, the recommendations of the Commission are mere 
recommendations and it is open to the President, if he thinks fit, to 
depart from them. But it would be unwise to depart from them 
except for patent error”.  
 The Commission is expected to play the role of a wise man, 
a judge between the conflicting claims of the States on the one 
hand and the Centre on the other. B.R. Amedkar conceived of the 
role of the Commission “to do justice between Province and 
Province and between the Centre and the Provinces”. The 
Commission would be acting as a bumper between the President 
and the Provinces, which might be clamoring for more revenue 
from income tax. T.T. Krishnamachari held the opinion that the 
instruction of the Finance Commission was incorporated “to assure 
the States that they will have a fair deal”, and the scheme of 
distribution will not be made by the Union arbitrarily but will be 
based on the recommendations of an independent Commission, 
which will assess the changing needs of the States in making them, 
the purpose being to obviate the frequent political pressure to 
which Parliament and the Cabinet are likely to be subjected in 
revising the system of Union-State revenue transfers. The 
significant thing to note is that financial assistance, whether by 
way of devolution or grants, which the State receives on the basis 
of the recommendation of the Finance Commission, is of a 
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statutory character and thus does not affect the autonomy of the 
States. This is a method of resolving scrambles over the proceeds 
of taxes between the Union and the States, which are frequent 
occurrence in a federal Constitution. 
 The institution of the Finance Commission thus, provides a 
much needed flexibility in the interest of optimum distribution of 
the national resources as between different Governments in the 
country in accordance with their respective needs. It is conceived 
as the major instrument for periodic readjustments of Union-State 
financial relation with a view to strengthening the financial 
position of the States without compromising their autonomy. The 
establishment of this rather unique institution, says 
K.R.Bombwalla, may be described as India’s original contribution 
to the theory and practice of federalism. 
 The idea is borrowed from the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission of Australia, but there are many interesting points of 
departure between the two bodies. The Australian Commission is a 
continuing body and recommends grants to the deficit States every 
year. On the other hand, the Indian Finance Commission is not a 
continuing body but sits only once in five years. The appointments 
to the Commission are made for nearly a year, whereas the 
members of the Commonwealth Commission are given a three 
years’ term at a time. The Indian Commission becomes functus 
officio after completing its assigned work while the Australian 
Commission is a continuing body. Though an ad hoc body, the 
Indian Commission has much wider functions to discharge than its 
Australian counter part. The latter merely recommends annual 
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grants to the claimant States and has nothing to do with the sharing 
of income tax, which are negotiated between the Center and the 
States from time to time. The Indian Finance Commission, on the 
other hand, recommends not only the fiscal-need grants but also 
provides for tax sharing between the Centre and the States inter se. 
Besides, other matters relating to the inter-governmental financial 
relationship may also be referred to it from time to time. Statutory 
Transfers To States, under the recommendations of the successive 
Finance Commissions 
7. 2     Review of the First Finance Commission Devolution     
 (1952- 57)  
Transfer of resources from Centre to the States is inherent in 
the relationship envisaged in the Constitution between the Centre 
and States. Finance Commission is a silent feature of the Indian 
Constitution. The constitutional mandate required the President to 
appoint the first Finance Commission in terms of Article 280 
within two years from the commencement of the Indian 
Constitution. Hence the first Finance Commission was appointed 
by the President of India under chairmanship of Shri K.C.Neogi by 
an order dated 22nd November 1951 to make recommendations on 
the following aspects. 
1. The Finance Commission had to decide the share of States 
and the Union territories in the divisible pool of income tax 
under Article 270, and to recommend on the following 
points: - 
(a) The percentage of net proceeds of income tax, which 
should be assigned to States; 
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(b) The manner in which the share so assigned, shall be 
distributed among States; and 
(c) The percentage of net proceeds of tax, which shall 
be deemed to represent the proceeds attributable to 
part C States1.  
2. The principles, which should govern the grants-in-aid of 
revenues of States out of consolidated fund of India. The 
President communicated that the Commission should be 
formally requested to make recommendation to him in 
regard to: - 
(a) The sums to be prescribed by him as grants-in-aid   of 
revenues of States of Assam, Bihar, Orissa and West 
Bengal in lieu of assignment of any share of the net 
proceeds in each year of the export duty on jute and 
jute products to these States in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 273 of the Constitution; and 
     (b) The States in need of assistance and the sums payable 
to such States as grants-in-aid of their revenues under 
the substantive portion of clause (i) of Article 275 of 
the Constitution. 
The first Finance Commission considered “it undesirable to 
concentrate on income tax as a balancing factor in the adjustment 
of resources between the Centre and the Units”2.  It thought that 
“an increase in the States’ share of this tax should not be used as a 
major factor in the devolution of further resources to the States”3. 
But since there were factors working towards a reduction in the 
States’ share, it came “to the conclusion that some increase in the 
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share assignment to the States was justified”4, and raise the share 
of States from 50 to 55 per cent. Thus, the first Finance 
Commission increased the share of States in net proceeds of 
income tax from 50 to 55 per cent. 
Regarding the distribution criterion of income tax proceeds 
among the States, it assigned 2.25 per cent of the net proceeds to 
part C States and further recommended that the States’ share (55 
per cent) in the divisible pool of income tax be determined on the 
basis of population with 80 per cent weightage as per 1951 census 
and 20 per cent share should be based on income tax collection 
from different States. 
Respect to division of Union Excise Duties under Article 
272 of the Indian Constitution (Entry 84 List I), the Commission 
recommended that 40 per cent proceeds only, from tobacco 
(including cigarettes, cigars etc) matches and vegetable oil should 
be distributed among the States, on the basis of the size of their 
population. It suggested that the Government of India should 
collect consumption data so that the next Commission may think of 
distributing Union excise duties in proportion to the level of 
consumption instead of population. 
Grant- in- aid:  
    Article 275 empowers the Indian Parliament to pay such 
grants-in-aid to the States, which are in need of assistance by law. 
Under Article 280(1)(b) and 280(3)(b) of the Constitution, the 
Finance Commission proposed guidelines for determining the 
necessity and the quantum of grants both conditional and 
unconditional under Article 275 of the Constitution. They were, 
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(a)Budgetary needs defined as the revenue gap arising in the 
State Budgets after the shares of divisible taxes were 
credited. 
(b) Tax efforts of the States are a significant factor in 
determining the fiscal need. “A State which is prepared to 
raise the maximum amount of revenue through taxation is 
better entitled to Central assistance than a State which does 
not itself act sufficiently in the same direction”. 
(c) Economy in expenditure should also be taken into account 
in deciding upon the grants-in-aid. 
(d) Grants-in-aid is an important instrument in equalising the 
standard of social service across jurisdiction. If the standard 
of social services in a State is significantly lower compared 
to an all-India average its eligibility is established provided 
it is qualified on other counts also. 
(e) Special obligations of national concern, which are 
technically within the ambit of the State functions and in 
the discharge of which there is undue strain on the State 
finances, should be supported by grants-in-aid. 
(f) Grants-in-aid are also proposed independent of the 
budgetary need to the States to pursue such beneficent 
programmes, which are of primary importance and of 
national concern; such programmes which would enable the 
States, which are backward to come at the level of more, 
advanced States. 
These principles, on examination, will appear to have a close 
resemblance to the principles evolved by the Common wealth 
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Grants Commission of Australia5. To conclude, it is natural that in 
a matter, which involves the distribution of resources, all recipients 
would not be satisfied. In general, however, the Commission 
proposal received appreciation from all quarters. It was clear from 
its recommendations that, the first Finance Commission recognized 
the need for augmenting financial resources of the State on the one 
hand and classified the position of the Centre with the regard to its 
ability to assist the States through the grants-in-ad on other hand.   
7. 3  Review of Second Finance Commission. Devolution  
 (1957- 62) 
 The Second Finance Commission was set up in June 1956 
under chairmanship of Shri K. Santhanam. Their report was 
submitted in September 1957. The commission had to consider;  
1. The distribution between the Union and the States of the net 
proceeds of taxes which were to be divided and the 
allocation of States net share among the States; 
2. The principles that govern the grants-in-aid of the revenues 
of the States by the Centre and the amounts of grants under 
Art. 273 and the substantive portion of Art. 275(1) and ; 
3. The modification, if any, necessary in the rates of interest 
and the terms of repayments of the loans made to the various 
States by the Government of India. 
The taxes, regarding the allocation of which they had to 
make recommendations were income tax, Union excise duties, 
estate duty, tax on railway fares, and additional excise duties 
proposed to be levied on a few commodities in lieu of sales tax by 
the States. 
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The Second Finance Commission felt that an increase of the 
net proceeds of income tax in any financial year from 55 per cent 
to 60 per cent was justified, in view of the unanimous desire of 
States. The net proceeds of income tax attributable to Union 
territories were fixed at one per cent of the said tax. The 
Commission also held the view that the actual distribution of the 
share assigned to the States should be 10 per cent on the basis of 
collection and 90 per cent on basis of population, i.e. on the 1951 
census figures of population.6 Prior to April, 1952, no duty of 
excise was shared between the Union and States. The Second 
Finance Commission recommended to add the duties on sugar, tea, 
coffee, paper and vegetable, non-essential oils, to former divisible 
excise duties of tobacco, (including manufactured tobacco) 
matches and vegetable products which were earlier recommended 
by First Finance Commission; and the share of the States was 
reduced to 25 per cent. The Commission recommended that 90 per 
cent of the States’ share of Union excise duties should be 
distributed on the basis of population, the balance 10 per cent 
being used for adjustment, in favour of needy States. As a result of 
selected divisible commodities to eight (from three), the amount 
accruing to the States increased to Rs.153 crores, from 46 crores of 
the First Finance Commission. This bore out its observation that 
selected commodities shall be “common and widespread 
consumption and which yield a sizeable sum of revenue”. 
 Respect to the additional duty of excise levied on mill-made 
textiles, sugar and tobacco (including manufactured tobacco) in 
replacement of the sales taxes then levied by State Governments, 
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the Finance Commission was requested to suggest principles of 
distribution of this proposed tax among the States and the amount 
to each State. 
 The Commission suggested that one per cent of net proceeds 
from these were to be assigned to Union territories and 1.25 per 
cent to Jammu and Kashmir. The Commission arrived at the share 
of individual States largely on the basis of consumption figures, 
using population as a correctional factor, as the data on 
consumption were found defective. 
 Respect to the net proceeds of estate duty levied and 
collected under Article 269, by Union, was suggested by 
Commission to be assigned to the States, on formula that one per 
cent as the share attributable to Union territories, the balance was 
to be apportioned between immovable property and other property 
in the ratio of the gross value of all such properties brought into 
assessment in that year. The sum thus apportioned to immovable 
properties was to be distributed among the States in proportion to 
the gross value of the immovable property located in each State; 
the reminder was to be allocated among the States according to 
population. A tax on railway passenger fares was levied by the 
Centre, under Art.269, was recommended to assign the share to the 
respective State on basis of the net proceeds of actual passengers 
travel on railways within its limits. 
Grant- in- aid:  
 The Commission had not made any change in the grants to 
four jute growing States, viz. West Bengal, Bihar, Assam and 
Orissa, in lieu of a share of the export duty on jute under Art.273, 
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excepting for an adjustment of the grants to Bihar and West Bengal 
to take account of the transfer of certain areas from Bihar to West 
Bengal. 
7. 4   Review of the Third Finance Commission Devolution  
 (1962- 66) 
 The Third Finance Commission was set up in December 
1960 under the chairmanship of Shri Ashok K.Chanda in terms of 
Article 280 of the Constitution. It submitted its Report to the Union 
Government in December 1961. Its terms of references were: - 
(a) Sharing of income tax proceeds and Union excise duty 
proceeds on specified commodities between the Union and 
the States; 
(b) Distribution of additional excise duties levied on certain 
commodities; 
(c) Laying down guideline for extending grants-in-aid under 
Article 275(1) by the Union to the States; and  
(d) To make recommendations regarding: - 
 (i) the changes, if any, to be made in the principles       
governing the distribution among the States of estate 
duty    on property other than agricultural land; and 
  (ii) the distribution of the ad-hoc grants of Rs.12.25 crores 
payable to States in lieu of the loss arising from the 
abolition of the tax on railway passenger fares. 
The Finance Bill of 1959-raised controversy when it took 
away the income tax paid by companies and classified it as 
corporation tax. The States naturally felt deprived because by this 
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action an expanding source of revenues to which they were entitled 
was taken away. 
In the Commission’s opinion, the 66.75 per cent of the net 
proceeds of the tax should be assigned for distribution of States, 
and the distribution of the said assigned revenues among the States 
should be on the basis of 80 per cent for population and 20 per cent 
for collection, thus restoring the formula recommended by the First 
Finance Commission.  
In regard to sharing of Union excise duties, the third Finance 
Commission considered an extension of the list of excisable 
commodities in the divisible pool from 8 to 35 by including all 
commodities on which the duties were collected in 1960-61 
excluding silk fabrics and duty on motor spirit in view of the 
shrinkage of the divisible pool of income tax and need for 
assistance to the States for filling the larger revenue gaps caused 
by the impact of the committed expenditure of two successive 
plans. The Commission simultaneously reduced the State’s share 
of the divisible pool form 25 per cent to 20 per cent. In 
determining the share of each State the Commission, while 
continuing population as the major factor of distribution, had also 
taken into account the relative financial weakness of the States, the 
disparity in the levels of development reached, the percentage of 
scheduled casts and tribes and backward classes in the population 
etc. The idea behind this approach was to make an attempt “to 
bring all the States as far as possible to comparative level of 
financial balance through devolution.  
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Respect to devolution of additional duties of excise, the 
Commission recommended to retain one per cent share of Union 
territories from entire net proceeds of additional excise duties, but 
increased the share of Jammu Kashmir from 1.25 per cent to 1.5 
per cent. In respect to other States, the Commission recommended 
a small increase in the annual guaranteed amount from the existing 
level of Rs. 32.50 Crores to 32.54 Crores. As regards the 
distribution of the balance of net collections after meeting the 
guaranteed amount, partly on the basis of percentage increase in 
the collection of sales tax in each State since 1957-58 when the 
additional excise duties were imposed and partly on basis of 
population. 
Respect to principles governing distribution of estate duty 
was remained same as Second Finance Commission suggested 
them. 
Grants in lieu of Tax on Railway Passenger Fares: 
 The Commission recommended the distribution of the 
annual grants of Rs.12.5 Crores payable to the States in lieu of 
their share of the tax on railway passenger fares on the principle of 
compensation so as to place the States broadly on the same footing 
as they were before tax was abolished on April 1961. 
Grants- in- aid: 
 The Commission recommended an annual payment of total 
grants-in-aid of Rs.110.25 Crores to all States, except Maharashtra 
of this amount Rs.52 Crores were for filling the revenue gap in the 
budget of the State Governments. The balance of Rs.58.25 Crores 
was as grants-in-aid towards 75 per cent of the revenue 
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components of the States’ plans and included in its scheme of 
devolution and grants-in-aid. The Third Finance Commission 
suggested that, 
(a) Assistance towards fulfilling national purposes should 
still be conditional; and 
(b) Grants, which are meant to strengthen the local function, 
should be unconditional and States should be free to 
utilise them in a way that suited them. 
Under the Third Finance Commission’s recommendations 
under the horizontal distribution of resources transfer to State of 
Gujarat were as follows7 :- 
 
1.Share of Income tax - 4.78% 
2.Share of Union excise duties - 6.45 % 
3.Grants-in-aid, under Art. 275 - 4.25 lakhs 
4. Special purpose grant - 1.00 lakh 
5. Share of estate duty - 4.78 % 
6.Grants in lieu of tax on railway fares - 68 lakhs 
7. Addi. duty of excise Income to be assured -123.45lakhs 
8. Distribution of balance - 5.40 % 
 
In allocation of grants for the development of 
communication in the backward area, Gujarat having a higher per 
capita income qualified for a higher capita transfer to the tune of 
Rs. 1 Crore per year, while Uttar Pradesh, an avowedly backward 
State, did not quality for any grant.  
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7. 5     Review of the Fourth Finance Commission Devolution  
(1966- 71) 
 The Fourth Finance Commission, which was constituted in 
May 1964 under chairmanship of Dr. P.V. Rajamannar, in terms of 
Article 280 of the Constitution, submitted its Report in August 
1965. 
 As regards the share of net proceeds of taxes on income 
(other than agricultural income) the Commission recommended 
that 75 per cent of the divisible pool of income tax should be 
assigned to the States for distribution among them. In regard to the 
distribution of States share inter se, 80 per cent on the basis of 
population and 20 per cent on the basis of collection, the share of 
Union territories in the divisible pool of income tax proceeds at 2.5 
per cent. 
 In regard to sharing of the proceeds from Union excise duty 
among States, the share of States was determined on the basis of 
80 per cent on population and 20 per cent on economic and social 
backwardness. 
 The Fourth Finance Commission recommended that of net 
proceeds of additional excise duties in lieu of sales tax for the 
years 1966-67 to 1970-71, one per cent should assigned to Union 
territories, one and half per cent to be paid to the State of Jammu 
and Kashmir, one twentieth of one per cent be paid to Nagaland 
and the balance of 97.45 per cent of net proceeds, the guaranteed 
amount of Rs.3,245 lakhs be set apart and rest should be 
distributed on the basis of the proportion which sales tax revenue 
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collections in each State bore to total sales tax revenue in all States 
over the years, 1961-62 to 1963-64 
Estate Duty: 
 The Fourth Finance Commission retained the principles 
governing the distribution of estate duty as recommended by 
Second and Third Finance Commission, except for raising share of 
Union territories from 1 per cent to 2 per cent, after taking into 
account population and value of immovable property assessed in 
these territories in recent years. 
 Respect to Grants in lieu of tax on Railway Fares, the 
Commission did not suggest any change in the principles 
governing the distribution among the States of the grant payable to 
them under this head. 
 Regard to co-ordination between Union Excise Duties and 
Sales Taxes, the Commission suggested that procedure for 
formulating a scheme of ceiling on sales tax rates and for its 
implementation should be same as in case of additional excise 
duties in lieu of sales tax, i.e. by mutual agreement and 
understanding between the Centre and the States. 
Grants- in-aid: 
 The Commission recommended annual grants under Art.275 
of the Constitution amounting Rs. 121.89 Crores equal to one fifth 
of the deficit. 
 Under Fourth Finance Commission’s recommendations 
under the horizontal distribution of resources transferred to State 
of Gujarat were as follows8: -  
 1. Income Tax - Share received by Gujarat 5.29 % 
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 2. Union Excise Duties  - 4.80 % 
 3. Grants-in-aid under Art.275 - Nil   -  
 4. Estate Duty - 4.78 % 
 5. Grants in lieu of tax on railways passenger fares - 7.11 % 
 6. Additional Duties of excise in lieu of sales tax. 
        (a) Income to be assured- 323.45 lakhs 
        (b) Distribution of Balance - 7.43 % 
 To conclude, the Commission did commendable job in 
recognising the financial difficulties of States in view of increasing 
development and non-developmental expenditure and 
recommending a large share of divisible pool of income tax and 
Union excise duties. The suggestion of the Commission that there 
should be regular meeting between the Central and State 
Governments to discuss financial matter was a right step in 
bringing co-ordination in formulation and implementation of fiscal 
policies. 
7. 6    Review of the Fifth Finance Commission Devolution   
 (1969- 74) 
The Fifth Finance Commission was appointed by the 
Government of India, under Art.280 of the Constitution, with Shri 
Mahavir Tyagi as the Chairman in February 1968. The 
Commission made an interim report in October 1968 and on 31st, 
July 1969; it submitted its final Report to the President. 
 In addition to usual terms of references, the Commission 
was required to examine and make recommendations in regard to, 
1. Scope for extension of existing arrangements in regards 
to the   additional excise duties 
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2.  Scope for raising revenue, under Article 269  
3.  The problem   of unauthorised overdrafts of certain States 
     with Reserve Bank of India. 
The fifth Finance Commission, to cover the budgetary 
deficits of States, enlarged the divisible pool of income tax by 
adding advance income tax collections and special excise duties; 
both advance income tax collections and special excise duties had 
hither to remained outside the divisible pool. The States’ share in 
the divisible pool, however, was remained at 75 per cent of income 
tax and 20 per cent of Union excise duties. For the determination 
of the share of each State in sharable portion of income tax and 
Union excise duties, the Commission gave greater weightage to 
population and increasing the relative shares of States, which had 
low per capita income and were economically more backward. 
Income Tax: 
 Accordingly, in respect of income-tax, 90 per cent of the 
share of each State was fixed by the Fifth Finance Commission on 
the basis of population; the remaining 10 per cent being on the 
basis of assessments, in each State, instead of collections as 
recommended by earlier Commissions. The Fifth Finance 
Commission reduced weightage for collections from 20 per cent to 
10 per cent, because it recognized that collection basis aggravated 
inter-State inequality compared to a 100 per cent population basis 
since it was biased in favour of the advanced States. Yet the small 
weightage of 10 per cent was justified on the ground that the 
agricultural States could levy a tax on agricultural incomes not 
sharable with the Centre, while the industrial States needed to be 
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compensated. The share assigned to Union territories was fixed at 
2.6 per cent. 75 per cent share of income tax was to be distributed 
among the States.  
Union Excise Duties: 
 In regard to Union Excise duties, the weightage given to 
population, 80 per cent and the remaining 20 per cent, two-third 
was reserved exclusively for States whose per capita income was 
lower than the all States per capita income and the balance was to 
be distributed among all States accordingly to an integrated index 
of backwardness, as per criteria given in the Fifth Finance 
Commission Report. 
Additional Excise Duties: 
 These duties levied on tobacco, textiles and sugar in lieu of 
State sales tax, from 1957, had been treated by Finance 
Commissions as tax rental agreements between two levels of the 
Government, whereby the net proceeds were to be distributed 
among the States with the guarantee that each State must receive at 
least the amount it collected through sales taxes on these items in 
1956-57. 
 In regards to distribution of additional excise duties, the 
Fifth Finance Commission gave equal weightage to population and 
sales tax collections. 
Estate Duty: 
 The Commission decided to follow the principle laid down 
by the Fourth Finance Commission. 2 per cent of the net proceeds 
estate duty was earmarked to Union territories, the rest to States.  
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 Grants in lieu of tax on Railway Passengers Fares, was same 
as it was in Fourth Finance Commission Report. 
Grants-in-aid: 
 The Fifth Finance Commission studied the revenue gaps of 
different States and came to a conclusion that ten out of eighteen 
States would run into deficit and need grants-in-aid and the other 
eight States would have surplus, so the Commission reduced the 
quantum of statutory grants to about Rs.638 Crores for the period 
1969-70 to 1973-74 (from Rs.703 Crores for the period, 1966-67 to 
1970-71) 
 Recommendation in respect to Scope for Additional 
Taxation under Article 269, the Commission felt that there was no 
further scope for levying taxes enumerated in Art.269 of the 
Constitution, except in regard to a tax on advertisements in 
newspapers. 
 However, the Commission suggested for raising revenues 
mainly by taxation of agricultural sector, revision of rates of State 
excise duties, irrigation rates and power tariff and by collection of 
tax arrears and interest dues. 
Unauthorized Overdrafts: 
 Although loan do not come under the purview of the 
resource transfers recommended by the Finance Commissions, the 
Union Government sought Finance Commission’s advice to 
minimize the growing indebtedness of the States under Article 
280(d) of the Constitution “any other matter referred to the 
Commission by the President in the interest of sound finance”. 
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 The Fifth Finance Commission recommended the following 
the suitable measures to minimize the incidence of the overdrafts 
‘injection’. 
(a) Periodical review of limits by the Reserve Bank of India. 
(b) More frequent release of tax shares.  
(c) Consolidation loans so that repayment coincides with  
 release of Central Funds to the States and time of   
 floatation of their loan. 
(d) Modifying the size of the plan and the like.   
     (e) The Reserve Bank of India must stop payments, if   
           unauthorised overdrafts are not cleared, after 
           exhortation.  
(f) The Center must then assist the States to clear the 
     overdrafts, under States assurance that such a situation  
     would not arise again; and  
(g) If a State adopts a persistent attitude, it would have to  
      face the consequences of failure. 
Under Fifth Finance Commissions’ recommendations of the 
horizontal distribution of   resource transferred to State of Gujarat 
were as follows 9: -  
 1. Income Tax- 5.13 % 
 2. Union Excise duties - 4.17 % 
 3. Addition Excise duties - 323.45 lakhs (6.33%) 
 4. Estate duty- 4.80 % 
 5. Grants in lieu of Tax on railway passenger fares - 6.91 % 
 6. Grants-in-aid under Art.275 (1)   -nil – 
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 To conclude, the Fifth Finance Commission tried to provide 
more funds for the States by increasing the divisible pool by 
transferring 75 per cent share of income tax to States and also by 
including many items of excise duty in the divisible pool. The 
State Governments welcomed the introduction of States’ per capita 
income in relation to national per capita income as a factor in 
determining backwardness of a State for sharing Union Excise 
duties. 
 The Fifth Finance Commission through its various 
recommendations tried to raise additional funds for the States 
without weakening the financial position of the Union. 
7. 7    Review of the Sixth Finance Commission Devolution  
 (1974 - 79) 
Under the provisions of Article 280 of the Indian 
Constitution, the President appointed the Sixth Finance 
Commission in June 1972, under the chairmanship of Shri 
K.Brahmanand Reddy. The Sixth Finance Commission submitted 
its Report to the President on 28th October 1973. Following were 
the main recommendations of the Commission.  
Income – Tax: 
 The Commission raised the States’ share of the divisible 
pool of income tax from the existing 75 per cent to 80 per cent of 
the net proceeds. The Share of the Union territories was fixed at 
1.79 per cent. The Commission observed that there was a sufficient 
weight in the demand of the States that corporation tax should also 
be made shareable. It, therefore, suggested that this question 
  
 
377
should be put before National Development Council for 
consideration. 
 As regards the distribution criterion for the proceeds of 
income tax, the Commission was impressed by two factors, 
namely, population and collection. 
Union Excise Duty:  
 The Commission recognised that regional economic 
disparities should be reduced through the scheme of devolution of 
resources, and hence relative economic backwardness hold the 
substantial weights for distribution of States’ share in the proceeds 
of Union Excise Duties. In the light of the above, the Commission 
decided not to change the existing share of 20 per cent Union 
excise duties for the States. 
Additional Excise Duty: 
 As desired by the Fifth Finance Commission, the matter was 
considered by National Development Council, and the Council in 
1970, suggested that, the duties (additional excise) should not be 
abolish, and the net proceeds of additional excise duties levied on 
tobacco, textiles and sugar in lieu of State sales taxes were to be 
distributed among the States with the guarantee that each State 
must receive the amount it collected through sales taxes on these 
items in 1956-57. Hence, the final apportionment was in the ratio 
of 70:20:10 for population, State domestic product and production, 
respectively. The Commission recommended that share of Union 
Territories as 1.41 per cent. 
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Estate Duty: 
 The Commission recommended that, out of net proceeds of 
estate duty in each financial year, 2.5 per cent should be retained 
by Union, the proceeds attributable to union territories and the 
residual amount should be distributed in accordance to the 
principles described in the said report. 
Grants in lieu of Railway Passenger Fare Tax: 
 Since the tax on railway passenger fares was abolished from 
1st April 1961, the Union Government made an ad hoc grant of 
Rs.12.5 Crores yearly to State in lieu of tax for a period of five 
years from 1961-62 to 1965-66 and Rs. 16.25 Crores yearly to 
State from 1966-67 onwards. The Sixth Finance Commission 
raised further this annual grant from Rs.12.5 Crores to Rs.16.25 
Crores. The Commission suggested that the passenger earnings in 
each State on the basis of actual travel- gauge wise route lengths of 
railways- within its limits will be proper method for distribution of 
this grant inter-se, among the States. 
Grants in lieu of Wealth Tax on Agricultural Property: 
 Agricultural property was exempted from levy of wealth tax 
up to the year 1969-70, while the Wealth Tax had been enacted in 
1957. Wealth tax coverage was extended to agricultural property 
(except property situated in Jammu and Kashmir) in terms of the 
Finance Act of 1969, which became effective from the year 1970-
71. Inclusion of agricultural property under wealth tax was based 
on the consideration to bring equality between investors in non- 
agricultural property and agricultural property. 
 
  
 
379
 The Constitution does not provide the sharing of wealth tax 
with States either on an obligatory or permissive basis. Hence, 
when agricultural property was also included under wealth tax in 
1969, the Indian Government decided to provide grants on account 
of tax on agricultural property. The Commission recommended 
that the net proceeds of wealth tax to States in form of grants-in-
aid should be distributed to States in proportion to the value of 
agricultural property located in each State. 
Grants-in-aid: 
 Like its predecessors the Sixth Finance Commission was 
asked to recommend grants to States under Article 275(1). The 
Sixth Finance Commission recommended grants-in-aid to the tune 
of Rs.816 Crores for 15 States, to enable their per capita 
expenditure to come up to the average of all the States by the last 
year of the award i.e. 1978-79. This amount represented nearly a 
third of the total grants Rs. 2509 Crores recommended by the Sixth 
Finance Commission. It also recommended that the Planning 
Commission should monitor the usage of such funds, in other 
words, funds were earmarked without flexibility. 
Financing of Relief Expenditure: 
 The Sixth Finance Commission as per presidential order 
reviewed the policy and arrangements in regard to the financing of 
relief expenditure affected by natural calamities. The Commission 
observed that Central assistance for relief expenditure should be 
given on the basis of need and relative financial position of States 
and this amount should be adjusted against the ceiling of Central 
assistance for plan. It concluded that it would be difficult to decide 
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the scale of assistance to the States and the resources of such a 
fund might prove insufficient to meet a situation of large relief 
works. Therefore, the Sixth Finance Commission recommended 
the annual provision to States under “ 64 Finance Relief”. 
 Revision of terms of repayment of outstanding Central loans 
to States was a term of reference to be considered. As per 
presidential order and request to advice on growing indebtedness 
of the States under Article 280(d) of the Constitution, the 
Commission recommended consolidation of some loans into 
uniform categories, extension of the period of repayment, 
moratorium on repayment of some loans and writing off of pre-
portion loans. 
 Under the main recommendations of Sixth Finance 
Commission, respects to horizontal distribution of the resources 
transferred to the State of Gujarat were as follow10: - 
1. Income Tax - 5.55 % 
2. Union Excise Duties - 4.57 % 
3. Additional Excise Duties- 5.91 % 
4. Estate Duty   - 4.93 % 
5. Grants in lieu of Railway Passengers Fare Tax-7.47 % 
6. “64-Famina Relief” (Annual Provision) - 4.55 crores 
7. Debt Relief (74-79) - 36.25 crores 
 To conclude, the Sixth Finance Commission tried to give a 
rational base for providing funds to the States on the criterion of 
backwardness. However, the Commission’s devolution was subject 
to criticism by the States, which suffered due to droughts (Tamil 
Nadu and Gujarat) and severe floods (Bihar and Orissa) and the 
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central assistance to fight such natural calamities to the affected 
States was considered insufficient. 
7. 8    Review of the Seventh Finance Commission Devolution   
 (1979- 84) 
 The Government of India constituted the Seventh Finance 
Commission in June 1977 under the chairmanship of Shri J.N. 
Shellet, a retired Judge of Supreme Court, under the provisions of 
Article 280 of the Indian Constitution. 
 The Seventh Finance Commission recommended the 
distribution of the proceeds of sharable taxes/duties, along with 
others matters put for consideration and determination in the said 
presidential order, are as follows: - 
Income Tax: 
 1.Union territories were given a share of 2.19 per cent of the 
    net proceeds. 
2. 85 per cent of remaining amount was given to the States, 
     as against existing 80 per cent. 
3. The allocation of funds among the States was 90 per cent 
on the basis of population and 10 per cent on State 
contribution of income tax receipts.  
A large weightage (9o per cent) given to a mere scale factor, 
as population did not seem to be appropriate and also it did not 
help in obtaining the desired objective of balanced regional 
development. So, the developed States like Maharashtra got a 
share equal to 10.53 per cent while backward Orissa got only 3.79 
per cent and Gujarat got 5.95 per cent. 
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Union Excise Duties: 
(a) Excise on electric power generation imposed by the 
Central Government from March 78, was suggested to be 
share among the States on the basis of collection. 
(b) The share of States from the existing 20 per cent was 
raised to 40 per cent of revenue from all types of excise 
duties (basic special, auxiliary etc.). On the quantum of 
taxed to be shared with States it recommended that 
uniform principle should be applied to all sharable taxes 
and that the share of each State be made proportional to; 
Population X Poverty Ratio X Inverse of Per Capita 
Income. 
Additional Excise Duties: 
 The Seventh Finance Commission agreed with the 
suggestion made by Sixth Finance Commission, that there was 
hardly any need to earmark a guaranteed minimum amount of 
additional excise duty, since the share of additional excise duty 
now was no longer less than the sales tax receipts of those 
commodities in lieu of which additional excise duties were levied 
in 1956-57. 
 The Commission recommended that Sikkim should also get 
a share of additional excise duty. Since Textile goods are subject to 
sales tax, in several States, such States would not get share of 
excise duty in relation to textiles, while other States who had 
withdrawn the levy of sales tax in view of excise duty on textiles 
should be benefited. 
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Grants in lieu of Passenger Fares Tax: 
 In determining the amount of grants-in-aid for each State, 
the Commission adopted the total receipts of passenger fare of the 
starting station as basis – rather than the length of the railway line 
falling in the respective States. 
Estate Duty: 
 The Seventh Finance Commission did not depart from stand 
taken by earlier Commission with regard to distribution of estate 
duty. 
Grants in lieu of wealth Tax on Agricultural Property: 
 The net proceeds of wealth tax on agricultural property 
should be given to the States as grants-in-aid on the basis of the 
value of property located in each State, was the recommendation, 
given by Commission. 
 Grants-in-aid to fill the revenue gap, the Commission found 
that five States – Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Maharashtra and 
Punjab, during the Seventh Finance Commission period would be 
able to have surplus on revenue account, even without getting 
share of Union taxes, but eight States, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu 
and Kashmir, Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Orissa, Sikkim, 
Tripura would remain in deficit even after getting due share from 
Central taxes and they had to be provided with grants-in-aid 
amounting Rs.1173 crores. 
 Grants-in-aid for Administrative Reforms, were given to 17 
States excluding above mentioned revenue surplus States with 
Gujarat. 
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Financing Relief Expenditure: 
 It recommended that the Central Government should provide 
grants-in-aid to the States suffering from natural calamities, like 
earthquake, floods etc. to the extent of the 75 per cent of relief 
expenditure, but without bothering the said limit Central 
Government should help the States to any extent depending upon 
the gravity of the situation. 
 Horizontal distributions of Transfer of resources to State of 
Gujarat under Seventh Finance Commission under main 
recommendations are as follows11 :- 
1. Income tax  -  5.959 % 
2. Union Excise Duty - 4.10 % 
3. Additional Excise Duties    -Sugar   - Tobacco – Textile 
             8.742% - 6.013% - 6.013% 
4. Share of Railway Passenger Fares Tax of States -5.28 % 
5. Financial Aid for Relief Expenditure - 9.56 Crores 
 The Seventh Finance Commission suggested that, an expert 
non-political agency could be established to perform the functions 
of the secretariat of the Commission and play a watching and 
advisory role with regard to Central-State financial relations 
generally. 
 To conclude, taking an overall view, the Seventh Finance 
Commission had performed its task adequately, keeping in view 
the tremendous diverse interests with Union-State financial 
relations have generated in the country. 
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7. 9    Review of the Eighth Finance Commission Devolution  
 (1984- 89)  
The Eighth Finance Commission with Shri Y.B.Chauhan, 
Member of Parliament, as chairman, was constituted under the 
President’s Order dated 20th June, 1982, under Article 280 of the 
Indian Constitution, the terms of References were not new; as 
nearly as same as were in the earlier Commissions. 
 The final Report was submitted to the President on April 30, 
1984. The total task entrusted to the Commission can broadly be 
divided into two major head, firstly, the consideration of vertical 
fiscal division, i.e. division of revenue between the Union and the 
States; and secondly, horizontal fiscal division, i.e. allocation of 
States’ share among them. The Commission opined that, 
 “The crux of the problem is that the resources are limited 
and the needs of the States are enormous. It is to their credit that 
they are impatient to achieve further development as far as 
possible. The degrees of development vary; some States are 
relatively more advanced while others are lagging behind. 
Naturally, this leads to many competing claims, and the Finance 
Commission is compelled to adopt some approach in fixing 
priorities. At the same time it has to have regard to the needs of the 
Centre, which has many responsibilities. The overriding 
consideration which has guided the Commission, is the national 
interest taken as a whole ultimately, the solution we have chosen 
has been judged on this touchstone”. 
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Recommendations of the Eighth Finance Commission: 
Income Tax: 
1. Out of the net proceeds, a sum equal to 1.792 per cent 
    thereof was    attributed to Union territories. 
2. The share of net income tax proceeds, except the portion  
mentioned in above para (1) assigned to States, should be 
85 per cent. 
Union Duties of Excise:  
1. States should be paid a share out of the net proceeds of 
all excise duties, except the duties collected under the 
provisions of   Additional   excise Duties (Textiles and 
Textiles Articles) Act, 1978, and cesses   earmarked by 
low for special purposes. 
2. The net proceeds of the entire duty on generation of 
electricity should be distributed among the States in an 
amount equal to the collections in or attributable to that 
State.  
3. Excluding the net proceeds of excise duty on generation 
of electricity. The States share in the net proceeds of 
shareable excise duties should be 45 per cent. 
Additional Duties of Excise in replacement of Sales Tax: 
1. Sum equal to 2.391 per cent of such net proceeds be 
retained for Union territories. 
2. And balanced should be distributed among the States. 
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Estate Duty: 
1. The net proceeds of estate duty in respect of property 
other than agricultural land should attribute to Union 
territories. 
2. The balance of the net proceeds of estate duty in each 
year should be distributed among the States, in 
proportion to the gross value of the immovable property 
other than immovable property taken together located in 
each State and brought into assessment. 
3. Sikkim would also be entitled to a share in the net 
proceeds of this duty. 
Grant in lieu of Tax on Railway Passenger Fares: 
 The annual quantum of the grant in lieu of a tax on Railway 
Passenger Fares was raised to 95 Crores in each of the years 1984-
85 to 1988-89. 
Grant on account of Wealth Tax on Agricultural Property: 
 The share of each State in the grant on account of wealth tax 
on agricultural property should be an amount equivalent to the net 
collection of that State in same year. 
 The State of Gujarat got grants-in-aid to cover the additional 
burden on account of committed expenditure in respect of plan 
scheme, completed in 1984-85, of amount to Rs.14.375 Crores 
(annual Grant). 
 Under Financing of Relief Expenditure, the State of Gujarat, 
the amount of margin money Rs.29.75 Crores was granted.  
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 Under the horizontal distribution of the resources transferred 
to State of Gujarat under Eight Finance Commission 
recommendations were as follow 12: - 
 1.   Income Tax - 4.409 % 
 2.   Union Duties of Excise- 3.506 % 
 3.  Additional Duties of Excise in replacement of   
      Sales Tax 5.941% 
4. Grants in lieu of Tax on Railway Passenger  
      Fares  - 6.67 % 
5. Grants in aid under Article 275 of Constitution 
     14.375 Crores (annual) 
          6. Financing of Relief Expenditure -29.75Crores (annual) 
 Eight Finance Commission’s main recommendation was the 
increase in the Stats’ combined share of excise revenue from 40 
per cent to 45 per cent. But the extra 5% (enlarged) is to be shared 
not by all States but only by those having revenue deficits after the 
devolution of resources proposed by the Eight Finance 
Commission. But surprising to know that the list of States eligible 
for the 5% excise transfer excluded economically backward States 
like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar but included West Bengal.  
 The Finance Commission, being a creature of the 
Constitution, functions within frame of reference and any deviation 
from it would necessitate a constitutional amendment. This 
explains why Finance Commission take care not to enter into a 
discussion of whether any transfer of more revenue raising powers 
to States is desirable 
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7. 10   Review of the Ninth Finance Commission Devolution   
 (1990- 95) 
 In pursuance of the provision of Article 280 of the 
Constitution of India, the Ninth Finance Commission was 
constituted by order of the President [SO No.581 dtd.17th June, 
1989], consisting of Shri N.K.P. Salve (M.P.) as the Chairman and 
following four other members namely, 
(1) Justice Abdul Sattar Kureshi (J. of Gujarat High Court) 
 (2) Dr. Raja J. Chelleiah (Member of Planning Commission) 
 (3) Shri Laltan Avala (Ex. chief Minister of Mizoram) 
 (4) Shri Mahesh Prasad. 
The first report was submitted on 29th July 1989. 
Terms of Reference: 
 (1) The distribution between the Union and the States of the  
    net   proceeds of taxes, which are to be, or may be,  
    divided between them under Chapter I of the Part XII of   
    the Constitution and the allocation between the States of  
    the respective shares of such proceeds. 
(2) The principles, which should govern the grants-in-aid of   
     the revenues of the States out of the Consolidated Fund  
     of India and the sums to be paid to the States which are in  
     need of assistance by way of grants-in-aid of their  
    revenues under Article 275 of the Constitution for the 
     purposes of other than those specified in the provisos to  
     Clause (1) of that article. 
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The Commission may suggest changes, if any to be made in 
the principles governing the distribution of: - 
(1) Respect to the net proceeds in any financial year of the 
additional excise duties leviable under the Additional 
Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act 
1957, in replacement of the sales tax levied formerly by 
the State Governments, and; 
(2) The grants to be made available to the States in lieu of 
the tax under the repealed Railway Passenger Fares Act, 
1957. 
(3) Review the responsibility of merging of Additional 
Excise duties with basic Excise duties, and review of 
distribution of additional excise duties levied in lieu of 
States’ sales tax on item of special purposes under 
Additional excise duties Act of 1957. 
(4) The Commission may make an assessment of the debt 
position of the States as on 31st March, 1989 and suggest 
such corrective measures as are deemed necessary also 
keeping in view the financial requirements of the Centre. 
(5) The Commission may review the present scheme of 
Calamity Relief Fund and may make appropriate 
recommendations thereon. 
Recommendations of the Ninth Finance Commission: 
Income Tax: 
(1) Out of the net proceeds, sum equal to 1.437 per cent 
therefore was to be attributed to Union territories. 
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(2) The share of net income tax proceeds, except the portion 
representing the proceeds attributable to Union territories 
and Union emoluments, assigned to the States should be 
85 per cent; and 
(3) The distribution amongst the States inter se of the share 
assigned to the States in respect of each financial year 
should be on the basis of percentage shown in para 5- 13 
of the Financial Commission Report. 
Hon. Justice A.S.Kureshi, insist for the inclusion of 
corporation tax in the divisible pool of income tax for the States so 
as to distribute among them (States) 
The basis of distribution among the States inter se were 
(horizontal division) 
(1) 10% on the basis of contribution. 
(2) 45% on distance of per capita Income State multiplied  
by population. 
(3) 22.5% on the basis of population 
(4) 11.25% on the basis of composite index of 
backwardness. 
(5) 11.25% on the basis of inverse of per capita income  
     multiplied by the population of the State. 
 
The Ninth Finance Commission recommended that, the 
addition excise duties levied on Cotton Fabrics, Sugar and 
Tobacco, in lieu of sales tax, should be distributed amongst the 
States, on following basis;  
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 (A) Sum equal to 1.903 per cent of such net proceeds to be   
    retained by the  Central   Government as attributable to 
       Union    territories. 
(B) The balance should be distributed amongst the States in 
      accordance with the percentage mentioned in para 11-3 
      of the said report. 
Respect to the net percentage distribution of Union excise 
duties amongst States was fixed 45 per cent of net proceeds of 
excise duties; and the basis of such proceeds were to be distributed 
amongst the States were on following basis: - 
(1) 25% on basis of population. 
(2) 12.5% on the basis of I A T P. 
(3) 15.5% on the basis of index of backwardness. 
(4) 33.5% on basis of distance 
(5) 16.5% among deficit States. 
Grant in lieu of Tax on Railway Passenger Fares: 
The annual quantum of the grant in lieu of a tax on railway 
passenger fare was raised to Rs.150 crores in each year 1990 to 
1995 and the principles or criteria for distribution of said grants 
were same as were shown in 8th Finance Commission report. 
Grants - in – aid: 
 To cover the requirements of upgradation and special 
problems during the five years from 1990-95 the twenty-one 
States, except Gujarat, Maharashtra, Hariyana and Karnataka were 
paid the amount specified against each of them as grants-in-aid of 
their revenues under the substantive part of clause (1) of the 
Article 275 of the Constitution under para 11-7 of this report, while 
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the all twenty-five States got the grants-in-aid under the Provisions 
of Article 275(1) of the Constitution. 
The Ninth Finance Commissions recommended the 
horizontal distribution of the resources transferred to State of 
Gujarat were as follows13 :- 
(1) Income Tax - 4.550 per cent 
(2) Additional excise duties - 5.905 per cent 
       (Cotton fabrics, Sugar & Tobacco) 
(3) Union excise duties  - 3.183 per cent  
(4) Grants in lieu of tax on railway fares – 5.717 per cent 
(5) Relief expenditure fund - 85 crores 
(6) Grants-in-aid under Art.275 (1) - 63.75 crores (annually) 
 The Commission did not suggest the recommendation of 
merging of additional excise duty with basic Union excise duties, 
the reason was that most of the States did not give consent on the 
merging issue of excise duties. The Ninth Finance Commission 
was also asked in its terms of reference, inter alia, to adopt a 
normative approach in assessing receipts and expenditure on 
revenue account of both the Union and the States and not to accept 
the figures on face value. This was thought to inculcate fiscal 
discipline through curtailment of wasteful expenditure and 
enhancement of revenue raising efforts. The Commission used 
“needs” approach in assessment of expenditure and ‘capacity’ 
approach in assessment of revenue receipts. It used separate 
procedures for taxes and each of non-tax revenue-user charges, 
fees, dividends and interest. This approach received dissent from a 
member of the Commission itself and resentment from the States. 
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This term of reference was therefore dropped when the Tenth 
Finance Commission was constituted in 1992 and the gap filling 
approach reverted back. 
7. 11    Review of the Tenth Finance Commission Devolution      
    (1995 – 2000) 
 In pursuance of the provisions of Article 280 of the 
Constitution of India and of the Finance Commission 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1951 (33 of 1951), the President 
constituted a Finance Commission [under the order – SO No.431 
(E) dtd.15th June, 1992) consisting of Shri. Krishna Chandra Pant 
as the Chairman and the following four other members, namely; 
(1) Dr. Debi Prasad Pal (M.P.) as member  
(2) Shri B. P.R.Vithal - member 
(3) Dr. C.Rangrajan – member 
(4) Shri M.C.Gupta – member 
The Commission was asked to make recommendations 
regarding, 
 (1) the distribution between the Union and States of the net  
     proceeds   of taxes which are to be or may   divided  
     between   them   under   Chapter   1 of Part XII of the 
     Constitution and the allocation between the States of the  
     respective shares of such proceeds. 
(2) The principles, which should govern the grants-in-aid of 
 the revenues of the States out of the   Consolidated Fund  
of India and the sums to be paid to the States which are in 
need of assistance by way of grants-in-aid of their 
revenues under Article 275 of the Constitution for the  
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purposes other than those specified in the provisos to  
Clause (1) of that article and respect to distribution of 
additional excise duties and grants to States in lieu of tax  
under repealed Railway Passenger Fares Act, 1957. 
 In addition to the above terms of references the Commission 
was required to make recommendations on the followings: - 
(1) Review of present scheme of   Calamity Relief Fund, 
(2) Suggestion of corrective measures to narrow down the  
debt position of States, subject to keeping in view the 
financial requirements of the Centre. 
The two members, first, Dr. C.Rangrajan resigned during the 
working period of Finance Commission, as he was appointed as a 
Governor of Reserve Bank of India and another member Shri M.S. 
Gupta, relinquished charge of office as he took the charge of Chief 
Secretary to the Government of Haryana. 
The report of the Tenth Finance Commission was submitted 
to the President on 26th N0vember, 1994. 
The report of the Tenth Finance Commission covered the 
five years period commenced fro 1st April 1995 together with the 
explanatory memorandum on the action taken on the 
recommendations of the Commission, under pursuance of Article 
281 of the Constitution. For the period of five years commencing 
from April 1st 1995, recommendations contained in the Report of 
the Finance Commission relating to sharing of Income-tax, Union 
Duties of Excise, Additional Excise Duties in lieu of States’ sales 
tax had been accepted by Government. The recommendations of 
the Commission relating to grants in lieu of the repealed tax on 
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railway passenger fares have also been accepted by the 
Government. The recommendations of the Commission that 
receipts on account of ‘interest recoveries’ and ‘penalties’ under 
the Income Tax Act should be shared with the States with effect 
from 1st April, 1995 has been accepted by the Government. 
Income Tax: 
The Commission recommended that the share of the States 
in the net proceeds of income should be fixed at 77.5 per cent out 
of the net proceeds of income tax a sum equal to 0.927 per cent, 
thereof was to be attributed to Union territories. 
 The criteria for determination of the inter se shares of the 
States in the sharable proceeds of income tax based on following 
indices: 
(1) 20 % on the basis of population 
(2) 60 % on the distance of per capita income 
(3) 5 % on the basis of area adjusted 
(4) 5 % on the basis of index of infrastructure 
(5) 10% on the basis of tax efforts. 
Union Excise Duties: 
 The Commission recommended that net proceed of Union 
excise duties Entry 84 of Union List of the Seventh Schedule read 
with Article 272 of the Constitution, raised to 47.5 per cent. Out of 
these 47.5 per cent, the 7.5 per cent was recommended to assigned 
to the States, which were assessed to be as deficit States. 
 The criteria for distribution of net proceeds of 40% of Union 
excise duties were same above stated in case of income tax. 
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  Respect to distribution of additional excise duties, leviable 
under the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special 
Importance) Act 1957, in lieu of the sales tax levied formerly by 
the States, the Commission agreed with the view taken by the 
Ninth Commission, in this regard. Hence, in respect to distribution 
of additional excise duties, the criteria of population were based on 
latest census figures of 1991, instead of usual population figures of 
1971 census. As regards to share of the Union territories 
amounting to 2.203 per cent should be retained by the Central 
Government and the balance should be distributed among the 
States as shown in para 6-19 of the said report. 
Grant in lieu of Tax on Railway Passenger Fares: 
 Article 269 of the Constitution empowers the Government 
of India, amongst other things, to levy and collect taxes on railway 
fares and freights but the net proceeds are to be assigned to the 
States. The tax was levied for the first time under the Railway 
Passenger Fares Tax 1957. The Act was repealed with effect from 
1st April, 1961.In pursuance of the recommendations of the 
Railway Convention Committee; the tax was merged with basic 
fares. The tax was revived briefly in 1971 at the time of the 
Bangladesh war and was repealed again on 31st March 1973. It was 
agreed that the States should be compensated for the consequential 
loss of revenue through an ad hoc grant. 
The Commission recommended that,  
(1) The quantum of the grant in lieu of Railway Passenger  
                Fares Tax   for   1995-2000 should be   Rs.380   Crores  
               Annually. 
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(2) The shares   of the    States be allocated in the   same 
     proportion as the average of the non-suburban passenger 
     earnings in each State during the years 1988-89 to 92- 93 
     bears   the   average   of   the    aggregate    non-suburban   
     earnings in all States in those years. 
On this basis the shares States was declared in para 7-12 of 
the   report. 
Upgradation Grants: 
 The Commission recommended a total sum of Rs.2608.50 
Crores as grants for upgradation and special problems for the 
period 1995-2000. 
Financing of Relief Expenditure: 
 The Commission recommended that the amount worked out 
for all the States for the period of their report was Rs.6304.27 
Crores. Out of this, Centre would be required to contribute Rs. 
4728.19 Crores (75 per cent) and the States Rs. 1576.08 Crores (25 
per cent) and it was suggested to continue the current scheme of 
Calamity Relief Fund, with modifications suggested by the 
Commission in para 9-15 of the said report. 
 The Commission further suggested that in addition to the 
Calamity Relief Funds of the States, a National Fund for Calamity 
Relief should be created in which the Centre and the States will 
contribute and which will be managed by a National Calamity 
Relief Committee on which both the Centre and States would be 
represented. The size of the National Fund for Calamity Relief 
would be Rs.700 Crores, for the period of 1995 to 2000 with an 
initial corpus 200 Crores to which Centre will contribute Rs.150 
  
 
399
crores and the States Rs.50 Crores in proportion of 75: 25. The 
contribution of States inter se would be in the same proportion as 
their estimated total tax receipts after devolution. 
Grants- In- Aid: 
 The Commission recommended a scheme for debt relief in 
two parts:- 
(1) A scheme for general debt relief for all States linked to 
     fiscal performance; and 
(2) specific relief for States with high fiscal stress, special 
     category States and States with debt problems warranting 
     special attention. 
In addition a scheme for encouraging retirement of debts 
from the proceeds of disinvestments of equity holdings of State 
Government. 
The Commission suggests an Alternative Scheme for 
devolution of tax revenues. It recommended that having regard to 
the share of States in income tax, Union-excise duties and grants-
in-lieu of tax on railway passenger fare except surcharges in total 
central tax revenues (including additional excise duties) and the 
fact that they were recommending the inclusion of some taxes 
under Article 269 in the Central Pool, the share of States in the 
gross receipts of Central taxes should be 26 per cent. They further 
recommended that the tax rental arrangement should be 
terminated, and additional excise duties have to merge with basic 
excise duties. These three commodities (Cotton Fabrics, Sugar and 
Tobacco) should not be subjected to States sales tax. The Tenth 
Finance Commission had recommended a constitutional 
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amendment for fixing a share of 29 per cent for States, which 
could be reviewed after 15 years. To be precise, it had 
recommended a share of 26 per cent of the gross proceeds of all 
Union taxes and duties and a further share of 3 per cent of the same 
to the States where additional excise duty was being levied in lieu 
of sales tax on certain goods if the tax-rental arrangement were to 
terminated. 
Under the Tenth Finance Commission’s recommendations 
the horizontal distributed share of the resources transferred State of 
Gujarat were as follow14: - 
1. Income tax - 4.046 per cent 
2. Union Excise Duties - 4.046 per cent 
      (In 40 per cent of the net proceeds       of Union excise duties) 
3. Additional duties of excise -  5.995 per cent 
4. Grants in lieu of tax on Railway Passenger Fares -6.901%  
5. Grants-in-aid under Article 275(1) – Nil 
6. Upgradation grants-in-aid - Nil 
7. Special problem grants-in-aid - 50 crores 
8. Grant for urban local bodies grants-in-aid - 67.46 crores 
9. Calamity Relief Fund grants-in-aid - 551.17 crores 
  10. Grant for Rural local bodies grants-in-aid - 192.01 crores 
(For five years) 
In the following horizontal distribution of devolution of 
resources amongst the States, how the need base criteria adopted 
by various Finance Commissions to follow the principle of 
equality has affected the equity right of State of Gujarat in getting 
appropriate horizontal share will be seen. 
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Horizontal sharing of State of Gujarat: 
Finance Commission. Income Tax  Union Excise Duties 
Third    4.78%   6.45% 
Fourth    5.29%   4.80% 
Fifth    5.13%   4.17% 
Sixth    5.55%   4.57% 
Seventh   5.959%   4.10% 
Eighth   4.409%   3.506% 
Ninth     4.550%   5.905% 
Tenth    4.046%   4.046%  
There was a strong feeling was prevailing in Gujarat that 
due to need based criteria adopted particularly by the Tenth 
Finance Commission while pushing back the factor of 
contribution, this State has suffered badly in horizontal sharing of 
resources. Notwithstanding often – repeated justification of such a 
policy regime in terms of positive discrimination to reduce the 
regional disparities, it is working as a disincentive in promoting the 
growth. The general feeling of the Gujarat State is that a 
contribution scheme is an anathema with the Government of India. 
Legacy of the left-of-Centre approach in economic policy making 
appears to hold its sway even in a liberalized regime. Gujarat, with 
its forward looking industrial and other economic policies, has 
succeeded in attracting the largest share of flow of investment after 
the liberalization process was set in motion and would naturally 
contribute to the federal Government in proportionate manner. If 
this mammoth effort put in by the States goes unnoticed and 
unrecognised, it will not only work as a disincentive to the State, 
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but also in the long run undermine the federal tax revenue 
prospects. It is, therefore, necessarily that now the Finance 
Commission should adopt the practice to discards shibboleths 
which have so far governed the thinking in this regard and give 
some reward to the States on the basis of the contributions made by 
them to the National exchequer. It is accepted by all that present 
design of horizontal sharing has not brought about greater fiscal 
discipline among the States nor does this method take into account 
the impact on equity and efficiency. This however, should not be 
interpreted as a denial of the need of the backward States to enable 
them to catch up with their more developed neighbors. The need 
theory in concrete terms would mean helping the backward States 
in bringing their standards for social and economic services to the 
national average. The hard fact is that in a country where 
disparities are glaring due to historical and administrative reasons, 
achieving total equality in growth is well-neigh impossible. This 
has never been achieved any where in the world and experience in 
India is not different despite all that has been done through every 
conceivable means for taking development to the backward 
regions. So, Gujarat emphatically has urges before the all 
commission to correct the distributions that have crept in inter-
State allocation of resources due to the removal of contribution 
criterion. In estimating the quantum of inter-se distribution among 
the States, population and area of the State should be given due 
weight because they are the natural parameters deserving 
consideration in inter-State comparison.   
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7.12 Review of the Eleventh Finance Commission Devolution  
       (2000-2005) 
In pursuance of the provision of the Article 280 of the 
Constitution of India and of the Finance Commission 
(Miscellaneous Provision) Act, 1951(33 of 1951), the Eleventh 
Finance Commission has been constituted with Shri A.M. Khushro 
as the Chairman and the following four members, namely: - 
1. Shri N. C. Jain,  
       Former Advocate General of Madhya Pradesh.- Member 
2. Shri J. C. Jetly, (Retd.) 
      Former Secretary to Government of India – Member. 
3. Dr. Amresh Bagchi, 
      Former Director of the National Institute of Public Finance  
      and Policy - Member 
4. Shri T. N. Shrivastava, I A S. – Member- Secretary. 
 The Commission was asked to make recommendations on 
the following matter: - 
 (1) the   distribution between the Union and the States of the 
               net     proceeds   of   taxes which are to be, or may be,  
               divided      between   them     under    Chapter- 1    of the 
               Part     XII   of    the      Constitution and the    allocation 
               between   the   States of the    respective    shares of such  
               proceeds ; 
 (2) the principles which should govern the grants-in-aid of 
the revenues of the States out of the Consolidated Fund 
of India the sums to be paid to the States which are in 
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need of assistance by way of grants-in-aid of their     
revenues   under    Article 275      of the Constitution for  
      purpose   other    than those specified in the provisions to  
      Clause (1) of that article;  
 (3) the measures needed to augment the Consolidated Fund 
of a State to supplement the resources of the 
Municipalities in the State on the basis of 
recommendations made by Finance Commission of the 
State; 
(4) the    Commission had to review the state of Finances of 
the Union and the States and suggest ways and means by 
which the Governments, collectively and severally, may 
bring about a restructuring   of the public finance so as to 
restore budgetary  balance  and maintain macro economic 
stability; and; 
(5) The Commission may suggest changes, if any to be made 
in the principles governing the distribution among the 
States of, 
(a) the net proceeds in any financial year of the additional 
duties of excise leviable under the additional Duties of 
Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 (58 
of 1957) in lieu of the sales tax levied formerly by the 
State Governments and; 
(b) the grants to be made available to the States in lieu of 
tax under the repealed Railway Passenger Fares Tax 
Act, 1957 (25 0f 1957) 
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Thus, the terms of reference of the Eleventh Finance 
Commission, included the devolution of Central Tax proceeds and 
principles governing grants-in-aid to States; measures for 
correcting the States, debts position; schemes of calamity relief; 
and fund requirements for upgradation of standards; the 
Commission was first time mandated, in terms of 73rd and 74th 
constitutional amendments, to suggest measures to argument of 
Consolidated Fund of a State with a view to supplementing the 
resources of Panchayats and Municipalities. 
The Constitution (Eightieth Amendment) Act, 2000 has 
altered the pattern of sharing of central taxes between the Centre 
and the States in a fundamental way. Prior to this amendment, 
taxes on income other than agricultural income and Union duties of 
excise were shared with States under Article 270 and 272 
respectively. The Eightieth Amendment Act has substituted a new 
article for Article 270 and omitted the old Article 272. The 
provisions of new amended article has already been noted in earlier 
chapter of this thesis, hence it has not been repeated here. 
The main changes brought about by this amendment are as 
follows: - 
 (a) All Central taxes and duties, except those referred   in 
               Article 268 and 269 respectively, surcharges and cesses 
               are to be shared between the Centre and the States. 
 (b) Only States in which these taxes and duties are “leviable 
                in that year” are entitled to get a share in these taxes and  
                duties.  
          (c) A percentage of “net proceeds” of these taxes and duties  
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               as may be prescribed by the President by order after 
considering the recommendations of the Finance                   
Commission is to be shared by States. 
(d) The percentage of “net proceeds” of these taxes, which is  
     assigned to the States in any financial year shall not form  
     part of the Consolidated Fund of India. 
 The recommendation of the Tenth Finance Commission 
regarding sharing of “gross proceeds” was also not accepted in the 
new Amendment Act and the word “the share of net proceeds” was 
prescribed in order to maintain consistency between Articles 270, 
279 and 280. 
 The Amendment Act has recast the Article 269. The new 
article includes only takes on sale and purchase of goods and the 
takes on consignment of goods. All the other taxes that were listed 
under Article 269 prior to the amendment has deleted from this 
article. 
 As the expenditure tax and service tax was not leviable in 
the State of Jammu & Kashmir, the Eleventh Finance Commission 
had kept this positions in mind, while determining the inter- se 
share of the States in the distribution of Central taxes of 
expenditure tax & service tax.  
In view of the above mentioned changes under the 
Constitution (Eightieth) Amendment, the Eleventh Finance 
Commission recommended total aggregate share of State would be 
29.5 per cent of the net proceeds of all Union taxes and duties. 
Inter-se distribution among the States is done in the same manner 
as the distribution of 28 per cent of the net proceeds, while 1.5 per 
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cent of all sharable Union taxes and duties be allocated to the 
States separately. They further recommended that, if any State 
levies and collects sales tax on sugar, textile and tobacco, it will 
not be entitled to any share from this 1.5 per cent. Two basic 
principles for determining the inter-se shares of States were – (1) 
equity and (2) efficiency. The principle of equity makes up for 
resource deficiencies. As such it also tends to create a vested 
interest in continuing with the resource deficiency. To neutralize 
this adverse incentive, it needs to be complemented by suitable 
criteria for rewarding ‘efficiency’, i.e. efforts to improve the 
resource bases and deliver services at minimum (efficient) costs. 
Criteria and Relative weights for Determining Inter-se shares of 
States by Eleventh Finance Commission were as follow15 :- 
Criterion    Relative Weight (per cent) 
1.Population     10.5 per cent 
2.Income (Distance Method)  62.5 per cent 
3.Area     7.5 per cent  
4.Index infrastructure    7.5 per cent 
5.Tax effort      5.0 per cent  
6.Fiscal Discipline    7.5 per cent 
 The State of Gujarat received 2.821 per cent of share from 
net proceeds of all sharable Union taxes and duties, except the 
expenditure tax and service tax, in each financial year from 2001 to 
2004-05. As expenditure tax and service tax were not leviable in 
State of Jammu & Kashmir at time of preparing the Eleventh 
Finance Commission reports, the share in net proceeds of these 
taxes were not therefore, assigned to this State. The remaining 24 
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States were made eligible to receive the net proceeds of the said 
taxes. State of Gujarat received 2.858 per cent from the net 
proceeds of expenditure and service tax. 
 The Eleventh Finance Commission was asked to make the 
recommendations respect to upgradation grants to States under 
Para 5 of the presidential order, for the requirements of States for 
upgradation of standards in non-developmental and social sectors 
and services, particularly of States which are backward in general 
administration with a view to modernise and rationalise the 
administrative set up in the interest of speed, efficiency and sound 
fiscal management. 
 One of member, shri J. C. Jetli considered that, such grants 
in aid should be given only to such States, which are in need of 
assistance upgradation, so grants in aid to all States is in consistent 
with Article 275 of the Constitution. However, Chairman and other 
member were in favour of granting upgradation grants to all States 
for implementation of following sectors. 
(1) District administration; 
(2) Police administration; 
(3) Prisons administration; 
(4) Judicial administration; 
(5) Fiscal administrations;  
(6) Fire services; 
(7) Health services; 
(8) Elementary education; 
(9) Computer training for school children; 
         (10) Public libraries 
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    (11) Heritage protection; and 
    (12) Augmentation of traditional water sources. 
 So, Eleventh Finance Commission provided total 
Rs.4972.63 crores towards upgradation and special problem grants. 
 Under special problem grants the Gujarat was provided 
Rs.50 crores for the purpose to bolster the security infrastructure 
along the border (including 512Km. Long international border) 
effectively and for procurement of a helicopter for aerial patrolling, 
watch towers, residential quarters for the security staff, petrol 
vehicles etc. 
 State of Gujarat was allocated with Total sum of Rs.2500 
Lakhs of upgradation grants for the police administration; it 
includes Rs.206 Lakhs for providing facilities for women police 
personnel.  
 Under the paragraphs 3 (c) and 3 (d) of the Presidential 
order, the Commission was asked to make on the measures needed 
to augment the Consolidated Funds of the States to supplement the 
resources of the panchayats and the municipalities on the basis of 
the recommendations of the State Finance Commissions (SFCs), 
further the paragraph 6 of the Presidential order, gave the 
permission the Commission to make recommendations for the 
emoluments and terminal benefits of the employee of the local 
bodies, including teachers, on their own assessment in the said 
matter in case where, the SFCs have not been constituted as yet, or 
have not submitted their reports to concerning authority-States. 
 The rural and urban bodies, that are the panchayats and 
municipalities, were in existence even before the 73rd and 74th 
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constitutional amendments. Every States had enacted suitable 
legislation for devolution of functions, powers and responsibilities 
to these bodies, including the power to raise resources. The 
constitutional changes  - 73rd and 74th amendments – however; 
envisage the panchayats and municipalities as institutions of self-
Government. The Commission entrusted two study reports, one for 
rural local bodies (NIRD- National Institute for Rural 
Development) and other for urban local bodies (NIPFP- National 
Institute for Public Finance Policy) to determine the position of 
devolution of functions to the local bodies, the powers to raise 
resources and for working out the requirements for the 
maintenance of core services. 
 Keeping in view the availability of resources and overall 
limits set for the flow of resources from Centre to the States, the 
Eleventh Finance Commission recommended a total grant of 
Rs.1600 crore for the Panchayats and Rs.400 crore for the 
municipalities for each of the five years starting from financial 
year 2000-01. In per capita terms the amounts recommended by 
them for the rural local bodies were higher than those for urban 
local bodies.  
 The determination of the inter-se share of States in the 
amount indicated by Commission for the rural and urban bodies- 
i.e. for panchayats and municipalities for each of the five years 
were on following criteria and weights16 ; 
 (1) Population    40 per cent 
 (2) Index of decentralisation   20 per cent 
 (3) Distance from highest per capita income  20 per cent 
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 (4) Revenue effort     10 per cent 
 (5) Geographical area    10 per cent 
 State of Gujarat received total 4.351 per cent share from the 
allocated funds for panchayat and also received 6.626 per cent 
share fro allocated funds for municipalities, under 
recommendations of Eleventh Finance Commission. The Eleventh 
Finance Commission also suggested some remedial measures in 
respect to State Finance Commission’s recommendations. 
 As besides, the traditional terms of reference Eleventh 
Finance Commission was asked to recommend on three new items, 
which may affect the long-term scenario of fiscal federalism in 
India. They relate to finance for local bodies, monitorable 
programme for the States and fiscal management to achieve macro 
stability. Before we consider the recommendations of the Eleventh 
Finance Commission in these respects, let us have a look at the 
origin and development of the State Finance Commission, under 
the Indian Constitution.  
7. 13    State Finance Commission: 
 The concept of Panchayat as local-self Government has its 
historical origin. Since the days of Lord Ripon (way back in 
1880s.) emphasis was laid on this idea. The view was that local 
body should have its own source of income if it is to be a local-self 
Government in the real sense of term. Lord Ripon’s solution on 
local-self Government in the year 1882 laid special stress on the 
importance of entrusting to the local boards, not merely the 
expenditure of fixed allotments of funds, but the management of 
certain local sources of revenue. After the independence the 
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national government constituted a committee called as the Local 
Finance Enquiry Committee in the year 1950. The purpose of the 
Committee was to recommend the ways and means of improving 
the conditions of the financial resources of the local bodies. An 
important observation of the Committee was that “in almost every 
State there is a tendency to transfer functions from District Boards 
to the State Governments is a retrograde step”. The Committee 
suggestion was to avoid such transfer of functions. “One of the 
most important reason for the comparative lack of success of non 
urban local self governing bodies is this exceedingly limited and 
inelastic resources”, was the view of Study Team, under the 
chairmanship of Balwant Rai Mehta in Nove.1957. The Study 
Team suggested that property or house tax, tax from daily, bi-
weekly or weekly markets, Bazaars, hats, or shanties irrespective 
of their location, tax on carriages, carts, bicycles, rickshaws, boats 
etc., conservancy tax are the main sources of income for village 
panchayats, but it should be extended to included income from 
land revenue, water rate for minor irrigation, professional tax, rents 
and profits from the property of the panchayat samiti and many 
others. 
 In 1962 the Government of India in Ministry of Community 
Development, Panchayati Raj and Co-operation constituted a 
Committee on Resources and Finances of Panchayati Raj 
institutions. The resolution underlying the Constitution of the 
Committee (under the chairmanship of K. Santhanam) noted that 
“one of the fundamental requirements of panchayati raj institutions 
through transfer or otherwise is to enable them to discharge their 
  
 
413
responsibilities”. According to this resolution the resources can be 
broadly classified as follows:   
Resources transferred in the form of grants and loans by 
Central and State Governments, by higher tiers of panchayati raj to 
the lower tiers, the proceeds of taxes, duties, cesses etc., which the 
institutions can levy under their own powers, income from 
remunerative assets developed by these institutions and gifts and 
donations from public spirited citizens and voluntary contribution 
by the people. 
 In setting its approach to the problem of resources and 
finances of the panchayati raj institutions (PRIs), Santhanam 
Committee elaborated that for the resources pertaining to the 
functions allowed to PRIs on one hand they required ‘substantial 
assistance from governments’; and on the other hand for being a 
self governing institution “they should have substantial and 
growing resources”. The Santhanam Committee also expressed 
their grief over the on going scenario simply by saying that: 
 “Inspite of all these methods of assistance, we have to record 
the painful fact that the total income of a vast majority of 
Panchayats is far from adequate to give them a firm foundation”. 
 After the Santhanam Committee, the major discussion on 
financial resources of panchayats was taken place in Ashok Mehta 
Committee. In the opinion of the Committee there was general 
reluctance by the panchayat bodies to impose taxes. This 
reluctance was not only visible in the grass root tier but also 
persisted in the upper tiers. To pursue the matter of building up 
own resources, Ashok Mehta Committee recommended that some 
  
 
414
taxes should be made binding on the panchayats. The Committee 
was fully supportive to the idea of compulsory taxation by the 
panchayats. Committee felt, no democratic institution could 
continue to maintain its operational vitality depending only upon 
the external sources of fund. 
 It is recognised by all that an economy can never mature, if 
it has to perpetually depend on external assistance. It is also argued 
by many that foreign aid is often gap creating rather than being gap 
filling (gap between domesting investment and saving). The same 
analogy may extended here – a lower tier of government (say 
village panchayat) cannot initiate true development in the area 
under its jurisdiction as long as it has to rely excessively on supply 
or allocation of funds from higher authority i.e. State Government. 
Financial self-reliance and autonomy are very much essential for 
self-sustaining growth of the region (e.g. Village). 
Keeping the existing situation in view and for making the 
panchayatas institutions of self-governance specific Article 
(Article 243 H) was incorporated in the Constitution through the 
73rd Amendment Act, 1992, which says17, 
 “The Legislature of a State may, by law –  
(a) Authorize a panchayat to levy, collect and appropriate 
such taxes, duties, tolls and fees in accordance with 
such procedure and subject to such limits; 
(b) Assign to a panchayat such taxes, duties, tolls and 
fees levied and collected by the State Government for 
such purposes and subject to such conditions and 
limits; 
  
 
415
(c) Provide for making such grants in aid to the 
panchayats from the consolidated fund of the State; 
and 
(d) Provide for Constitution of such funds for crediting 
all money received respectively, by or on behalf of 
the panchayats and also for the withdrawal of such 
one therefore, as may be specified in the law”. 
In addition to this Article 243 H, the 73rd Amendment to the 
Constitution incorporated a new Article 243 I, where provision was 
made for Constitution of Finance Commission in each State for 
reviewing the financial position of the panchayat bodies and 
determining the principles for sharing funds (both tax and grants-
in-aid) between the State and the panchayat bodies. With the 
increasing functional liabilities it is expected that the matching 
financial resources should be made available to the to the 
panchayat bodies. Article 243 H and 243 I clearly mandated shared 
responsibilities of the State Government and the panchayat bodies 
in registering development to a commensurate extent. 
  Thus, 73rd Amendment is a landmark in the history of local 
governance in rural India. It has brought about significant changes 
in India’s federalism. The democratic base of Indian polity has 
widened. 
Twenty States and all the seven Union Territories have 
constituted their first SFCs so far; nearly 21 of them have so far 
submitted their reports, up to 1st July 2000 to the respective State 
Governments. 
A critical analysis of SFC recommendations reveals that:- 
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(a) The sharing of all revenue proceeds is one of the 
common principles recommended by SFCs. 
(b) Property tax reform has been a common theme and 
almost all the States have emphasized the need to re-
assess and effectively collect property/building 
taxes. 
(c) A number of taxes / levies have been assigned to the 
PRIs. These include licence fees / entertainment 
taxes for cable TV, registration fee for births and 
deaths, taxes on advertisements / holdings, tax on 
profession, house tax. 
(d) A general view is that SFCs have restricted the 
access of more buoyant taxes to PRIs and as a result, 
the net additional inflow is not significant 
considering the constitutional obligations of the 
PRIs. 
On the recommendations of SFC, relating to horizontal 
sharing of resources, it is found that most of the States have relied 
upon simply population as the criterion. After having an overview 
of the main features of the SFC recommendations, one generally 
believes that the annual financial flows to PRIs will go up very 
sharply once the recommendations are translated in to transfer. 
The first non-traditional ToR (Terms of Reference) is 
pertaining to local finance. The EFC was asked, to recommend, 
“suitable measures to augment the resources of the States to 
supplement those of their local bodies, the panchayat and the 
municipalities…keeping in view the need to supplement the 
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resources of their local bodies in the context of the 73rd and 74th 
amendments of the Constitution18.  
(1) Resources for local bodies:   
 The EFC, in its final report has recommended grants totaling  
Rs.10,000 crores for local bodies during (2000-2005), to be utilised 
for maintenance of civil services (excluding payment of salaries 
and wages) of this Rs.1,600 crores per annum is for rural local 
bodies and Rs.400 crores per annum for urban local bodies. Further 
EFC has said that 80 per cent of the interim amount granted to 
local bodies should go to the rural bodies and 20 per cent to urban 
ones. 
(2) Monitorable Programme:   
 The Commission had earlier recommended that 15 chronic 
revenue deficit States be given Rs.3,53,519 Crores during April 
2000 – March 2005 to cover their revenue deficit partially. Now 15 
per cent of this amount – or Rs.5,304 Crore out of this is to be held 
back, and this sum plus a matching grant from the Centre would be 
credited to an ‘incentive fund’ from which “fiscal performance 
based grants” would be distributed among all 25 (now 28) States as 
per the assessment of ‘performance’ by a monitoring group to be 
set up. Thus EFC is explicitly suggesting linking of grants to the 
implementation of a fiscal reforms programme. 
(3)   Fiscal Management and Macro Stability: 
Thirdly, EFC was also asked among other things to   review 
the State of finance of the Union and the States and suggest ways 
and means by which the governments, collectively and severally, 
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may bring about a restructuring of public finances so as to restore 
budgetary balance and maintain macroeconomic stability.  
The EFC observed “unsustainable expenditure growth has 
been fuelled also by competitive populism of governments 
resulting in needless subsidies and ad hoc announcement of 
packages by governments to placate particular regions and sections 
without commensurate effort to raise the required resources. Other 
contributory factors have been poor project management, thin 
dispersal of available funds over too many programmes and long 
gestation period19”  
 The Macro stability is the outcome of behavior of both 
States and Centre. If States are controlled while Centre goes on 
merrily in its own old ways the situation very dangerous for the 
unity of our country. State and Centre finance is not practically 
independent. The only alternative is to make comprehensive 
amendments to the Constitution incorporating size of debts, type of 
debts, monetised portion of the debt etc. by States and Central 
Governments in India. It will ensure macro stability. 
7.14   Vertical and Horizontal Distribution of Central Taxes: 
India by self-proclamation is a Union of States. The units of 
the Union, viz., the States have been described by some scholars as 
co-equal even though all residuary powers resides with the Union, 
which enjoy pre-eminent position with respect to items in the 
concurrent list. As the same time, looking from the constitutional 
angle at the spectrum of countries one find it difficult to make any 
generalization. Considering the different mechanism adopted 
through various finance Commissions in respect to devolution of 
  
 
419
central taxes transferred from Union to States, indicate the 
progressive steps moved towards Union and the States to co-
ordinate positions and make them to behave in co-equal manner. 
Before studying the impact of federal transfers on equity and 
allocative efficiency, we must note the major recommendations of 
the Finance Commissions set up so far. 
Income Tax: 
 States share in income tax rose from 55 per cent (1st FC) to 
85 per cent (7th FC). The 8th and 9th FC retained it at 85 per cent. 
The 10th FC reduced it to 77.5 per cent. Such decline in the share 
made for the first time had been recommended since the 10th 
Finance Commission believed that the Centre “should have a 
significant and tangible interest in its yield” as the Centre is the 
tax-levying authority. However, the loss of the States had been 
mirrored in a revenue equivalent increase in the net proceeds of 
Union excise duties from 45 per cent to 47 per cent. 
 Now let us discuss the criteria for the distribution (i.e. 
horizontal distribution) of the share of income tax among the 
States. All Finance Commission had to make recommendations 
regarding intense distribution amongst States of the net proceeds of 
income tax and certain other taxes. Criteria for devolution of taxes 
are not uniform. Rather, the Finance Commissions often suggest 
conflicting criteria. For instance, richer States emphasize 
“collection factor” as the important variable while poorer States 
feel that greater weightage should be given to ‘backwardness’. In 
respect to distribution of income tax “population of the States” and 
the “contribution” factor were given greater weightage by all 
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Finance Commissions down from 1st Finance Commission to 7th 
Finance Commission, the weight for population was raised 90 per 
cent by the 7th Finance Commission. The 11th Finance 
Commission reduced the sharable proceeds of income tax based on 
population of the State as a broad measure of need to 22.5 per cent 
by the 8th Finance Commission, 20 per cent by the 10th Finance 
Commission and 10 per cent. In its place, the index of 
backwardness was given greater weightage (45 per cent) by the 8th 
Finance Commission for the first time. The basis of distance of per 
capita income was raised from 45 per cent to 60 per cent, by the 
10th Finance Commission and 62.5 per cent by the 11th Finance 
Commission. Tax collection or tax effort and hence the fiscal 
prudence is another criterion in the distribution of income tax and 
Union excise duties used by the 10th and 11th Finance 
Commissions. 
 The more recent Commission (especially 10th and 11th) made 
sincere efforts in improving the vertical transfers. Poorer States 
including the most vocal State (i.e. West Bengal, a middle income 
State) that raised a hullabaloo of deteriorating Center-State 
financial relations in the 1970s and 1980s now welcomed the 
recommendations of the recent Commission’s award and the 
shibboleth of “conspiracy” has lost its currency in recent years. 
Ironically enough, 11th Finance Commission’s award came in for 
sharp criticisms from the better off States like Andhra Pradesh. 
Thus, the charge that Finance Commissions had done little to 
rectify regional imbalances is untenable. 
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 Another area of debate may be worth noting here. The 
Union Government over time has developed the habit of levying 
income tax surcharges, which are not shareable. As it has become 
regular source of revenue for the Centre, it should be shareable 
with the rest proceeds of income tax as was argued by 8th and 9th 
Finance Commissions. Although constitutional provision allows 
imposition of surcharges on income tax, this centralization of non-
shareable revenue rising is rather a chronic source of irritation in 
Centre-State Financial relations. 
Non-Shareable tax – Corporation Tax: 
Corporation tax more buoyant than income tax is not 
shareable under Constitution. This is another major area where the 
issue of Centre-State financial relations is shrouded with intense 
debates. In this connection, the Sarkaria Commission on Centre-
State Relations strongly recommended, “by an appropriate 
amendment of the Constitution, the net proceeds of corporation tax 
may be made permissively shareable with the States”. 
Union Excise Revenue: 
 The sharing of the Union excise duties with the States lies at 
the discretion of the, Indian Parliament. This means that 
distribution of income is compulsory while that of excise duties is 
not. As a result, its vertical distribution assumed as low profile in 
the initial stages of financial awards. The 1st Finance Commission 
recommended distribution of 40 per cent of excise revenues from 
only three articles- tobacco, matches, and vegetable oils. 
Successive Finance Commissions have reduced step by step, the 
percentage sharing of excise duties and the percentage sharing of 
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income tax. Share of the States in distributable duties declined to 
20 per cent from all articles following the 6th  Finance Commission 
recommendations. As the State’s share in net proceeds of income 
tax remained stationary at 85 per cent (as per the award of the 7th, 
8th and 9th Finance Commission recommendations), States’ share in 
the proceeds of excise duties had been raised to 47.5 per cent by 
10th Finance Commission. 
 Like the income tax, all the Finance Commissions (from 1st 
to 6th), quite rightly, considered respective populations of the 
States, as the basis of horizontal distribution of Union excise 
duties, but the emphasis on this criterion is on the decline. The first 
finance had taken population as the basic for distribution of 100 
per cent of excise duties. It had been declined to 75 per cent by the 
6th Finance Commission. The weight had been reduced to 25 per 
cent by the 7th Finance Commission, 20 per cent by 10th Finance 
Commission and 10 per cent by 11th Finance Commission. The 
degree of backwardness of a State as the criterion of horizontal 
distribution has received largest weightage. For the 10th Finance 
Commission, it was 60 per cent and for the 11th Finance 
Commission, it was 62.5 per cent. All these suggest that population 
itself is ‘not a progressive criterion’. 
 Special duties of excise (like regulatory duties, auxiliary 
duties) on certain goods are not shareable with the States. For 
obvious reasons, States demanded a share of it. Following the 
recommendations of the 6th Finance Commission auxiliary duties 
were merged with the basic excise duties and were placed in the 
divisible excise duties. Like income tax surcharges, States are 
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insisting, its inclusion in the divisible pool since levying of such 
taxes has become permanent feature, be shared with the States. 
 These tax-sharing criteria have raised the issue of “equity” 
and “allocative efficiency”. Profs. V.K.R.V.Rao, J.S.Gulati, Raja 
Chelliah, Hemilata Rao and others unequivocally argued that 
population rather than per capita income distance, is an equitable 
method for inter-State tax devolution. They felt that inter-State tax 
devolution on a per capita income basis is not only iniquitous but 
also biased in favour of well to do States. Although this criterion 
attempts to improve the progressively of the transfer schemes. It 
has been said earlier that the weightage given to population in the 
distribution of both income tax and excise revenues had been 
reduced substantially from 100 per cent (1st FC) to 10 per cent (11th 
FC) M.Govinda Rao observes that the criterion like “contribution” 
and “backwardness” are indeed contradictory. The “contribution” 
factor (10 per cent) as the variable for distribution of central taxes 
received importance at the hands of the 10th Finance Commission 
for first time. But 11th Finance Commission reduced its weight 
until the 10th Finance Commission, the criteria adopted for the 
distribution of income tax and excise duties were different and 
made uniform weight to the both of these taxes – income tax and 
excise duties. 
7. 15   In Conclusion 
Despite strong centralizing tendencies in our federal fiscal 
arrangements, no one can ignore long-term trends that favour 
regionalism, pluralism and decentralization. We demand more 
decentralization and pluralism to prevent general collapse of the 
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authority in the Indian polity. With the launching of economic 
reforms in 1991, one can expect a change in the character of fiscal 
federalism in India. Against the backdrop of the reduced role of the 
Government and greater reliance on market-driven principles, 
observe that nowadays the State Governments are shouldering a 
part of the burden of fiscal adjustment. Reforms in both tax and 
expenditure policies at the State level are urgently required, 
otherwise, the objective of reduction of vertical imbalance will 
remain unattained. After all, this is required to minimize transfers. 
We are afraid that equity and efficiency may be adversely affected 
by more and more decentralization of tax revenue. The question is; 
How much of decentralization? Actually, tax and expenditure 
responsibilities of the State Governments are not to be viewed in 
isolation; the entire gamut of Centre-State financial relations is 
required to be reviewed. 
 Further, overlapping in the functions of PC and FC are to be 
avoided as far as practicable. M. Govinda Rao goes on to suggest 
that the working of the FC and the methodology adopted by it 
require a change so that major irritants are removed. What is 
urgently called for is the ‘constructive federalism’ and particularly, 
‘cooperative federalism’ – a greater degree of consultation and 
partnership in our “layer-cake” perspective of governmental 
functions. Prof. Raja Chelliah observes “fiscal discipline ad inter-
State equity are necessary ingredients in cooperative federalism”. 
Indeed, there is enough room to reform it so that Centre-State 
financial relations can be recast with an optimistic note. 
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 The promotion of cooperative federalism demands the 
proper blending of the criteria of autonomy, fiscal discipline and 
inter-State equity so that a mutual trust and confidence between the 
Centre and the States and also amongst States themselves are 
fostered. But we must be cautions while preparing the room for 
cooperative federalism because the relationship between various 
layers of Government is competitive indeed. “The mechanism 
should ensure that no governmental unit is able to exploit, free ride 
and dominate other units so as to ensure competitive equality and 
cost-benefit appropriability among governmental units”. 
Finance Commissions adopt “arbitration” or “award” 
approach rather than consensus approach based on democratic 
principle, because it is a ‘discrete occurrence’ and not a ‘standing 
body’ like the Planning Commission. Justice Rajmanner made a 
remark that Finance Commissions represents the result of the 
“gamble on the personal view of five persons or majority of them”. 
Inspite of this institutional and constitutional arrangements as well 
as comments, we must remember that “it is this institution, and the 
manner in which the Finance Commissions have functioned over 
these 50 years, that have been responsible for a basic contradiction 
in the constitutional structure not leading to any breakdown. It is 
true that some degree of equity in vertical and horizontal 
distribution has been achieved through Finance Commissions 
award. For instance, in total tax proceeds, States’ share has gone 
up from 0.51 per cent of GDP in 1950 to 2.79 percent in 1997. 
This mean an increase from 12 per cent to 26 per cent of total 
central tax proceeds. In the midst of resource constraint, Finance 
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Commissions have been largely successful in achieving equity in 
horizontal distribution of the State’s share of the divisible pool 
between the States. It disparities between the States, seem to be 
widening over time, Finance Commissions alone cannot be blamed 
for this. 
 However, the gap-filing approach of Finance Commissions 
is not free from criticism. In the first place, none of the Finance 
Commissions made an objective assessment of the overall resource 
position of the Centre add the total quantum of available resources 
required to meet its award. In the name of achieving and reducing 
regional disparities successive Finance Commissions have been 
raising States’ share in the shareable taxes, Thus, Finance 
Commissions reward put a great financial strain on the Centre 
occasionally attempting ‘extra effort’ to mop up resources. We are 
afraid that there is no escape route of the Centre for this 
predicament. 
Secondly, the gap-filling approach has disincentive effects 
on tax effort in the sense that the Centre relies on non-shareable 
resources (like administered price mechanism). This not only 
distorts the pattern of resource mobilization at the Union levels but 
also leads to profligacy in spending at State level. Truly speaking, 
discretionary control of resources by the Centre and decentralized 
expenditure responsibilities of State Governments has made them 
fiscally irresponsible. The new economic policy measures 
introduced responsibilities. Politics of subsidy, rather than its 
economics, seems to have occupied the front seat. Prof. Amaresh 
Bagchi has emphasized that “At one level it would appear that 
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populist politics and the unbridled free rider instinct, the tragedy of 
the commons’ are the root cause of the chronic problem”. On the 
other hand, determination in the revenue position of both Central 
and State Governments has stumbled the process of transfer of 
resources. 
Often, State Governments are blamed for the determination 
of its revenue position. For instance, about half a dozen States have 
so far levied agricultural income tax, but the revenue collected is 
hopeless. The apathy of rising resources by State Governments is 
usually determined by political factors. Prof. M.Govinda Rao from 
his econometric study of four non-congress States observed that 
these States march behind Congress-ruled governments in raising 
revenues – a fact that had been noted first by Prof. Ashok Mitra in 
1975. 
 Absence of a deep commitment of political leaders has also 
a felling on the resource position of the States; India’s political 
economy has undergone a change due to a change in the nature of 
the leadership of now power elite. These people have little 
understanding of macroeconomic environment and thus 
macromanagement of the economy. They politicize and interfere 
with the administration and merely distribute sops to their 
electrical constituencies. 
 Anyway, we can conclude that “fiscal irresponsibility 
hypothesis” of both Central and State Governments originates from 
the “political irresponsibility hypothesis” or specifically 
irresponsible behavior on the part of the governments. Instead of 
coordination between these two levels of governments, what we 
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find that one charges other for one’s lapses. The kaleidoscopic 
change in parties and persons heading State Governments also 
render impossible any durable or meaningful Centre-State 
coordination. 
 Overtime, the PC- an extra constitutional authority that 
makes discretionary transfers intrudes into the inter-governmental 
transfer of resources. 
 Following the recommendations of the PC and FC, financial 
resources are transferred to the States to correct horizontal 
imbalance. Grants and loans constitute plan transfers. Both these 
two roughly comprise 70 per cent and 30 per cent respectively. As 
this ratio is almost fixed and stationary, it is the poorer States that 
suffer most compared to richer States. However, the union 
Government fails to understand that the poorer States deserve more 
grants and fewer loans. Moreover, because of this, per capita 
grants of the better off States are higher. In addition, F.C.  makes 
Article 275 Grants to cover budget deficit. Interestingly, richer 
States enjoy Grants by making deficits in their budgets. Some 
times, political considerations determine Grants to States. 
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FISCAL FEDERALISM IN INDIA
Appendix - 1
Distribution of Income Tax to States as Recommended by various Finance
Commmissions
    Coverage Vertical Basis of Distribution Remarks
% to be
distributed
among states
1st F.C.  Net proceeds of taxes        55 %   80%   population
1952  on income other than   20%   collection
 agricultural income
2nd F.C. Excluding  proceeds        60 %   90%   population       100 population Goal
1957   attributable to Union   10%   collection
  Emoluments.
3rd F.C.       66.7%  80%   population
1961  20%   collection
4th F.C.       75%  80%   population
1965  20%   collection
5th F.C. Advance tax collection       75% 90%   population
1969  included 10%   assessment
6th F.C.   No Change       80%  90%   population
1973  10% assessment
7th F.C.   No Change       85%  90%   population
1978  10%   assessment
8th F.C.  No Change of       85%  10% on the basis of          In order that Punjab
1984  Assessment   assessment          which is the highest
  90% of divisible pool          per capita  income
 (a) 25% on population         States also gets a
 (b) 25% on the basis of         share under this
 inverse of per capita          formula. income
 income multiplied by          distance  of Punjab
 population  and;          and  Haryana are
 (c) 50% on the basis of          treated as equal.
  distance of per  capita
 income from the highest
 per capita income state
 multiplied by population
Verticale Basic of Distribution Remark
          Coverage % to be
distributed
among states
9th F.C.      85 %   (i) 1% on the basic of
1989   contribution;
  (ii) 45% on distance of
 per capita income state
  multiplied by population
  (iii) 22.5% on the basic
  of population
  (iv) 11.25% on the basis
  of composite index  of
 backwardness;
  (v) 11.25% on the basis
 of inverse of per capita
 income multiplied by the
 population of the state.
10th F.C.
1994   77.5% 30% on the basis of
population.
60% on the basis of
distance.
5% on the basis of area
adjusted.
5% on the basis of index
of infrastructure.
10% on the basis of tax
effect.
APPENDIX -II
Distribution of Income Excise Duties to States as Recommended by Various
Finance Commissions.
Coverage       % to be
      distributed
      among
      states
1st F.C.  Tobacco, matches and 40% 100% population Selected excise on
1952  vegitable products commodities of
comman and wide-
spread consumption
yielding a sizeable
sum were included
in order to ensure
sizeable revenue
and reasonable
stability.
2nd F.C. Articles added  sugar, 25% 90% population
1957  coffee, tea, paper and 10% population
 vegitable non-essential
 oil
3rd F.C.  All commodities on 20% Population major basis, but    Wide coverage
1961  which excise duties some adjustment was made because of need
 levied in 1960-61 except on the basis of relative               for  broader base
 (i) those where yield is financial weakness disparity and in relation with
 below Rs.50 lakhs  a in devlopment. percentage sales tax.
 year and; (2) motor spirit of Scheduled castes, tribes
  (treated differently)
4th F.C.  All excluding regulatory 20% 80% population and 20%   Extension of same
1965  duties, special excise and relative economic and   logic as  Third
 earmarked cesses. social backwardness, two-   Finance
thirds of which distributed   Commission.
only among states with per
capita income below average
per capita income of all states.
5th F.C.  All excluding regulatory 20% 90% population; 20% economic
1969  duties and earmarked and social backwardness, two-
 cesses; special excises third of which distributed only
 to be included from among states with per capta
 1972-73 onwards. income below average per
capita  income of all states.
     Vertical   Basis of Distribution       Remark
6th F.C.  All excluding auxiliary 20% 75% population; 25% relative
1973  duties of excise for economic and social
backwardness, the distribution
of this portion should be in
relation to the  distance of the
             state’s  per capita income
 from that of the state with the
 highest per capita  income
 multiplied by  the population
 of the state concerned.
7th F.C.  Entire net proceeds of 40% Percentage share in each state
1978  union excise duty on in the divisible pool determined
 generation of electricity by assigning 25% weight to
 to be paid to the states. each of the following factors;
 Besides 40% of the net (a) Population by 1971 census
 proceeds on all other. (b) inverse of per capita  states
     domestic product
(c) percentage of poor in total
     state population
(d) formula of revenue
     equalization as worked out
     by the Commission.
8th F.C.  Share increased from 40% 90% of  divisible  pool In order that Punjab
1984  40% of the net proceeds (a) 25% on population basis which is the highest
 of the union excise duties (b) 25% on basis of inverse per capita income
 excluding the excise duty      of per capita income state also gets a
 on electricity which      multiplied by population share under this
stands abolished  from and; (c)  50% on the basis of formula. income
1st October  1984. distance of per capita income distance of Punjab
from the highest per capita and Haryana  are
income state multiplied  by treated as equal.
population. A new principle  of
 5% Exclusively for states directly linking
showing deficit on revenue devolution  to
account after devolution of deficits rather than
taxes and duties due to them. dealing with them
only through
grants-in-aid.
9th F.C. 45% (i) 25% on basis of population
1989 (ii) 12.5% on the basis of IATP
(iii) 15.5% on the basis of index
       of backwardness
(iv) 33.5% on the basis of
       distance
(v) 16.5% among deficit states
10th F.C. 47.5% For 40% of the net proceeds the
1994 indies are : 20% on the basis of
           the distance of per capita income.
          5% on the basis of area adjusted,
5% on the basis of index of
infrastructure and ;
10% on the basis of tax effort.
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Chapter- 8 
Conclusions and    Suggestions. 
 
The march of unitary Constitution towards the co-operative 
federalism in India concludes into two-step forward one step 
backward. We have seen in the earlier chapters of this study that, 
far from being a doctrinaire concept federalism has now acquired 
certain values, moral connotations, and its works as a unifying 
device in the multi-national world of today. It keeps a proper 
balance between the centripetal and centrifugal forces continuously 
at work in a multi-religious, multi-lingual, multi-cultural and 
variegated society. It allows participatory democracy and 
experimentation at local level effectively without denying the 
benefit of concerted and united efforts needed to meet the 
exigencies of modern war and economic pressure. The elements 
autonomy and independence of national and the State 
Governments have given away to the idea of mutual co-operation 
and interdependence between the two layers of governments. In 
other words co-operative federalism has replaced the idea of 
competitive federalism. Certain essential features like division of 
powers, a written constitutional document, inflexible process of 
amendment and authority of the Court are found in all federations; 
but beyond this every federation has its own distinguishing 
features. 
The nation today is in the grip of a crisis and the feature of 
our polity is imperiled. The cherished democratic values of our 
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freedom struggle are under assault, and the assertive trend of 
centralization of power leading to authoritarianism has resulted in 
disturbing signs of alienation in some parts of the country. This is 
dangerous drift has to be halted. 
The integrity and sovereignty of India must emerge from a 
conscious effort towards harmonization of the linguistic, ethnic 
and cultural entities, which constitute our great nation. The golden 
thread of unity created by the freedom struggle runs throughout the 
length and breadth of the country, we must ensure that this thread 
is strengthened in the times to come. 
The Indian Constitution, whatever its limitations, is a 
document of great relevance to the democratic advance of our 
people and it has to undergo changes keeping in step with the 
experiences and demands of the people. 
The framers of the Constitution of independent India, had 
decided to have a federal solution of many problems that had 
plagued the country in its march towards unity and nationalism. 
The promotion of co-operative federalism demands the proper 
blending of the criteria of autonomy, fiscal discipline and inter-
state equity so that a mutual trust and inter-state equity so that a 
mutual trust and confidence between the Centre and States and also 
amongst States themselves are fostered. 
The Indian Constitution is perhaps one of the few 
Constitutions, which makes a conscious and deliberate effort to 
provide for co-operation between the Centre and the States. This is 
evidenced by existence of concurrent matters, overtly enumerated 
in Concurrent List. In the financial field, the Constitution aim at 
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distribution of revenue resources and taxing power in such a 
manner so as to avoid overlapping. Consequently in the Concurrent 
List there is no provision of taxing power and all are taxing entries 
are to be found either in the Union List or in the State List. The 
Constitution envisages a common pool of certain taxes collected 
by the Central Government, which are to be shared with the State 
Governments. The Indian Constitution does not merely provide 
that in the case of a conflict between a Central and a State law on a 
Concurrent List the central law shall prevail over the State law, 
under Article 254(1), but it also leaves room for a State law to 
override the Central law provided the State law is later in time and 
has received the sanction of the President of India under same 
Article 254(2). This flexibility is the peculiarity of the Indian 
Constitution is a positive step in direction towards the co-operative 
federalism.  In Indian Constitution, the allocation of revenue 
resources to the States is so meager that they have to depend on the 
central grant for effective functioning, the provisions for dispersal 
and distribution of the revenues collected by the Centre, under 
Union List is also a step towards the co-operative federalism. 
Further a revolutionary step ahead in the direction of co-operative 
federalism is the provisions for amendment in the Constitution. 
In respect to the nature of Indian polity and its functions the 
research scholar expresses her views in the following manner:- 
(a) That the Constitution is basically sound and flexible  
 enough to meet the challenge of the changing times; 
(b) The difficulties, issues, tensions and problems which 
have arisen in Union-State relationship are not due to any 
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substantial defect in the scheme and fundamental fabric 
of the Constitution but because over the years these 
relationships have not been worked in conformity with 
the true spirit and intent of the Constitution; 
(c) That in a large and heterogeneous country like India, 
there is a need for substantial decentralization, territorial 
as well as functional of powers and functions in normal 
times in the interest of efficiency and equality, although 
there has to be provision for considerable centralization 
in times of emergency.  
(d) These difficulties, problems and issues can be resolved 
and distortions rectified without major constitutional 
amendments, by 
(i) Changing the executive procedures, practices and 
some regulatory laws, impinging upon certain spheres 
of Union-State relations; 
 (ii)Involving healthy conventions and procedures with 
the aid and advice of an effective consultative body 
(as envisaged by Article 263) composed of the 
representative of the Union and the States. 
Old theory of unitary v/s new practical of federalism results 
in to constitutional amendments. In common parlance, amendment 
might convey the sense of improvement or a slight change in the 
main instrument but the word ‘amendment’, when used in relation 
to a Constitution carries all shades of meaning such as alteration, 
revision, repeat, addition, variation or deletion of any provision of 
the Constitution. By usage it has come to mean every kind of 
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change brought about by the process of amendment in 
Constitution; it is used in the widest possible sense; it can be said 
that “to amend is to deconstitute and reconstitute” with the passage 
of time, it is accepted universally and unanimously that in modern 
world in which we are living is growing constantly more crowded 
and complex and there is constant pressure on Constitutions for 
amendment, or abandonment.  Therefore, it is appropriate and 
indispensable that world ‘amendment’ is understood as including 
all kinds of changes. 
The modes of adapting the Constitution to new 
circumstances may either be formal or informal. Informal methods 
are judicial interpretation and conventions. The judicial 
interpretation may go to some extent in this respect but cannot 
change the wordings of the basic law and certain desired changes 
may be impossible of achievement without the verbal changes in 
the provisions of the Constitution. The formal method of 
constitutional amendment consists in changing the language of the 
constitutional provisions so as to adapt them to the changed 
context of the social needs. In some countries the process may be 
easier than in others, and, accordingly, the constitutions are 
sometimes classified into flexible or rigid. 
Thus, it can be said that the difference between rigid and 
flexible constitution is mainly of degree. Those who draft the 
constitutions usually intend to put limitations upon Government, 
through the extent of the limitations may vary from case to case. 
Through the amending process the defects in the existing 
Constitution can be removed and also the safeguard provided 
 439  
against unforeseen stresses and strains put on it by the onward 
march of time. Times are not static, they change and therefore, the 
life of a nation is dynamic, living and organic; its political, social 
and economic conditions change continuously from time to time. 
Social mores and ideals change which create new problems and 
alter the complexion of the old ones. 
A Constitution which is drawn up to meet the needs of a 
community during a particular period cannot meet the changing 
needs of a community hence, it necessary to have the constitutional 
provision for prescribing the metod of affecting a change in the 
Constitution so as to secure the stability of the State and at the 
same time make the fundamental law sufficiently flexible to keep 
pace with the time and needs of a changing society. Thus, the 
amending provision in a Constitution is of a great importance for it 
may be enable the country to develop peacefully the alternative to 
which may be stagnation and revolution. But one has to bear in 
mind that, the amending power of the Constitution should not be 
taken as a plaything but it should be used with care and caution.  
The Indian Constitution is a federal Constitution and is a 
written one. The essence of a written Constitution ‘lies’ in its mode 
of amendment. The reason for introducing the element of 
flexibility in the Constitution was explained by Shri Jawaharlal 
Nehru in the Constituent Assembly in the following words: 
“While we want this Constitution to be as solid and as 
permanent in structure as we can make it, nevertheless there is no 
permanence in Constitutions. There should be certain flexibility. If 
you make any thing rigid and permanent, you stop a nation’s 
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growth, the growth of a living vital organic people…. In any event 
we should not make a Constitution such as some other great 
countries have, which are so rigid that they…cannot be adapted 
easily to changing conditions. Today, especially when the world is 
in turmoil and we are passing through a very swift period of 
transition, what we may do today may not be wholly applicable 
tomorrow”. 
H.V. Kamath, agreeing with the procedure of amendment, 
suggested that the people at large should guarantee a period of six 
months. The people can voice their opinion and views upon the 
Bill for an amendment initiated in Parliament. 
The present scholar agreed with the H.V.Kamath’s view that 
in the procedure of the amendment, it is required that a period of 
six months should be guaranteed under the Constitution between 
the initiation and the final passage of the Bill so as to ensure, “a 
proper and adequate discussion in the country by the people at 
large. The people can voice their opinions and views upon the Bill 
for an amendment initiated in Parliament.” 
The Constitution of India is an excellent document of 
splendid compromise. It marks a peculiar balance between British 
Parliamentary supremacy and American Judicial supremacy; 
British unitary system and American Federalism. It creates three 
major instruments of power, i.e. the legislature, the executive and 
the judiciary. It demarcates three spheres minutely and expects 
them to exercise their respective powers without overstepping their 
limits. No authority created under the Constitution is supreme and 
all authorities function under the supreme law of the land. Thus, 
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legislature and the judiciary are both supreme within their 
respective spheres. But unfortunately the judicial pronouncements 
have not been always hailed in good spirit. The important 
pronouncements have been nullified by hasty legislation. The 
rendering ineffective of judgments or orders of competent Courts 
and Tribunals by changing their basis by legislative enactment and 
under constitutional amendments, is well known pattern of all 
validating Act, such validating legislation which removes the 
causes of ineffectiveness or invalidity of actions or proceeding is 
not an encroachments, observed by Supreme Court in I. N. 
Saksena Case v/s State of M. P.1  is not consistent with the spirit 
and values of the Indian Constitution, present research student 
personally feel that the supremacy by one organ over the other 
organs of the government is not appreciable. The special bench of 
the Calcutta High Court in Sunil Kumar Bose v/s Chief Secretary 
of Government of W. B.2 had pointed out that “ the people of India 
have given us (Judges) the power of interpreting the Constitution 
of India and of deciding whether any piece of legislation is or not 
consistent with the provisions laid down in the Constitution of 
India. “ The power of judicial review is exercised by judges on 
behalf of the people of India”. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer has vary 
aptly remarked that3:  
“The judicial power is exercise by Courts on behalf of the 
people of India, so long as “WE THE PEOPLE” have appointed 
them to exercise such power.”  
The present scholar thinks that the utmost need of the age is 
not the supremacy of any one organ over the other but a proper 
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understanding, confidence and mutual difference between all the 
governmental organs. The judiciary does not declare a law 
unconstitutional or willingly. The Supreme Court laid down the 
principle underlying the exercise of the power of judicial review, 
as early as 1952. In State of Madras v/s Rao4, the Supreme Court 
laid down the guidelines as follows:  
“If then the courts in the country face up to such important 
and none-too-easy task, it is not out of any desire to tilt at 
legislative authority in a crusader’s spirit, but in discharge of a 
duty plainly laid upon them by the Constitution”. 
The condition of tension and claim of supremacy by one 
organ over the other organs of the government is not appreciable. 
The seven Judges bench of the Supreme Court pointed out in U.P. 
Controversy Case5, The necessity of the amicable relations among 
all organs of the government under the following observation that:   
“These two august bodies (the judiciary and the legislature) 
as well as the executive which is another important constituent of a 
democratic state, must function not in a spirit of hostility, but 
nationally harmoniously and in a spirit of understanding.” 
The peculiar longing of parliamentary supremacy is base on 
wrong presumption that Parliament cannot implement socio-
economic programme without having omnipotent powers over all 
organs. The plea of the omnipotent of Parliament is based on the 
presumption that, in parliamentary democracy, all powers spring 
from the people. The will of the people is expressed by votes. The 
Parliament is thus supreme. The plea of the supremacy of 
Parliament is unequivocally taken on the basis that Parliament 
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represents the will of the people. However, there are certain 
limitations on the representative basis: - 
1. The defective   election   system makes it doubtful whether 
the government by numerical majority represents even the 
majority of the whole of the population. It represents the 
nation by fiction. Really speaking, the party in power, 
sometimes, is voted by less than 40 per cent of the whole of 
the population. 
2. The malpractices in election also create doubt about the 
genuineness of the representation of the will of the people. 
3. The idea of the representative supremacy rests on some 
fallacious presumptions that the electorate have approved of 
every measures which legislators deem necessary so as to 
meet the unforeseeable twists and turns of the events. Such a 
presumption has been rebutted by the practice of the 
countries where the constitutional amendments require 
referendum. The Commonwealth of Australia represents a 
glaring example. Out of 32 amendments proposed by the 
Australian Parliament and put to the people’s referendum, as 
their Constitution required, 27 were voted out by the people. 
It was very aptly remarked by Hamilton that “the 
representative of the people in a popular assembly seem 
sometimes to fancy that they are the people themselves….” 
4. It is also doubtful that the representative of the people 
always act for the welfare of the people. The practice of 
overthrowing constitutional government, who had the 
support of more than two-third of majority of legislators, 
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had also been thrown by proclaiming constitutional 
emergency under Article 356 on the ground of 
maladministration and the government working against the 
people, are indicative of the fact that the representative 
government may act even against the will of the people, who 
have elected them. It may also abuse the power in the name 
of the people. 
5. There is another danger of the extreme approach about 
representative supremacy, i.e., the party in power at the 
Centre and more that half of the States may amend the 
Constitution perpetuating itself in power or it can declare all 
parties barring ruling one to be illegal and put out of 
commission for election purposes. All such laws may be 
included in the 9th Schedule, which courts cannot touch, It 
may be pleaded that the Constitution puts no limitation upon 
the exercise of such powers by Parliament.   
The peculiar circumstances of the country and abrupt 
exercise of constituent power requires and earnest and faithful 
inquiry, about the genuineness or rationality of implied limitations 
or ‘basic-structure theory’ limiting the uncontrolled power of the 
Parliament. 
The clause 5 of Article 368, clarify that: -  
“For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that there 
shall be no limitation, whatever on the constituent power of 
Parliament to amend by way of addition, variation or repeal the 
provisions of this Constitution under this article.” 
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The Indian Parliament retained its power to amend the 
Constitution including Part III, the fundamental rights of the 
citizen of India. Thus, Parliament possesses the plenary power to 
enact law in respect of all matters allotted to it. The plea of the 
omnipotence of Parliament is base on the presumption that in 
parliamentary democracy, all powers spring from the people. The 
will of the people is expressed by votes. The Parliament is 
supreme. 
The modern constitutionalism provides two approaches in 
this respect. The British pattern has peculiar faith in parliamentary 
supremacy. However, the secrecy of the well functioning of British 
Government lies in awakened public opinion. Furthermore, British 
system of Government has been uniquely stable because it has 
been able to combine strong government and strong opposition.6 
Thus, there is always a check on the wantonness of the 
representative majority. In India, the situation is adverse, whatever 
pleases the executive, and the legislation to that effect may be 
enacted. Even the constitutional may be made without providing 
the sufficient time for due deliberations, for example, The 
Constitution 40th Amendment Act, 1976 was passed hurriedly 
putting 64 enactments in the 9th Schedule in one stroke. The 
tendency of all round curtailment of judicial power and tendency 
of putting certain illegal Acts in Ninth Schedule enthusiastically is 
not appreciable. In the words of Justice P.B. Mukherji, “the 
incorporation of void and illegal acts into the Constitution make 
them constitutional is a striking proof of the failure of Indian 
legislation to conform to the Constitution under which it work7.”  
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The assumption that legislation is remedy of all evils is ill 
founded. ‘Tokenism’ has become the fashion in the field of 
legislation. The need of time is the earnest implementation of laws 
and not domineering will of the parliamentary supremacy over 
judiciary. The great work of eminent statesmen, legal luminaries 
equipped with knowledge of political and constitutional history of 
India as well as important countries of the world should not be 
mutilated so easily imperiled. 
All constitution represents a mix of liberty and restrain and 
an equation of democracy and discipline. There should be 
discipline in a democracy and sufficient democracy in discipline to 
avoid extreme of anarchy and tyranny.  
The Assam High Court has very aptly pointed it out as 
follows: - 
“The Constitution having entrusted its powers and 
responsibilities to different persons or authorities at different stages 
under diverse circumstances, these persons or authorities will have 
to work in harmony and not in hostility seeming or otherwise. The 
checks and balances replete in the Constitution do not necessarily 
mean subordination of one authority to another. These 
constitutional safeguards are only safety valves of a democratic 
Constitution”.8 
Thanks to the victory of the principles of the democracy, 
which reflected in the enactment of the 43rd Amendment Act, 1977 
of the Constitution where inter alia provided for the restoration of 
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and High Courts, curtailed 
by the enactment of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) 
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Act, 1976 and accordingly Articles 32A, 131A, 144A, 226A and 
228A included in the Constitution by the said amendment, omitted 
by this Act. The Act also provided for the omission of Article 31D 
which conferred special powers on Parliament to enact certain laws 
in respect to anti-national activities.   
The Parliament has asserted its unfettered, unbridled and 
unchecked powers over all the organs of the Government. 
However, the final say lies with Court vide Article 141. Let us 
hope that the Supreme Court will correct this over-assertion of 
parliamentary omnipotence, when an appropriate opportunity 
arises in this respect.  
In a federal polity, it is most desirable that the Centre and 
each of the State Governments must have under its own 
independent control financial resources sufficient to perform its 
exclusive functions and they should also be allowed to have their 
own distinct fiscal policy. But, the power politics, depression 
politics, welfare politics and the internal combustion engine have 
tended to bring about the revolutionary transformation of the 
structure of federal finance in federal countries.  All this has not 
only made the States financially dependent on the Centre but has 
also required the Centre to play an effective coordinating role in 
the fiscal affairs of the federal countries.  
In the course of working the Constitution during the last 
more than fifty years acute problems have came to the surface. In 
substance the complaint is against overcentralisation, while some 
feel that there is nothing wrong in the Constitution and malady lies 
in its implementation, there are many who assert that a drastic 
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revision itself would be necessary because the extra extraordinary 
power have been exercised in the most ordinary circumstances and 
this has given rise to widespread dissatisfaction among the States. 
The present scholar feels the trust reposed by the framers of the 
Constitution in President and Parliament to discharge their 
fiduciary responsibility towards the States has not been kept in full 
measures.  
In respect to the field of taxation, the Central Government 
has curtailed down the States power of sales tax in undesired 
manner. The insertion of Entry 91-A by the Constitution (six 
Amendment) Act, 1956, “Taxes on the sale or purchase of goods 
other than newspapers, where such sale or purchase takes place in 
the course of inter-State trade or commerce,” in the Union List also 
confirms the fact of immunisation, of Union right to levy inter-
State sales tax, under Article 286 of the Constitution by replacing 
the State’s obligatory right of sales tax, in that event under 
Constitution 6th Amendment Act, 1956. The same way insertion of 
Entry 92-B at Union List under the Constitution (Forty six 
Amendment) Act, 1982, enable the Union to levy tax on the 
consignment of goods, where such consignment take place in the 
course of inter-State trade or commerce, Article 366 was also 
suitable amended to insert a definition of “tax on the sale or 
purchase of goods” to include transfer for consideration of 
controlled commodities, transfer of property in goods involved in 
the execution of a work contract, delivery of goods on hire-
purchase  or any system of payment by installments etc.  
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So, the Union government has strengthened its taxation side, 
under amendments of the Constitution. But no same efforts have 
been made to widen the taxation resources of the State List. Apart 
from that Union has kept more elastic and buoyant resources of 
taxation in the Union List compare to State List’s taxation 
resources. 
The study reveals that by action and by non-action 
Parliament has affected adversely States interests in divisible pool 
and also revenues meant for exclusive State purposes. It substituted 
income tax on the income of corporations by corporation tax and 
thereby reduced the share of the States in the divisible pool. 
Similarly by substituting sales tax on certain items by additional 
excise duties and by limiting the rate of additional excise duties to 
the rate of Central sales tax, it caused considerable loss to States’ 
revenue. And there has been a persistent attempts has been made 
by the Union to substitute more and more items of sales tax by 
additional duties of excise. It appears that in this area Parliament 
and Central Government have paid very little attention to the 
States’ revenue requirement and have been guided mainly by the 
pleas of the traders. The autonomy of the States in financial 
matters has been also eroded by the Constitution (Amendment) 
Act, 1956, where by Constitution was amended so as to give power 
to the Parliament to tax inter-State sales and limit the powers of the 
States to tax even intra-State sales in respect of goods declared by 
Parliament of special importance in inter-State trade. The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Union of India v/s H. S. Dhilon9, upholding the 
validity of wealth tax calculated on the basis of net wealth 
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inclusive of agricultural land, even though Entry 86 of the Union 
List excludes agricultural land from capital value of assets, may 
give the impression that the Court was strengthening the Union 
power at the expense of the States. 
The word “income” of the phrase “Taxes on income other 
than agricultural income” of Entry 82, List I, Sche.7 though seems 
to be simple and expressive one, its real character and nature is 
hidden and inclusive. The ambit of the word  “income” accruing in 
Entry 82, includes the definition of “income” not only includes the 
capital gains, salary, income from profession, trade or business, i.e. 
what one gets from other’s or what one earns by exploiting his 
property, but it would also includes the following incomes derived 
through different sources. 
1. The income tax, on the gross receipts of certain category of 
hotels. 
2. The prize money received by the participant in a Motor 
Rally is also considerable as an income. 
3. De-reorganization of partial portion of HUF property in 
certain cases for the purpose of levy and collection of 
income tax. 
4. The definition of ‘income’ also includes that which one 
saved by using one’s own property, thus the annual rent 
value of assessee’s house, which was in his own use was 
also taken into consideration in assessment of income tax. 
5. Tax on income from betting and gambling also falls under 
Entry 82 of List I, though the State Legislature have got the 
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power to impose tax on betting and gambling under Entries 
34 and 62 respectively of the State List. 
6. The power of borrowing money by the Central Government 
under annuity deposit scheme from the tax payers in higher 
income group at the rules prescribed, was too considered 
power conferred by Entry 82 in List I  
7. The tax on receipt of pension, or on the income from 
investments was also considered as in truth and substance a 
tax on income.  
8. The ambit of the income tax was extended to cover the loan 
received by a member of a controlled company as dividend 
to prevent evasion of tax  
9. As the meaning of expression ‘agriculture’ and ‘agricultural’ 
purposes, which were not defined in the Income Tax Act, 
1922, the Court favoured the Union, under demarcation that 
the areas of the operation of union and State taxation with 
respect to forestry by maintaining a distinction between 
products, which grew wild on the land or were of 
spontaneous growth and did not involve any human skill or 
labour on the land were eligible to be consider as non-
agricultural products. 
10. Again in favour of Union taxing power, the meaning of 
agricultural income was not only ascertained from its 
definition given in Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, but rules 24 
made there under Section 59 were added to find out the 
exact meaning of agricultural income. So on the basis of this 
theory, the income derived from Tea plantation process was 
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divided in to two parts, i.e. 40% of the income derived from 
tea plantation was treated as non- agricultural taxable under 
the Income-tax Act. 
 So from the above stated facts, it is very clear and 
significant that the definition of the word ‘income’ has been 
widened more than it should be. Moreover, the Supreme Court 
excluded forestry from agricultural operation and has cleverly 
converted the 40% of the agricultural product of tea plantation in 
to non- agricultural product, under relevant provisions of Income-
tax Act. The research scholar personally believes that the word  
“income” should not be treated so flexible, that it could encroach 
the tax field of State, i.e. tax on agricultural income. The Union 
Government should not deprive the States’ obligatory right to tax 
on agricultural income under Entry 46 of List II. 
 The scholar thinks that, the definition of agricultural 
products, should be widen to include the products, which grew 
wild on the land, or of spontaneous growth, though they do not 
involve any human skill, or labour on the land. In brief it can be 
said that, income derived from all botanical products of land, 
should be consider as an agricultural income. 
Supreme Court’s trend towards the immunization of Union 
taxation, under Entry 82 of List I, is not healthy and the present 
scholar believes that it is against the spirit of democracy. In 
absence of exact strict definition of words “income ” and 
“agricultural income”, the Court is free to consider the various 
meanings of the said terms. So it is necessary that the legal 
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definitions of these terms should be construed in the spirit and 
values of democratic principles, of our Indian Constitution. 
Taxation of agricultural income is a sensitive matter. The 
Union and the State Governments in connection with the levy of 
such tax have highlighted many problems. Nonetheless, in view of 
its potential, the question of raising resources from this Entry 46 of 
List II, by forgoing political consensus and the modalities of 
levying tax and collection of proceeds, etc., would required an in-
depth and comprehensive consideration in the National Economic 
and Development Council. The present scholar believes that some 
industrialists and rich farmers who are industrialist and traders etc 
etc. use this the exemption of agriculture tax in some States, as a 
tax evasion instrument. 
The broad concept and wider meaning of the phrase of Entry 
86 of List I given in the case of Sudhirchandra Nawan v/s wealth 
tax Officer10, is also against values of democracy of the 
Constitution, as it deprives States’ basic, fundamental rights to 
levy tax under Entry 49 of List II. In reality, the Entry 86 should be 
transferred to State List, to complete the meaning and title of Entry 
49; tax on lands and buildings. It is very simple fact that assets 
always stand on earth-land, whether it is in a form of a building, 
factory, office or any concrete structure, all need basement of 
earth-land, whatever lands, or buildings exist in a particular State, 
they are the real properties of that land. So the basic right to levy 
taxes on capital value of those assets should be transferred in 
favour of the States. 
The Entry 84 of List- I speaks for: - 
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Duties of excise on tobacco and other goods manufactured 
or produced in India should be limited, by transferring the clause 
of the power to levy excise duties on medicinal and toilet 
preparation containing alcohol or any substances opium, Indian 
hemp and other narcotic drugs and narcotics to the State List I, in 
respect to Entry 51. The present scholar believes that to hamonised 
the taxing power of the State, the Entry 51 of List II should be 
altered so as to empower the States to levy excise duties on 
medicinal and toilet preparation containing alcohol etc. etc. Such 
transfer will harmonize the State’s power to levy excise duties, 
under entry 51 of the State List. 
Same way, Act & enactments, made under the Entry 54 of 
List- I Regulation of Mines and Mineral Development, denudes the 
right of the legislature to levy tax on mineral rights under 50 of 
List II.  In case of Saurashtra Cement & Chemical Industries and 
another etc. v/s Union of India11, the same Court reversed the 
earlier decision of Gujarat High Court in latter period. The present 
scholar personally believes that former decision, that State 
Legislature has power to levy taxes on mineral rights was 
absolutely correct, but latter decision, that denudes the said right is 
no way in the spirit of the Constitution. Why judiciary’s action 
attitudes are in favour of Centre?  No way it is proper to curtail 
down the State’s legal obligatory rights provided under 
Constitution, one might be led to infer that the Court have 
attempted to further centralize a system which is already over-
centralized, in other words, the highest Court of land has further 
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strengthened an already strong Centre at expense of the States 
autonomy. 
Judiciary is a noble constructive organ of the Constitution. 
Judiciary has to act in such a manner, that keeping with balance 
with future and present need, the real spirit and intent of founding 
fathers of the Constitution be saved under democratic character of 
our Constitution. Judiciary is a Light House, whose primary duty is 
to save sovereignty of a State, by giving proper guidance and 
verdict through its valuable decisions. And now duty has been cast 
upon the Parliament to give honors to the verdict of Judiciary.     
The Present scholar believes that the principle of 
independence revenue resources and their adequacy to meet the 
district responsibilities of the Union and the States should be 
consider the first and foremost principle in allocation of revenue 
resources between Centre and States. In older federations of United 
States, Canada and Australia, the financial resources to the units 
were allocated in proportion to their governmental responsibilities, 
a trend towards centralisation is discernible in these countries. The 
federal governments have steadily increased their powers at the 
expense of States. There have been many contributory factors for 
such increase. First, same of the ever-growing and elastic sources 
of revenue like custom and excise duties have been allotted to the 
national governments and the units have been left with 
comparatively inelastic resources like agricultural income, taxes on 
land and building etc., Secondly, effective exploitation of financial 
resources granted to central government has also resulted into 
augmenting their financial position. Thirdly, politico-economic 
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trends of the twentieth century have also helped the centralisation 
process. The Article 248 of the Constitution exclusively empower 
the Parliament to make any law with respect to any matter and 
enumerated in the Concurrent List or State, and such power shall 
include the power of making any law imposing a tax not 
mentioned in either of those Lists; and Entry 97 of Union List says, 
“Any other matter not enumerated in List II or List III including 
any tax not mentioned in either of those Lists.” The present scholar 
believes that Article 248 gives the sovereign power to the Union to 
legislate to strengthen the centralization power. 
The expression ‘residuary power’ refers to those powers, 
which are not allocated either to the federal legislature or to the 
units. It carries the idea of non-descript i.e. powers which were not 
in contemplation of the framers of the Constitution. Any scheme of 
the distribution of powers has to leave room for unforeseen 
eventualities. Looking to different federal Constitutions, regard to 
the allocation of residuary powers. In the United States of America 
and in Commonwealth of Australia residuary powers remain with 
the States, in Canada they have been allocated to the Dominion 
Government. Under the Government of India Act, 1935, residuary 
power was allocated neither to the Centre nor to the Provinces; it 
was given to the Governor General who, in the exercise of his 
discretion, was to allocate the same to the Centre or to the 
Provinces, as the circumstances might require from time to time. 
The controversy about the residuary power at the time of 
enactment of the Government of India Act, 1935 and shift in the 
decision of the Constituent Assembly of India about the allocation 
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of residuary power after the partition of the country would indicate 
that the grant of residuary power to the Centre or the States reflects 
the intention of the Constitution-makers about the nature of federal 
set-up the Constitution proposes to establish (the strong center). 
Thus, Professor K.C. Wheare observes, “ Where the residue of the 
power is to rest is an important question in framing federal 
government. It may affect the whole balance of power in a 
federation”. The present scholar suggest to balance the financial 
economy and to eradicate the fiscal dependency of States the Entry 
97 of List-I should be transfer to State List to make State 
financially autonomous. 
We have seen in earlier chapters that, Courts have often 
found it necessary to take recourse to residuary power to sustain 
parliamentary legislation, whereas the Courts were expected to 
take recourse to residuary power as a last resort. The principle 
behind is, that all the items in all lists, including the Union List, 
have to be given broad construction so as to avoid resort to 
residuary power. But when legislation is sustained as an exercise 
of residuary power and not under one of the items enumerated in 
the Union List or even Concurrent List the debate is largely 
academic because, State interests are not adversely affected. 
However, when giving restrictive interpretation to State powers 
enlarges the scope of residuary power the decision assumes 
importance and become indicative of the judicial attitude on 
Center-State relations. It has already been pointed out that judicial 
attitude plays a major role in the area. In general, the State List 
items are to be harmonized with the Union and Concurrent List 
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items and, if necessary, their scope may be delimited. But in 
relation to residuary powers, items of each List including those of 
State List are to be given precedence. 
In case of Federation of Hotel & Restaurant v/s Union of 
India12, the Supreme Court observed that, “The Expenditure Tax 
Act enacted by Parliament is essentially a tax on expenditure and 
not on luxuries or sale of goods falling with State power, under 
Entry 62 & 54 of State List respectively. Here the taxation States 
powers were negativated and resort to residuary power was taken 
to sustain the Parliamentary legislation “Expenditure Tax Act”. 
Thus, Residuary power is the Brahmashtra for Union Government, 
which gives power to levy of taxes on such entry, even if, it has not 
enumerated in the Union List.  
Now the Courts will have to play their role to keep the 
political process going in the desired direction of making the will 
of the people effective. The Courts can expose the ills of political 
process but they cannot work as substitutes for the political 
process. Their role is mainly that of naysayer and at best they can 
police the boundaries drawn in the Constitution.  
In the area of financial relations there is much that the 
Courts can do. With a view to correct the fiscal imbalance between 
the Union and the States, the Courts can make the financial 
distribution between the Union and the States more effective. 
Though the Courts cannot coerce the Parliament to fulfill the 
constitutional obligations, but they can ask the Central 
Government to compensate the States for loss suffered by them 
due to non-taping of revenue resources enumerated in Article 269 
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and the amount of compensation may be ascertained by keeping 
into account many factors including the recommendations of the 
Finance Commissions. So may be done with respect to increasing 
surcharge on income tax. Secondly, the Courts can treat 
reclassification of tax on income of companies as corporation tax 
as a colorable exercise of power and can restrain the Parliament 
from substituting sales tax by additional excise duties. 
Lastly, the present scholar believes, that though the Courts 
cannot enforce the recommendations of the Finance Commissions 
as binding, but they can insist upon the fact that in case the Centre 
refuses to accept the recommendation of the Commission, it must 
adduce convincing reasons.  
The above suggestions may look too bold and some may 
even find them unworkable within the present framework. Here it 
is rime of basic structure, which our Courts have been able to 
evolve to save the Constitution from total annihilation.        
The last 50 years working of Indian Constitution has 
revealed the facts, that States have became more and more 
dependent on Centre, to perform their constitutional liabilities, due 
to the allotment of inadequate resources of revenues in the State 
List. The present scholar think that the pattern of fiscal or taxing 
heads under Union List and State List of Schedule Seventh of the 
Constitution is need to be reviewed as utmost need of the nation.  
The pattern of fiscal federalism under Indian Constitution 
shows that in India, the Central Government has the expensive 
source of revenue, while the State Governments are burdened with 
expensive social services. This naturally involves a scheme of 
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transfer of resources from the Centre to the States. The strength of 
the Union lies in strength of the individual States that there is 
progress in all the States and that regional disparities are included 
to the maximum extent possible, but in practice this has never been 
found possible in any federal Constitution. There is a measure of 
inter dependence between the Central and State Governments 
which is most pronounced in federations with a developing 
economy under a scheme of national planning. 
The Centre has been providing financial assistances to the 
States,  
(a) through the recommendations of Finance Commission under 
the relative provision of the Indian Constitution. These 
statutory transfers may be termed as federal transfers and 
also provide financial assistance to the States,  
(b) through the agency of Panning Commission, a non-statutory 
agency, these transfers may be termed as plan transfers.  
(c) The financial assistances are also given by the Union 
ministries, especially finance ministry under the request of 
States to comply their needs loan assistance come, under the 
purview of only Planning Commission and Union 
ministries.  
 The loans do not come under purview of resources transfers 
recommended by the Finance Commission, even though the Union 
Government has sought their advice to minimize the growing 
indebtedness of the States under Article 280 (d) of the Constitution 
“any other matter referred to the Commission by the president in 
the interest of sound finance”. Accordingly, the Finance 
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Commission took specific aspects of loan referred them for study 
but did not affect a through overall investigation. The assistance 
from ministries consists of both conditional grants and conditional 
as well as unconditional loans. 
The present scholar has observed from the above stated 
financial provisions that India has the distinction of being a 
country with characters, a federal structure and planned economy. 
So it has two separate organizations to deal with those, namely, (1) 
Finance Commission and (2) Planning Commission. 
 The non-tax resources of the Union Government include: – 
1. Borrowing, both internal and external under Article 292   
of the Constitution. 
2. Income from various government undertakings and 
monopolies. These include income from currency and 
mint, Reserve Bank of India, railways, posts and 
telegraphs and other commercial and non-commercial 
undertakings. 
3. Income accruing to the Government of India, on account 
of his sovereign rights and performance of functions 
connected with or arising out of these rights, for instance 
income from Government property. 
 The non-tax revenues of the State include: - 
 1. The State governments are authorized to borrow, under  
      Article 293, but only within the country, including loans  
      from the Government of India; 
2.  Income from government undertakings owned fully or  
 partly by the State Government; 
 462  
3.  Income from public property owned by the State Govt;      
 4.  Royalty from mines, forests, treasure-trove, etc ; 
5.  Grants-in-aids from the Central Government; 
  6.  Other grants from the Central Government. 
In short, it can be said that all the taxes and duties levied by 
the Union do not form the part of consolidated fund of India but 
many of these taxes and duties are distributed amongst the States 
and form part of the consolidated fund of the State. Even those 
taxes and duties, which constitute the consolidated fund of India, 
may be used for the purpose of supplementing the revenues of 
States in accordance with their needs. Those sources of revenue 
allocated to the State may not be sufficient for their purposes and 
that the Government of India would have to subsidies their welfare 
activities. The Union and States together from one organic whole 
for the purposes of utilization of the resources of territories of 
India as a whole. “Really we allocate wealth to the States for the 
eradication of their poverty and not for nursing it”- A. M. Khusaro, 
Chairman of Eleventh Finance Commission. 
The Constitution (Eightieth Amendment) Act, 2000 has 
altered the pattern of sharing of Central taxes between the Centre 
and the States in a fundamental way. Prior to this amendment, 
taxes on income other than agricultural income and Union duties of 
excise were shared with States under Articles 270 and 272 
respectively. The Eightieth Amendment Act has substituted a new 
article for Article 270 and omitted the old article 272. The 
provisions of new Amended article has already been noted in 
earlier chapter of this thesis. 
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The main changes brought about by this amendment are as 
follows: - 
(a) All Central taxes, duties, except those referred in articles 
268 and 269 respectively, surcharges, and cesses, are to 
be shared between the Centre and the States. 
(b) Only States in which these taxes and duties are ‘leviable 
in that year’ are entitled to get a share in these taxes and 
duties. 
(c) A percentage of “net proceeds” of these taxes and duties 
as may be prescribed by the President by order after 
considering the recommendations of the Finance 
Commission is to be shared by States. 
(d) The percentage of “net proceeds” of these taxes and 
duties, which is assigned to the States in any financial 
year, shall not form part of the Consolidated Fund of 
India. 
(e) The article 270(2) which referred to taxes on income 
prior to the amendment contained the following 
provision: - 
“Such percentage as may be described, of the net 
proceeds in any financial year of any such tax, except 
in so far as those proceeds represent proceeds 
attributable to Union Territories or to taxes payable in 
respect of Union emoluments, shall not form part of 
the Consolidated Fund of India”. 
(f) The recommendations of the Tenth Finance Commission 
regarding sharing of “gross proceeds” was also not 
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accepted in the new Amendment Act and the words “the 
share of net proceeds” was prescribed in order to 
maintain consistency between articles 270, 279 and 280. 
The Constitution (Eightieth Amendment) Act has come into 
force. A consequence of this change is that the net proceeds of the 
additional excise duties levied under the Additional Excise Duties 
(Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957, cannot be passed on to 
the States as Article 272 of the Constitution has been deleted. 
These are now part of the tax revenue receipts of the Central 
Government and are sharable with the States. The Eleventh 
Finance Commission the aggregate share of the State in all Union 
taxes and duties would be 29.5 per cent. The Eleventh Finance 
Commission further recommended that 1.5 per cent of all sharable 
Union taxes and duties would be allocated to the States separately, 
and if any State levied and collected the sales tax on sugar, textiles 
and tobacco, would not be entitled to any share from this 1.5 per 
cent. 
Criteria and Relative weights for Determining inter se share 
of States by Eleventh Finance Commission were as follow: - 
 
Criterion       RelativeWeight(percent)  
(1) Population    10.0 % 
(2) Income (Distance Method)  62.5 % 
(3) Area      7.5 % 
(4) Index infrastructure    7.5 % 
(5) Tax effort     5.0 % 
(6) Fiscal Discipline     7.5 % 
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The Finance Commission is the Constitutional body of an 
autonomous status to which the States represent their case for their 
just and fair share of resources. From the collective point of view, 
the States are interested in more vertical justice in the form of 
greater devolution from the Centre. Individual States are keen on 
greater horizontal justice in the inter-se allocation of the total 
transfer among the States. Broadly, two criteria governed the inter-
State allocation; namely, needs of the States measured in terms of 
backwardness and contribution. Over the years, contribution has 
been entirely pushed to the background giving predominance to the 
needs alone. This has worked as a terrible distinctive to the States 
that are capable of making efforts to support and sustain greater 
collection of tax revenue swelling the kitty for sharing. 
 Special Note for Gujarat: 
There is a strong feeling prevailing in Gujarat that due to 
need based criteria adopted by the past Finance Commissions 
while pushing back the factor of contribution, this State has 
suffered badly in horizontal sharing of the resources. 
Notwithstanding often-repeated justification of such a policy 
regime in terms of positive discrimination to reduce the regional 
disparities, it is working as a distinctive in promoting the growth.  
Gujarat, with its forward looking industrial and other 
economic policies, has succeeded in attracting the largest share of 
flow of investment after the liberalization process was set in 
motion and would naturally contribute to the federal Government 
in proportionate manner. If this mammoth effort put in by the State 
goes unnoticed and unrecognized, it will not only work as a 
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distinctive to the State, but also in the long run undermine the 
federal tax revenue prospects. It is, therefore, necessary that the 
Twelth Finance Commission should discards shibboleths which 
have so far governed the thinking in this regard and give some 
reward to the States on the basis of the contributions made by them 
to the National exchequer. It is accepted by all that the present 
design of horizontal sharing has not brought about greater fiscal 
discipline among the States nor does this method take into account 
the impact on equity and efficiency. 
The basic challenge faced by the Gujarat State is essential 
that of deepening and widening the quality of physical and social 
infrastructure for sustaining all round economic growth and human 
development. In this, special focus needs to be given to the 
growing urbanization and urban poverty. To meet these challenges 
the State would have to make large investment in physical and 
social infrastructure. At the same, it has to restructure and 
modernize its policies and administrative machinery to strengthen 
the infrastructure and institutions that would foster private 
investment. Though the State has started in the right earnest in this 
direction, there is yet a long way to go. 
In estimating the quantum of inter-se distribution among the 
States, population and area of the State would be given due weight 
because they are the natural parameters deserving consideration in 
inter-se comparison.  The problems of urbanization particularly the 
slums need to be attended on a high priority basis to mitigate the 
adverse impact of haphazard growth of the cities and make them 
safer for all. Cities act as the focal points of growth and due to 
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push and pull factors; the problems of rural area get transmitted to 
them. Gujarat is experiencing fast urbanization and it is now 
placed as No.2 in the degree of urbanization. 30 to 40 per cent of 
the urban populations are living in shanties and slums. Lack of 
proper planning and a long-term vision about orderly development 
will only worsen the situation. This needs to be one of the 
important planks in determining the sharing among the States, so 
as to give an impetus to priorities lacking of urban poverty in all its 
manifestations. 
Gujarat State preferred the following weightage to determine 
the horizontal sharing, before 11th Finance Commission,   
(1) Population: 50 % weight with 10 % earmarked  
     for tribal population.   
(2) Area: 10 % 
(3) Population below poverty line: 10% 
(4) Fiscal discipline including tax efforts: 20%  
(5) Contribution to Central taxes: 10% 
 Through the Constitution in 1950, India adopted a federal 
system of finance with all honesty, sincerity and dedication. The 
experience of the last fifty years has brought into focus some 
points, which ask for greater fiscal autonomy States. All the 
principles of federal finance have been in corporated in our system 
of devolution of fiscal resources between Centre and States. But 
both the units have failed to observe fiscal discipline and control 
leading to the present crisis of fiscal imbalance of grave 
dimension.  
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 To accelerate the pace of economic development and to 
meet the situation of better distribution of national income by 
gearing the strategy of development directly to the;  
(a) problems of unemployment and poverty; 
(b) removal of disparities in regions and between the stronger 
and weaker sections of the society in the country; and,  
(c) to control inflationary pressures and bring commodities 
within reach of common man, a strong federal mosaic is 
needed. 
 Keeping the view of the present disturbing trends in Union-
State relations one hand and proper utilization of resources of the 
nation as a whole on the other, the search of objectivity in the 
Union-State financial relations now becomes more important. 
 No sound Government is possible without sound finance. 
Lack of financial resources and autonomy make the States prisoner 
of indecision. A sense of indifference, aptly and non-involvement 
amongst the States has been created. They have become mostly 
spending agencies without any initiative, because for all activities 
they are mostly dependent on Central Government’s decision. 
They have simply become a sleeping partner in the development 
process of the country, because they are devoid of taking 
independent decisions of their own choice. 
 In a desperate bid, the State Governments involve them 
selves in such schemes which are capital- intensive, having long 
gestation period and slow-yielding This is due to the transference 
system-mainly of Planning Commission- which is based on 
matching share. For this State Governments divert their revenue 
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surpluses to capital accounts. This results in depriving the 
measures for creating basic-intra-structure most suited to the needs 
of the States. Thus, the present system of resources transference is 
adversely affecting fiscal autonomy, democratic set-up, and 
administrative efficiency of the State governments. The cry of 
financial indiscipline and non-productive activities resulting 
inflationary tendency in the economy is natural.  
 A reordering of the political, financial and economic 
relations between the Centre and State is crucial for the 
preservation of the unity and integrity of the country. Since thin 
reordering should accelerate the pace of economic development 
and change the fundament disequilibrium in their relationship 
between the Centre and the States, the Finance Commissions 
should recommend the basic change in the Constitution. 
 In the meantime, since these facts call for appropriate 
‘Corrective Measures’ to bring about better correspondence 
between resources and responsibilities, the Finance Commissions 
should, therefore, have to take rational and broad-based view of the 
transfer of resources. It should not be confined only to non-plan 
gap filling body taking into consideration only revenue accounts, 
but adopt the “total Budgetary Needs” criterion in recommending 
the transfer of resources.    
8.1 Suggestions 
  The legal study of federal State financial in India, with 
special reference to the Sate of Gujarat, bonafidly concludes, that 
the last more than half a century working of the unitary natured 
system of the Indian Constitution has resulted in two steps forward 
 470  
in direction of co operative federalism, and one step backward 
towards its original unitary system. Such contradictory movements 
of the Constitution need to be rectified. Followings are few 
remedial and corrective measures have suggested bringing the 
harmony in movement, towards co-operative federalism. 
1) The honest and sincere efforts and endeavors has to be made 
by the Union Government to justify equal and equitable 
status of the three organs of the Constitution namely, 
Legislative, Executive and Judiciary regarding their working 
in their respective spheres. 
2) The honest efforts should be made to consider the law of the 
land is the supreme, than anything. 
3) The undesired centralize fiscal power of union should be 
decentralized, in such a manner, that the State get benefited 
under their equity right of fiscal autonomy, in aim of 
achieving the goal of co-operative federalism. 
4) The present scholar bonafidely believes that in Vertical and 
Horizontal distribution of revenue resources, the Finance 
Commissions have not properly followed the spirit and 
principles of Article 14 of the Constitution, in true sense. 
Equity and Equality stands together in the Constitution. In 
determining the inter se share of the States, the equality 
should stands for poor, backward and dense populated 
States, while equity should stand in favour of developed 
States. Therefore, Finance Commission is advised to take a 
rational and broad base view for transfer of resources among 
the States.     
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5) An amendment should be made in the Article 263 of the 
Constitution to introduce a constitutional body named 
Democratic Disciplinary Body, which is required to be 
constituted, to monitor the fiscal discipline, between Centre 
and States, in respect to their federal financial relationship.  
6) An amendment should be made in the Constitution to define 
the ambit and scope of the word “income” under Entry 82, 
List I of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. In the interest 
of social and economic justice the inclusive nature of word 
“income” has to be restricted, and it should be narrow down 
in its present nature to the reasonable extent. 
7) The ambit and scope of the phrase “Agricultural income” is 
required to be get expanded, so that the income derived from 
forestry, plantation or from any botanical products of the 
land, wholly or totally get recognized as an “agricultural 
income” under Entry 46 of List II of Seventh Schedule of 
the Constitution. The required amendment should be made 
to include new concept and definition of the word 
“agriculture income”, at Entry 46 of List II. 
8) An amendment should be made in the Constitution, so that 
the Entry 84 of List I, which is meant for, the power to levy 
excise duties on medicinal and toilet preparations containing 
alcohol etc., might get transferred to State List II of the 
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.  
9) An amendment should be made in the Constitution, so that 
the Entry 51 of List II, be get altered, to empower the States 
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to levy excise duties on medicinal and toilet preparations 
containing alcohol etc. to raise their revenues. 
10) The “Agricultural tax “ being a politically sensitive issue, an 
appropriate amendment should be made in the Constitution, 
so that the right of levy and collection of agricultural income 
tax” under Entry 46 of List II get vested in the Central 
Government for the purpose of assigning it to the States. 
11) An amendment should be made in the Constitution for the 
transfer of the Entry 86 of the Union List to the States List 
Entry 49 to strengthen the power of State taxation in respect 
to taxes on lands and buildings. 
12) An amendment should be made in the Constitution, so as the 
Entry 97 of List I “Residuary Power” get transferred in to 
the State List II, Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, to 
strengthen the States fiscal power and fiscal autonomy. 
13) An amendment should be made in the Constitution, so that 
in the new era of globalization, the 50% (fifty per cent) of 
the gross proceeds of corporation tax get enable to brought 
into the “divisible pool” for the purpose of its distribution 
among the States, on the basis of contribution factor, to do 
equity towards the developing States. 
14) An amendment should be made in the Constitution, for an 
insertion of a new entry at State List II for making of laws 
relating to inquiries and statistics for the purpose of the any 
matters in the State List. 
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15) Supremacy of Parliamentary character Constitution is 
required to be revised and reviewed to change its character 
from strong unitary to bear a character of ideal federalism.   
16) Judiciary should be looked upon as a guard and guide of the 
Indian Constitution. 
17) In the matter of controversy of any judicial decision, in 
respect to the challenge to the competency of taxing 
authority, a public opinion should be cultivated, before 
making any hasty amendment in the Constitution, to set side 
or to nullify the same judicial decision. 
18) The Courts will have to play their role in constructive nature 
to keep the political process going in the desired direction of 
making the will of the people effective. 
19) By taking a few innovative and bold decisions there is much 
that judicial institution, can perform and prevent further 
deterioration in the crisis-ridden atmosphere of Centre-State 
relations. 
20) In the area of financial relations there is much that Court can 
do. With a view to correct the fiscal imbalance between the 
Union and the States, the Courts can make the financial 
distribution between the Union and the States more 
effective. An appropriate amendment should be made to 
enable the judiciary to play the constructive role to give 
proper guideline in the matter of distribution of devolution 
of revenue under the relevant provisions of the Constitution.  
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21) It is suggested that the financial resources, other than tax 
revenues of Union, are also to be distributed between the 
Centre and the States. 
22) It is suggested that the ‘Special Federal Fund’ for ensuring 
faster development in economically under developed areas 
relative to other developed areas of the country, as provided 
for, in the Yugeslav Constitution should be established in 
India. 
23) The Finance Commission should consider and recognized 
the States sincere and honest efforts towards the 
implementation of “Directive Principles” of Chapter IV of 
the Constitution in their State policy. Hence at the time of 
determination of grants-in aid, the Commission should assist 
the States to implement the directive principle policy.  
24) It is also suggested that the more Central taxes such as 
corporation tax, customs duty, and surcharge on Income Tax 
etc. should be brought into the ‘sharable pool’ of devolution 
of resources.   
25) It is specifically suggested that the recognisation of the 
State’s commitment to prohibition policy and compensation 
for loss of revenue should be taken in account, in granting 
special compensation award or grants-in-aid in favour of 
States.  
26) The additional resources should be provided to the State to 
strengthen the local body like Panchayati Raj Institution.   
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27) The Constitution should be suitably amended to add the 
subject of taxation of “advertisements broadcast by radio or 
television to the present Entry 92, List I and Art.269 (1) (f). 
28) It is also suggested that inclusion of the following Union 
taxes would widen the base of devolution of revenues to the 
States;  
- Corporation tax; 
- Customs and export duties; and 
- Tax on the capital value of the assets. 
- The above said revenues should be brought, into the 
divisible pool, so as to distribute them between the 
Centre and the States. 
29) It is suggested that in respect to the Loans and indebtedness 
of States, a committee of export might be set up to consider 
the entire issue relating to the indebtedness of States. The 
Committee to be set up might, also consider the desirability 
of constituting an authority analogous to the Australian Loan 
council or forming development bank on the lines of World 
Bank to deal with applications made to the Centre by States 
for loans. 
30) A change should be made under the appropriate amendment 
of Article 368, in the process of amendment, that a period of 
not less than six months should be guaranteed under the 
Constitution, between the initial and final passage of the 
Bill, so as to ensure a proper adequate discussion in the 
country by the people at large. 
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31) An amendment should be made in the Article 280 of the 
Constitution to make the Finance Commission as a 
permanent structural statutory body, in respect to the 
persistent demand of States to set up a permanent Finance 
Commission. The setting up of a permanent Finance 
Commission instead of one constituted in five years to 
reduce the scope for the Central Government to make 
discretionary transfer in an ad hoc manner to the States, to 
start on clean State, collect material required for its work 
from the State Governments and the Central Government 
and to review the various aspects of the finance of the 
Centre and the States Governments. 
32) It is suggested that the scope of the Finance Commission 
should be enlarged considerably, since it is a statutory body. 
This would reduce the interference of the Centre in the 
financial management of the States and the arbitrariness of 
discretionary grants that accompanies such interference.  
33) It is not required that Sharing of revenues under Article 270 
should be operated under the principles, which are relevant 
for Article 275. The contribution factor should be one of the 
major guiding principles under Article 270, as it was before 
the new amendment, the 80th Amendment Act, 2000 of the 
Constitution. The same practice should be restored, in place 
of present adopted criteria for the distribution of revenue. 
34) It is also suggested that the States should be allowed to re-
impose sales tax on, Machine made fabrics, sugar and 
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tobacco, items without any restriction of upper limit of tax 
rate. 
35) It is required that the practice of separate formula for 
devolution of different taxes should be reinstated, as the 
most of them represent taxes on economic activities which 
are of local origin and had been in Union List only with a 
view to maintain consistency across the States as they are 
taxes on mobile factors of production. 
36) It is necessary that the projection of revenue and expenditure 
should be realistic in nature. 
37) It is suggested that devolution of taxes should be made on 
gross proceeds and not on the net proceeds. In the fiscal 
interest of the States, the 40% of the Central receipts to be 
devolved to the States on the basis of formula prescribed by 
the Finance Commission. 
38) It is suggested that compensatory payment of tax on railway 
fares should be revived and distributed amongst the States 
on the basis of contribution. 
39) The Finance Commission should take into account the trend 
rate and there should be no discrimination by artificial 
division of States and imputing unrealistic revenue growth 
rates for so called developed States. 
40) It is suggested that being the State of Gujarat highly prone to 
the natural calamities therefore the special considerations in 
fixing the limit of CRF for the State should be rationalize 
under the disbursal methodology of NCCF. 
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41) It is suggested that the State of Gujarat has been 
implementing the directive principle of the Constitution, 
through the complete prohibition of liquor and other 
intoxicating drinks since 1960, as a result of this 
implementation of State policy it incurred and estimated 
annual loss of rupees 1025 crores of excise revenue. Hence 
to justify the State policy hundred percent of this loss should 
be given in form of Grants-in-Aid. 
42) The present inflexibility of shared taxes should be removed 
by making the base as broad as can be. 
43) In respect to the determination of Grants-in-aid, the 
approach of the Finance and Planning Commissions should 
be the aim that,(1) broad planning priorities are observed; 
(2) these priorities are adopted to the States’ individual 
needs;(3) the States are given proper incentives to develop 
and tap their resources;(4) that all the resources are 
employed with the maximum economy and efficiency; and 
(5) States are encouraged to contribute in creating infra-
structure to the planning process. 
44) It is suggested that service tax should remain sharable during 
the transition period of implementation of VAT. 
45) It is suggested that criteria for distribution of revenues, for 
all taxes should be 30 per cent should be distributed on 
contribution basis, while for 55 per cent, the formula may 
include the following indicators, 
- Population 
- Inverse of per capita Private Household Consumption 
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- Area 
- Urbanisation 
- Poverty 
46) Balance 15 per cent of the tax, to be provided as incentive to 
the States on the basis of, 
- Better own tax efforts, 
- Better non-tax efforts  
- Better fiscal discipline 
- Decadal grow rate achieved in the nominal GSDP in 
i. immediate past decade. 
47) It is also suggested that incentive grant for local self 
Government should be granted on the basis of indicators 
such as percentage of bodies having elected wing, 
percentage of expenditure incurred by the local bodies to the 
total State revenue receipt, per capita tax and non-tax 
revenue of the local bodies. 
48) It is suggested that, the Finance Commission should fully 
compensate the loss of revenue due to abolition of octroi, 
fully compensate for the electricity charges towards the 
drinking water scheme of the village panchayats and 
continue with the ad hoc grant provided by former FC, 11th 
FC, for modernization of the village panchayats and use of 
information technology to the State of Gujarat. 
49) It is suggested that in the interest of humanity and social 
justice that considering the fact that 2001, Bhuj earthquake, 
an accepted national calamity, the loan worth of Rs.5478 
crore, taken by State of Gujarat from ADB and world Bank 
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should be converted into the special problem grant on 
ground of equity by the Union Government. 
50) It is suggested that Ceiling to be fixed for CRF of a State on 
the basis of average actual expenditure in the last five years 
towards calamity relief.  
51) It is suggested that being the State of Gujarat a highly prone 
to the natural calamities, the special considerations should 
be given to the said facts, while fixing the limit of CRF for 
the State of Gujarat, to rationalize the disbursal methodology 
under NCCF. 
52) It is also suggested, as State of Gujarat is implementing the 
directive principles laid down in the Constitution, through 
complete prohibition of liquor and other intoxicating drinks 
since, its inception in 1960, and it has suffered annually of 
Rs.1025 crores, of excise revenues. Union should assist the 
State of Gujarat, by providing 100 per cent of this loss in 
form of Grant-in-Aid. 
53) It is suggested that, the time has ripen to rethink for the 
imposition and levy of agricultural income tax, in State of 
Gujarat. As State represents its identity as an agricultural 
and an Industrial State, together, the agricultural income tax 
will the serve the purpose to raise the revenue, and to 
decrease the budgetary deficits. 
54) It is also suggested that, as the State of Gujarat is providing 
the suitable platform for the working of different national 
and multi-national companies, the demand for equitable 
share in the proceeds of such company’s income 
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tax/corporation tax would not be understood as an 
unreasonable demand by the Central Government, so the 
State should insist for the amendment in the Constitution, to 
justify its equity demand.     
 
 It is call for immediate corrective measures the Government 
should learn to live within means. The political leaders and 
bureaucrats are expected to set an example of simplicity and 
services to the people. The simple principles of accountability, 
responsibility and transparency must be observed in their fiscal 
behaviour. The Governments are supposed to observe fiscal 
discipline, and control leading to the present crisis of fiscal 
imbalances of grave dimension.    
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
     Answer in terms of “Yes” or “No” 
 
1. Can our Constitution be called as UNITARY in the strict 
sense?  (Yes/No) 
 
2. Do you agree with the fact, for the protection of the 
independence and ensurance of the unity, the Centre should 
be more centralize?  (Yes/No) 
 
3. Do you think, there is a need for decentralization of powers 
and functions in favour of States? (Yes/No) 
 
4. Do you believe in present Country’s situation, the Judiciary 
should be act as a “THIRD HOUSE”? (Yes/No) 
 
5. Do you believe in the system of Parliamentary Supremacy? 
(Yes/No) 
 
6. Do you think, to save the spirit of the Constitution a 
Democratic Disciplinary Body should be constituted? 
(Yes/No) 
 
7. Do you agree that some elastic revenue resources of Union 
should be transferred in the State List? (Yes/No) 
 
8. Do you think, that the States have sufficient fiscal autonomy 
under the present fiscal relationship? (Yes/No) 
 
9. Do you believe that the present federal financial relationship 
between Centre and States is just like a begging system, 
where Centre enjoys the power of Giver and States fall in 
the category of receiver? (Yes/No) 
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10. Do you think, a complete separation of the fiscal relations of 
the Centre and States with abolition of the scheme of 
transfer of resources, should be brought in the Constitution?  
(Yes/No) 
 
11. Do you believe that all States must impose an agricultural 
tax? (Yes/No) 
 
12. Do you think the concept and definition of the word 
“Income” should be define limited?  (Yes/No) 
 
13. Do you think that, corporation tax should be brought in to 
the “divisible pool” of shareable taxes of Union? (Yes/No) 
 
14. Do you think, the statutory body – Finance Commission 
should be a permanent body? (Yes/No) 
 
15. Do you think, for the loss of revenue some compensation 
has to be provided to the State of Gujarat, for its 
commitment to prohibition policy in the interest of legal 
justice? (Yes/No)   
 
